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Abstract: 
The present investigation intends to explore the semantics of some English and Spanish 
prepositions. For the English language, the prepositions to be analyzed are between, among, 
and amid (chapter 4), to (chapter 5), and for (chapter 6). These English prepositions are 
then contrasted with their Spanish equivalents; these are entre (usually equivalent to 
between, among, and amid in chapter 4), a (usually equivalent to English to in chapter 5), 
and para (usually equivalent to for in chapter 6). This contrastive analysis, in turn, might 
shed light on the conceptual differences and similarities that are exhibited by these two 
prepositional sets. The differences and similarities will be spotted by focusing on the 
semantic units that populate the conceptual basis of each preposition. The term conceptual 
basis (Morras 2018; Morras and Barcelona 2019) must be understood as the semantic or 
meaning potential (in the sense of Allwood 2003) that words facilitate access to. The 
semantic units that populate the conceptual basis of each preposition are referred to here as 
(conceptual) parameters (Morras, in press). These are phenomenology-based structures, 
akin to image schemas (Johnson 1987), that constitute the bedrock of word meaning and 
figurative reasoning (Lakoff 1990).  
The methodology used to pin down the parameters for each preposition is based on corpus 
work. Doing a manual search in the concordance section of two databases, the British 
National Corpus (BNC) for the English prepositions, and the Spanish Web 2011 
(esTenTen11, Eu + Am) for the Spanish ones, the present research intends to keep up with 
the spirit of the usage-based approach to language and cognition by analyzing real instances 
of language use. In addition, data drawn from dictionaries (the Cambridge (online) English 
Dictionary (CED) for English, and the Diccionario de la Lengua Española (DLE) for 
Spanish) was analyzed to propose the conceptual parameters that may constitute each 
conceptual basis. 
The cognitivist approach adopted in this research comes from important advances in the 
cognitive sciences (e.g., Allwood 2003; Clark 2003; Rice 1992; Slobin 2003; Talmy 2000) 
that point to the close link between linguistic structure and encyclopedic knowledge 
(Langacker 1987) or conceptual structure. In this line, the investigation reported here 
intends to shed some light on the schematic type of conceptual structure that is accessed via 
closed-class items and its role in embodied simulations. Following Talmy (2000), words 
can be broadly divided into open-class, and closed-class. Open-class words, traditionally 
referred to as content words, offer access points (in the sense of Langacker 1987) to a type 
of conceptual structure that is highly rich. Hence, open-class items such as nouns, verbs, 
and adjectives are thought of as offering wide access (Talmy 2007) to conceptual structure. 
On the contrary, closed-class items, traditionally known as functional words, are claimed 
(e.g., Talmy 2007) to offer narrower access to conceptual structure. In sum, the differences 
between wide and narrow access is reflected in the conceptual richness or schematicity that 
words facilitate access to. It follows that the semantic units that primarily constitute the 
conceptual basis of an open-class item can be associated with what is known as cognitive 
models and frames (Barsalou 1992, 1999), whereas the semantic units that populate the 
conceptual basis of a closed-class item are associated with conceptual parameters. The 
interplay between these two types of word classes gives rise to a cognitive representation 
(in Talmy’s 2000 parlance) where closed-class elements offer a “semantic scaffolding” for 
the rich conceptual material that is accessed via open-class items. 
The idea formulated above goes contrary to the claims of some cognitive linguists 
(especially Evans 2009, 2013), who maintain a sort of strict dichotomy between open and 
closed-class items by claiming that closed-class items, such as prepositions, conjunctions, 
and “particles”, do not offer access to conceptual structure but encode purely linguistic 
content. While I agree with the idea that there must be something that is unique about the 
linguistic system (see Morras, in press), closed-class items do offer access to conceptual 
structure. The difference lies in the type of conceptual structure that is accessed. This is 
precisely the reason why the present research introduces the notion of conceptual 
parameter: Because it captures the schematic conceptual material that constitutes the 
‘semantic scaffolding’ of a linguistic event. This will allow us to appreciate the contribution 
that closed-class elements have in embodied simulations. Following Lawrence Barsalou 
(1999), all concepts are simulators and hence, form part of an embodied simulation. These 
include manners (e.g., clumsily), relations (e.g., between), properties (e.g., blue), among 
others. 
The analysis presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6 provides a view of word meaning as being 
constituted by two important representational levels which are related to what Talmy 
(2007) refers to as the first condition of attending (of the first and second levels of 
isolation). The first level of isolation within the first condition of attending relates to the 
lexical representation level of words. At this level, we can appreciate the meaning potential 
of words that is captured by the notion of conceptual basis, as we shall see in more detail 
later. This conceptual basis must be stored in long-term semantic memory and represents 
the mental units that constitute the mental lexico-grammatical system (using Panther’s 2006 
term) of a person – that is, the semantics of words in complete isolation. On the other hand, 
there is the second level of isolation for linguistic analysis, and this is concerned with what 
Allwood (2003) refers to as meaning determination. Meaning determination has to do with 
the contextual realization of a word. It is only in context that words acquire their (situated) 
semantics: certain semantic attributes within the conceptual basis of a given word get 
activated or highlighted in a situated linguistic event, while others remain backgrounded.  
The analysis of the prepositions selected starts with a thorough description of their spatial 
roots in order to propose their respective conceptual basis and appreciate how parameters 
get activated differently depending on the linguistic contexts that the preposition is 
integrated with. After that, the research presents non-spatial and temporal usages, which 
crucially, are motivated by the spatio-conceptual structure that comes from the conceptual 
basis of the preposition. An important aspect to highlight about this second part of the 
analysis, is that temporal and other non-spatial usages are treated in separate sections. This 
is because the present research assumes that the domain of time exhibits its own structure, 
which can be qualitatively distinguished from the properties of space, as we shall see in 
chapter 2. This type of conceptual structure that is inherently temporal in nature, emerges as 
a result of temporal reference (Evans 2013). Whenever we deal with temporal reference as 
in See you at noon, there must be (schematic) temporal structure involved. This is clearly 
not the case as in an utterance such as Those countries are at war, in which the preposition 
at establishes a (non-spatial) relation between some countries and a state of warfare, rather 
than a relation between an event and its temporal reference. This issue will be further 
developed throughout the investigation. 
To sum up, the approach adopted here intends to shed light on the spatio-conceptual 
structuring of some English and Spanish prepositions and its role in non-spatial and 
temporal usages. It also offers an alternative view for language teaching, in that it sees 
language as flexible and structured at the same time, as opposed to the rigid view of 
language as dictionary-like entries in the mind, and the meaningless character of syntax. 
The usage-based approach to language and cognition assumes word meaning as being 
encyclopedic-like in character, as well as fostering a thorough description of 
phenomenological structures as essential if we seriously want to fully apprehend the area of 
spatial semantics. Some of the implications that this approach may bring to students, 
teachers, and researchers in language teaching are developed in chapter 7, along with 
possible applications of cognitive-linguistic methods in the classroom that can be extracted 
from the analysis presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6. Lastly, the conceptual bases are 
formulated in such a way that can they be psychologically validated through experimental 
methods. A sample (in chapter 7) of some conceptual parameters of between, among, amid, 
and entre, is provided to show this point. 
Finally, the investigation ends with some concluding remarks, among them the importance 
of a thorough understanding and description of the spatial semantics of prepositions to 
approach a more psychologically plausible theory of language and provide adequate 
explanations for non-spatial and temporal usages; the idea that time exhibits its own 
structure and that this is reflected in temporal linguistic constructions; the pedagogical 
implications and applications that the present account might offer; and the psycholinguistic 
experimentation that could be carried out using this approach. 
 
Keywords: conceptual basis, conceptual parameters, trajector, landmark, conceptual 
structure, temporal structure 
 
 
 
 
Resumen: 
La presente investigación pretende explorar la semántica de algunas preposiciones del 
inglés y el español. Las preposiciones inglesas que serán analizadas son between, among, 
amid (capítulo 4), to (capítulo 5), y for (capítulo 6). Estas preposiciones serán seguidamente 
contrastadas con sus equivalentes del español; estos son entre (equivalente usualmente a 
between, among, y amid en el capítulo 4), a (equivalente usualmente al inglés to en el 
capítulo 5), y para (equivalente usualmente a for en el capítulo 6). Dicho análisis 
contrastivo podría arrojar luz sobre las diferencias y similitudes conceptuales que son 
exhibidas por estos dos grupos preposicionales. Estas diferencias y similitudes emergen a 
través de un enfoque en las unidades semánticas que conforman la base conceptual de cada 
preposición. El termino base conceptual (Morras 2018; Morras y Barcelona 2019) debe ser 
entendido como el potencial semántico o de significado (en el sentido de Allwood 2003) al 
que las palabras ofrecen acceso. Las unidades semánticas que conforman la base conceptual 
de cada preposición son entendidas como parámetros conceptuales (Morras, in press). Estos 
son estructuras emergentes basadas en la fenomenología, parecidos a los esquemas de 
imágenes (Johnson 1987), los cuales constituyen el cimiento del significado verbal y el 
razonamiento figurativo (Lakoff 1990). 
La metodología ocupada para identificar los parámetros de cada preposición está basada en 
corpus. Utilizando una búsqueda manual en la sección de concordancia de dos bases de 
datos, el British National Corpus (BNC) para las preposiciones inglesas, y el Spanish Web 
2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) para las del idioma español, la presente investigación intenta 
mantener el espíritu del estudio del lenguaje basado en el uso a través de un análisis de 
ejemplos reales de uso de lenguaje. También fue analizada información proveniente de 
diccionarios (el Cambridge (online) English Dictionary (CED) para el inglés, y el 
Diccionario de la Lengua Española (DLE) para el español) de manera de sugerir los 
parámetros conceptuales que podrían constituir cada base conceptual. 
La postura cognitivista adoptada en esta investigación proviene de importantes avances en 
las ciencias cognitivas (ej., Allwood 2003; Clark 2003; Rice 1992; Slobin 2003; Talmy 
2000) los cuales apuntan a una estrecha relación entre la estructura lingüística y el 
conocimiento enciclopédico (Langacker 1987) o estructura conceptual. En este sentido, la 
investigación pretende arrojar luz sobre la estructura conceptual esquemática que es 
facilitada a través de clase cerrada, y su rol en las simulaciones corporeizadas. Siguiendo a 
Talmy (2000), las palabras pueden ser ampliamente divididas bajo la clase abierta o 
cerrada. Las palabras de la clase abierta, tradicionalmente conocidas como palabras de 
contenido, ofrecen puntos de acceso (en el sentido de Langacker 1987) a un tipo de 
estructura conceptual la cual es altamente rica. Por ende, las palabras de la clase abierta, 
tales como sustantivos, verbos, y adjetivos, ofrecen un acceso amplio (Talmy 2007) a la 
estructura conceptual. Por el contrario, las palabras de la clase cerrada, tradicionalmente 
llamadas palabras funcionales, ofrecerían un acceso más estrecho a la estructura 
conceptual. Para resumir, la diferencia entre acceso amplio y estrecho se ve reflejada en la 
riqueza o esquematicidad conceptual que es facilitada a través de las palabras. Las unidades 
semánticas que primordialmente constituyen la base conceptual de una palabra de la clase 
abierta son relacionadas con lo que se conoce como cuadros y modelos cognitivos 
(Barsalou 1992, 1999), mientras que las unidades semánticas que conforman la base 
conceptual de una palabra de la clase cerrada son asociadas con parámetros conceptuales. 
La interfaz entre estos dos tipos de palabras da como resultado una representación cognitiva 
(en el sentido de Talmy 2000) en donde los elementos de la clase cerrada brindan un tipo de 
“andamiaje semántico” para el rico material conceptual facilitado por la clase abierta. 
La idea formulada arriba es contraria a los postulados de algunos lingüistas del paradigma 
cognitivista (especialmente Evans 2009, 2013) quienes mantienen una estricta dicotomía 
entre estos dos grupos de palabras, postulando que los elementos de la clase cerrada, como 
las preposiciones, conjunciones, y “partículas”, no ofrecen acceso a la estructura 
conceptual, sino que codifican exclusivamente contenido lingüístico. Si bien el presente 
autor está de acuerdo con que debe existir algo exclusivo del sistema lingüístico (véase 
Morras, in press), los elementos de la clase carrada sí ofrecen acceso a la estructura 
conceptual. La diferencia radica en el tipo de estructura conceptual que es facilitada. Esta es 
precisamente la razón de introducir la noción de parámetro conceptual: el hecho de que 
captura el material conceptual esquemático que constituye el ‘andamiaje semántico’ de un 
evento lingüístico.  Esto nos permitirá apreciar la contribución que las palabras de la clase 
cerrada tienen frente a las simulaciones corporeizadas. Siguiendo a Lawrence Barsalou 
(1999), todos los conceptos son simuladores, y, por ende, forman parte de una simulación 
corporeizada. Estos conceptos incluyen maneras (ej., inteligentemente), relaciones (ej., 
entre), propiedades (ej., azul), entre otros. 
El análisis presentado en los capítulos 4, 5, y 6, ofrece una visión del significado verbal que 
está constituido por dos importantes niveles de representación que están relacionados con lo 
que Talmy (2007) denomina primera condición de atención (del primer y segundo nivel de 
aislamiento). El primer nivel de aislamiento dentro de la primera condición de atención está 
relacionado con el nivel de representación léxico de una palabra. En este nivel podemos 
apreciar el potencial de significado de las palabras, el cual es capturado por la noción de 
base conceptual, como lo veremos en más detalle más adelante. Dicha base conceptual debe 
de ser almacenada en la memoria semántica de largo plazo y representa las unidades 
mentales que forman el sistema léxico-gramatical (usando el termino de Panther 2006) de 
una persona – quiere decir, la semántica de las palabras bajo completo aislamiento. Por el 
otro lado, está el segundo nivel de aislamiento para el análisis lingüístico; este concierne a 
lo que Allwood (2003) denomina determinación del significado. La determinación del 
significado tiene que ver con el uso contextual de una palabra. Las palabras adquieren su 
semántica (situada) solamente bajo contexto: sólo algunos atributos semánticos dentro de la 
base conceptual de una determinada palabra se activan en un uso lingüístico situado, 
mientras que los demás permanecen en su trasfondo. 
El análisis de las preposiciones seleccionadas comienza con una detallada descripción de 
sus raíces espaciales. Esto nos permite proponer sus respectivas bases conceptuales y 
apreciar cómo los parámetros conceptuales se activan diferentemente dependiendo del 
contexto lingüístico en el cual la preposición se ve integrada. Después de esto, la 
investigación presenta usos no espaciales y temporales, que crucialmente son motivados 
por la estructura espacio-conceptual proveniente de la base conceptual de la preposición. 
Un punto importante por resaltar aquí respecto a la segunda parte del análisis concierne al 
tratamiento individualizado (en secciones separadas) de los usos preposicionales no 
espaciales y temporales. Esto se debe a que el presente trabajo asume que el dominio del 
tiempo exhibe su propia estructura, que puede ser cualitativamente distinta de la del 
dominio espacial, como lo veremos en el capítulo 2. Este tipo de estructura conceptual, que 
es inherentemente temporal por naturaleza, emerge como resultado de la referencia 
temporal (Evans 2013). Cada vez que lidiamos con localización temporal, como en 
expresiones tales como See you at noon, debe de estar involucrada una estructura temporal 
(esquemática). Este claramente no es el caso de expresiones como Those countries are at 
war, en donde la preposición inglesa at establece una relación (no espacial) entre unos 
países y el estado de guerra, en vez de una relación entre un evento y su referente temporal. 
Este punto será desarrollado en profundad a lo largo de la investigación.  
Para resumir, la postura adoptada aquí intenta arrojar luz sobre la estructuración espacio-
conceptual de algunas de las preposiciones del inglés y el español, y su rol en usos no 
espaciales y temporales. También ofrece una visión alternativa para la enseñanza de 
idiomas, puesto que ve el lenguaje como algo flexible y estructurado al mismo tiempo, 
contrario a la rígida visión del lenguaje como entradas de un diccionario en la mente, así 
como el carácter vacío de la sintaxis. La idea del lenguaje basado en el uso asume el 
significado verbal como algo enciclopédico por naturaleza, como también fomenta una 
descripción meticulosa de las estructuras fenomenológicas como esenciales si es que 
queremos en serio comprender en detalle el área de la semántica espacial. Algunas 
implicaciones que esta postura acarrearía para estudiantes, profesores, e investigadores del 
área de la enseñanza, son desarrolladas en el capítulo 7, junto con posibles aplicaciones de 
métodos de lingüística cognitiva en el aula que pueden ser extraídos de los capítulos 4, 5, y 
6. Por último, las bases conceptuales son formuladas de tal manera de que puedan ser 
validadas psicológicamente a través de métodos experimentales. Un posible ejemplo 
(capítulo 7) de algunos parámetros conceptuales de between, among, amid, y entre, es 
presentado para mostrar este punto. 
Finalmente, la investigación termina con algunos comentarios, entre ellos la importancia de 
un detallado conocimiento acerca de la semántica espacial de las preposiciones con objeto 
de acercarnos a una teoría del lenguaje que sea psicológicamente posible y provea 
explicaciones adecuadas para los usos preposicionales no espaciales y temporales; la idea 
de que el tiempo exhibe su propia estructura, que se refleja en construcciones lingüísticas 
temporales; las posibles implicaciones y aplicaciones pedagógicas que la presente visión 
podría ofrecer; y los experimentos psicolingüísticos que se podrían realizar utilizando este 
método. 
Palabras clave: base conceptual, parámetros conceptuales, trajector, landmark, estructura 
conceptual, estructura temporal 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The present study deals with the semantics of some English and Spanish prepositions, 
specifically between, among, amid, to, for (for English), and entre, a, and para (for 
Spanish). The research intends to provide an account of their spatial configuration in order 
to achieve a solid ground from which to apprehend better the partial structuring and 
supportive function of the spatio-conceptual structure underlying non-spatial and temporal 
prepositional usages. The study is expected to provide full details about the spatial, non-
spatial and temporal behavior of the prepositions proposed. 
I now provide a brief overview of the main ideas that drive this research. 
1.1 Spatial semantics and closed-class items 
Spatial semantics has been traditionally understood in terms of the simple relation model. 
That model states that prepositions encode purely spatio-geometric information. However, 
it turns out that functional elements and/or consequences (Herskovits 1985, 1986, 1988; 
Vandeloise 1991, 1994, 2003) are as important as spatio-geometric information to properly 
understand the semantics of preposition (as we shall see in more detail later). This fuller 
perspective in spatial semantics allows us to achieve a clearer account of the conceptual 
structuring of prepositions. 
Prepositions are closed-class elements, which as opposed to open-class elements, offer a 
narrow access (in the sense of Talmy 2007) to conceptual structure. This narrow access is 
related to the type of information that these elements offer access to, namely a more 
schematic conceptual structure, compared to the rich conceptual structure that open-class 
elements such as nouns, verbs, and adjectives, provide access to. To see this point, consider 
the example below: 
(1) a. She goes to the hospital 
b. She goes to the beach 
Note that in (1) above the closed-class elements are put in italics to show the schematic 
content they encode. In the case of she, it can be glossed as [FEMALE AGENT], in the case of 
to it can be glossed as [MOTION TOWARD A GOAL], for the it can be [IDENTIFIABLE THING], 
and finally for the third-person suffix -es it can be [THIRD PERSON SINGULAR PRESENT 
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TENSE]. Note that even though these elements may provide basically the same conceptual 
content to each construction in (1), what makes the more prominent difference in each 
reading (and hence in each corresponding embodied simulation)1 is the rich conceptual 
content provided (mainly) by the profile of the nominal elements that fill the NP2 slot,2 
here the hospital and the beach in (1a) and (1b), respectively. On the other hand, closed-
class items also contribute to embodied simulations (i.e., in-reading), but their contribution 
plays the role of conceptual scaffolding (following Talmy 2000) for the richer conceptual 
content evoked by open-class elements. This interplay is what builds up a cognitive 
representation. 
The distinction between closed-class and open-class items will be essential to understand 
how a cognitive representation (in the sense of Talmy 2000) takes place.3 After all, the 
human conceptual system is structured by many types of knowledge (Barsalou 1999, 2008), 
among them spatio-conceptual, temporal, and introspective structure.4 That conceptual 
structuring (in language and cognition) comes from the very same situational content but 
varies in its situational focus (Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005). The result of this is 
that words provide access points (Langacker 1987) to conceptual structure (or encyclopedic 
knowledge), which can be of different types depending on the grammatical category of a 
given morpheme. 
                                                             
1 The notion of embodied simulation, in basic terms, has to do with the creation of mental experiences about 
perception and action in the absence of their manifestation. The embodied simulation theory (e.g., Bergen 
2012) states that we use the same parts of the brain that are devoted to interacting with the world for different 
cognitive operations such as imagery, recall, and language comprehension. From this it follows that “We 
understand language by simulating in our mind what it would be like to experience the things that the 
language describes” (ibid.13).  
2 The term profile is used in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991, 2008) to refer to the designatum of 
the scope of a predication (i.e., its base). The notion of scope, on the other hand, deals with an expression’s 
“coverage” (Langacker 2008: 62). It is the part or portion of the domains that are accessed in a linguistic 
event which is used as the basis for its meaning. 
3 However, both classes are understood in this research as the two extremes of a continuum. The whole 
system then, is referred to here as lexico-grammatical system (a term taken from Panther 2006). 
4 Introspective structure should be understood as a type of conceptual structure that emerges from the felt 
qualities of human experience (i.e., the aesthetics of phenomenological experience), including reflexive 
thinking. 
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The conceptual structure that constitutes the meaning potential (Allwood 2003) that words 
provide access to, is referred to in this research as conceptual basis – the semantic spectrum 
on the basis of which word meanings can be elaborated and extended.5 As noted earlier, 
there is a distinction between schematic and rich conceptual structure, which, I suggest, 
leads to the conceptual basis of a word being constituted by either conceptual parameters 
(see below) and/or cognitive models and frames. Cognitive models (Evans 2009; see also 
Lakoff’s 1987 ICMs) and frames (Barsalou 1992; Fillmore 1982; see also Schank and 
Abelson’s 1977 scripts) are rich non-linguistic bodies of knowledge which are 
interconnected in the human conceptual system as shown below for the open-class word 
hospital: 
 
 
 
 
 
[HOSPITAL] 
Figure 1.1. Partial conceptual basis for hospital 
In figure 1.1 above, we can observe a partial conceptual basis for the [HOSPITAL] lexical 
concept,6 which at the very least, offers access to cognitive models such as Health Care, 
Emergency, Rehabilitation and Treatment, which can be further developed into secondary 
                                                             
5 Elaboration and extension must be understood as forming a continuum. The former deals with full 
schematicity and is a type of adjustment in the level of specificity that characterizes a given structure, whereas 
the latter has to do with partial schematicity (for details see Langacker 1987: 66-76). 
6 Lexical concepts (Evans 2006, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2013) are bundles of different types of knowledge, 
including semantic parameters, that constitute the semantic pole of a symbolic unit. Lexical concepts are 
instances of language use, so they are treated interchangeably with the term sense in this research. Another 
key feature of lexical concepts is that they encode linguistic content (in the form of linguistic parameters [see 
Morras, in press]) and offer access to conceptual structure which varies in richness (cognitive models and 
frames for the rich conceptual material, and conceptual parameters for more schematic structures). 
Health care Emergency Rehabilitation Treatments 
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cognitive models such as types of rehabilitations and treatments. For instance, Health Care 
can be further developed into Skin health, Dietary, Buccal health, among others. This in 
turn, shows the highly rich conceptual content that can be accessed via open-class items 
such as hospital.  
On the other hand, the present dissertation makes use of the notion of conceptual parameter 
as key to understanding the structuring of the conceptual bases of the propositions to be 
analyzed in chapters 4, 5, and 6. Parameters (following Evans 2009, 2010a, 2013) are part 
of the bundle of different types of schematic information that form the semantic core of a 
(closed-class) symbolic unit.7 Parameters serve to compress fine distinctions within the 
complexity of experience. However, this type of parameter is referred to in Morras (in 
press) as conceptual parameter: a highly schematic bundle of conceptual information that is 
phenomenologically based. Conceptual parameters embody the schematic structure that 
inheres in the conceptual system, so they are reflected in the semantics of closed-class 
items. This in turn, is one of the main reasons to support the idea that closed-class items 
offer a narrower access to conceptual structure, compared to the wider access offered by 
open-class items. This goes contrary to the position adopted by Evans (e.g., 2009, 2013) 
who claims that closed-class items do not offer access to conceptual structure.8 
The second type of parameter that is identified in Morras (in press) is termed linguistic 
parameter. Linguistic parameters consist of bundles of highly schematic information that is 
purely linguistic – that is – encoded in and externalized via language. Following Langacker 
(e.g., 1987, 2008) symbolic units can profile either a thing or a relation. I use this 
terminology to suggest that the linguistic content that a word such as hospital or at encode, 
can be glossed as [THING] and [RELATION], respectively. At a higher level of organization, 
we can also appreciate the schematic content that might be exclusively encoded in 
language. This has been demonstrated by Adele Goldberg (1995) in her work on 
                                                             
7 Parameters also structure open-class items, but in a highly schematic way. For instance, the noun hospital, in 
addition to its cognitive models and frames, also encodes the parametric information of [THING]. This type of 
parameter has been referred to in Morras (in press) as linguistic parameter. 
8 It must be added that conceptual parameters also structure open-class items. However, this type of schematic 
information is not as prominent as cognitive models and frames within the conceptual basis of an open-class 
item. 
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ditransitive constructions. For example, the linguistic content that is evoked by an utterance 
such as Joe baked Mary a cake, can be glossed as [X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z].  
As an example of how the complexity of experience might get parameterized,9 consider the 
conceptual basis of the preposition at proposed in Evans (2009:173): 
                                                                Co-location 
 
Spatial scenes involving location 
                                                            
                                                          Practical Association 
Figure 1.2. Conceptual basis for at 
Note that in figure 1.2 above, the proto-scene of at is put in italics. Proto-scenes (following 
Tyler and Evans 2003a, 2003b) consist of humanly relevant phenomenological experiences 
that allow the abstraction of recurrent patterns and experiential structure in the form of 
conceptual parameters.10 The English preposition at is a relational unit that depicts a highly 
general way to locate things in space, hence, it can be posit that the humanly relevant 
scenes involving location in space give rise to (at least) two recurrent patterns that become 
parameterized. The Co-location parameter might be the core semantic value of at. But in 
addition to this, there is also another parameter that is non-spatial in nature, so it is 
relational. This functional factor in turn, can be categorized as an added constraint (in the 
sense of Herskovits 1985, 1986). To illustrate this idea, consider the following example: 
(2) a. They are at the supermarket 
b. He is at his desk 
                                                             
9 In this research, parameterization is understood as the process in which experiential patterns and structures 
that are most recurrent within a proto-scene, become the conceptual parameters (or cognitive models and 
frames) of a given word’s conceptual basis. 
10 In the case of richer conceptual bases such as the ones of nouns as shown in figure 1.1 above for the word 
hospital, proto-scenes are also key for their conceptual development since they are built up by experiential 
structure that one acquires through lived experience. 
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In (2) we can locate each trajector (Langacker 1987, 1991, 2008) – the attentional figure in 
a relational profile – (They and He respectively) with respect to each landmark – the second 
most prominent entity in a construction (supermarket and desk) – by virtue of the relational 
unit at that establishes correspondence links between them (see section 2.2.1 in chapter 2). 
Correspondence links, in turn, indicate how component and composite structures fit 
together in a coherent semantic assembly. Such links allow the activation of the Co-location 
parameter (see figure 1.2 above). However, the activation of the Co-location parameter is 
not enough to fully understand the expressions in (2). It follows that in (2a) the group of 
people might not be solely located with respect to the supermarket, but also doing the 
shopping, working, or the like. By the same token, in example (2b) the man is not only 
located with respect to his desk, but he might also be in a position to work. Similar cases in 
which there are added constraints in prepositional usages are at the university and at the 
cinema, where there is a practical association between trajector and landmark. It follows 
that the parameter of Practical Association also gets activated for these spatial realizations. 
As shown above, added constraints in prepositional usages amount to evidence against the 
rigid idea of prepositions as encoding purely spatio-geometric information. This is an issue 
that will be further developed in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
1.2 From the spatial to the non-spatial in prepositional usages 
The conceptual basis of at shown above, can in turn help us to apprehend better the 
processes that give rise to figurative understanding. For instance, in prepositional phrases 
such as at peace/ease, at establishes something more than a simple spatial relation between 
an attentional figure and its ground as in She feels at ease practicing yoga. It follows that at 
also allows a non-spatial relation between a state of existence (e.g., being at ease) and the 
attentional figure (here She). This means that the resulting composite conception (or part of 
it) in which at plays a non-spatial relational function could be glossed as [STATE OF 
EXISTENCE].11 Crucially, however, the parameter that allows the establishment of 
                                                             
11 [STATE OF EXISTENCE] is a term used in Evans (2009, 2010a) to describe some of the meanings that at can 
acquire at times, such as in at rest/peace/ease/liberty. Other lexical concepts that establish correspondence 
links with Practical Association are the [STATE OF MUTUAL RELATION] for cases involving at 
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correspondence links is Practical Association. As mentioned earlier, practical associations 
can be understood as the added constraints or functional elements/consequences that exist 
between a given attentional figure and its ground, and this is reflected in spatial and non-
spatial conceptions.  
Functional categories turn out to be particularly important when it comes to non-spatial 
usages. For instance, the parameter of Practical Association may receive a higher activation 
than Co-location. The parameter of Co-location, on the other hand, might structure the 
spatio-informational background of sentences such as She’s at ease practicing yoga: while 
it is true that practicing yoga involves being in a sports center, gym, or any other place 
equipped to do so, the sentence just given can be uttered to someone to indicate a habitual 
behavior of a person, rather than to say that the person is in the gym practicing yoga right 
now. This, in turn, evokes a non-spatial feature related to a state of existence with respect to 
an activity.  
Figure 1.3 below shows the relation between the [STATE OF EXISTENCE] lexical concept and 
the parameter of Practical Association. This correspondence, in turn, partly allows 
figurative extension. 
                                                                Co-location 
 
Spatial scenes involving location 
                                                           
                                                         Practical Association 
 
                                                         [STATE OF EXISTENCE] 
Figure 1.3. The parameter of Practical Association and its relationship with the [STATE OF EXISTENCE] non-spatial lexical 
concept of at (Adapted from Evans 2009, 2010a) 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
war/variance/strife, and the [AFFECTING EXTERNAL STATE] for cases that involve prepositional phrases such as 
at peril/risk/hazard/expense. 
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The correspondences between the Practical Association parameter and the [STATE OF 
EXISTENCE] lexical concept may in turn, be driven by the conceptual metaphor STATES ARE 
LOCATIONS (Lakoff 1990). It follows from this that conceptual metaphor is another type of 
knowledge that is involved in non-spatial and temporal conceptions as we shall see in more 
detail later. 
1.2.1 Going further than TIME IS SPACE: temporal structure as a type of conceptual structure 
The last main issue that this research intends to address is related to the temporal behavior 
of prepositions. This issue deserves great attention since we might not be dealing with 
exactly the same mechanisms when conceptualizing temporal scenes. One of the 
assumptions in this research is that time is more fundamental than space since it constitutes 
a temporal integrational system at the neuronal level (Pöppel 2004, 2009) that is 
independent of the cognitive acts and percepts – that is, this temporal operating platform 
may provide a logistical basis for conscious representation and a working platform for our 
phenomenal present. Time constitutes, at the neuro-cognitive level, a pre-semantic 
operation that is fundamental to conceptualization.12 
In addition, evidence from neuropsychology suggest that time could be dissociated from 
space at the neurological level. In an experiment, David Kemmerer (2005) tested whether 
his 4 brain-injured patients (the injury was in the perisylvian region) could comprehend 
prepositional usages about space and time using the same prepositions (e.g., at the park vs. 
at 2 o’clock). It turns out that 2 patients understood the spatial senses and not the temporal 
ones, while the other 2 patients did vice versa. The results obtained amount to evidence that 
space and time are qualitatively distinct. The qualitatively unique nature of the domain of 
time gives rise to the temporal structure that inheres in the human conceptual system as one 
distinct type of knowledge. In addition, time exhibits transience (following Galton 2011; 
see also Evans 2013), which can be understood as the subjectively felt experience of the 
passing of time. Transience is assumed in this study to be the hallmark of the temporal 
domain. This is a purely temporal feature that is absent in the spatial realm. 
                                                             
12 See Pöppel (2004) for what the role of the 3-second window in temporal integration might be. 
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Temporal structure turns out to be key to conceptualize the temporal meanings of 
prepositions; for instance, in prepositional phrases that evoke temporal lexical concepts 
such as the ones below: 
(3) a.   See you tomorrow at half past 5.                                            [POINT IN TIME] 
b. Can we meet at lunchtime?                                                    [PERIOD OF TIME] 
In (3a), at functions as a temporal relational unit in that it helps to anchor the upcoming 
event (the meeting) to the temporal matrix, which is conceptualized extrinsically (i.e., by 
the use of clocks) – that is, independently of the subjective experience of time, whereas in 
(3b) the periodicity-based strategy used is concerned with an event-based cyclical concept 
such as {LUNCHTIME}. 
The point I want to remark here is that in order to conceptualize (3a) (as well as (3b) and all 
the temporal instances of at we need temporal cognition (in the sense of Evans 2004, 2013, 
see also Galton 2011; Morras (to appear); Pöppel 2004, 2009) as a key requirement. As 
mentioned above, time might be even more basic than space to give life to consciousness 
itself due to its system of temporal integration known as the 3-second window (Pöppel 
2004). 
Note that temporal cognition can be reflected, at a schematic level, in temporal reference. 
For instance, in (3a), the temporal reference may encode a schematic temporal information 
that could be glossed as [TE FIXED TO AN RP WITHIN A TIME-RECKONING SYSTEM]. In this 
case the target event (TE), here the meeting between the two people, is fixed with respect to 
an RP (reference point), here half past 5. In (3a) we make use of the {TWELVE-HOUR 
CLOCK} where the origo (O) – the entity that starts the count in a periodicity-based system 
– is fixed as 12 a.m. Moreover, the O anchors the relationship between TE and RP to the 
transience type of duration.13 Time-reckoning systems are characterized by the use of 
clocks that either embody – like an hourglass – or metonymically symbolizes – like a 
clockface, the passage of time.  
                                                             
13 Following Evans (2013) there are three types of transience: Duration, succession, and anisotropic. These 
characterize the extrinsic, sequential, and deictic temporal frames of reference, respectively. 
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In addition to time-reckoning systems, we also make use of event-reckoning systems (based 
on calendars and cyclicity). This difference in turn, allows us to distinguish between two 
neuro-cognitive complex features that underlie this periodicity-based temporal strategy. 
This temporal strategy is based on mensural and cyclical time. In (3b) we make use of 
cyclical temporal units, in this case {DAY}, to understand – and hence, locate – events such 
as lunch. In (3b), lunchtime serves as an RP to locate the TE (the possible meeting) and 
further anchor it with help of an O (here {MIDNIGHT} to the transience type of duration. The 
schematic temporal import in this case could be glossed as [TE FIXED TO AN RP WITHIN AN 
EVENT-RECKONING SYSTEM]. Time and event-reckoning systems and all their facets 
constitute what is known as the extrinsic temporal frame of reference (see Evans 2013: 
Ch.6). This type of temporal reference turns out to be key for a more complete 
understanding of temporal cognition and temporal linguistic realizations, as well shall see 
in more detail later. 
1.1.2 Conceptual metaphor in temporal conceptualizations 
Another mechanism that is involved in temporal (and non-spatial) conceptualizations is 
conceptual metaphor. I suggest that the metaphor LOCATION IN TIME IS LOCATION IN SPACE 
underdetermines the temporal realizations in the case of the English at shown above, as 
well as in the other cases presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6. The preposition at allows the 
establishment of correspondence links between the parameter of Co-location and the Event-
Reckoning or Time-Reckoning parameters that result from sense-extension, but which, 
nevertheless, inhere in the human conceptual system in the form of temporal structure. 
In (3a) there is activation (through extension) of the Time-Reckoning parameter, whereas in 
(3b) the parameter that gets activated is Event-Reckoning. Figure 1.4 below depicts this 
sense-extension and its relationship with two temporal lexical concepts for at:14 
 
 
 
                                                             
14 For further details on the temporal behavior of the English preposition at, see Morras (to appear). 
 
 
11 
 
Practical Association 
 
 
Scenes involving temporal location 
                                                             
 
 
Co-location 
     
                Time-Reckoning                                                              Event-Reckoning 
 
                 [POINT IN TIME]                                                                 [PERIOD OF TIME] 
Figure 1.4. Sense-extension: Temporal units and their relationship with temporal lexical concepts for at 
As shown above, the spatial, non-spatial, and temporal behavior of prepositions, can be 
better understood under the scope of some theories and constructs (and empirical evidence 
as well) from cognitive linguistics, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. This in turn, 
might shed light on the partial structuring and supportive role of the domain of space with 
respect to the non-spatial and temporal domains. As we shall see in more detail later, there 
are more mechanisms involved in non-spatial and temporal understanding apart from 
metaphor and metonymy, mainly the conceptual structure that is purely temporal in nature, 
and the (direct) non-metaphoric concepts that are (mainly) based on introspective structure 
and subjective experience. 
The type of analysis such as the one briefly introduced above might bring further benefits 
to areas such as language teaching and educational linguistics, since the conceptual bases to 
be presented throughout this research can be applied to English, Spanish, and linguistics 
lessons. In addition, the parameters proposed for each conceptual basis can be 
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experimentally validated by experts in the area. These two ideas, among others that the 
present investigation intends to show, are further developed in sections 7.3. and 7.4 in 
chapter 7. 
1.3 Methodological tools and thesis structure 
The examples that will be shown in the analysis (chapters 4, 5, and 6) have been taken from 
two corpora: the British National Corpus (BNC) and the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, 
Eu + Am). The idea behind using corpora is not statistical but rather naturalistically-driven 
– it is simply used as a way to keep on with the usage-based approach that characterizes the 
Cognitive Linguistics enterprise. The research reported here presents an analysis based on 
real instances of language use instead of made-up examples. 
In addition to this, another type of source of data has been used for this study, namely the 
dictionaries – specifically the Cambridge (Online) English Dictionary (monolingual 
version, CED from now) and the Diccionario de la Lengua Española (DLE from now). In 
conjunction, corpus work and the use of reliable dictionaries helped the present author to 
pin down the semantic parameters that may constitute the conceptual bases of the 
prepositions between, among, amid, for, to, and entre, a, and para. Further details are 
provided in chapter 3 which is concerned with methodology. 
The thesis is divided as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background; in this 
chapter some key theories and constructs from Cognitive Linguistics will be introduced. 
Ideas and theories such as parameters, lexical concepts, metaphor, metonymy, Cognitive 
Grammar, temporal reference, among others, are essential to enrich and hence provide an 
elegant semantic account of the prepositions selected, as well as to familiarize the reader 
with a cognitivist perspective on language and cognition. Chapter 3 deals with 
methodological issues; in this chapter the main emphasis is given to introspection as the 
main tool for analytical thought, along with corpus work. Then in chapters 4, 5, and 6, a 
cognitive linguistic analysis is presented for each preposition proposed. The first ones are 
between, among, and amid (chapter 4) considering they exhibit semantic overlap, followed 
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by their Spanish equivalent entre.15 After that, I present the case of to and its Spanish 
equivalent a (chapter 5), finishing with for and its Spanish equivalent para (chapter 6). 
Then in chapter 7, some remarks that are extracted from the analysis are placed at the front, 
among them the importance of context in the meaning determination of a word’s 
conceptual basis, the importance of phenomenology for the emergence of spatio-conceptual 
structure, the nature of temporal structure in human cognition, also some pedagogical 
applications that might be carried out using the conceptual bases suggested, and proposals 
for psychological validations of some of the conceptual parameters proposed in the 
analysis. Finally, chapter 8 presents concluding remarks. 
Lastly, I want to emphasize that the present research is driven by a willingness to approach 
a psychologically real understanding of the spatial, non-spatial, and temporal behavior of 
prepositions by showing how the type of conceptual structure that comes from each domain 
complements each other while exhibiting their own conceptual character.16 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
15 See Morras (2018) and Morras and Barcelona (2019) for an overview of the spatial, non- spatial, and 
temporal behavior of the Spanish preposition entre and its English equivalents. 
16 This research has been inspired by some great advances in the cognitive sciences, I am particularly grateful 
to so many scholars that have provided elegant theories, constructs, and insight during the past 50 years or so. 
We now know considerably more about the foundational roles of space and time in human cognition, and that 
even though they might be intertwined at the conceptual level, each has a neuro-cognitive basis that makes 
them qualitatively distinct. As mentioned earlier, the system of temporal integration at the neuronal level 
might provide a pre-semantic window that is fundamental for conceptualization; this makes time more “basic” 
– so to speak – than space. On the other hand, non-spatial or abstract concepts also have a 
phenomenologically real structuring; for instance, {SADNESS}. Following Lawrence Barsalou (1999), we do 
have a non-metaphorical understanding of what the feeling of sadness is. After all, for figurative language 
understanding to be interpreted as in an utterance such as she’s down today (i.e., [SAD]), we need a non-
metaphorical concept of {SADNESS} – whose structuring is mainly introspective in character – for the 
mapping to occur in the first place (see also Murphy 1996 for such a view). 
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1.4 Summary 
This introductory chapter has been mainly intended to provide a general picture of the main 
research focus: the spatial, non-spatial and temporal realizations of some English and 
Spanish prepositions under the scope of cognitive linguistics. The main idea behind this is 
to show that the non-spatial and temporal conceptualizations of the prepositions analyzed 
are not entirely motivated by spatio-conceptual structure. This in turn, is due to temporal 
and introspective structures as types of knowledge that inhere in the conceptual system. The 
contrastive analysis presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6, will also show conceptual differences 
and similarities between English and Spanish prepositional vehicles. This might bring 
benefits for students and language teachers who are looking for a more realistic account of 
lexical representation (i.e., the conceptual basis of a word) and meaning determination (i.e., 
the contextual realization of a word’s conceptual basis). The linguistic examples that are 
subject to scrutiny in the analysis have been taken from the BNC and the Spanish Web 2011 
(esTenTen11, Eu + Am) corpora for English and Spanish prepositions, respectively. This is 
intended to stay in line with the usage-based approach that is fostered in cognitive 
linguistics. The CED and the DLE have also been used. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Background 
The present study is inspired by some cognitive linguistic and cognitive psychology tenets, 
among others that come from the wide field of the cognitive sciences. I hereby shall 
provide some essential grounds for positioning the reader on the right track and allow him 
to make the most of the linguistic analysis presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6 in terms of 
comprehension and utility. Thus, I will here provide a brief description and discussion of 
the main theoretical tools and constructs that this research is mainly based on so as to 
familiarize the reader with its theoretical core. However, additional theoretical notions 
related to the ones discussed in this section, will also be introduced as we go through in 
later chapters. 
The main constructs and theories that are applied in this research and briefly examined 
below are: 
Space and Time in Cognitive Linguistics 
Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991, 2008) 
Trajector and Landmark (Langacker 1987, 2008) 
Correspondences, Profile determinant and Elaboration (Langacker 1987, 2008) 
Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models Theory (LCCM) (Evans 2006, 2009, 2013) 
Metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) and Metonymy (Barcelona 2000a, 2011, 2015; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Ruiz de Mendoza 2017) theories. 
I now proceed to introduce the constructs and theories one by one. 
2.1. Space and Time in Cognitive Linguistics 
Fundamental to the understanding of human cognition is the study of space and time as two 
of the main foundations of the human mind. We live in a three-dimensional world – hence, 
we navigate space in any direction to accomplish our daily goals such as going for some 
groceries to the supermarket or take the bus to go to college. On the other hand, we also 
have “the event” in which all others unfold (in the sense of Evans 2004, 2013), which is 
time. We move in space through time, and these two fundamental domains end up 
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structuring the human conceptual system via affordances (Gibson 1979), which are the 
possible interactions (with objects) in space. 
Spatial thinking is essential for survival. Where to go to find food, water, and go back to 
our shelter is elementary to survival. Owing to the centrality of the conceptual structure 
provided by the domain of space, spatial thinking becomes the foundation for other 
conceptual domains which are amply illustrated in the way we talk and reason (e.g., Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980, 1999; Talmy 1983). How things are apprehended and which spatial 
frame of reference (Levinson 2003) is deployed will depend on the type of space: how it is 
perceived and how it serves to successful navigation. Following Barbara Tversky (2008), 
there are three fundamental types of spatial structures or “spaces” – in Tversky’s parlance – 
and these are the space of the body, the space around the body, and the space for 
navigation. 
The space of the body is the first we encounter since birth (or even before) – the very 
repository of our organs and brain. It projects spatial particles such as {up} and {down} 
(vertical plane), {left} and {right} (transversal plane), and {front}, {back} (sagittal plane). 
This space not only consists of the constituent structure of matter, in this case the human 
body, but also of space itself. This type of space allows us to “keep track of where body 
parts are relative to one another” (ibid. 204), through proprioception,17 in the case of our 
own body, and through vision, in the case of other bodies. 
The space around the body has to do with the space immediately surrounding the human 
body – the space of “actual or potential perception and action” (ibid. 204): the one within 
our visual scope and/or hand-reachable distance.  
Finally, the last type of space that constitutes the core of our spatial cognition and human 
conceptual system in general, is the space of navigation and it deals with experience itself 
like wandering through a museum or hiking on the mountains. This type of space is 
apparently “too large to be perceived from a single place” (ibid. 205), hence, it is 
constructed from separate pieces of experience. 
                                                             
17 Proprioception can be understood as the ability to sense stimuli arising within the body regarding position, 
motion, and equilibrium. 
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The three types of spatio-conceptual knowledge mentioned above are what mainly allow us 
to develop the concepts the way we do. For instance, the concept of {gravity} is entrenched 
in the human mind because of the morphology of our bodies (i.e., embodiment), as well as 
because of the Earth’s gravity field which attracts all objects to its surface: if we drop an 
apple, it falls. By the same token, if we fully extend our arms in front of us and try to stay 
in that position for 10 minutes, we will soon feel the gravity pull (so we will get tired). 
This, in turn, can be explained in terms of force dynamics (Talmy 2000) in that there is an 
agonist (the force we generate by lifting our arms and keeping them straight) and an 
antagonist. This latter notion exhibits in this case a tendency to rest so it represents the 
resistance that the agonist must bear or break. On the contrary, if our bodies were a sort of 
gas with no transversal, vertical, or sagittal plane, we would have no concepts such as 
{left} or {front}, nor would we experience gravity in the way we normally do. 
Human spatial navigation is thus the key to understanding most of the encyclopedic 
knowledge that human beings must acquire. Encyclopedic knowledge, following Ronald 
Langacker (1987), is the accumulation of non-linguistic coherent semantic units that are 
categorized and linked to each other by virtue of the type of experiences we encounter in 
our daily lives. Encyclopedic knowledge is akin to what Barsalou (1999, 2003, 2008) refers 
to as the human conceptual system, which, to put in just a few words, is the very repository 
of the mind (see also Mandler 1992, 2004). Therefore, the acquisition of this system and/or 
knowledge, comes from navigation in space and experiences of different types. Navigation 
involves the three “types of spaces” mentioned above, but it will be generalized now for 
understanding purposes. Such navigation is deeply linked to the affordances (Gibson 1979) 
that space offers, which makes us develop, change or even replace, a given concept in our 
mental repository. Under this enactive approach to concepts and cognition (see Thompson 
2005, 2007; Di Paolo and Thompson 2014; Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991 for such a 
view; see also Barsalou 2003) categorization is not seen as taxonomic but action-
environment oriented. This is not to say that we do not have a taxonomic and “concept-
stable” organization: we do in fact, but this information is used as a conceptual bedrock for 
situated interactions with the environment. Take for instance the prototype for {dog}, 
which for some people might be a German shepherd, whereas for other people it can be a 
Cocker Spaniel. But now if we say She’s taking her dog to the pet hairdresser, we probably 
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imagine, as a prototype of a dog that needs more attention in its hair than others, a Poodle, 
rather than, say, a Doberman or a Pitbull.  
Concepts behave similarly to categorization: they can of course exhibit a sort of stable 
knowledge, but they are not fixed. On the contrary, new experiences can either change a 
given concept or even replace it. For instance, we could use a screwdriver, which is a tool 
prototypically used for driving screws, to take out a piece of wood from an old kitchen 
cabin. In this case something that is used for a supposedly “structured” thing can be used 
for another.  
Before the development of more complex concepts such as {happiness} or {sadness} in the 
road to a fully functional conceptual system, we acquire what in cognitive psychology, 
philosophy and cognitive linguistics is referred to as image schemas (e.g., Johnson 1987, 
2007; Hampe 2005; Lakoff 1987; Mandler 1992, 2004).18 Image schemas are schematic 
representations of spatial relations we encounter every day that are pre-conceptual in origin. 
For example, consider the image schema of {container}, which is a ubiquitous spatial 
experience we encounter daily. We enter and get out of our rooms, we put the food in the 
fridge and take it out when hungry, among many other humanly relevant interactions 
involving containers. The space of the body can be also understood as the container of all 
the necessary organs, including flesh and bones, as previously seen. 
More examples of image schemas, originally proposed by the philosopher Mark Johnson 
(1987: 126), are {contact}, {center/periphery}, {pressure}, {balance}, {mass/count}, 
{path}, among many others. These are the first concepts we acquire; they come in the form 
of image-schematic structure and eventually structure word meaning and metaphorical 
reasoning (Evans 2010c; Johnson 1987; Mandler 1992). To illustrate, take as an example a 
verb such as jump. It consists of image-schematic structure in the form of {up – down}. 
Image schemas are then embodied in word meaning since they are acquired way before the 
linguistic system is fully developed. Under this vision, it should not be surprising that 
symbolic units – for example, words, are access sites to conceptual structure. The linguistic 
                                                             
18 The braces ({}) are used in this dissertation to indicate concepts and image schemas (i.e. conceptual level) 
whereas the square brackets are used to indicate a lexical concept – that is, at the level of the linguistic 
system. 
 
 
19 
 
system has evolved to narrow down (i.e. specify) the rich conceptual material of the much 
older conceptual system (Evans 2009, 2013, 2014). 
The embodied character of image-schematic structure is provided by what Tyler and Evans 
(2003a, 2003b) term proto-scenes, which as mentioned in the previous chapter, are 
humanly relevant interactions in space from which abstractions and functional categories 
are acquired. If we go back to our example of the importance of containers in our daily 
lives, we can see how we abstract away some notions through our experiences with 
containers. For instance, when we are just one-year-old infants or younger, we already 
understand that a container can transport the thing contained or that a container that is not 
transparent (such as a black box), can occlude the contained entity because we cannot see 
the object inside. Those things become abstractions that are acquired from 
phenomenological experience. When these abstractions are prominent enough, to the point 
they can build the conceptual basis of a word, they become conceptual parameters. To 
illustrate this point, consider the conceptual basis of the English preposition in below, taken 
from the work of Evans (2009, 2010a, 2015a): 
                                                                 Enclosure 
 
 
Occlusion                                    (Humanly relevant) spatial scenes                      Location   with  
                                                            involving enclosure                                       Surety 
 
                                                      
                                                          Affecting Conditions 
Figure 2.1. Conceptual basis for the English preposition in 
Figure 2.1 above represents the conceptual basis of the English preposition in which is 
motivated and structured by humanly relevant interactions in space that involve containers 
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(the proto-scene of in).19 Note how image schemas such as {enclosure} and {occlusion} are 
highly relevant for the structuring of the conceptual basis of in, to the point they become 
parameterized. Parameters in this sense are bundles of schematic information that are stored 
in long-term semantic memory. They are not necessarily related to spatio-geometric 
information only but also integrate functionality and introspective structure, along with 
perceptual, temporal, and event-like structure; this in turn, is reflected in some parameters 
such as Affecting Conditions and Location with Surety, which emerge as functional 
consequences of phenomenological experience.20 As pointed out earlier, all concepts are 
developed through perception, situated action, and introspection (Barsalou 1999, 2003, 
2008; Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005) – that is, all concepts come from the same 
situational content. 
The image schema of {enclosure}, then, due to its highly relevant role in the proto-scene of 
in, becomes parameterized into the Enclosure parameter. Its highly relevant role is reflected 
in the notion of containment: a container has a volumetric interior wherein different things 
can be stored. The second parameter depicted in figure 2.1 is Occlusion, and it has to do 
with the fact that many containers do not allow us to see what is inside unless the container 
is made of glass or any other transparent material. The third parameter is Location with 
Surety, and it arises as a functional consequence of an object being placed inside a 
container. When we put things in containers, we can move the container, so the things 
inside will also move along. Lastly, the conceptual basis of in is also partially structured by 
the Affecting Conditions parameter. This can be apprehended as another functional 
consequence that has to do with the conditions that a given container offer to the entity 
contained. For example, if we store a dish of pasta with tomato sauce in the oven on a hot 
day, it will be sour at night because the oven offers certain affecting conditions that are not 
suitable for storing food on a hot day. On the contrary, if we store the pasta and tomato 
sauce dish in the fridge on a hot day, it will be still edible at night since a refrigerator does 
                                                             
19 As introduced in chapter 1, the construct of conceptual basis is the one used in this research to refer to the 
meaning potential (Allwood 2003) or semantic spectrum (Evans 2015a) that words provide access to. 
20 Location with Surety is a parameter coined by Evans (2009, 2010a, 2015a) to refer to the capacity of some 
containers to transport the object(s) they contain. 
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offer proper conditions for food storage. In this case, an oven and a refrigerator are two 
different containers that offer distinct affecting conditions to the entity that is inside. 
We can see that parameters are multifaceted in the sense that they are spatial and non-
spatial. Importantly, however, the majority, if not all of them, are motivated by image-
schematic structure. This structure might be the one that is invariantly mapped (in the sense 
of Lakoff 1990) when we move from the spatial to the non-spatial domain. This invariance 
facilitates metaphorical understanding. For instance, consider an expression like He’s in 
love, in which the relational unit in, rather than establishing a link between the man and a 
concrete thing, it establishes a relation between a person and a psychosomatic state, here 
love. That figurative conception in turn, is motivated by the conceptual basis of in depicted 
in figure 2.1 above, particularly by the activation of the Affecting Conditions parameter, 
which eventually provides access to the [psychosomatic state] lexical concept of in in He’s 
in love. The conceptual metaphor underlying these non-spatial usages of in can be states are 
locations. 
In the final analysis, we can see that non-spatial (and temporal) conceptions are ultimately 
supported and partially structured by spatio-conceptual structure. 
2.1.1 Temporal structure 
At the outset of section 2.1, we started talking about time as ‘the event’ in which all others 
unfold.21 Traditionally, the domain of time has been widely understood by virtue of spatio-
conceptual structure. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) argue that time is understood in 
terms of space like in the moving time (e.g., Christmas is approaching) and moving ego 
(e.g., We are approaching Christmas) metaphors. By the same token, Moore (2006) argues 
that time can also be understood as objects in a sequence (e.g., lunch comes after 
breakfast). However, such a view depicts the domain of time as something that apparently 
lacks its own structure – hence, it describes it as something that seems to be less 
phenomenologically real than space. I argue, on the contrary (following Evans 2004, 2013; 
Galton 2011; Pöppel 2004, 2009), that time does have its own structure, and that this 
                                                             
21 We might also define time as a dimension. 
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conceptual structure is qualitatively distinct from the one that comes from space.22 This is 
the issue I now turn to briefly explore. 
One of the main differences between space and time, following Galton (2011), is that the 
domain of time exhibits something that space does not, and this is transience. Recall from 
chapter 1 that transience is the hallmark of time, and hence part of its inalienable character. 
Transience can be understood as the passing of time: the phenomenologically real 
experience of feeling how time is required for any event as something which underlies them 
no matter what the conceptual nature of the event is. Transience can be further divided into 
three types (according to Evans 2013): (i) duration, (ii) succession, and (iii) anisotropic. In 
addition, Galton (2011) proposes three parameters for comparing time and space. These are 
quantity, linearity and directedness. Let us take a look at each aspect. 
Quantity 
Quantity must be understood as the magnitude that relates to the quantifiability of a given 
substrate – the conceptual structure that makes up the domain, which in the case of space is 
matter. From this, two broad types of matter can be distinguished: discrete entities, such as 
objects, and mass entities, such as fluids. The substrate that makes up a domain allows us to 
quantify it. In the domain of space this relates to the property of extension which manifests 
itself in the three-dimensional character of space, involving length (one dimension), area 
(two dimensions), and volume (three dimensions). 
On the other hand, the substrate of time is action (Talmy 2000). This substrate can also be 
broadly divided into bounded versus unbounded;23 this, in turn, is analogous to the 
distinction between discrete versus mass things in space. The means of “cutting up” action 
into amounts (i.e., quantify) is duration rather than extension. While temporal duration can 
be measured using measuring systems such as clocks, duration can also be estimated 
without such systems. Human beings appear to reliably distinguish periods of different 
temporal magnitudes: it is different to go to the cinema for a couple of hours (even though 
time flies when we are having fun (i.e., temporal compression)), than waiting for our turn 
                                                             
22 However, we do tend to apprehend time in terms of space due to temporal experience being fundamental to 
the construction of events.  
23 This is reflected in language by the grammatical distinction between perfective and imperfective aspect.  
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for 5 minutes in a supermarket counter (in this case time drags when we are bored or 
waiting (i.e., temporal protraction)). 
Lastly, unlike the property of extension, which is exhibited by the spatial substrate matter, 
the quantification of the temporal domain (duration) is unidimensional considering the fact 
that time always moves forward and never stops or goes back. 
Linearity 
The second aspect for presenting a qualitative distinction between the foundations of 
human cognition, here space and time, is linearity. This notion can also be understood as 
dimensionality (in the sense of Evans 2013). This relates to the constituent structure of 
matter (in the case of space) that involves three distinct planes with respect to which points 
can be located. As pointed out above, our representation of space is three dimensional since 
it involves the transversal, sagittal, and vertical planes. On the contrary, the constituent 
structure of action in the domain of time, involves succession. Succession in this view must 
be understood as “the (sequential) relationship that holds between different units and sub-
units of action” (ibid. 64), so our representation of time is unidimensional since it involves 
a relationship between units of action in a sequence. From a phenomenological perspective, 
we can observe that time exhibits dimensionality, just like space does, but the temporal 
dimensionality provides a one-dimensional constituent structure due to its sequential 
relationship between events. 
Directedness 
The last aspect is directedness. This relates to the symmetricity of the substrate in each 
domain. The domain of space is symmetric (i.e., isotropic), that means it has no inherent 
asymmetry since it is possible to proceed in any direction: we can indeed navigate space 
from side to side and forward or back. On the other hand, time is asymmetric (i.e., 
anisotropic). To understand anisotropy, consider the thermodynamic property of matter: a 
cup of coffee cools down and cannot spontaneously heat up again.24 By the same token, and 
                                                             
24 Temporal units must necessarily occur in indefinite succession and this succession cannot be reverted or 
undone; this explains why the past moment when the coffee was hot cannot reoccur spontaneously, or why if 
it is 7.30pm on October 3, 2019, it cannot be 2.30 pm again on the same day a few hours later. 
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at the macroscopic level of matter, the anisotropic nature of time has led some scholars like 
Sir Arthur Eddington to coin the term “the arrow of time” (1928). Time is then experienced 
as anisotropic at the subjective level from a phenomenological perspective. This relates to 
the anticipation of a future event, the actual experience of the event or nowness (James 
[1890]/1950) and the recollection of the event as past. This feature of time is referred to by 
Evans (2013: 65) as anisotropicity.25 
After having reviewed the three most important aspects to see qualitative differences 
between space and time, we can observe that they also meet at the conceptual level, 
considering that both can be scrutinized under the scope of quantity, linearity and 
directedness. Moreover, it is important to mention that space and time can sometimes be 
used interchangeably in linguistically mediated communication to express a similar 
conception. To illustrate this point, consider the following example: 
(1) a. Málaga is 200 kilometers from Córdoba.                                      [distance] 
            b. Málaga is two hours by car from Córdoba.                                   [distance] 
The conceptual phenomenon above is known as conceptual alternativity (Talmy 2000) and 
is used to express a similar conception using different domains of experience, in this case 
space in (1a) and time in (1b) are used to sanction the [distance] lexical concept. Note that 
without such conceptual “meeting point” between space and time, expressions like the ones 
in (1) would be impossible. Temporal and spatio-conceptual structures are interwoven in 
the human mind since they are the foundations of human cognition.26 
Now when it comes to temporal conceptions as in Her birthday is in May or I did my 
homework in the morning, we can observe that these instances are partly motivated by 
spatio-conceptual structure that comes in this case from the relational unit in. However, 
                                                             
25 See also Husserl’s three-fold structure of time-consciousness (1991) which are primal impression – akin to 
what James ([1890]/1950) calls nowness, retention, which deals with the just-past event structure, and 
protention, which has to do with what happens in the immediate future. 
26 Since time and space regularly co-occur in the same scenario, one of them can be used to activate the other 
metonymically, as in (1b).  
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much temporal thinking is also needed to fully apprehend expressions like the ones just 
given. For instance, temporal concepts such as {month}, {morning}, {hour}, {week}, 
{day}, among others, are crucial to conceptually integrate in with its prepositional-
landmark elements as in a prepositional phrase such as in May or in the morning. On the 
other hand, the preposition in might help us to understand a bounded temporal concept such 
as {month} or {morning} due to the spatio-conceptual structure it offers access to, 
particularly because of the parameter of Enclosure that gets activated and metaphorically 
interpreted (see figure 2.1 above) to conceptualize temporal borders. 
Temporal reference is another pivotal factor that is assumed in this research as being part 
and parcel of the type of temporal structure that inheres in the human conceptual system. 
Following Evans (2013) there are three types of temporal frames of references – or t-FoR 
for short – these are deictic (ego-based), sequential (event-based), and extrinsic 
(periodicity-based). This latter temporal strategy is analogous to the absolute spatial frame 
of reference (see Levinson 2003). 
In sum, we can observe that time is far from just “parasitic” with respect to space. Both 
domains manifest similarities (that is the main reason why time is often understood in terms 
of space), and differences. The main difference between these two domains is transience, a 
temporal feature per excellence that constitutes the hallmark of time and is absent in the 
spatial domain. However, spatio-conceptual and temporal structures seem to jointly work in 
the development of the human conceptual system. This makes us think about the possibility 
of positing a sort of “fourth-dimensional space-time continuum” (see Langacker 2012a). 
2.2 Cognitive Grammar 
The theory of Cognitive Grammar (CG for short) has been thoroughly developed by Roland 
Langacker (1987, 1991, 2008). This theory offers an alternative perspective to the 
generative tradition in linguistics (e.g., Chomsky 1965, 1995) since it reflects an intellectual 
trend in the study of language and mind that is not based on mechanistic conceptions but on 
biological systems and cognitive processes. CG is at odds with the (still) dominant 
mainstream in current linguistic theory that advocates a sharp separation between syntax 
and semantics. Syntax in CG is not apprehended as an autonomous system but is included, 
along with semantics and pragmatics, within the semantic pole of a symbolic unit. Words 
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are symbolic units in that they consist of a semantic pole, a phonological pole, and the 
relationship that holds between them. However, the conception of language as symbolic in 
CG goes beyond lexicon to grammar since morphological and syntactic structures are 
inherently symbolic as well (see also Goldberg 1995). Symbolic units, then, are deployed in 
CG for the representation of both lexical and grammatical structure. One of the simplest 
symbolic unit is a morpheme such as table, where semantic and phonological structure 
participate as unanalyzable wholes in a symbolic relationship. From this idea we can 
observe that a symbolic structure is bipolar in that it consists of a semantic pole, a 
phonological pole, and the association between them. Such a symbolic representation 
provides access points to conceptual structure. 
Following Langacker (1987: 11-12) a symbolic unit in CG, embraces the spirit of 
Saussurean linguistics (Saussure 1916); nevertheless, there is a couple of points in which 
CG departs from classic Saussurean philosophy. The first one has to do with the already 
mentioned idea that morphological and syntactic structures are as symbolic as the lexical 
items they deploy. The second point concerns arbitrariness. In CG, a polymorphemic 
linguistic sign is by definition non-arbitrary, since it manifests a level of analyzability. For 
instance, consider the word charger, which is the form used in English to refer to a 
charging device. Given that charge means what it does, and so does the suffix -er, it is 
anything but arbitrary that their integration will yield the form charger as the thing which 
performs such an action. Note that form is conventionalized in that another form could have 
been perfectly chosen for the {charger} concept, but it is not arbitrary in the sense of being 
unmotivated. Arbitrariness, thus, must be understood, along with the notions of 
conventionalization (the speakers’ agreement to employ a given form for a concept) and 
entrenchment (the linguistic mental representation of a given concept that is acquired 
through usage), as motivated, and as something that exhibits a degree of analyzability. 
Another pivotal idea in CG is designation or profiling, which is characterized by the 
highlighting of some entity within a predication. From this idea, two main types of 
predicates can be spotted depending on the conceptual nature of the designated entity: a 
nominal predication or a relational predication. A nominal predication prototypically 
designates or profiles a thing (i.e., nouns), whereas a relational predication prototypically 
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profiles either a process or an atemporal relation (i.e., verbs, prepositions, adjectives, 
among other grammatical categories). It is important to mention, however, the notion of 
base, which is the conceptual “backup” that the profiled entity stands out against. Take for 
example the word head: it profiles a thing with respect to a presupposed mental 
representation of body. As Langacker (1987) puts in “The semantic value of an expression 
resides in neither the base nor the profile alone, but only in their combination; it derives 
from the designation of a specific entity identified and characterized by its position within a 
larger configuration” (ibid. 183). 
The present dissertation is focused on prepositions. They are atemporal relational units that 
are conceptually dependent – that is, one cannot (fully) conceptualize them unless we take 
into consideration the entities that these atemporal relations interconnect. Hence, atemporal 
relational predications such as prepositions, put interconnections in the profile rather than 
in the base. The relational profile of a preposition can be apprehended as the link of the 
content evoked by the primary focus (trajector), which can either be a thing or a relation, 
and the secondary focus (landmark). This latter is generally characterized by simple nouns 
and nominals (Langacker 2008: 116). 
Prepositions are considered atemporal because the temporal profile (i.e., temporal 
evolution) is not critical (as opposed to verbs). This can be exemplified in an utterance such 
as the glass is on the table, where the temporal profile is not necessarily positive (i.e., non-
zero); on the contrary, it is being backgrounded since the strict correspondence between 
conceived time and processing time is suspended. Conceived time refers to the processing 
of an actual activity, whereas processing time deals with conceptual activity. 
Atemporal relations profiled by prepositions can be simplex or complex depending on 
whether a composite conception – the very meaning of words in a situated linguistic event 
– reduces to a single consistent configuration. Simplex atemporal relations are also 
understood as static relations. We can find examples of these in the utterance just given 
above – the glass is on the table – where the preposition on serves as relational unit to 
specify the location of the glass with respect to the table: their interconnections are in the 
profile in a summary way, like when we see a picture of a glass that is on a table.  
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On the contrary, complex atemporal relations evoked by prepositions are considered in 
connection with processual predications as in She’s running along the track, since they do 
not reduce to a single consistent configuration. Another example of that phenomenon is an 
utterance like The cat jumped over the wall, in which the preposition over, conveys path 
rather than location. The evolution of such a situation through time (i.e., conceived time) is 
doubtlessly an important facet of the perfective aspect of the utterance, but it is confined to 
the base and hence, left unprofiled. When we say the cat jumped over the wall, we evoke a 
sequential scanning. However, the specific semantic import of the highly polysemous 
English preposition over (for details see Brugman 1981) is at the expense of the suspension 
of sequential scanning – this in turn, is the main reason why prepositions are considered 
atemporal relational units. Prepositions generally behave in both ways depending on the 
conceptual nature of the elements they are integrated with in a composite structure. Over 
can also function as a simplex atemporal unit as in an expression such as the picture is over 
the sofa, where no sequential but summary scanning is involved.  
Another example in which we can appreciate more clearly the atemporal character of 
complex relational predications evoked by prepositions is in an utterance such as The road 
goes through the mountains, where the preposition through is integrated in the 
prepositional phrase through the mountains which designates a series of distinct locative 
relationships between the trajector, here the road, and its landmark, here the mountains. 
Here the mental scanning is fictive in nature (so it inheres in the virtual plane) and occurs 
only in processing time rather than conceived time. 
2.2.1 Trajector and Landmark 
I now turn to briefly introduce the constructs of trajector (TR) and landmark (LM). This 
asymmetric alignment is fundamental to relational predications and underlies the notion of 
subject/object, among others. Trajector and landmark must be understood as the 
manifestation in language of a more basic cognitive ability known as figure (F) and ground 
(G) in the school of Gestalt psychology. Figure/ground relations have to do primarily with 
perceptual input, as when we pay attention to a bird flying in the sky – the bird becomes the 
attentional figure that is perceived against its background, that is, the sky. 
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It follows from this idea that the TR is the figure in a relational profile whereas the LM is 
the second most prominent entity in a given construction such as the glass is on the table, 
in which the nominal the glass functions as TR, whereas the nominal the table functions as 
LM. Such an alignment, in turn, is linked by the relational unit on that functions as simplex 
atemporal unit and elaboration site for these more conceptually autonomous structures. 
Note that the LM provides a reference point with respect to which the TR is situated. The 
notions of figure (F) and ground (G), and trajector (TR) and landmark (LM) are used 
interchangeably in this research. 
An important aspect to highlight about the TR/LM alignment in prepositional items is that 
the TR, which does not have to necessarily be a mover (Langacker 2008: 72), has a peculiar 
nature in that it can be associated with a thing or a relation. On the other hand, the 
prepositional landmark is more “stable” since it is generally elaborated by things (i.e., 
simple nouns and nominals). For example, in an utterance such as the glass is on the table, 
the nominal profile of the glass elaborates the TR, and the nominal profile of the table 
elaborates the prepositional landmark. This type of TR could be treated as nominal TR due 
to its more autonomous nature since it designates a thing. On the other hand, we also 
encounter relational TRs as in utterances such as She’s running along the track, where the 
TR is elaborated by the clause She’s running, whereas the prepositional landmark is 
elaborated by the nominal profile evoked in the track. Note that in the former utterance the 
preposition on profiles a simplex atemporal relation, compared to the complex atemporal 
relation profiled by the preposition along in the latter utterance. This, in turn, might be key 
to distinguishing such a fine-grained conceptual behavior within the primary focal 
prominence that defines a (prepositional) TR.  
It is also important to mention that the LM of prepositions, even though they tend to be 
elaborated by simple nouns and nominals, sometimes can also be relational as in This glue 
is to fix the table, where the nominal This glue elaborates de TR of to (nominal TR in this 
case), while its LM is elaborated by the clause fix the table. 
According to Langacker (1987), a good point of divergence and reason why to prefer the 
construct of trajector/landmark alignment over subject/object is due to the focus on the 
internal structure of relational predications at any level of organization. It does not need to 
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be spelled out directly as traditionally understood wherein the subject and object are 
normally used for overt nominals such as noun phrases with specifiable roles in clause-
level syntax. On the contrary, TR and LM are often relational rather than nominal in 
character. 
Trajector and landmark will enormously help us to understand how the English and Spanish 
prepositional vehicles analyzed in this research are distributed in the linguistic examples 
provided in the analysis. However, in addition to trajector/landmark alignment, the present 
research also makes use of important descriptive factors within CG that allow us to fully 
apprehend the resulting alignment of the TR and its LM in a situated linguistic usage event. 
Such descriptive factors are correspondences, profile determinacy, and elaboration. They 
will be briefly introduced below. 
Correspondences 
Correspondence links between symbolic units are motivated by the substructures that these 
have in common. The sharing substructures of two component expressions can then be 
integrated in a coherent semantic assembly. To illustrate this point, consider the clause the 
kitten is in the box, where there are correspondence links between the TR of [is] and the 
profile of [the-kitten], as well as between the LM of [in] and the profile of [the-box]. 
Correspondences allow semantic assembly to form composite structures. These must be 
understood as structures that are built by superimposing (through the process of summation 
[Langacker 2012b]) corresponding entities to merge their specifications. 
Elaboration 
Elaboration occurs when correspondence links are established, so it fully fledges the 
semantic assembly of a composite structure. To illustrate how elaboration works, consider 
the prepositional landmark of the utterance just given above (the kitty is in the box), here 
the nominal the box. Once correspondence links are established between the LM of in and 
the profile of the box, the more conceptually dependent relational unit, here the preposition 
in, serves as elaboration site, or e-site for short, for the profile of the more conceptually 
autonomous nominal the box. This makes the conceptually autonomous predication spell 
out its properties in finer detail. 
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Profile Determinacy 
A composite structure generally inherits the profile of one of its components. The inherent 
component structure’s profile is termed the profile determinant. To illustrate, consider the 
clause The toy is under the table, in which [toy] serves as profile determinant due to its 
highly relevant role as main attentional figure in the composite structure which establishes 
correspondence links between its profile – here a thing – and the schematic trajector of the 
relational structure [under-the-table].27 The same goes for head/modifier constructions such 
as bad boys. The head, here boys, is a type of figure that is usually considered as profile 
determinant, whereas the modifier, here bad, constitutes its ground. The head boys 
elaborates the TR of bad which serves as e-site due to its conceptual dependency on more 
conceptually autonomous structures such as the plural noun boys. 
2.3. Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models Theory (LCCM) 
I now provide a brief description of LCCM theory. LCCM Theory is a theoretical account 
of lexical representation and semantic composition in language understanding. This theory 
derives its name from its two main theoretical constructs – cognitive models and lexical 
concepts. Lexical concepts in this account are units of semantic structure that exist as a 
natural part of the mental grammar and sanction specific instances of language use. In this 
dissertation, the lexical concept notion is used interchangeably with the one of sense. On 
the other hand, a cognitive model is a coherent body of non-linguistic knowledge that 
consists of a frame or a combination of related frames. Cognitive models provide rich 
conceptual content to embodied simulations (for details on lexical concepts and cognitive 
models see Evans 2009: Ch. 7 and 10). 
LCCM offers a methodological framework for conducting semantic analysis of lexical 
concepts by providing the two constructs mentioned above, along with the one of 
parameters, which as mentioned earlier, are the semantic elements that make up the 
conceptual basis of a given word (and more complex symbolic assembles such as phrases 
and clauses).  
                                                             
27 On the other hand, the profile determinant of the prepositional phrase under the table is the preposition 
under since it designates a spatial relation rather than the table. 
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Parameters are considered modal (following Barsalou 1999) since they might be 
represented in the same systems that produces them (i.e. sensory-motor mechanisms). A 
common representational system underlies perception (bottom-up processes) and cognition 
(top-down processes); this in turn, is reflected at the conceptual and linguistic levels, as we 
shall see below. As we recognize or produce linguistic expressions, or even imagine an 
event or a thing such as {tree}, the same neural connections in their respective areas (visual 
and motor cortices at the very least) fire up. The same neural connections also fire up when 
we directly perceive the world and move in space.  
Parameters, on the other hand, are also multimodal in that they are structured by perceptual, 
introspective, and event-like conceptual knowledge. Abstract concepts may tend to be more 
structured by introspective and event-like structure whereas concrete concepts by 
perceptual structure (in addition to event-like and introspective structure) due to the 
immediacy of perception. In the case of atemporal relations encoded by prepositions, they 
might be mainly structured by perceptual and event-like structure. However, as we shall see 
in the linguistic analysis, there is also a degree of introspective structure at least in some of 
the prepositional vehicles analyzed. The English and Spanish prepositions for and para 
represent good linguistic evidence of this because they are generally used in situations that 
are related to purposes, intentions, and goals even though such usages are themselves 
spatially organized as shown in chapter 6. 
Parameters can vary according to their level of schematicity as shown in the conceptual 
basis of the English preposition in in figure 2.1 above. The four parameters that, at the very 
least, make up its conceptual basis are more specific than say the parameter of Relation.28 
This type of parameter is a more schematic semantic element in that it is concerned with 
conceptual and grammatical functions – that is, what the preposition profiles at the highest 
level of schematicity. 
                                                             
28 Due to its highly schematic nature, the parameter of (atemporal) Relation is not considered as a member of 
the conceptual basis of in depicted in figure 2.1. However, it is always encoded in linguistic communication. 
Atemporal Relation might function as background information in the form of parametric linguistic 
knowledge. See Morras (in press) for an account of parametric knowledge in linguistic structure. 
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Even though LCCM offers some constructs that are applied in this research such as lexical 
concepts and parameters, I depart from Evans’s theory in some regards that I shall indicate 
below. 
Lexical concepts are claimed to have bipartite organization: on the one hand they encode 
linguistic content, and on the other hand they facilitate access to conceptual structure.  
According to Evans (2006, 2009, 2010b, 2013), linguistic content represents the form that 
conceptual structure takes for direct encoding in language. For instance, a noun such as girl 
encodes linguistic content which can be labelled as [thing] and facilitates access to its 
cognitive model which in turn, provides unlimited possible simulations when that word is 
put in contexts as in I like that girl, Mark looks like a girl, or That perfume is for girls. In 
each utterance, the noun girl acquires a different reading since different substructures or 
attributes get conceptually highlighted within its cognitive model. 
Now the point in which I depart from Evans is that he maintains a sharp distinction between 
closed-class and open-class items (which I agree on but in a different way) and goes further 
by saying that open-class items, but not closed-class ones, facilitate access to conceptual 
structure – that is, cognitive models. It follows, according to LCCM, that lexical concepts 
that are paired with both lexical classes encode linguistic content, but only those lexical 
concepts that are paired with open-class words (i.e., open-class lexical concepts) facilitate 
access to conceptual structure. On the contrary, I think that both classes encode linguistic 
content and facilitate access to conceptual structure. However, the conceptual material that 
is accessed by each grammatical category seems to be of a different kind, as mentioned 
earlier in chapter 1. 
Following Talmy (2000), the distinction between closed-class and open-class items helps 
us to understand the conceptual import afforded by the lexico-grammatical system. Open-
class items seem to provide richer conceptual content whereas closed-class items are 
apprehended as providing a conceptual ‘scaffolding’ – so to speak – in that they provide 
access to a much more schematic content. To illustrate this point, consider the following 
example: 
(1) She painted the house 
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In (1) above, the composite structure is built by the open-class elements paint and house, 
and the closed-class elements she, the -ed suffix, and the. Now if we consider the linguistic 
(and conceptual) schematic content encoded by the lexical concepts that are combined in 
(1), we could gloss it as [someone somethinged the something]. In this way, we can 
appreciate the schematic import of the semantic structure inherent in the combinatorial 
sequence of a pronoun, a regular past tense verb, a definite article, and a noun. On the other 
hand, the schematic meaning encoded in (1) provides access to conceptual structure in the 
form of simulators that allow embodied simulations to take place.29 If we read or close our 
eyes and listen to the utterance in (1), we can indeed simulate a perfective event where 
someone did something to an entity (i.e. the painting event). This is precisely because 
words are access sites to conceptual structure.  
Now my point here is that even though the open-class words paint, and house provide a 
richer conceptual content since their cognitive models are constituted by a large set of 
attributes and values, this may not preclude closed-class items such as she, -ed, and the, 
from being supported by schematic conceptual information. After all, simulators are 
concepts in our mental repository (Barsalou 1999), hence, they are based on encyclopedic 
knowledge and so provide access to conceptual structure. I here assume, therefore, that all 
words and morphemes facilitate access to their conceptual basis, and that conceptual bases 
are constituted by different types of conceptual structure depending on the grammatical 
category that a given (lexical or morphemic) construction belongs to. Cognitive models and 
frames capture the rich conceptual structure offered by open-class items, whereas 
conceptual parameters capture the nature of the schematic type of conceptual structure that 
is accessed via closed-class items. It follows from this that open-class words provide a 
wider access to conceptual structure, while closed-class items provide a narrower one 
(Talmy 2007). 
                                                             
29 In this research symbolic units are assumed to develop together with what they represent in the conceptual 
system. This is akin to what Barsalou (1999) refers to as the associated perceptual symbols of linguistic units. 
There are correspondences between lexical concepts (i.e. word meaning) that populate the mental grammar, 
and non-lexical concepts – those stored in the older conceptual system. The linguistic system, in turn, seems 
to have been evolved later, to harness the conceptual content and make embodied simulation easier to achieve 
by linguistic index and control (see Evans 2014, 2015b). 
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As mentioned above, the difference between the conceptual bases of open and closed-class 
items is a matter of degree between schematic and rich conceptual content. This idea 
further points to different qualities or types of conceptual structures that our encyclopedic 
knowledge of the world – the human conceptual system – might be constituted of. 
The rich conceptual import of open-class words can be appreciated if we replace the 
utterance in (1) with the one given below: 
(2) She smashed the guitar       
We can observe how expression in (2) encodes the same schematic content as (1) above 
([someone did something to something]). However, the composite structure triggers a 
different simulation since it evokes a different perfective event in which the act of 
smashing, rather than painting, is involved. In LCCM Theory, simulations are triggered by 
a subset of lexical concepts, open-class lexical concepts. However, there seem to be 
situations in which closed-class elements play a more distinguishable role in embodied 
simulations. Following Barsalou (1999), word simulation not only has to do with entire 
things and events such as [tree] or [jump], but also with other aspects of simulations such as 
manners (e.g., intelligently), relations (e.g., between), time and aspect (e.g., smashed), 
among others. To illustrate this point, consider the following example: 
(3) a. I want to eat pizza                                                                 [desire] 
            b. She was attached to her mother                             [emotional attachment] 
            c. My laptop is next to the TV                                                [location] 
            d. We are going to the beach                                [motion towards a destination] 
In (3) above, we can observe how a closed-class prepositional vehicle such as to, activates 
different parameters within its conceptual basis (see figure 5.3 in chapter 5) depending on 
the linguistic context it is placed in. In (3a) there are correspondence links between the 
profile of I want and the TR of to, and between the profile of eat pizza and the prepositional 
landmark. The resulting composite conception evokes the [desire] lexical concept or sense 
that is partly sanctioned by to in a distributed way (in the sense of Sinha and Kuteva 1995). 
In (2b), the TR of to is elaborated by She was attached, whereas its prepositional landmark 
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is elaborated by the person to whom the subject’s feelings are aimed at (her mother); the 
resulting sense is the one of [emotional attachment], in which to contributes schematically 
as the vector that characterizes the emotional linearity that goes from one person to another 
(i.e. transfer). In (3c), to activates its locative function, there is no vector whatsoever but a 
static relation in which the laptop (here the entity that elaborates the TR of next to) is 
located with respect to the TV (LM). Finally, in (3d), to behaves as a complex atemporal 
relation in that it encodes a sequence of an ongoing trip to a target destination that functions 
as prepositional landmark, here the profile of the nominal the beach. 
As briefly shown above, open-class and closed-class words should be seen as forming a 
continuum in that we need both to achieve a cognitive representation (in the sense of 
Talmy 2000). The difference hinges in the degree of conceptual schematicity and richness 
that each lexical group contributes to embodied simulations. Closed-class items are indeed 
schematic and serve as scaffolding for meaning construction; nevertheless, they work out 
simulators since they are concepts themselves. We would not say, for instance, that the 
[forward motion] lexical concept, which is encoded by the preposition to, is not a concept. 
On the contrary, it is maybe one of the first concepts we acquire in the early stages of life 
considering the importance of navigating space to achieve our daily goals. Furthermore, 
{forward motion} could be considered an attribute of the spatial navigation frame that may 
background the conceptual basis of the English preposition to. It follows that to does 
facilitate access to conceptual structure – that is, non-linguistic knowledge inherent in the 
human conceptual system. Even though the content offered by to is more schematic than 
saying, chair, which exhibits a conceptually richer simulator due to the affordances it offers 
in our daily lives: we can see chairs and interact with them in a considerable different way 
we apprehend a concept such as {forward motion}, which is more based on proprioception. 
Now when it comes to imagery, it is also easier to evoke a mental picture of a chair than if 
we try to imagine a closed-class vehicle such as to. Nevertheless, we can still think of a 
concept such as to even though the simulation we might evoke would be something like a 
schematic forward vector rather than a mental picture with all its vivid details. 
2.3.1 Lexical representation and meaning determination 
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I now want to briefly address how words are represented in our mental linguistic system 
and how they are narrowed down conceptually for communicative purposes. To do so, one 
of the main constructs presented in this research is the one of conceptual basis, which must 
be understood as the meaning potential that words provide access to. Such potential varies 
depending on the grammatical category that a given morpheme is member of, as shown 
earlier. A conceptual basis is built through proto-scenes (Tyler and Evans 2003a, 2003b). 
Recall that these are humanly relevant scenes in which abstractions and functional 
categories are acquired and hence, parameterized in thought and language. It follows that 
the most relevant experiential aspects of a given proto-scene become the parameters (and 
cognitive models) of a word’s conceptual basis.30 Conceptual bases are not static but 
dynamic, just as concepts and categorization are since they can sanction a proliferation of 
senses in novel contexts of use. Moreover, conceptual bases also provide a psychologically 
real account for the processes of elaboration and extension, which deal with literal and 
figurative understanding, respectively. 
Conceptual bases exist at the level of the lexical representation since they constitute the 
conceptual/linguistic substrate that inhabits in the mental lexicon and is stored in long-term 
semantic memory (as captured in figures 1.1, 1.2, and 2.1 above). Put it differently, they are 
the knowledge we have about what words mean in the absence of any context – under the 
first condition of attending (in the sense of Talmy 2007) within introspection. For instance, 
if we say the word chair or to, there is indeed something that tells us what they mean. This 
in turn, is due to the conceptual basis we have for each word in our mind as a proficient or 
native speaker of English. However, there is a clear difference in how we simulate isolated 
words such as chair and to. The former is richer due to the cognitive models that compose 
its conceptual basis – it offers a wider access to conceptual structure – whereas the closed-
class item to offers a narrower access, and this is indeed reflected in the schematic structure 
in terms of the parameterized spatio-conceptual structure that is offered by this preposition. 
                                                             
30 Cognitive models are conceptually richer than conceptual parameters. Recall that conceptual parameters are 
constituted by a more schematic type of conceptual structure – they compress the complexity of experience 
into semantic units for linguistically mediated communication. At an even higher schematic level, we can also 
consider the parameter of [RELATION] as the linguistic nature that prepositions, among other grammatical 
categories, exhibit.  
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On the other hand, and this is related to a more complex level of organization due to lexical 
integration, there is meaning determination. This notion is taken from the work of Jens 
Allwood (2003) and must be understood as the realization of a symbolic unit in context. 
This in turn, is consonant with Langacker’s (e.g., 1987, 2008, 2009) idea of active zones. 
The present research takes a somehow nuanced perspective on the notion of active zone 
since it is seen as a highlighting process that deals with the specific parameters and/or 
cognitive models of a word’s conceptual basis that are most directly involved in a given 
linguistic construction.31 
Even though words should not be apprehended outside context, the distinction between 
lexical representation and meaning determination seems useful in that it provides insight on 
the conceptual and linguistic knowledge that populate our mental grammar. It suggests that 
there must be “something” about words that has to be stored in long-term semantic memory 
for recognition, imagination, and production. On the other hand, the notion of meaning 
determination provides good insight on how words acquire their situated semantics. After 
all, when words get integrated in a situated linguistic event, a substructure of each 
conceptual basis is the one that gets highlighted or activated. On this respect, and following 
Langacker (1987: 68-71), we can say that word sanctioning is generally partial. 
2.4 Metaphor 
I now turn to conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; see also 
Kövecses 1986, 2005) by providing a brief introduction and show how this theory will be 
used. 
Metaphor has been traditionally seen in Linguistics and Philosophy as a matter of 
peripheral interest. However, cognitive-linguistic research on metaphor, particularly the 
pioneering work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999; see also Grady 1997 for primary 
                                                             
31 For Langacker himself (2000) active zone has to do with the ‘parts’ or ‘portion’ of an entity that participate 
most directly in a profiled relationship. For example, in a sentence such as Your dog bit my cat, the part of the 
dog that is most directly involved is {TEETH}, rather than say, {TAIL}. While I agree with Langacker’s notion, 
the present investigation takes a nuanced perspective on this notion by considering the activation or 
highlighting of the conceptual parameters as another instance of active zone since it shows the semantic 
elements that are directly involved in a given profiled relationship while others remain backgrounded.  
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metaphors, and Barcelona 2000b for the interaction of metaphor and metonymy) has 
demonstrated the central role that metaphor has not only in language, but also in human 
thought and action. Metaphor is pervasive in our everyday life to the point that it is 
considered as a key component of our human conceptual system. Due to the metaphorical 
nature of a large part of our conceptual system, language is an important source of evidence 
to understand what that system is like. To provide an idea of how a concept can be 
understood metaphorically, I cite an example taken from Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 4) 
about the concept of {argument} that in some Western cultures is apprehended as {war}: 
argument is war 
Your claims are indefensible 
He attacked every weak point in my argument 
She demolished his argument 
I’ve never won an argument with her 
We can observe that many of the things we do in an argument are partially structured by the 
concept of {war}. Therefore, {argument} is the target domain – the concept we aim to 
understand – whereas {war} constitutes the source domain – the domain from which we 
can extract attributes and values in order to generate the metaphorical mapping. Such a 
metaphorical mapping highlights the most relevant aspects of the source domain (while 
hiding others) to apprehend the target concept. This selective process is due to the 
“invariance principle” (Lakoff 1990), which stipulates that metaphorical mappings preserve 
the image-schematic structure of the source domain. Source domain inferences in the form 
of image-schematic structure help to fully flesh the understanding of the target domain 
(ibid. 54). Note that the words in italics in the example just given above are precisely the 
attributes that are taken from the concept of {war}. Such attributes do help structuring other 
concepts such as {argument}. The {argument} concept exhibits metaphorical coherence 
(see Lakoff and Johnson 1980: Ch. 16) to be understood in terms of war since an argument 
is understood as a verbal fight in which there is a winner and a loser. 
However, a caveat is in order when we represent abstract concepts such as {argument} or 
even more abstract ones such as {anger} in terms of a hot fluid exploding in a container 
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(Lakoff and Johnson 1980), and it has to do with the necessity of a direct, non-metaphorical 
representation of an abstract domain since metaphor itself is not sufficient for representing 
abstract concepts (Barsalou et al. 1993, Barsalou 1999; see also Murphy 1996). This idea is 
not of course to deny the major role of metaphor in elaborating and construing abstract 
concepts. On the contrary, it complements our understanding of how abstract concepts are 
structured in the human mind. Following Barsalou (1999), the necessity of a direct, non-
metaphorical representation of an abstract domain is important for two reasons. The first 
one is that it constitutes the most basic understanding of the domain. To know that an 
argument is like a war or that anger is like a hot fluid in a container, does not exhaust our 
notions of argument and anger: those concepts exist independently in the conceptual system 
even though they are conceptualized in an easier way through metaphorical mappings – that 
is precisely why metaphor facilitates rather than completely structures abstract concepts.  
The second reason for advocating the existence of a basic direct, non-metaphorical 
representation of abstract concepts is that such a representation guides the mapping of a 
concrete domain onto it. This idea is endorsed by the fact that a concrete domain, as in the 
metaphor love is a journey, here journey, cannot be mapped systematically onto an abstract 
domain, here love, if this target domain is “contentless”. 
Some research on emotions (e.g., Mandler 1975) has shown that people have direct 
knowledge of emotions such as {anger}. Such direct knowledge comes from three sources 
of experience. First, anger involves the perception that an event’s goal has been blocked. 
Second, the perception of an event’s goal being blocked, triggers the experience of intense 
affective states. The third source of experience involves the subject’s behavioral responses, 
such as seeking revenge, expressing disapproval, among other responses. In sum, each of 
these three aspects of anger make people develop a concept of it through direct experience. 
When people (metaphorically) think of a concept such as {anger}, that understanding 
elaborates and extends the direct concept, making it more accessible and cognition friendly. 
Furthermore, metaphor (and metonymy) often involve polysemy (Lakoff 1990, 1993) as in 
an utterance such as Ralph exploded with anger in which the past-tense verb exploded 
points to a figurative meaning rather than its literal one: a person clearly cannot explode 
due to anger. On the contrary, it points to an intensification – linguistically speaking – of 
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such a mental state. Under this context, the verb explode activates a simulation of angry 
behavior which comes from direct phenomenological and subjective experience. This 
activation might be due to the extension of the Explosion cognitive model that may 
populate the conceptual basis of explode, but which, nevertheless, needs conceptual 
metaphor for its proper interpretation in the non-spatial domain since we are dealing in this 
case with a psychological state rather than with an explosive event. 
Metaphorical understanding is doubtlessly critical to understanding the meaning extension 
exhibited by the English and Spanish prepositions analyzed in this research. To illustrate 
this point, consider the following example with the English preposition in (Spanish en), 
which even though it is not considered in the linguistic analysis of the present study, is a 
good linguistic example considering that its conceptual basis was already presented in 
figure 2.1 above: 
(4)      a. The students are in the classroom                                          [location] 
                   (Los estudiantes están en el aula) 
                 b. They are in trouble                                                      [psychological state] 
                   (Ellos están en problemas) 
In (4) above, the English preposition in and its Spanish equivalent en establish a relation 
between the TR and the LM. In (4a), the profile of the students establishes correspondence 
links with the TR of in – hence, in serves as e-site and its TR is elaborated. On the other 
hand, the prepositional landmark of in is elaborated by the nominal the classroom due to 
correspondence links between the nominal’s profile and the LM of in. The resulting 
composite structure yields [location] as main lexical concept. Now if we take a look at the 
conceptual basis of in in figure 2.1 above, we can observe that there is conceptual 
activation of the parameter of Enclosure, since the students are located inside the 
classroom, probably for a lesson. There might also be activation of the parameter of 
Occlusion unless the classroom walls are made of transparent glass or the classroom is 
equipped with windows, so one could see the students inside when walk past. 
On the other hand, (4b) evokes a completely different scene, even though it employs the 
same relational unit, here the preposition in and its Spanish equivalent en. In (4b), they 
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profiles a group of two or more people; this profile establishes correspondence links with 
the TR of in and hence elaborates it, whereas its prepositional landmark is elaborated by the 
noun trouble. The resulting composite conception yields a scene in which the prototypical 
three-dimensional locative function of in, and en, is not the highlighted aspect of their 
conceptual basis. Rather, the parameter that receives primary activation is the one of 
Affecting Conditions. Such a motivation comes from the very nature of containers: they 
provide affecting conditions to the entity contained. As mentioned earlier, it is not the same 
leaving fresh food in the oven rather than leaving it in the fridge. They are different types of 
containers and hence provide different affecting conditions to the food stored. In addition to 
this activation, the Affecting Conditions parameter also becomes metaphorically extended 
so as to apprehend the [psychological state] lexical concept.32  
To sum up, metaphorical understanding is crucial for non-spatial usages of prepositions. 
Nevertheless, this is not the whole story; we do need non-metaphorical representations of 
abstract concepts such as [trouble] and [love] as well. What metaphorical understanding 
brings to the front, is a key aspect that facilitates the conceptualization of abstract (and 
temporal) concepts and which is based on more concrete human experience. Recall that all 
the concepts that inhabit our human conceptual system are derived from the same 
situational content (Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005), but their situational focus varies 
depending on how much perceptual, introspective, and event-like structure is embedded in 
each concept. 
2.5 Metonymy 
Metonymy is a conceptual process that is entrenched in human language, thought and 
action. Just like metaphor, metonymic concepts structure and give its nature to the human 
conceptual system. However, metonymic patterns seem to be more basic than metaphorical 
ones. As a matter of fact, some scholars have even come to suggest, as a plausible 
hypothesis, that metonymic patterns regularly motivate metaphor (Barcelona 2000a) and 
                                                             
32 Moreover, metonymy is instrumental (following Barcelona 2000a, 2011) in extracting the abstract 
correlation between some elements of the target’s conceptual structure and a similar element in the source’s 
conceptual structure in (4b). Here the Affecting Conditions parameter is the semantic element that connects 
containers with emotional states. 
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grammar (Barcelona 2009; Langacker 2009), an idea that seems indeed plausible if we 
assume the more basic and essential role of metonymy in human thought and action. This 
in turn, might be due to the more specific scope, hence informative aspect of metonymies. 
Metonymies not only serve a referential function, but also provide an easier, quicker initial 
understanding of the concept that is being activated. Such a function is carried out through 
mental access: concept A provides access to and activates the semantically related concept 
B. This is called by Barcelona (2009, 2011) the “inferential” function of metonymy, and he, 
following Panther and Thornburg (2007), claims that metonymy is a basic inferential 
mechanism. 
To illustrate a metonymic pattern that is reflected in language, consider a nowadays classic 
example taken from the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 35): 
(5) The ham sandwich asked for his check. 
In (5) above, the ham sandwich stands for the costumer who asked for the sandwich and is 
waiting for his check. Note also that there is conceptual coherence between the two entities 
that constitute the metonymic relation. 
It is important to mention that example (5) should not be considered a part for whole  
metonymy,33 since we are not exactly dealing with either a metonymic expansion or 
reduction (in the sense of Ruiz de Mendoza 2017) of the same entity but only with 
conceptual relatedness or correspondences between two different entities – in this case the 
customer and the sandwich ordered.34 In a sentence such as There are a lot of good heads in 
the university, in which good heads stands for smart people – that is, we refer to one type of 
entity by mentioning one of its salient parts. By and large, we can say that one of the most 
general properties of metonymy is the notion of mental access, which is provided by one 
                                                             
33 Following Lakoff and Johnson (1980), PART FOR WHOLE metonymies are included as special ones since 
they have been referred to by rhetoricians as synecdoche. However, in the present research metonymic 
patterns are not treated under a different label. PART FOR WHOLE metonymies maintain the same essence of 
this cognitive operation, which is mental access and activation. 
34 On the issue of the convenience to maintain the tripartite distinction between WHOLE FOR PART, PART FOR 
WHOLE and PART FOR PART, see Barcelona (2019). 
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element (or a facet of it) with respect to another semantically related entity (for a detailed 
analysis of the properties of metonymy and the main types thereof, see Barcelona 2011). 
As mentioned at the outset of this section, metonymic patterns appear to be more basic than 
metaphorical ones, and this is reflected in the way we think and act.35 For instance, 
everyone knows the voice of their best friend. So, if we hear the voice of our best friend 
saying “Ey, it’s me!” while knocking the door, we would immediately know that it is her. 
In this case, the mind processes a voice for person (best friend) metonymy. Moreover, the 
way in which our best friend knocks the door, might be another metonymic cue considering 
that people generally know plenty of things about their best friend, including their behavior. 
Furthermore, this metonymic contingency is also reflected in the animal kingdom in the way 
animals recognize each other just by listening to each other in the jungle. Such a primitive 
and essential animal and human capacity, in turn, might provide a line of evidence to 
demonstrate the more basic role of metonymy in human cognition. Metonymy is manifest 
in lower-semantic levels such as index and icon: both consist in a relationship between two 
entities in which one provides mental access to the other. This highly entrenched status and 
level of pervasiveness of metonymy in everyday life, has led some scholars such as 
Langacker (2009) and Barcelona (p.c.) to think about metonymic constraints in active 
zones. After all, if the role of metonymy in human cognition is pivotal due to its existence 
at more basic semantic levels, then the fact should not surprise us that it is also present at 
the highest semantic level – here the symbolic system of language. 
It may be a plausible idea to think of active zones as being motivated by metonymic 
processes. If we consider that words are access points to conceptual structure, which takes 
the form of a word’s conceptual basis, and that some parameters and/or cognitive models 
(depending on the grammatical category of the symbolic unit) get activated due to context 
while others are backgrounded , then we can observe that there is a narrowing-down 
process that is concerned with the active zones of the conceptual basis, as exemplified in 
the introductory examples given for in and to above. 
                                                             
35 Recall that metonymies are more specific since they exhibit a narrower scope than metaphors: they not only 
provide specific reference but facilitate understanding. They are mental shortcuts.  
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Note that there is indeed a reductive operation when we listen to a sentence and process it. 
This process might be two-fold: first we access the conceptual unit – here the coherent 
semantic assembly of the words’ conceptual bases in discourse – and then, the parameters 
and cognitive models that are most directly involved get highlighted.36 It follows that such 
a reductive operation is a metonymic pattern which is characterized by the whole for part 
metonymy: a cognitive zooming-in operation, as when we say I hurt my arm, in which the 
whole arm is profiled; however, its active zone concerns the area in which the injury or 
bruise is located.  
The theories and constructs presented in this chapter constitute the theoretical foundation to 
appreciate in the best way possible the linguistic analysis provided in chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the analysis is about the English prepositions between, among, 
amid, to, and for; and their Spanish equivalents entre, a, and para.  
The next chapter is devoted to discussing the methodology followed in the research 
reported in this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
36 Those processes might occur almost in tandem. A difference in processing time might exist. 
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2.6 Summary 
The theories and constructs shown in this chapter represent the core theoretical ground 
from which this investigation has been carried out. Space and time are the foundations of 
human cognition. They both have their own conceptual structure, which can be labeled as 
spatio-conceptual and temporal, respectively. The chapter presented the theory of CG, this 
provides elegant constructs for the linguistic analysis presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6, 
especially trajector and landmark alignment, correspondence links, and elaboration. 
LCCM theory, which is a theory inspired by CG (among other theories such as Conceptual 
Blending [Fauconnier and Turner 2002]), also provides us with sophisticated tools for 
analytical thought, particularly the ones of parameters and lexical concepts. Finally, the 
theories of Conceptual Metaphor and Metonymy were briefly introduced. Both figurative 
tropes structure the conceptual system, but metonymy seems to be more basic than 
metaphor due to its informative and referential character and because it is present in lower 
semantic levels such as index and icon. Metaphor and metonymy also help us to apprehend 
more clearly processes of semantic extension and temporal conceptualizations of linguistic 
constructions. Furthermore, metonymic features might drive the active zones of a word’s 
conceptual basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
The ideas and theories about conceptual structuring in language that come from the 
Cognitive Linguistics enterprise have been mainly posited on traditional grounds – that is, 
introspection and theoretical analysis. These are standard methodological tools in the field 
of linguistics overall. However, work in areas such as corpus linguistics (e.g., 
Stefanowitsch 2003; Grondelaers 2000) and experimental methods (e.g., Carlson and 
Kenny 2006; Carlson-Radvansky, Covey, and Lattanzi 1999) have provided new insights 
and perspectives to the understanding of language and cognition. It follows that these 
additional methodologies, among others, can provide unique contributions to the whole 
picture: the nature of conceptual organization in language. 
The present investigation makes use of real instances of language use. The analysis presents 
actual usage – as it appears in corpora in the form of spontaneous, non-elicited language 
data. This methodological decision is in line with one of the main tenets in cognitive 
linguistics: the usage-based approach.  
We have combined this corpus-based approach with analytical thought. This involves the 
systematic use of abstraction, comparison, and reasoning. This activity is by itself 
introspective in character. Introspection is key for the semantic analysis presented in 
chapters 4, 5, and 6 – as it has been for the development of cognitive linguistics. Following 
Talmy (2007), linguistic introspection is the conscious attention that a language user directs 
to particular aspects of language. Attention can be paid at three different conditions of 
attending. The first deals with conceptual content associated with linguistic representations, 
the second is concerned with the various aspects of language occurring while one is 
engaged in linguistically mediated communication – that is, at the discourse level. The third 
and last condition of attending deals with the memory trace of different aspects of language 
that were just manifested (ibid. xiii-xvi).  
The research reported in this dissertation deals exclusively with the first condition of 
attending since it intends to show the mental representations of the prepositions at the level 
of the lexical representation – the conceptual content in isolation – as well as their context-
induced interpretations (i.e., meaning determination) due to lexical integration. 
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3.1 The role of introspection  
According to Talmy (2007), meaning is not the only area of language for whose study 
introspection is virtually inevitable, but it also has the advantage over other methodologies 
of providing direct access to analytical thought. Introspection can actually access different 
types of meanings depending on the grammatical category under scrutiny. In the present 
study we deal with prepositions, which compared to grammatical categories such as nouns, 
verbs, adjectives (and adverbs), offer a narrower access to conceptual structure.37 For 
instance, one can readily attend to the meaning of the open-class word table, one can also 
readily simulate a table and describe it in the mind if one is asked to do so. On the other 
hand, attending to the meaning of a closed-class word such as to, requires much attention to 
the parameters that constitute its conceptual basis.38 The meaning of a closed-class element 
is more schematic than the rich conceptual content evoked by open-class elements. This, in 
turn, is linguistic evidence that the conceptual system might be constituted by more than 
one type of conceptual structure, among them spatio-conceptual, temporal, and 
introspective. Words offer access to conceptual structure of different kinds (as briefly 
shown for the noun hospital and the preposition at in chapter 1). It seems that the wider the 
access point is, the richer the conceptual structure provided. This notion is indeed 
consonant with the view of closed-class elements as “semantic scaffolding” (Talmy 2000) 
for the richer conceptual content provided by open-class elements in order to create a 
cognitive representation. 
                                                             
37 As mentioned in chapter 2, this idea goes contrary to Evans (e.g., 2009, 2010b, 2013) in that he claims that 
closed-class lexical concepts do not provide access points to conceptual structure but encode purely linguistic 
content.  While I agree that words do have purely linguistic content that might be encoded in a parametric 
fashion (i.e., linguistic parameters), closed-class items offer a narrow access to conceptual structure. The 
(conceptual) parameters shown for the conceptual bases in this research are in fact a product of this narrow 
access in that they manifest a more schematic conceptual content – compared to the richer (and so less 
schematic) conceptual structure that is mainly offered by nouns, verbs, and adjectives. Hence, open-class 
items offer a wider access to this conceptual structure (which in turn, can be of different types). 
38 By the same token, in the case we close our eyes and try to imagine the preposition to in isolation, we might 
not get a mental simulation as rich as if we imagine a table. 
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Within the first condition of attending, the focus can fall on the isolation of a preposition 
such as to, as well as on its contextual linguistic realizations and the meaning of the whole 
phrase or sentence in which this element is integrated. This first level of isolation is treated 
in the present study as lexical representation – the semantic spectrum of words which has 
been formalized in this study (as well as elsewhere [e.g., Morras 2018; Morras and 
Barcelona 2019]) as conceptual basis. The conceptual bases of the words that populate a 
speaker’s mental lexicon, are ultimately stored in long-term semantic memory. The attempt 
to describe lexical representation in terms of the conceptual basis proposed for each 
preposition, has been done in support for the idea that there must be something in the 
mental lexicon that is readily accessed through language and allows a proliferation of 
meanings when engaged in different contexts. This is an issue that will be further 
developed in the analysis. 
At the second level of isolation, we can study the linguistic realization of a word’s 
conceptual basis – that is, the semantics that words achieve once they are put in context. 
For instance, we can think of the closed-class item over as a schematic relational unit that 
links two things in which the TR is (prototypically) in a higher position with respect to its 
LM as in There are black clouds over the city. The composite conception might sanction 
the [ABOVE] lexical concept – a simplex atemporal scene that involves summary scanning. 
Now, if we put the same preposition in a different context such as in Joe jumped over his 
neighbor’s fence to get his soccer ball, rather than summary scanning, over is integrated in 
a sequential operation, so it activates different parameters of its conceptual basis. In this 
case, the lexical concept that is sanctioned might be glossed as [CHANGE OF LOCATION] 
since it involves the change of location of the TR (Joe) – it starts at point A, passes point B 
(the fence),39 and finally arrives at point C.  
As shown above, the two levels of isolation – what is referred to in this study as lexical 
representation and meaning determination – are the two main analytical constructs to study 
the spatial, non-spatial, and temporal behavior of the prepositions proposed in this research.  
3.2 The utility of corpora 
                                                             
39 To pass point B, the TR must move up and then down that LM. 
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The use of dictionaries complements analytical thought in a thorough semantic analysis. 
This method can be considered as a type of corpus work that can address questions 
regarding the polysemous senses that a particular word can have – an issue that is also 
briefly addressed in this research since the analysis deals with the active zones (Langacker 
1987, 2000, 2008, 2009) of prepositions, among other things. Recall from the previous 
chapter that the notion of active zone is treated somehow differently in this research. Here it 
is understood as the highlighting of one or more parameters or cognitive models of a 
word’s conceptual basis that are most directly involved in a given construction. 
To analyze the semantics of prepositions and try to pin down the conceptual parameters that 
might constitute their respective conceptual basis, two dictionaries has been made use of. 
For the English prepositions the present author used the Cambridge (Online) English 
Dictionary (or CED for short), whereas for the Spanish prepositions the Diccionario de la 
Lengua Española (DLE) was used. In addition, other works have also been used to propose 
the conceptual bases presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6, notably the work of Ramón Trujillo 
(1971) for the Spanish entre (equivalent to between, among and amid), and Tyler and Evans 
(2003a) and Wierzbicka (1988) for to (Spanish a) and for (Spanish para). 
A further supplement to analytical thought is the use of corpora. As mentioned above, 
cognitive linguistics is usage-based, so it should complement its introspective nature with 
methodologies that focus on naturalistically produced speech, such as audiovisual 
recordings and corpora.40 Even though corpora are mainly used for linguistic phenomena 
whose range of instantiation or frequency is the issue (for such a case see Grondelaers, 
Geeraerts, and Speelman 2007), they can also help us to map out the different realizations 
of a linguistic symbol. Doing a manual search in the concordance section, the present 
author intended just that: To go through several examples, paying special attention to the 
conceptual nature of the trajector/landmark alignment of the prepositions under scrutiny.  
The two corpora that were used for this research are the British National Corpus (BNC) for 
the English prepositions, and the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) for the 
Spanish ones.  
                                                             
40 A drawback, however, is that in the corpus database the text is captured segmentally, leaving aside 
expressive accompaniments and the timing of the components. This is not so in audiovisual recordings.  
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As noted above, corpus work is not only used for statistical purposes, but also for obtaining 
real instances of language-in-use as raw material for analytical thought, among other uses. 
Statistical findings are not the main aim of the present research. Corpus work in this study 
is used exclusively to keep up with the spirit of the usage-based approach to language and 
conceptual structuring by analyzing real (rather than invented) instances of spatial, non-
spatial, and temporal usages of the English and Spanish prepositions. 
In sum, the combination of introspection under the first condition of attending, with the use 
of dictionaries and corpora, are the main tools to attempt to arrive at the nature of the 
lexical representation and meaning determination of the English and Spanish prepositions 
selected. It follows from this that the correct use of ‘introspection’, following (Talmy 
2007), involves grounding one’s analyses on real representative, naturally occurring data. 
For the lexical representation level, I propose a number of conceptual bases as a way to 
understand (and identify) the parameters that, at the very least, should constitute the 
meaning spectrum of a preposition. This representational level in turn, will be key to shed 
some light on the contextual realizations of prepositions (i.e., their meaning determination). 
3.3 Presentation of the analysis 
In the analysis, which covers chapters 4, 5, and 6, I first consider the spatial structure that 
underlies the conceptual basis of each preposition. Dictionaries and examples taken from 
corpora will be essential to posit the conceptual parameters that may constitute each 
conceptual basis. The conceptual basis in turn, allows us to apprehend in a better way the 
phenomenological structuring of spatial language underlying the semantics of prepositions. 
Once we get to a thorough spatial analysis, the parameters that were identified as 
constituting the conceptual basis of each preposition will be used to show how they 
motivate non-spatial and temporal usages. In addition, Conceptual Metaphor (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980; 1999) and metonymy (Barcelona 2011, 2015) theories will be applied to 
investigate how we move from the spatial to the non-spatial, and on how we conceptualize 
temporal expressions by recruiting spatio-conceptual structure. 
Once a comparison between some spatial and non-spatial lexical concepts for each 
preposition is provided, I will proceed to show their temporal behavior. To do so, the 
conceptual basis will again help us to apprehend the temporal semantics of prepositions 
 
 
52 
 
since, as we shall see, there is spatio-conceptual structure that is mapped from the spatial 
domain to the temporal one.  
I want to highlight at this point that even though temporal concepts are inherently non-
spatial, the present investigation treats them as being purely temporal.41 This is due to 
temporal structure partly constituting the human conceptual system (as introspective 
structure partly does as well). Hence, we speak of the temporal domain whenever we deal 
with temporal reference. As seen in chapter 2, the domain of time is not fully motivated by 
spatio-conceptual structure, and it might not even be close to that, as some authors have 
suggested otherwise (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1999).42 It turns out that there is much more 
temporal structure in the human conceptual system than previously thought. Recall that 
time is as foundational for human cognition as space, and it might be even more if we 
assume that time is “the event” in which all others unfold. Moreover, and as previously 
mentioned, time constitutes an integrational system (the 3-second window) at the neuronal 
level that is essential for conceptualization due to its pre-semantic character (see Pöppel 
2004, 2009). 
To identify the temporal structure that underlies the temporal usages of the prepositions 
presented in this research, I consider some temporal concepts such as extrinsic temporal 
reference and transience. Extrinsic temporal reference is analogous (even though not 
completely) to its spatial counterpart – an absolute spatial coordinate system that makes use 
of fixed bearings. Time can also be seen in an absolute manner by using periodicity-based 
systems that fix events within a temporal matrix, irrespective of subjective experience. On 
the other hand, transience is the feature that differentiates time from space. Recall that 
transience can be understood in terms of the subjectively felt experience of the passage of 
time and that the type of transience that is involved in extrinsic temporal reference is 
duration. These two temporal concepts, along with some others that will be introduced 
                                                             
41 This is the main reason why non-spatial and temporal usages are treated in separate sections in the present 
dissertation. 
42 Even though Lakoff and Johnson do not claim that our understanding of time is fully motivated by space, 
they think it is mostly so. This view is at odds with the present research, since time seems to be even more 
basic than space for human cognition, and this is because time works at the neuro-cognitive level, as 
suggested by some neuroscientists such as Ernst Pöppel (e.g., 2004, 2009). 
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throughout the analysis, are based on recent findings in the cognitive sciences, particularly 
in areas such as philosophy (e.g., Galton 2011), neuroscience (e.g., Pöppel 2004, 2009; 
Walsh 2003), neuropsychology (e.g., Kemmerer 2005) and cognitive linguistics (e.g., 
Evans 2004, 2013; Morras 2018; Morras and Barcelona 2019; Sinha et al. 2016). These 
findings, among others, provide a solid ground for positing a type of conceptual structure 
that is purely temporal in nature and plays a prominent role in the temporal usages of 
prepositions. 
After identifying the topological structure encoded by prepositions and its role in non-
spatial and temporal conceptions, the research will provide some pedagogical ideas (in 
chapter 7, section 7.3) for teaching prepositions to Spanish and English students. The 
conceptual bases shown throughout this investigation are expected to help students (and 
teachers) to apprehend considerably better the semantics of spatial language and appreciate 
more clearly how the spatio-conceptual structure offered by prepositions is key to 
understanding part of the conceptual structuring underlying non-spatial and temporal 
prepositional usages. It follows that the next step, even though not covered in the present 
investigation, is to test the efficiency of the conceptual bases proposed by applying them 
into the classroom for English, Spanish and/or linguistics lessons. This in turn, would 
contribute to approach the much-desirable cognitive linguistic syllabus, an idea envisioned 
by some applied linguists such as Randal Holme (2009: Ch.9). 
3.4 Further methodologies 
A further methodology, not applied but just suggested in this research, has to do with 
experimental methods to validate the psychological reality of the conceptual parameters for 
the prepositions analyzed (see chapter 7, section 7.4). The application of experimental 
methods to linguistic cognition has the advantage of addressing individual cognitive factors 
by presenting participants with stimuli or instructions and monitoring their responses. 
Additional advantages of experimental methods such as Placement tasks and Acceptability 
Ratings,43 are the accessibility to their millisecond scale of cognitive processes (which is 
not available to any other methodology) (Talmy 2007: xx), as well as the complementation 
that experimental methods provide to other methodologies such as introspective first 
                                                             
43 See Carlson and Hill (2007) for an overview of these types of methods. 
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condition of attending and corpus work. Regarding introspection, even though it might not 
be fully reliable due to its subjective character, it nevertheless allows an examination of the 
linguistic processing that may occur inside an individual’s cognition. This permits us to 
describe human cognition as an integrated system. Such hypotheses can be further 
supported by corpus work and experimental methods. Corpus work, in turn, shares with 
experimental methods the fact that both base their conclusions on the linguistic behavior 
identified across a set of individuals, allowing us to discern important minute 
characteristics of linguistic cognition, such as the core semantic values of between, among, 
and amid with respect to the parameters of Separation, Inclusion, and Central position, as 
we shall see in more detail in chapter 7. 
By and large, each of the methodologies mentioned above contributes from its own partial 
perspective to our overall understanding of conceptual structuring in language. However, 
each presents limitations. This generates the necessity of the application of other 
methodologies as a matter of complementation (for instance audiovisual recordings). It 
should be further noticed, following Gibbs (2007), that each methodology needs to pay 
attention to the findings of neighboring areas so as to get new ideas about where to continue 
within its own practice. This is particularly the feedback that is needed in the cognitive 
sciences to approach an integral view of human cognition. This idea is akin to the cognitive 
commitment, (Lakoff 1990) which states that an account of human language must accord to 
what is generally known about the mind from disciplines other than linguistics, such as 
psychology and neuroscience. 
The complementary methods used in this research such as corpus work (dictionaries and 
corpora) and the proposals for experimental methods and teaching practices given after the 
analysis, intend to provide an answer to the complaints of some scholars in such areas as 
cognitive psychology (e.g., Gibbs 2007), as well as in other disciplines (e.g., Sandra 1998), 
on the introspective character of linguistic analysis and the lack of a clear explanation of 
the methods used. Nowadays, many cognitive scientists are skeptical of theoretical claims 
that are based exclusively on introspection since this does not constitute the kind of 
objective, replicable data that many scholars in the cognitive (and natural) sciences prefer. 
This in part is why this research makes use of non-made-up linguistic expressions for the 
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analysis. It also offers further proposals to corroborate the psychological reality and 
pedagogical applications of the hypotheses that will be presented here. This, in turn, will 
provide falsifiable proposals so that alternatives might be suggested if the conceptual bases 
proposed for the prepositions under analysis turned out to be incorrect.  
The next section pertains to the lack of a well-established methodology to identify 
figuration in language, a conceptual phenomenon that has been elusive for linguists, but 
which nevertheless, the present research intends to shed some light on. 
3.5 Identifying figurative language 
Even though there are many theoretical attempts to identify and describe figuration in 
language (e.g., Bowdle and Gentner 2005; Evans 2010d; Giora 2003), there is still no 
consensus among cognitive linguists as to how a given word or expression in context 
expresses metaphorical meaning. This section, far from establishing such consensus, 
intends to put forward some elementary tenets about the continuum existing between 
literality and figuration in language, with special emphasis on prepositional usages. 
First and foremost, we have to consider literality and figuration in processing terms. Under 
this condition, the traditional view (e.g., Searle 1979) of a strict differentiation between 
literal and figurative language is untenable. It turns out that metaphorical understanding 
begins as early in processing as literal understanding (Goldvarg and Glucksberg 1998), and 
in the case of idiomatic expressions (e.g. spill the beans) their metaphorical meanings are 
processed more quickly than their literal ones (Gibbs 1994). 
Literality and figuration seem to be driven by the very same mechanisms, namely lexical 
concept selection, integration, and interpretation (see Evans 2009: 215-278). The saliency 
factor, as pointed out by some authors such as Giora (2003, 2008) might be key to 
determining whether an expression is literal or figurative. Saliency determines which 
meaning is processed more quickly. Under this perspective, figuration is seen as a graded 
phenomenon.  
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Also involved in figurative language understanding are knowledge types and complexity.44 
Following Evans (2009) Complexity has to do with the length of the access route that a 
given lexical concept exhibits. Knowledge types are concerned with figurative tropes such 
as primary (Grady 1997) and complex (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) metaphors, metonymy, 
and semantic affordances – these latter can be described as the semantic tendencies that 
hold at the level of the lexical concept (i.e. linguistic content). 
To appreciate these ideas more clearly, consider the following spatial and non-spatial 
usages of the English preposition in: 
(1) a. The kitten is in the box                                            [ENCLOSURE] 
      b. Susan is in love with Tom                                [PSYCHOSOMATIC STATE] 
We can say that (1a) and (1b) are classified as good examples of literal and figurative 
realizations of in.45 In (1a) the kitten is located with respect to the box – it is inside the box 
so if someone grabs the box and moves it to another place, the kitten moves along with it– 
that means that the LM offers a functional element that has to do with transportation. This 
functionality becomes entrenched and is captured by the Location with Surety parameter. 
Consider again the conceptual basis of in: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
44 For details on knowledge types, saliency, and complexity in figurative language understanding, see Evans 
(2010d). 
45 Now we are briefly dealing with the two extremes of the literality-figuration continuum. An example that 
may lie in the middle is I’ve got a hole in my sock, in which the metonymy WHOLE FOR PART is involved. In 
contributes to the profiling with the part in which the hole is located. TR (hole) and LM (sock) refer to the 
same entity. 
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Enclosure                                          
 
       Occlusion                                          Spatial scenes                          Location with Surety          
                                                             involving enclosure 
                                             
Affecting Conditions 
Figure 3.1. Conceptual basis for in 
The conceptual basis of in proposed in Evans (2009: 160) can help us understand how the 
literal conception in (1a) arises. I suggest that in (1a) there is primary activation of the 
Enclosure parameter considering that nobody is grabbing the box. Note that even though 
the LM (here box) can also highlight parameters like Occlusion, and Location with Surety, 
the sentence in (1a) makes primarily use of Enclosure to construe the spatial scene. We may 
gloss the resulting spatial lexical concept as [ENCLOSURE]. Note also that the length of the 
access route is short – that makes (1a) less complex than (1b), where the preposition in 
holds a relation between a person and a psychosomatic state such as love. The resulting 
non-spatial lexical concept in (1b) can be glossed as [PSYCHOSOMATIC STATE] and is the 
result of semantic extension. 
Some researchers (e.g., Lakoff 1993; Barcelona p.c.) suggest that expressions such as She’s 
in love or I’m in shock are primarily motivated by the conceptual metaphor STATES ARE 
LOCATIONS, and that the parameter of Enclosure is key for metaphorical extension. 
However, I suggest (following Evans 2009, 2010a, 2010d, 2013) that we also need to 
consider the parameter of Affecting Conditions. This is due to the affective conditions that 
containers usually provide. As pointed out earlier, a container such as a refrigerator 
provides better affecting conditions for storing fresh food than a backpack or a wooden 
box, for instance. This, in turn, is what occurs at the subjective level when we fall in love. 
Feeling in love makes us think and act in certain ways (sometimes clumsily). Furthermore, 
I suggest that while there is metaphor in (1b), this underdetermines the figurative 
conception. As previously mentioned, metaphor is one type of knowledge that holds at the 
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conceptual level. There might also be factors that hold exclusively at the linguistic level – 
semantic affordances could be one of those, so they represent another type of knowledge 
that a speaker must handle. For instance, note that in (apparently) manifests semantic 
tendencies toward elements that evoke subjective/internal states (compare in love vs.*on 
love). Figure 3.2 below depicts how the parameter of Affecting Conditions establishes a 
relation with the [PSYCHOSOMATIC STATE] lexical concept: 
Enclosure 
                                                    
  Occlusion                                             Spatial scenes                               Location with Surety          
                                                            involving enclosure 
 
                                                          Affecting Conditions 
 
                                                       [PSYCHOSOMATIC STATE] 
Figure 3.2. Affecting Conditions and its relationship with one of the “state” or figurative lexical concepts for 
in 
The correspondences between Affecting Conditions and the [PSYCHOSOMATIC STATE] 
lexical concept is established via metaphorical mapping (indicated by the dashed double 
arrow). Note that the non-spatial conception evoked in (1b) is more complex than (1a). It 
also exhibits a longer access route to achieve the activation of [PSYCHOSOMATIC STATE]. 
However, there are some cases in which a long activation route need not necessarily evoke 
a prototypical figurative conception, such as in the utterance below: 
(2)  The flag is in the wind                                                   [PREVAILING CONDITIONS] 
We now know from psycholinguistic research that despite this supposed longer activation 
route, metaphorical expressions responding to well-established conceptual metaphors are 
understood as easily and as fast as literal expressions involving prepositions. This metaphor 
in turn, comes from Enclosure being a conceptual parameter that partly constitutes the 
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conceptual basis of in. Note that in 1(b), even though Enclosure does not establish 
correspondences with the [PSYCHOSOMATIC STATE] lexical concept, it participates in the 
form of the metaphor STATES ARE CONTAINERS. This metaphor might allow the activation 
and extension of Affecting Conditions in the first place, as well as the establishment of 
correspondence links between this parameter and the state lexical concept. Now in (2), the 
preposition in contributes to the sanctioning of the [PREVAILING CONDITION] sense. 
Prevailing conditions are situations that continue in time, such as a flag on a windy day or 
in a storm. It follows that these types of situations affect the attentional figure in fairly 
different ways. Examples of these are in the sand, in the water, in the snow, in the dust, 
among others. In figure 3.3 below, we can observe that the parameter of Affecting 
Conditions establishes correspondences with the [PREVAILING CONDITIONS] lexical concept. 
However, it is unclear whether we are dealing with figuration or with a literal spatial 
conception. I suggest that we still make use of the metaphor STATES ARE CONTAINERS to 
understand the relation evoked in (2). 
                                                                  Enclosure 
                                                    
Occlusion                                               Spatial scenes                               Location with Surety          
                                                            involving enclosure 
 
                                                          Affecting Conditions 
 
                                                       [PREVAILING CONDITIONS] 
Figure 3.3. Affecting Conditions and its relationship with [PREVAILING CONDITIONS] 
In sum, we can observe that the activation route may not be necessarily compulsory at the 
moment of determining the level of figuration of a given construction. We can also 
appreciate how metaphor not only is constituted by one sub-mapping, but by a multiplicity 
of sub-mappings from source to target. When it comes to non-spatial conceptions in the 
case of in, the parameter of Affecting Conditions is the one that establishes 
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correspondences with non-spatial and state lexical concepts. However, for such a 
correspondence to occur, metaphor must work at a more schematic level. The metaphor 
STATES ARE CONTAINERS may underlie most of the non-spatial usages of in. Crucially, the 
conceptual content of this metaphorical thinking might come from the parameter of 
Enclosure. 
Lastly, temporal scenes evoked by in seem to behave slightly differently, specifically due to 
the role of Enclosure, which seems to be much more involved rather than being activated 
more schematically as in (1b) and (2) above, and because of the role that temporal structure 
plays in temporal conceptions. Consider the examples below: 
(3) a. The meeting was in June                                         [TEMPORAL ENCLOSURE]             
            b. I see you in ten minutes                                            [IMMINENT MOMENT] 
The Enclosure parameter establishes correspondence links with semantic sub-structures of 
the [TEMPORAL ENCLOSURE] and [IMMINENT MOMENT] lexical concepts. Crucially, these 
correspondences might occur in the first place due to metaphor, to temporal structure in the 
form of temporal reference, and to the semantic affordances of the symbolic units involved 
in (3). Note how temporal structure is slightly different in each example. In (3a) it has to do 
with an event-reckoning system. We make use of cyclical thinking, specifically of the 
temporal concept {YEAR} to locate the month of June and hence the meeting with respect to 
it.  
In (3b), on the other hand, we make use of a time-reckoning system, particularly of a closed 
system that deals with countdowns (here 10 minutes). Figure 3.4 below shows the 
activation and extension of the Enclosure parameter and its correspondences with the 
temporal lexical concepts for in evoked in example (3): 
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    [IMMINENT MOMENT]                                                          [TEMPORAL ENCLOSURE] 
 
                                                           Enclosure 
 
   Occlusion                                         Spatial scenes                              Location with Surety 
                                                        involving enclosure                                                     
 
                                                    Affecting Conditions 
Figure 3.4. Enclosure and its relationship with temporal usages associated with in 
The ideas above, which have been fostered within the Cognitive Linguistics enterprise, 
leads this research to the following assumptions: 
i) there is a continuum between literal and figurative language. 
ii) essentially the same structures and processes are involved in literal and figurative                               
conceptions.46 
iii) conceptual metaphors underlie non-spatial and temporal expressions rather than fully 
motivate them. There are more types of knowledge involved in these types of constructions.    
 
 
                                                             
46 In this research, structures and processes are mainly concerned with lexical concept selection, integration, 
and interpretation (see Evans 2009: Ch. 11, 12, and 13 for full details on these notions). Nevertheless, a caveat 
is in order. Even though many processes and structures are involved in linguistically mediated communication 
(literal and non-literal), there is evidence (Bottini et.al 1994) that the right hemisphere has a specific role in 
the interpretation of figuration in language, such as metaphor. This might amount to evidence of slight 
differences that hold at the neurological level. 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter has introduced some relevant methodological tools and perspectives used in 
this research. We discussed the role of introspection within the first condition of attending: 
it allows us to scrutinize symbolic units at the level of the lexical representation as well as 
at the level of meaning determination (which further involves active zones). In addition to 
introspection, there is a naturalistically driven corpus work in the form of dictionaries and 
corpora to provide real instances of language use and pin down the parameters that might 
constitute each conceptual basis. Further methodologies that have not been applied at in the 
research reported in this dissertation but that will be applied to the results of my research at 
a later stage, concern the pedagogical applications and the psychological validation of the 
conceptual bases proposed. This chapter has also introduced the structure of the analysis to 
be presented in the following chapters and provided some suggestions for the identification 
of figurative language. 
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Chapter 4: Between, among, amid, and their Spanish equivalent entre. 
I now turn to present a cognitive linguistic analysis of the prepositions proposed for this 
research, focusing on the spatio-conceptual organization they exhibit and its role on non-
spatial and temporal usages. 
4.1 Spatial lexical concepts for between 
According to the CED (monolingual version), a spatial configuration that is generally 
encoded by the English preposition between, consists of a thing or things that are located in 
or moving into the space that separates two places, people, or objects. That is, a TR is 
situated in the middle of or in a central-like position with respect to (at least) two or more 
reference objects that serve as LM and surround the entity. 
Figure 4.1 represents the spatial configuration just mentioned: 
 
                                                            
                                            
                                                                                                       
 
    Figure 4.1. Prototypical spatial arrangement for between 
Figure 4.1 shows a possible proto-scene of the English preposition between, which 
manifests a central position on the part of the TR with respect to its reference objects or 
LM. Moreover, within this (approximately) central position, there must be a certain degree 
of proximity between the TR and its LM in order to visually and mentally establish the 
region occupied by them, which crucially determines where the TR is to be located. 
Another phenomenological parameter that builds up the conceptual basis of between is the 
parameter of Surround. This is a feature that helps us to apprehend that a thing is between 
two or more individual elements. Furthermore, there is also a degree of separation of the 
elements making up the LM from each other, to locate the TR in the middle. 
    TR 
LM 
LM 
LM 
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It follows from the idea above, that the spatial lexical concepts or senses that a given spatial 
particle might have, come from the proto-scenes they are derived from. As mentioned in 
chapters 1and 2, proto-scenes (following Tyler and Evans 2003a, 2003b) consist of 
humanly relevant scenes wherein abstractions out of specific spatial arrangements (i.e., 
recurrent patterns and structures) give rise to idealized spatio-functional configurations. 
These abstractions take the form of conceptual parameters such as Separation and Central 
position. Also recall that conceptual parameters are akin to image schemas in that they try 
to capture the schematic type of conceptual structure that inheres in the human conceptual 
system. Image schemas, as previously mentioned, are pre-conceptual units that structure the 
way we interact with and perceive the world, and which eventually build up the conceptual 
basis of word meaning (Evans 2010c; Johnson 1987; see also Mandler 2004). In order to 
observe the role that these phenomenological parameters play in meaning construction, 
consider the following expression: 
(1) The triangle is between the three squares. 
In (1) we can see how the TR (the triangle) is located within the region that is built by its 
LM. The TR is somehow surrounded by the LM; moreover, they are in proximity to each 
other. We can already observe that the phenomenological parameters of Proximity, 
Surround, and Separation are vital for the semantics of the English preposition between. 
Furthermore, this particular spatial configuration carries a functional consequence: the 
entity which receives the focus of attention (i.e., the F/TR) is located in a sort of central-
like position since it is within the locative region that is created by its LM.47 In (1), the 
nominal the triangle elaborates the TR of the atemporal (i.e., non-processual in 
Langacker’s [1987, 2008] terms) relation profiled by between whereas the nominal the 
three squares elaborates its LM. There is also a correspondence link between the atemporal 
relational landmark and the nominal the three squares in that their profiles refer to the same 
entity. The correspondence link pertains to reference whereas elaboration is a matter of 
characterization (Langacker 2008: 198). Note also that relational predications like the ones 
evoked by between are highly dependent on the more autonomous structures evoked by 
                                                             
47 Recall from chapter 2 (section 2.2.1) that the notions of figure (F) and ground (G) are treated 
interchangeably in this work with the notions of trajector (TR) and landmark (LM). 
 
 
65 
 
nominals. This is understood in the Cognitive Grammar literature as 
autonomous/dependent-alignment, or A/D-alignment for short, as a key feature of language 
design (Langacker 1987, 2008). 
Now consider an image that depicts a mundane spatial scene which can be described as “a 
bench between two trees” (taken from Morras (2018: 60); Morras and Barcelona (2019: 
111): 
 
Image 4.1. “A bench between two trees” 
Image 4.1 above shows a mundane spatial scene that human beings encounter since their 
early stages in life. These frequent phenomenological encounters constitute primary scenes 
where abstractions of specific spatial arrangements become linguistically parameterized to 
eventually constitute the conceptual basis of a given preposition such as between. Note how 
the parameters mentioned for between such as Separation and Proximity are indeed 
abstractions of the scene (among many other proto-scenes in everyday experience) depicted 
in image 4.1. We can observe that there is proximity between the bench (F) and the trees 
(G), there is also a separation between the trees where the bench is located. This 
configuration in turn, carries the functional consequence of the parameter of Central 
position since the bench acquires a mid-position between the trees. Finally, the parameter of 
Surround may be present even though the bench is not fully surrounded by the trees. Figure 
4.2 below shows the conceptual basis adapted from Morras (2018: 62) and Morras and 
Barcelona (2019: 110) for the preposition between: 
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(Approximately) Central position 
                                                 
Spatial scenes involving the 
Surround                             location of an entity between two                           Proximity                                                         
.   or more individual entities 
 
Separation 
Figure 4.2. Conceptual basis proposed for between 
As presented by figure 4.2, the conceptual basis of between consists, at the very least, of 
four semantic parameters. The one of Separation (and perhaps Surround) might constitute 
the core semantic value of between due to its emergence from a proto-scene that has to do 
with the location of an entity that is surrounded, and in some degree of proximity to two or 
more separate and identifiable things. Evidence from this locative behavior comes from the 
following passage taken from the British National Corpus (BNC):  
(2) Further away, they could see a high bridge between the hills, but the station was 
too far away to see                                                                                             
[LOCATION]                                                                                 
In (2) we can see how between functions as a locative relational unit. Moreover, the 
parameters featured in figure 4.2 are indeed present. There is a TR (the bridge) which is co-
located with, and proximal to, its LM (the hills). Notice how the hills are conceptualized as 
a group of individual entities that surround the bridge in question. This surrounding factor, 
along with proximity, generates a functional consequence which is the (approximately) 
central position exhibited by the TR. It is important to emphasize, though, that this central 
position is subject to variation due to the high level of schematicity evoked in the composite 
structure they could see a high bridge between the hills, but the TR is always located within 
the region established by its LM. Figure 4.3 depicts the degree of variation that the 
expression in (2) might convey: 
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Figure 4.3. ‘Further away, they could see a high bridge between the hills’ 
In figure 4.3, the white area represents the region where the TR (the bridge) is to be located 
(here between the hills). The black circle represents the bridge itself. Figure 4.3 shows how 
the parameter of Central position can significantly vary. This in turn, shows a low level of 
specificity exhibited by between: the bridge could be located at any point within the white 
area that stands for the hills in expression (2). However, the very fact of being located 
within the region, makes the TR acquire a sort of central position. The English preposition 
between in (2) is elaborated in order to establish a coherent semantic integration of the 
autonomous nominal structures encoded by a high bridge and the hills. Furthermore, these 
nominal structures manifest a correspondence link due to the coherent assembly of each 
component and composite structure. In sum, we can appreciate how the parameters of 
Surround, Proximity, and Central position get activated at the moment of conceiving this 
specific spatial scene (Separation might receive secondary activation). Further evidence of 
this spatial behavior comes from the following passage extracted from the BNC: 
(3) There's a thick mist between the hills and us. I can't see through it, but through it 
we shall have to go                                                                              [LOCATION]   
Unlike the expression in (2), sentence (3) places the TR (the mist) between two separate 
entities (therefore the parameter of Separation gets activated), which are the hills and the 
group of people that is evoked by the object pronoun us. These two entities constitute the 
boundary of the region in whose middle part the TR is located. Crucially, the coordination 
 
 
 
               
                 
 
 
 
68 
 
structure of the and-type (the hills and us) evokes a mental space in which two coequal 
elements are mentally juxtaposed.48 It follows that the conceptual structure yielded by the 
hills and us elaborates the prepositional landmark of between. 
Figure 4.4 shows the conceptualization of expression in (3): 
       
Figure 4.4 
The dotted line indicates the mist that exists between the hills and the group of people, as 
shown in example (3). We can also observe how the prepositional landmark (the hills and 
us) is apprehended as a single entity in the composite expression: they mark the conceived 
spatial area in which the mist is located. There is a correspondence link between the profile 
of the nominal conjoined structure the hills and us, and the abstract prepositional landmark 
of between. This correspondence in turn, provides the conceptual ground for the elaboration 
of the prepositional landmark. Further activation of the parameters of Proximity and 
Central position are expected. 
There are some cases in which the primary attentional focus falls on the trajectory or 
distance existing between two things, as evidenced in the following passage extracted from 
the BNC: 
(4) During a normal night's sleep, we cycle between these two main states   
[DISTANCE] 
In (4) we can observe how the activity of cycling takes place along the distance that exists 
between the two main states. Notice how the profiled relation between the TR (we cycle) 
and its prepositional landmark (these two main states) is similar to (3); however, the 
highlighting process is different: distinct attributes of the spatial relation get activated. 
                                                             
48 Following Langacker (2008:407), the coequal status of the prepositional-landmark elements of between as 
shown in (3), means that these elements participate independently and to the same extent in the same set of 
grammatical relationships. For instance, each conjunct (the hills and us) in (3) specifies the LM of a thick mist 
and is thus its prepositional complement. The grammatical parallelism of the conjuncts implies that they are 
semantically parallel as well. 
People Hills 
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Rather than location, expression in (4) conveys the [DISTANCE] lexical concept. This 
highlighting in turn, might be driven by the primary activation of the Separation parameter.  
When a different active zone gets sanctioned within the same profiled relation, it is 
understood in the Cognitive Grammar literature as profile/active-zone discrepancy (e.g., 
Langacker 1987, 2000, 2008, 2009). Even though expressions (3) and (4) convey the same 
non-processual relation that is profiled by the preposition between, expression (4) lays more 
emphasis on the distance between the two prepositional-landmark elements since it is 
within that distance that the sporty activity of cycling takes place – this in turn, gives more 
conceptual prominence to the path than to the locative function of the relational predication 
encoded by between. 
Figure 4.5 below depicts this difference where the bold line indicates that the primary 
activation goes on the distance or trajectory, rather than on the location, which might 
receive secondary activation: 
 
                                               
Figure 4.5. [DISTANCE] spatial lexical concept for between 
The examples so far have been presented with the purpose of showing how 
phenomenological parameters are in charge of semantically building the conceptual basis of 
spatial language, particularly prepositions. However, the conceptual bases proposed in this 
research are by no means exhaustive, in that they do not intend to capture all the range of 
possible meanings that a preposition or any word in general might have in context since 
that would be an ill-conceived quest if we take seriously the protean nature of words 
(Taylor 2006). On the contrary, the conceptual bases proposed in this research represent an 
attempt to understand the core configuration of prepositional vehicles, as well as to show 
how the processes of elaboration and extension take place (Langacker 1987, 2008). In other 
words, the conceptual bases proposed here might shed light on how we “work out” the 
semantic potential of words. 
    LM      LM 
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The next section will be devoted to explaining how the English preposition between 
behaves in abstract domains by showing, in a non-exhaustive way, some of the probably 
most prototypical non-spatial senses of between that are sanctioned under certain contexts. 
It is important, however, to point out that by showing the non-spatial (and temporal) 
behavior of some English and Spanish prepositions, this investigation intends to show how 
it is the conceptual basis of a given closed-class prepositional vehicle, which is 
phenomenologically constituted, that partially structures these types of usages. 
4.1.1 Non-spatial lexical concepts for between 
To start with, it is important to recall that the conceptual basis shown in figure 4.2 above is 
based on, at the very least, the four phenomenological parameters described. These 
parameters in turn, are akin to pre-conceptual spatial relations or image schemas since they 
eventually become parameterized as part of the schematic conceptual content encoded by 
between. Recall that parameterization is a process in which abstractions of recurrent 
patterns and structures of a given proto-scene become (part of) the semantic spectrum (i.e., 
conceptual basis) of a given word.49 
Pre-conceptual units are fundamental for the way we understand and move in space: these 
structures are then reflected in language since the conceptual bases that words provide 
access to are precisely rooted in image-schematic structure. Crucially, the conceptual basis 
of a given prepositional vehicle provides a complex but schematic spatio-conceptual 
structure. This structure in turn, can be metaphorically and metonymically extended in 
order to conceive figurative conceptions underlying non-spatial usages. 
Figure 4.2 above shows the parameters that, at the very least, constitute the conceptual 
basis of between (see also figure 4.1). It follows that the spatial arrangements (i.e., proto-
scenes) that motivate the conceptual basis of between, are sources for conceptual metaphors 
and metonymies to take place. As an example, consider the following passage taken from 
the BNC: 
(5) In fact, between you and me, I think she's relieved.                               [SECRET] 
                                                             
49 See Morras (in press) for suggestions on the differences that might exist between linguistic and conceptual 
parameterization. 
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In (5), the information shared by the speakers evokes a notion of [SECRET]; this is partly 
due to the integration of the closed-class item between with its direct object (you and me) in 
a conjoined prepositional phrase. It follows from this composite structure, that you and me 
elaborates the LM of between. The elaboration site, or e-site for short, and the landmark of 
between correspond to the profile of you and me. This in turn, gives rise to the mental 
juxtaposition of the two coequal elements within the prepositional phrase in (5).  In addition, 
the composite structure realized by between you and me, which has unit status since it is an 
entrenched and conventionalized expression in English, evokes a mental space in which 
secret information is expected. 
One of the prototypical spatial arrangements of the preposition between is depicted in 
figure 4.1 (and image 4.1) where the triangle is in a central position and is surrounded (even 
though not totally) by the three squares in relatively close proximity to each other. This 
mundane perceptual event is then subject to reification – that is, subject to the transition 
from an operational to a structural embodied schema (Sfard 1994). The notion of reification 
must be understood as the act of changing something abstract (= existing as a thought or 
idea) into something real. Operational schemas, on the other hand, are understood as 
schemas of action, whereas a structural schema, encodes a permanent object-like construct 
that might be acted upon in order to produce other constructs. In sum, humans need 
conceptual reification to trigger metaphorical mappings: a secret between two or more 
people manifests a highly similar conceptual base as a concrete thing that is located 
between two or more elements. The concrete thing located in the middle corresponds to the 
secret, whereas the reference objects that surround the entity on focus correspond to the 
people who know about the secret. This process is also based on notions such as virtual 
boundary (Langacker 1987: 195-197) and standard/target asymmetry (Langacker 1987: 
349-350); the latter is a fundamental cognitive function that has to do with the exploitation 
of previous experiences for the structuring and interpretation of novel ones. Crucially, the 
exploitation of the Central position parameter, as shown in figure 4.2, becomes figuratively 
extended to understand an abstract concept, such as private information that is shared by 
two or more people: there is a virtual boundary that is constituted by the people who know 
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the secret, and the secret itself is the abstract thing located within the virtual region.50 The 
parameter of Separation also plays an important role (hence, it gets activated and extended) 
and this is reflected by the people who know the secret. Just like two or more separate 
elements can locate a given F in the spatial realm, so can two or more people “locate” a 
secret between them. there is an abstract structural similarity between the spatial and the 
non-spatial configuration in this case. And the roles of the F and the two (reference) objects 
that serve as ground (G) in the spatial domain are relationally equivalent to the roles of 
information, communicator and addressee in the non-spatial domain. 
Further evidence that supports the existence of the [SECRET] lexical concept for between in 
that it might be the result of reanalysis (following Hopper and Traugott 1993), comes from 
what I term the [SHARE] lexical concept. According to the CED, between denotes a sharing 
activity among two or more people or things. To exemplify this sense, consider the 
following passage extracted from the BNC: 
(6) The financing of education is shared between central and local 
government.                                                                                         [SHARE] 
The semantics evoked by between in (6) is achieved, at the very least, by virtue of the 
integration of the open-class elements financing, education, shared, central and local 
government, which respectively elaborate the TR (i.e., the financing of education) and LM 
(i.e., central and local government) of the preposition between. As in (5) above, expression 
(6) conveys the notion that something (the financing of education) is shared by the central 
and local government. However, there is an added constraint (in the sense of Herskovits 
1985) in (5) that is absent in (6) and this is the notion of privacy. Whereas in (5) a secret is 
shared by two people, in (6) the financing of education is not a secret. In (6), it implies the 
division of costs, that is, the financing of education is equally distributed between central 
and local government, but in (5), a secret is something that cannot be equally distributed or 
divided, but simply shared. In a nutshell, I suggest that the [SHARE] lexical concept is partly 
                                                             
50 Virtual boundary (Langacker 1987) must be apprehended as the mental delimitation in cases where no 
boundary feature at all is objectively present. For instance, the name of containers such as glass, jar, tub, and 
box, are frequently construed as designating the entire enclosed area, rather than simply the physical object 
per se. 
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sanctioned by the parameters of Separation and Central position (and probably Proximity) 
since those conceptual parameters are the ones that allow us to locate an object which is in 
the middle of two or more individual and identifiable things. This spatial configuration 
creates a region that is shared between the trajector and the landmark’s periphery. 
Figure 4.6 below depicts the conceptualization of the [SHARE] and/or [DIVISION] lexical 
concept(s) for between: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. [SHARE] and/or [DIVISION] lexical concepts for between 
In figure 4.6 above, the dashed line indicates that the white region is being shared between 
entities A and B, whereas the continuous line represents the relationship holding between 
entities A and B. 
The examples shown so far point to a clear but more abstract notion of {LINK}, which is 
precisely another sense or lexical concept that can be sanctioned by between. I think that 
this sense has its roots in the parameter of Proximity (which might serve as a functional 
element). As shown above, Proximity is one of the parameters that constitutes the 
conceptual basis of the English prepositional vehicle between. It follows that proximity is a 
characteristic that happens to configure part of the spatial arrangements in which the 
preposition between is used. Such spatial configurations, in turn, convey a sort of 
relationship between a TR and two or more elements that serve as LM. This eventually 
results in a notion of link or “common ground”. According to the CED, the preposition 
between denotes a connection among two or more places, things, or people. As an example 
of the [LINK] sense, consider the following linguistic evidence taken from the BNC: 
 B A 
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(7) A new centre for research into the links between society and global climate 
change has been opened by the Social and Economic Research Council (SERC).                  
[LINK] 
In (7), one of the aims of the new center for research is to show the link or connections 
between society and global climate change. That is, the new center for research functions as 
the core of the shared region in which the links between society and global climate change 
take place. We can therefore observe how example (7) metaphorically and metonymically 
resembles figure 4.1 above in that the TR, here the links (i.e., the investigation carried out 
by the new center) is in a profiled relation with its LM (society and global climate change), 
but rather than having a spatial link of proximity, they have a figurative one. 
Note that in (7), the conjunction and establishes a coordination structure wherein the 
nominal structures provided by society and global climate change elaborate the 
prepositional landmark of between and are conceived as being together in a single 
attentional frame due to mental juxtaposition. This in turn, implies the conceptual 
emergence of a higher-order entity comprising the elements profiled by the conjuncts. 
Figure 4.7 diagrams the conceptualization of the [LINK] lexical concept for between: 
Links 
 
             Figure 4.7. [LINK] lexical concept for between 
In figure 4.7 above, the line in bold metaphorically represents the figurative link or 
connections existing between the society and the global climate change. Importantly, this 
metaphorical mapping can take place by means of the conceptual content evoked by the 
new center for research, which establishes the links between society and global climate 
change. However, the new center for research in (7) is not conceived as “mediating” 
between the two abstract landmarks, as in John and Mary will share the cost between them 
(where the cost is an abstract TR “located” in the middle of two things (LM). In (7), the 
center’s research is devoted to the study / observation of the links. Thus, it is the links that 
function as the TR of the non-processual relational predication conveyed by between. In 
    Society 
Global 
climate 
change 
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addition, the center for research is metonymically understood under the metonymic pattern 
WHOLE FOR PART, in that what gets activated (i.e., its active zone) is the research team that 
carries out the investigation rather than the building itself. 
I now move on to the [DIFFERENCE] or [DISTINCTION] lexical concept, which shows 
practically the same profiled relation exhibited by the [LINK] lexical concept. However, its 
active zone is different. To illustrate this point, consider the following passage taken from 
the BNC: 
(8) In other words, there is a clear distinction between application logic and the 
computer representation of that logic.                   [DISTINCTION/DIFFERENCE] 
In (8), the application logic and the computer representation of that logic are the things that 
are subject to differentiation. The distinction between these two things is the focus of 
attention – that is, there is a conceptual link between the act of perceiving differences and 
the entities that are subject to this differentiation. To exemplify, consider figure 4.8 below: 
Distinction 
 
 
Figure 4.8. [DISTINCTION/DIFFERENCE] lexical concept for between 
Figure 4.8 shows the same profiled relation between TR and LM as figure 4.7. However, 
there is a profile/active-zone discrepancy in that the same profile relation gets activated 
differently via linguistically mediated communication.51 The integration of the autonomous 
nominal structure evoked by a clear distinction plays an important role in the composite 
conception in that it functions as TR of the simplex atemporal relation profiled by between. 
There is also a correspondence between the profile of the entities circled in figure 4.8 and 
the prepositional landmark of between. This in turn, provides a coherent semantic assembly 
within the higher-order composite conception conveyed by the whole passage in (8). It 
follows that the very nature of the link between the entities in the circles is different: while 
                                                             
51 In this case we have to consider the prototypical relational profile of between, which requires two “similar” 
LMs, for postulating that discrepancy. 
Computer 
representati
on of that 
logic 
Application                  
logic 
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in 4.7 the link points to connections between the coequal prepositional-landmark elements 
(indicated by the line in bold), the link in figure 4.8 conveys a distinction (rather than 
connections), which is indicated by the dotted line.  
A further type of knowledge that must be involved in (8) is conceptual metaphor. We can 
observe that the conceptual metaphors SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS and DIFFERENCE IS 
SEPARATION might be involved in the non-spatial usage evoked in (8) (Barcelona, p.c.). 
Indeed, the parameters that establish correspondence links with these metaphors are 
Separation and Proximity. Central position might also participate in this metaphorical 
understanding. 
The next lexical concept to be accounted for in this non-exhaustive list of the (probably 
prototypical) meanings of between, is the one of [COLLABORATION], which is a subtype of 
the {LINK} schema, in the sense that two or more entities work together in order to achieve 
a common goal. To appreciate this point, consider the following example taken from the 
BNC: 
(9) In 1985, following further collaboration between Philips and Sony, the first 
Compact Disc Read Only Memory (CD-ROM) emerged.                              
[COLLABORATION] 
We can observe in (9) that the emergence of the first CD-ROM is in part the result of the 
collaboration of the companies Philips and Sony. Such collaboration is the TR of between 
in the composite structure evoked in collaboration between Philips and Sony, while the 
prepositional landmark is jointly elaborated by the profile of the coordination structure 
Philips and Sony. These latter companies in (9) are jointly collaborating between them to 
make the project run: there is a link between the collaborative bodies and the project itself 
(the release of the first CD-ROM), but this link is concerned neither with commonalities 
nor with differences as in (7) and (8), respectively. Rather, the use of between in (9) has to 
do with collaboration. 
Figure 4.9 depicts the [COLLABORATION] lexical concept for between:    
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Figure 4.9. [COLLABORATION] lexical concept for between 
The arrows represent the collaborative link (they also express intentionality) – the TR of 
between – offered by each company to jointly elaborate the product, here the first CD-ROM 
in (9). Note that figure 4.9 also captures the CD-ROM as TR of emerged in the clause the 
first Compact Disc Read Only Memory (CD-ROM) emerged. Indeed, the main attentional 
focus falls on collaboration in the clause following further collaboration between Philips 
and Sony, but then the attention shifts to CD-ROM once the integration of the clause the 
first Compact Disc Read Only Memory (CD-ROM) emerged takes place in a higher-order 
composite structure. 
The parameters that might be most directly involved in terms of activation and extension in 
(9) are Separation, Proximity, and Central position. Extension in turn, is the result of 
correspondences between these conceptual parameters and conceptual metaphors. 
Another possibly prototypical lexical concept for between that I want to consider is the one 
of [COMPETITION], which is typically used in sports events. According to the CED, between 
denotes a discussion, argument, or game between two or more people or groups of people, 
that involves both people and groups. As an example, consider the following piece of 
evidence extracted from the BNC: 
(10) Even today as I write this, a football match between the men and the women 
of Halling is taking place, the teams being known as the Go-Go Girls and Bionic 
Males                                                                                            [COMPETITION]                                                                                                                                   
In (10), there is a football match between the men and the women of Halling (the Bionic 
Males and the Go-Go Girls respectively), which means that the sporting event is a sort of 
link between the two football teams. Importantly, the nominal structure encoded by a 
football match functions as the TR of the non-processual relational predication conveyed by 
between, and its prepositional landmark is elaborated by the nominal conjoining structure 
Philip Sony 
  CD-ROM 
collaboration   collaboration 
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the men and the women of Halling, whose essential import consists in the mental 
juxtaposition of two coequal elements that are conceived as being together in the same 
attentional frame. This partial composite structure is then integrated with the rest of the 
conceptual structure encoded by the maximal scope of sentence (10) in a higher-order 
composite structure to eventually arrive at the composite conception that sanctions the 
[COMPETITION] lexical concept for between. 
We can conceptualize a football match by virtue of the entities that make possible the actual 
match, that is, the football teams and the pitch (among other elements such as the referee 
and the spectators), at the very least, are the things that are minimally required for 
conceptualizing the sporting event.52 It follows that a football match functions as a sort of 
link between the two football teams; but apart from that, it is an event in which the winner 
gets a prize (satisfaction of victory included), therefore, notions such as confrontation and 
competitiveness are to be expected. Figure 4.10 diagrams a possible conceptualization of 
the [COMPETITION] lexical concept: 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. [COMPETITION] lexical concept for between 
The football match represents the attentional figure and therefore it is the TR of the 
relational profile of between. The arrows indicate competition or confrontation as well as 
the intention between the two teams to get the victory. The two teams in turn, function as 
LM by virtue of the copulative coordination structure the men and the women of Halling.  
As in most of the examples shown so far, there is a similar image-schematic structure that 
underlies the [COMPETITION] lexical concept and comes from the {LINK} image schema. 
This underlying structure allows humans to get access to metaphorical and metonymical 
conceptions. However, this underlying schematic structure is subject to the conceptual 
nature of the trajector/landmark alignment of a given construction. For instance, compare 
                                                             
52 For details on conceptual organization see Lakoff’s 1987 idealized cognitive models. 
Football       
match 
Go-Go 
Girls 
Bionic 
Males 
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the clause There are differences between X and Y with There are similarities between X and 
Y, or There is collaboration between X and Y in this project. In each utterance we can 
appreciate the schematic structure of {LINK}, but because of the conceptual nature of the 
trajector/landmark alignment, specifically on the TR (i.e., differences, collaboration, 
similarities) the resulting composite conception is considerably different. 
Conceptual metaphor is key to apprehending the conceptual flexibility of this image 
schematic structure since it is the vehicle for non-spatial understanding. I suggest that a 
wide array of conceptual metaphors such as SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS, DIFFERENCE IS 
SEPARATION, and COLLABORATION IS PROXIMITY, among others, establish correspondence 
links with the parameters of between. Such correspondences might allow metaphorical 
extensions in the first place.  
The last two senses that this chapter includes for between are the [CHOICE] and [TEMPORAL 
DISTANCE] lexical concepts. I will start with the [CHOICE] lexical concept, which I suggest, 
is derived from the Surround and Central position parameters (see figure 4.2 above). To 
illustrate its linguistic realization, consider the following BNC passage: 
(11) We can make a choice between struggling on or surrendering forever to the 
forces of death.                                                                                     [CHOICE]                                         
In (11), the conceptualizers are to decide between two options: (i) struggling on, or (ii) 
surrendering forever to the forces of death. These two alternatives are an example of a 
coordination structure of the or-type. That means there is a mental juxtaposition of two or 
more coequal elements. However, the or-type coordination structure is more elaborate than 
the and-type in that its meaning resides in the relationship between two mental spaces 
where each candidate or option such as in (11) has the potential to fill the role (see 
Langacker 2008: 411). Each alternative is considered on an equal basis, making mental 
juxtaposition the key feature in this type of coordinate relation even though or divorces it 
into two separate mental spaces (contrary to the and-type which does not invoke separate 
spaces). It follows from this that the prepositional landmark of between is elaborated by the 
or-type conjoining structure struggling on or surrendering forever, and its TR is filled by 
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the relational profile evoked in We can make a choice in order to yield the composite 
conception evoked in (11). 
If we take a look at figure 4.1 above, we can see similarities in the conceptual structure that 
both figure 4.1 and the composite conception of between in (11) share: the conceptualizers’ 
choosing process is metaphorically given a central position (as the triangle in figure 4.1). It 
is in this region that the conceptualizers can decide by taking one of the two options that are 
available (like the squares in figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.11 depicts this metaphorical reasoning: 
 
Figure 4.11. [CHOICE] lexical concept for between 
Figure 4.11 above shows the act of choosing in (11) (represented by the circle in bold) and 
the two available options to do so (represented by the dashed diamonds). Note how the 
relational profile of make a choice adopts a central position which is akin to a figurative 
vantage point from which the group of people can observe (i.e., think about) the two 
options that are available (represented by the dashed diamonds; they also indicate the 
potentiality of the options to be taken). The two options virtually delimit the periphery of 
the area (prepositional landmark) in which the act of choosing takes places.  
Activation in (11) might fall on the parameters of Separation and Central position. These 
are further extended to conceive the non-spatial scenario evoked in (11) in which a choice 
is involved. As mentioned earlier and depicted in figure 4.11, the possible choice acquires a 
central position with respect to the two options available. These two options are individual 
and separate elements even though they have coequal status as prepositional landmark. 
Now note how the English preposition between can be sanctioned even when the 
conceptualizer(s) have many more options at their disposal to pick up, as evidenced in the 
following BNC sample: 
(12) The qualification with respect to comp sixteen is that congress needs to be 
aware that a future Labour government will have to decide between 
any competing priorities                                                             [CHOICE] 
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As shown in (12), between can also be sanctioned in situations where more than two 
options (in this case many) are available for the subjects to make up their mind and choose. 
In (12) the TR of between is elaborated by the clause a future Labour government will have 
to decide, while the prepositional landmark is elaborated by many competing priorities. 
An important point to highlight in (12) is the use of the determiner many, which function as 
a coarse-grained grounding quantifier for the nominal competing priorities to yield the 
composite structure evoked by many competing priorities. Another important fact that 
enables the preposition between to sanction situations in which people must decide between 
many or several options, is that between co-occurs with plural mass nouns, as well as with 
count nouns.53  
There will be more to say about the [CHOICE] lexical concept below when the preposition 
among is presented as another option for the linguistic realization of this sense. For now, 
figure 4.12 attempts to capture the [CHOICE] lexical concept that is partially sanctioned by 
between: 
 
 
Figure 4.12.  [CHOICE] lexical concept for between 
4.1.2 [TEMPORAL DISTANCE] lexical concept for between54 
As briefly seen in chapter 2, the domain of time has been widely understood throughout the 
literature in terms of the more concrete domain of space (Johnson 1987; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999; see also Moore 2006, 2014). For present purposes, the metaphor TIME 
IS SPACE will be the starting point to account for the temporal behavior of the English 
                                                             
53 For the noun classification that this research follows see Langacker (2008: 128-146). 
54 The temporal behavior of among and amid have not been considered in this research due to their low 
frequency in linguistically mediated communication. 
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preposition between.55 To see how this metaphorical mapping takes place, consider the 
following passage extracted from the BNC: 
(13) A study published in the British Medical Journal traces the excess cesium to 
locally produced lamb and milk from cows which have eaten coastal grasses 
contaminated with nuclear waste. The measurements were taken between 1979 
and 1986.                                                                        [TEMPORAL DISTANCE]                                      
As in (3) and (4) above, there are two clearly separated points that establish a boundary in 
terms of the distance that a given attentional figure can occupy. In this case, the spatial 
reification is reflected in that two temporal points can delimit an event: these temporal 
points represent the beginning and end of the target event (TE). At the linguistic level, we 
can say that in (13) the clause the measurements were taken elaborates the TR of the 
temporal relationship profiled by between, and its prepositional landmark is filled by the 
and-type coordination relation evoked in 1979 and 1986.56 The single attentional frame of 
the coordination structure in turn, establishes a correspondence with the Separation 
parameter, hence, this parameter gets activated and extended for temporal reference in 
linguistically mediated communication, which in this case is periodicity-based.57 We can 
observe how the landmark in (13), which plays the role of temporal reference point or RP,  
locates the target event (TE), the measurements (i.e., trajector), and fixes it (with the help of 
an origo) to a type of event-reckoning system. The origo (O), which is set at year 1, 
grounds the relation between TE and RP to the transience type of duration. Recall from 
chapter 2 that duration is a type of transience that defines the extrinsic temporal frame of 
                                                             
55 However, and as argued in chapter 2, time might be more basic than space, so temporal structures is 
expected to constitute a type of knowledge that partly builds up the human conceptual system. Temporal 
cognition is fundamental for linguistic realizations of time (see Morras [to appear] for such a view). 
56 Even though in the cognitive grammar literature prepositions profile atemporal relations, since (unlike 
verbs) they do not designate events or states that evolve over time, they can be apprehended as temporal in 
temporal linguistic constructions by virtue of the metaphorical mapping TIME IS SPACE. Several spatial 
prepositions are used to designate temporal periods (understood as spatial paths) as well as temporal locations 
(understood as spatial locations). 
57 This type of coordinate strategy is a characteristic of the extrinsic temporal frame of reference (for details 
on this type of temporal reference, see Evans 2013: Ch.6). 
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reference (or t-FoR for short). Duration can be understood as the subjectively felt 
experience of the passing of time forming an elapse. The O in (13) is set at year 1 since it 
represents the temporal point in which repeatable event-reckoning systems such as the 
Gregorian calendar begin.58 
Another parameter that gets activated and extended for temporal conceptualization is 
Central position. The semantics of this parameter matches the metaphorical 
conceptualization of a temporal event that is in a delimitated temporal area, just like a 
concrete thing in space can be located in the area delimitated by other objects. However, 
semantic extension in the form of metaphorical mappings for temporal conceptualizations 
is not the whole story since we do need a type of conceptual structure that is purely 
temporal for a full-fledged account of temporal semantics. 
The idea (and evidence) of time as qualitatively different from space has made some 
scholars, including myself, assume temporal thinking/cognition as the key feature of time 
since this represents its unique structure (Evans 2004, 2013). Moreover, time seems to be 
more essential or basic than space for conceptualization itself due to the temporal 
integration system that functions at the neurological level, as suggested by Pöppel (e.g., 
2004, 2009). Note that to understand that the measurements in (13) were taken between the 
years 1979 and 1986, we first need to apprehend the {24-HOUR} and {365-DAY} cycles, 
which are features of the extrinsic t-FoR. Furthermore, we make use of linear time to 
temporally locate the event in (13).59 These features, in turn, are manifestations of temporal 
concepts that structure cyclical and mensural-like periodicities. This structure seems to be 
purely temporal in that we locate a TE with respect to an RP within the Gregorian calendar. 
A highly schematic temporal structure that might emerge from this type of temporal 
reference could be glossed as [TE FIXED WITH RESPECT TO AN RP IN THE GREGORIAN 
CALENDAR]. 
                                                             
58 Recall from chapter 2 that event-reckoning systems are related to the use of calendars, while time-
reckoning systems are associated with the use of clocks. Both systems underlie the temporal structuring of the 
extrinsic t-FoR. Moreover, both types of systems can be further divided into repeatable, open-ended (i.e. 
linear time), and closed (i.e. countdowns). 
59 Our temporal concept of {LINEAR TIME}, in turn, might be grounded by the primary metaphor DURATION IS 
LENGTH (Grady 1997). 
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Besides the essential need of positing a type of structure which is purely temporal in the 
conceptualizations of time as shown for the preposition between, much of the spatio-
conceptual structure of between is mapped onto the domain of time, to the extent that the 
metaphor TIME IS SPACE seems to appeal for an account of the temporal behavior of some 
English and Spanish prepositions since space and time do share a common schematic 
structure (Johnson 1987). In the case of the preposition between (following Talmy 2000), 
the metaphorical link comes from the very substrate of each domain: while time is about 
action, space is about matter. The tendency of conceptualizing time in terms of space 
comes from the irrefutable fact that temporal experience is fundamental to the occurrence 
of events. According to Grady (1997), the asymmetrical relation of time in terms of space 
underpins the primary metaphor of DURATION IS LENGTH, where the primary source is 
LENGTH and the primary target is DURATION.  
In the final analysis, I suggest that while space is absolutely essential for temporal 
understanding, spatio-conceptual structure partially structures and supports linguistic 
temporal realizations, rather than fully motivate them since time exhibits its own structure. 
Another point is that conceptual metaphors underdetermine rather than completely motivate 
temporal understanding, as briefly argued in chapter 2.60 This in turn, broadens our view of 
the types of knowledge and degree of complexity lying behind temporal (and non-spatial) 
conceptions. 
Figure 4.13 shows the [TEMPORAL DISTANCE] lexical concept for between:                                  
 
Measurement 
Figure 4.13. [TEMPORAL DISTANCE] lexical concept for between 
Figure 4.13 shows how the primary metaphor DURATION IS LENGTH underlies the temporal 
understanding of between. A spatial source schema ({LENGTH}, or rather {PATH}, in this 
                                                             
60 By underdetermination the present author means that conceptual metaphor in its own does not provide 
enough constraints to specify a unique solution as to what exactly are the mechanisms and types of knowledge 
involved in non-spatial and temporal usages. As we have seen so far, we also need temporal thinking as well 
as non-metaphorical representations, apart from conceptual metaphor, to approach a richer understanding of 
the very nature of these types of scenes. 
1979 1986 
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case) is mapped onto a target schema, here {DURATION}. The representation of the 
metaphor requires a representation of both source and target plus that of the mapping of one 
onto the other. The set of specific sub-mappings or correspondences can be understood as: 
beginning of {PATH} mapped onto beginning of {DURATION} or rather {PERIOD}, 
intermediate parts of {PATH} mapped onto intermediate phases of {PERIOD}, end of {PATH} 
onto end of {PERIOD}. Thus, the resulting blend (in the sense of Fauconnier and Turner 
2002) of the metaphorical mappings is what figure 4.13 captures best. 
Note that figure 4.13 strikingly shares the same image-schematic structure as figures 4.4 
and 4.5 above; however, rather than pointing to a perceivable spatial configuration, figure 
4.13 depicts a temporal scene. 
4.2 Spatial lexical concepts for among 
I now turn to the English preposition among. Unlike between, among is generally used 
when there are at least 3 entities that are part of a group, and which are not specifically 
named. According to the CED, among denotes a thing or things that are in the middle of or 
surrounded by other things. As an example, compare the following examples: 
(14) a. The negotiations between Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil are going well. 
      b.  The negotiations among the South American countries are going well. 
As depicted in (14), the use of among sanctions situations in which there is homogeneity in 
that the entities of a given group are not specified, rather, they are conceptualized as a 
mass. In addition, the mass noun category – broadly speaking – includes both non-plural 
mass nouns (such as gold) and plural mass (such as diamonds) (see Langacker 2008:130). 
However, there are few properties that this preposition has in common with between, 
among them, the fact that both prepositions manifest a low level of specificity (Langacker 
1987, 2008: 55-57). To see this point, consider the first example taken from the BNC: 
(15) If you come, I will meet you among the crowd. Otherwise - tonight, and I 
will give the call. Jeannie                                                                                                
[WITHIN] 
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In (15) there is a dialogue between two people in which they are planning to meet in the 
middle of a crowd. It follows from this situation that there is an apparent spatial 
configuration in which the speaker will be included in a sort of mass (i.e., many people) 
that might surround her. Moreover, the spatial arrangement depicted in (15) is akin to (2) 
above in that it manifests a low level of specificity (see figure 4.3 above): the speakers 
could meet anywhere within the mass of people. The surrounding mass in turn, makes the 
speaker acquire an approximately central position, just like in cases where the preposition 
between is sanctioned; however, I suggest that there is an added constraint in the spatial 
scenes that are generally evoked by among, and it has to do with the attentional figure 
becoming part of the mass that surrounds it; therefore, the parameters of Inclusion and 
Surround might be expected as key configurational features or core values that the 
conceptual basis of among might be constituted of. A person who is in the middle of, or 
anywhere in a large crowd as evoked in (15), could easily get occluded by the mass of 
people; hence, the parameter of Occlusion is a phenomenological consequence which is 
generally and apparently present in the sanctioning of spatial scenes involving among.  
Figure 4.14 depicts the conceptual basis proposed for among: 
    Surround 
 
     Central position                  Spatial scenes involving the location                         Proximity 
         of an entity in the middle of or surrounded 
           by plural and/or mass-like entities 
 
          Occlusion                          Homogeneity                               Inclusion 
Figure 4.14. Conceptual basis for among 
As figure 4.14 shows, there are, at the very least, 6 parameters that semantically constitute 
the conceptual basis of the English preposition among. Just like in the case of the 
preposition between, among manifests the parameters of Surround, Proximity, and Central 
position, but apart from those parameters, and as evidenced in (14), among generally 
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exhibits an integrational feature, in that a given attentional figure that is supposed to be 
among other entities is also considered to be part of the larger group. There is also 
homogeneity in that the entities that form the group (i.e., the ground) are not specifically 
named, as in (14b). 
Occlusion is another parameter that arises as a functional consequence of being part of a 
larger group: the possibilities of occlusion for an entity that is being surrounded by a big 
number of other elements is higher than when a given entity is located between two or more 
things. This conceptual import is particularly true for spatial or “literal” utterances 
involving the preposition among. We can say, then, that one of the conceptual differences 
between among and between lies in the fact that the former functions as e-site for non-
plural and plural mass nouns, whereas the latter does so for count and mass nouns.  
At the core of the conceptual basis of among, we can appreciate a proto-scene that relates to 
the location of an F or TR that is surrounded by entities (G/LM). These entities exhibit a 
plural or mass-like character. This, in turn, might shed light on the reasons why the 
prepositional-landmark elements of among are seen unitarily. Image 4.2 shows a mundane 
spatial scene that may be considered as a “proto-scene” for among: 
 
Image 4.2. Possible proto-scene for among: “the green apple is among several red ones” (Taken from Morras 2018: 67; 
Morras and Barcelona 2019: 115) 
I now turn to consider some of the possibly prototypical lexical concepts or senses that the 
word among can sanction. The first one, which I think arises as a functional consequence of 
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the parameter of Inclusion, is the [OCCLUSION] lexical concept. This sense is exemplified in 
the following corpus passage extracted from the BNC: 
(16) and when he came out among the crowd he received an ovation           
[OCCLUSION] 
In (16), we can see how the crowd occludes the protagonist since he was apparently out of 
sight. Then when he came out of the crowd, he received an ovation. Note also that the 
preposition among in (16) evokes a complex atemporal relation since it partly encodes a 
trajectory within the whole composite structure. The notion of movement or trajectory 
comes from the clause he came out among the crowd, which clearly points to an occlusive 
feature that is partially encoded by among. Furthermore, we can conceptualize the 
protagonist as being in the middle of a mass of people because when he came out from it, 
he received an ovation; this means that the people noticed when the protagonist became 
visible and hence reacted upon with great enjoyment. 
We can observe, then, the multiple activation of the parameters that make up the conceptual 
basis of among in the fact that the protagonist was in the middle of a crowd and then came 
out of it. This means he was surrounded by it; hence, there was proximity and inclusion 
since he was part of the crowd. The crowd in turn, is apprehended as a homogeneous thing 
since it is conceptualized as a mass in which none of its participants is mentioned. All these 
factors, particularly the fact of being in the middle of a large crowd, generate the functional 
consequence of occlusion.  
Now the grammatical import of among is that it functions as e-site for the nominal the 
crowd: there is a correspondence link between the prepositional landmark of among and the 
profile of the nominal. Its (relational) TR, on the other hand, is filled with the relational 
profile of the clause he came out due to the complex atemporal character of among in (16).  
Further evidence of the [OCCLUSION] lexical concept comes from the following passage 
extracted from the BNC: 
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(17) The path and the valley are actually a trap created by a flock of Harpies who 
nest in a small cave hidden among the rocks                                                       
[OCCLUSION] 
In (17) we can observe again how the [OCCLUSION] lexical concept is partially sanctioned 
by the preposition among. This time, however, among evokes a simplex atemporal relation 
in that trajectory is not encoded; rather, the spatial scene is conceptualized in a summary-
like fashion rather than sequentially. The clause a small cave hidden, profile a thing which 
is the cave. Furthermore, the verb hidden denotes an action that does not require movement, 
that is why the composite conception is based on summary scanning (Langacker 1987). It 
follows that the relational profile of the clause a small cave hidden elaborates the TR of 
among, whereas the profile of the nominal the rocks establishes a correspondence link with 
its LM and therefore elaborates it. 
Figure 4.15 depicts some of the possible spatial scenes that could be evoked in (16) in 
which a small cave is hidden among the rocks. Hence, it is occluded. 
 
 
 
 
4.15. “a small cave hidden among the rocks” 
Figure 4.15 resembles figure 4.3 above in that there is a low level of specificity about the 
exact location of the attentional figure (i.e. the small cave). Moreover, the level of 
schematicity (contrary to specificity) (Langacker 2008: 55-57) of among is higher than the 
one of between: between generally establishes a minimum of two countable or mass-like 
reference objects which constitute the periphery of the area in which an attentional figure is 
to be located. On the contrary, among usually establishes the periphery and region with just 
one reference object which is conceptualized as a mass due to the homogeneous character 
of its prepositional landmark in that the thing or things that elaborate it are not explicitly 
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mentioned. This mass-like character of the prepositional landmark of among is elaborated 
by the rocks in (16) and captured by the dashed circles in figure 4.15. 
I now turn to what I term the [INCLUSION] lexical concept and it refers to the fact that a 
given entity is part of a whole conceptual configuration in that it belongs to the whole 
group and has a certain role or function within the group. According to the CED, among 
denotes a relation in which a person or thing is included as part of a group of people or 
things. As an example, consider the following utterance taken from the BNC: 
(18) She was wailing among her friends                                        [INCLUSION]                                                  
The girl in (18) is not solely located in a group of people, but she is having an active 
participation within the group as a member. Now what causes the Inclusion parameter to 
get primary activation, as opposed to secondary activation,61 is the very nature of the 
prepositional landmark her friends, which is lexically integrated with the possessive 
determiner her. This possessive determiner denotes the nouns that follows it, in this case 
friends, as belonging to the possessor. 
In the composite structure yielded by She was wailing among her friends, the relational 
profile of She was wailing elaborates the TR of among while its prepositional landmark 
serves as e-site for the profile of the nominal her friends. Note again how the parameters 
proposed as constituting the conceptual basis of among get activated: the girl is included in 
the group (Inclusion), she is near her friends (Proximity), she might be surrounded by her 
friends (Surround), and her friends in turn are apprehended as a homogeneous group 
(Homogeneity) since none of her friends is mentioned separately. 
4.2.1 Non-spatial lexical concepts for among 
I now want to focus on the non-spatial behavior that is usually exhibited by among. I will 
focus particularly on two lexical concepts; these are the ones of [GROUPING] and [CHOICE]. 
                                                             
61 Secondary activation has to do with the conceptual knowledge that is backgrounded. This type of activation 
supports the conceptual import of the parameters that are most directly involved in a given construction. 
 
 
91 
 
I start with the [GROUPING] lexical concept, which seems to be a figurative extension that is 
partly motivated by the parameters of Surround and Inclusion. Consider the following BNC 
passage: 
(19) Scott Currie will be visiting us on 27th November at 2 p.m. I'd like him to 
look specifically at Personnel's computing problems among other things.           
[GROUPING]62     
In (19), the boss of a company is talking with the staff about a supposedly computing 
expert, here Scott Currie, that is visiting the company on the 27th of November at 2 p.m. 
Now the point that the current analysis is concerned with has to do with the composite 
structure evoked in Personnel's computing problems among other things. It follows that the 
personnel’s computing problems are the principal reason why Scott is visiting the 
company; however, the boss of the company wants him to look at other things too. The 
backgrounded “other things” Scott can deal with, but which nevertheless are not mentioned, 
constitute the prepositional landmark of the relational unit among, whereas its TR is 
elaborated by the nominal Personnel's computing problems.  
Figure 4.16 depicts the contextual realization of among in (19): 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16. ‘I'd like him to look specifically at Personnel's computing problems among other things’ 
Figure 4.16 shows how the Personnel’s computing problems, which are represented by the 
black circle, adopt a central position within the figurative/virtual region that is populated by 
                                                             
62 This lexical concept should be understood as “grouping in an ad hoc category”. More precisely for the 
present case in (19), the category might be called the {TASKS / THINGS} that Scott has to carry out. 
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the unknown number of other things Scott might do for the company (represented by the 
outer dashed circle). This conceptual import encoded by among, resembles the proto-scene 
from which the conceptual basis of among emerges (see image 4.2 above). It follows that 
the parameter of Surround plays a substantial role in the figurative extension of among, in 
that the surrounding entities that are near to the attentional figure in the spatial domain get 
extended onto non-spatial domains for linguistically mediated communication. In (19), the 
possible things Scott can do for the company, build up the figurative region. From this 
region just one thing gets highlighted while all the others remain backgrounded as an open-
ended array of more things Scott might do but which, nevertheless, are not mentioned. This 
feature in turn, is akin to the homogeneity manifested in spatial scenes in which 
prepositional-landmark elements are not explicitly mentioned or identified but 
conceptualized as a whole, as shown in (17) and (18). 
In (19), one of the jobs, and maybe the most relevant one that Scott was called for, was 
solving the Personnel’s computing problems, but there are other things as well that Scott 
will do in (19). Those omitted things evoked by the composite structure among other 
things, are included in the things that the company’s boss wants Scott to do. It follows from 
this that the phenomenological parameter of Inclusion is involved in the figurative 
extension to eventually arrive at the composite structure evoked by the [GROUPING] lexical 
concept. We can observe invariance in (19) (following Lakoff 1990) in terms of how the 
schematic structure from the spatial parameters of Surround and Inclusion (at the very 
least) is preserved and mapped onto the non-spatial domain. 
Consider another BNC example of the [GROUPING] lexical concept and its relationship with 
the English among: 
(20) Among other things, smoking makes the blood clot more easily and puts him 
at risk of another heart attack, which may be less mild than the first.                        
[GROUPING] 
Note that in (20), the passage starts with the relational composite structure evoked by 
among other things. At this low level of conceptual organization, the LM corresponds to 
other things. The TR, on the other hand, might be an argument or a proposition in favor of 
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the speaker’s claim. This argument is made explicit by the clause “smoking…first”. Thus, it 
is a relational TR. It follows from this idea that the semantics of among other things in (20) 
is not just [GROUPING] but also [ARGUMENT HIGHLIGHTING]. 
Unlike (19), the composite structure yielded by among other things comes at the beginning 
of the passage in (20). It follows that there is a distinct constituency (particularly in terms of 
word order) in each corpus passage that might play a role in triggering the conceptual linear 
order of embodied simulations. In (20), the introductory expression among other things 
evokes a mental space that has a superordinate character in that the category {THINGS} is 
evoked. Furthermore, the information about the things that get highlighted within the 
superordinate category comes after – from this point, it follows that the lexical integration 
of smoking makes the blood clot more easily and puts him at risk of another heart attack 
carries this specific information to form the higher-order composite structure evoked by 
among other things, smoking makes the blood clot more easily and puts him at risk of 
another heart attack.  
Figure 4.17 below depicts the contribution of among other things in (20). The outer circle 
in bold stands for the superordinate category of {THINGS} whereas the dashed circle in the 
middle represents the upcoming information about the member(s) of the category that get 
highlighted. In addition, there seems to be a figure/ground reversal (Langacker 1987: 125) 
between (19) and (20) which might be due to the mental word order in the lexical 
integration of the whole composite structure evoked in each passage.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Conceptualization of the composite structure evoked in ‘among other things’ in (20) 
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Figure/ground reversal is one of the manifestations that is generally encountered in the 
wider notion of profile/active-zone discrepancy. Note how the profile relation is identical to 
the one shown in Figure 4.16 above. However, figure 4.17 shows that different aspects that 
constitute the profiled relationship are activated. This difference in the activation routes 
might be due to the constituency that each passage presents in their composite-integration 
order. 
Now let us consider what might happen in language processing when the rest of the 
utterance is integrated: 
                                                     
                                                          
                            
 
 
Figure 4.18. ‘Among other things, smoking makes the blood clot more easily and puts him at risk of another heart attack’ 
As mentioned above, figure 4.17 evokes a mental space in which a not-yet mentioned 
attentional figure is surrounded by more things that constitute its G. Crucially though, they 
both are part of the same group. On the other hand, figure 4.18 narrows down the schematic 
import of among other things and establishes some health problems caused by smoking as 
main figure (TR). It follows that the act of smoking carries several health issues from which 
just two of them get highlighted in (20). The backgrounded health problems are represented 
by the dashed circle that surrounds the highlighted ones. 
We can then appreciate the metaphorical extension of the parameters of Inclusion and 
Surround which receive primary activation when conceiving this particular sense of among. 
We can also observe that the parameter of Homogeneity is present because when people say 
among other things, they unitize the backgrounded things in a single group while the 
SMOKING causes 
blood clot and heart 
attack, among other 
things 
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attentional figure is the thing or things that come to the front and are therefore, named. 
Central position might receive secondary activation. 
It is important to mention at this point that the current analysis is based on specific 
composite structures. It is not intended by any means to go through all the discourse 
maximal scope even though sometimes is necessary. In the case of (19) and (20), the 
change in the position in which among other things is placed in each corpus example, 
might play a role both in embodied simulations and language processing (for details on the 
role of embodied simulations in language comprehension see Bergen 2012). 
The last prototypical lexical concept of among to be analyzed as a figurative extension of 
its conceptual basis as depicted in figure 4.14 above, is the one of [CHOICE], which happens 
to be sanctioned by between as well (as shown in (11) and (12)). It follows from the 
linguistic evidence exposed so far, that lexical concepts are form-specific, but forms (i.e. 
lexical vehicles) are not lexical concept specific since a single word form can be associated 
with a potentially large number of lexical concepts that may or may not be semantically 
related (Evans 2009: Ch. 7). As shown in passage (12), the English preposition between can 
also express a situation in which a person has to decide between/among several options. 
However, I think that there might be a subtle conceptual difference in the use of each 
preposition to evoke the [CHOICE] sense, and it comes from the very nature of their 
conceptual basis, particularly from the different ways the {LINK} image schema structures 
each preposition.63 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the [CHOICE] lexical concept, it is important to briefly 
recall some important conceptual features of the two prepositions shown so far. 
The image schema of {LINK} that underlies the conceptual basis of the preposition between, 
seems to be of a special kind since the conceptual nature of the linkage between the 
prepositional-landmark elements that between co-occurs with, appears to be more 
perceptually identifiable – that is, spatial scenes which are generally encoded by between 
exhibit a clear separation and therefore identification, of the elements that elaborate its 
prepositional landmark. There might be of course, spatial scenes in which the entities are 
                                                             
63 For details on the conceptual nature of the {LINK} image schema, see Johnson (1987: 117-121). 
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stick to each other. Nevertheless, the elements that elaborate the prepositional landmark of 
between are generally apprehended as countable nouns (e.g. parrot) as in (5) and (6), for 
instance, and plural mass nouns (e.g. parrots) as in (1) and (2). 
The image-schematic structure that underlies the conceptual basis of between can be 
observed in example (7) as well as in figures 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, and 4.13. On the contrary, 
the English preposition among appears to exhibit a high degree of proximity and 
homogeneity of its prepositional-landmark element(s) as shown by its proto-scene in image 
4.2 above. This mundane phenomenological experience might eventually have 
communicative consequences with respect to the linguistic realization of the {LINK} image 
schema. As mentioned earlier, there is a conceptual distinction between the prepositions 
among and between in that the prepositional landmark of among establishes 
correspondence links with the profiles of non-plural mass (as in (16)), and plural mass 
nouns (as in (17)), whereas between does so but mostly with count and plural mass nouns, 
as in examples (5) and (1). 
We now must consider the parameter of Inclusion within the image-schematic structure of 
linkage that is encoded by among as part of the linguistic motivation that lies behind a 
given spatial scene where an entity is located among other entities. Furthermore, the 
parameter of Surround is apparently more prominent in among than in between; this in turn, 
provides further reasons for the qualitative distinction between the image-schematic 
structure of linkage in these two similar prepositions (see figures 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17). In 
addition, a grammatical trait that is highly frequent in between, as opposed to among where 
it is practically absent, is the use of the coordination structures of the and- and or-type (as 
shown in most of the linguistic examples of between). Also note that Inclusion is motivated 
by the conceptual fact that this preposition establishes correspondence links with non-plural 
and plural mass nouns. It follows that the profile of a mass noun is not construed as being 
bounded within the immediate scope in the domain of instantiation: a mass noun does not 
encode a boundary as an onstage element to be focused on, therefore, there is no bounding 
within its immediate scope (Langacker 1987, 2008). This very conceptual import makes the 
parameters of Inclusion and Surround (as well as Homogeneity) become more prominent in 
the conceptual basis of among.  
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As an instance of the [CHOICE] lexical concept that is partially sanctioned by among, 
consider the following passage taken from the BNC: 
(21) The models also describe the exact form of the deterioration in decision 
making which occurs when people have to choose among several alternatives 
instead of just two                                                                            [CHOICE] 
The preposition among in (21) partially evokes the same lexical concept as between in (12). 
Even though the semantic tendency of both prepositions to co-occur with concrete and 
abstract things is expected, this does not represent substantial evidence for establishing an 
adequate criterion of the semantic co-occurrences or tendencies of the prepositions among 
and between.  
In (21) the nominal several alternatives equates its profile with the prepositional landmark 
of among, just like the nominal many competing alternatives establishes correspondence 
links with the LM of between in (12) above. However, I think that an explanation about the 
differences in terms of usage of these similar prepositions, especially on the [CHOICE] 
lexical concept, does lie at both the linguistic and conceptual level. Both prepositions 
partially evoke the situation of choosing between many options available. Nevertheless, and 
based on subtle differences of the {LINK} image schema that structures each preposition, as 
well as on the differences in the conceptual parameters that constitute the conceptual bases 
of among and between, is that these prepositions, under specific contexts of use, might 
trigger different but semantically related embodied simulations.  
Figure 4.19 intends to show this point: 
 C= conceptualizer                          
                                   
 
Figure 4.19. [CHOICE] lexical concept for among 
In addition, we could also say that the reason why the lexical concept of [CHOICE] is 
sanctioned by both among and between, is because they share some conceptual ground in 
C 
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that they both can semantically co-occur with plural mass nouns, such as priorities and 
alternatives, as evidenced in (12) and (21), respectively. Moreover, example (12) exhibits 
as part of its composite conception, the composite structure evoked by decide between 
many competing priorities in which the adjectival gerund competing modifies the plural 
mass noun priorities. This in turn, narrows down the type of priority evoked in (12) and it 
also might shed light on the identifiable character of the prepositional-landmark elements 
that co-occur with between. 
 4.3 Spatial lexical concepts for amid 
I now turn to the (possibly) prototypical spatial lexical concepts that are generally 
sanctioned by the English preposition amid. To do so, it is first necessary to consider the 
core semantic value of this preposition. The relational unit amid is generally understood as 
a preposition that denotes a spatial configuration wherein a given TR is surrounded by one 
or more things (LM). Importantly, these surrounding things – the prepositional-landmark 
elements that co-occur with amid – are conceptualized as mass-like objects. According to 
the CED, amid is a synonym of among in that it denotes one or more things which are in 
the middle of or surrounded by one or more elements. 
The conceptual nature of the surrounding entities that constitute the prepositional landmark 
of amid is that they are usually inseparable; this means that the semantic co-occurrences of 
amid have to do mainly with non-plural mass nouns even though it can also be integrated 
with plural mass nouns as in the case of among, and, less frequently, with count nouns. As 
an example, consider the following passage extracted from the BNC: 
(22) Shelley was conscious of the sound of her own breathing, even amid the 
clatter of plates and the loud hubbub of Spanish conversation.                                        
[IN THE MIDDLE OF] 
In (22) the composite structure yielded by Shelley was conscious of the sound of her own 
breathing profiles Shelley’s breathing as a primary conceptual focus which then becomes 
integrated with even amid the clatter of plates and the loud hubbub of Spanish conversation 
to build the higher-order composite structure and then conception evoked in the passage 
above. It follows that Shelley’s breathing establishes correspondence links with the TR of 
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amid and therefore elaborates it, while the coordination structure the clatter of plates and 
the loud hubbub of Spanish conversation jointly elaborates its prepositional landmark. Note 
the conceptual import of the prepositional-landmark elements in that they are 
conceptualized as mass-like things: there is a certain degree of homogeneity in the elements 
that elaborate the prepositional landmark of amid, just like in the case of among. Another 
important point to highlight here is that the preposition amid can co-occur with the 
coordination structure of the and-type, just like between can (among can also do so, but less 
frequently). The coordination structure the clatter of plates and the loud hubbub of Spanish 
conversation, in turn, is what enables the [IN THE MIDDLE OF] lexical concept to receive 
primary activation since it helps locate Shelley’s breathing in the middle of the two 
prepositional-landmark elements, here the clatter of plates and the loud hubbub.64 
Figure 4.20 depicts the conceptual basis proposed for the English preposition amid: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
64 It must be added that the [IN THE MIDDLE OF] lexical concept might be treated as an abstract variant of our 
spatially rooted concept of {IN THE MIDDLE OF}. This special treatment is due to the temporal concept of 
{SIMULTANEITY}. Simultaneity or synchronicity is a temporal quality (following Evans 2013:67-68) that 
consists of an awareness that two or more events are occurring at the same moment. The lexical concept 
evoked in (22) seems to be a temporal extension of this more spatially rooted concept, since the breathing 
event is presented as co-occurring temporally with the two landmark events (the clatter of plates and the 
conversation hubbub). This in turn, might count as an instance of the metaphor TIME IS SPACE. Lastly, 
temporal qualities are experiences types that involve comparison across a specific type of transience. In the 
present case, it has to do with anisotropicity since it involves the temporal element of {NOW}. 
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                                                             Surround 
 
                                                                Spatial scenes involving an 
       Central position                 entity surrounded by one or more                    Homogeneity 
                                                                       mass-like entities65 
 
                                                             Proximity 
Figure 4.20. Conceptual basis for amid 
The semantic parameters proposed above as constituents of the conceptual basis of amid 
are indeed present in the composite conception evoked in (22) even though their activation 
varies depending on the linguistic context that amid is integrated with. The manifestation of 
the Surround parameter has to do with the spatial limits established by the LM (the clatter 
of plates and the loud hubbub in (22)). This spatial boundary establishes the area in which 
the TR (Shelley’s breathing) is located. Furthermore, the spatial delimitation provided by 
the prepositional landmark carries functional consequences in that the TR acquires a central 
position due to its location within the delimited region. Proximity is another parameter 
which varies significantly. In (22) we know, even though in a coarse-grained way, that there 
is a certain degree of proximity between the TR and its prepositional landmark. We do not 
know the exact distance that Shelley is with respect to the clatter of plates and the people 
who were talking loudly (thus there is a fairly high level of schematicity evoked in (22)). 
What we do know, however, is that Shelley is located with respect to two elements (LM) 
that help to conceptualize a semantically coherent spatial scenario in which amid plays a 
relational role. Finally, the last parameter that is activated in (22) is the one of 
Homogeneity. Plural mass and non-plural mass nouns are conceptualized as something 
inseparable or unitized. This feature in turn, is what characterizes the prepositional 
landmark of amid. In (22), we can observe how the prepositional landmark consists of two 
                                                             
65 These entities tend to be non-plural and plural mass. 
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inseparable things: the clatter of plates and the loud hubbub are apprehended as unitary 
entities in that their immediate scope is just a portion of their maximal one.  
More evidence of the relational spatial role of amid comes from the following passage 
extracted from the BNC: 
(23) A koliba turned out to be a large wooden chalet-type restaurant which in this 
case was set amid tall pine trees                                                    [SURROUND] 
In (23) the composite structure A koliba turned out to be a large wooden chalet-type 
restaurant profiles a thing which is a type of restaurant denominated Koliba. This profiled 
thing then, functions as main attentional figure in a higher level of organization when the 
composite structure evoked in which in this case was set amid tall pine trees is integrated 
and this yields the resulting composite conception. Now at a lower level of semantic 
organization, we can observe that the relational profile of was set elaborates the TR of amid 
while its prepositional landmark is elaborated by tall pine trees in the clause was set amid 
tall pine trees. 
Note the unitization feature exhibited by the prepositional landmark tall pine trees in that 
the primary conceptual import goes on conceptualizing the group of tall pine trees as a 
whole, rather than focusing individually on each tree that composes the group. 
Figure 4.21 is devoted to make this point clear: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.21. ‘was set amid tall pine trees’                                                                            
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In figure 4.21, the outer circle in bold represents the conceptual unitization of the nominal 
tall pine trees whereas the small dashed circles stand for the individual trees that constitute 
the whole area where the Koliba (represented by the triangle in bold) was set.  
It is important to capture the conceptual import of the parameter of Homogeneity in that it 
is a characteristic of the prepositional-landmark elements of the spatial scenes in which 
amid is involved. Quantitatively, amid sanctions situation in which a figure is surrounded 
by one or more things; qualitatively, the surrounding entities are conceptualized unitarily.  
In the final analysis, the English preposition amid appears to behave in a hybrid-like 
grammatical manner in that it can co-occur with coordinate structures of the and-type, just 
like between can (as opposed to among which exhibits this behavior but considerably less) 
as shown in (22), and it can also co-occur with just one concept rather than two coequally 
juxtaposed ones, as shown in (23). This one-element prepositional-landmark character is 
highly frequent in among but less in between, as shown in most of the examples so far 
involving between (however see example (2) above for the one-element prepositional-
landmark feature). 
4.3.1 Figurative lexical concepts for amid 
We saw in section 4.3 a couple of important facts: (i) that the grammatical behavior of amid 
is akin to the one of between and among in that amid can co-occur with conjoins as well as 
with simple nouns, and (ii) that there is a conceptual import which is generally manifested 
by the prepositional landmark of amid and is the phenomenon of unitization (following 
Langacker 2008:342-343). Unitization is the reflection of our human propensity to 
conceptualize the world in terms of discrete objects to individually interact with them. It 
allows the semantic and grammatical treatment as masses of count things (normally 
expressed as count nouns). For instance, in (23) the prepositional landmark tall pine trees 
profiles the whole group of pine trees (rather than each tree being individually profiled) that 
populates the area in which the restaurant is located: the tall pine trees get unitized.  
Now when it comes to non-spatial domains, the predominance of the prepositional 
landmark of amid to become conceptualized as a unitized thing is reflected by its 
substance-like status. Consider the following passage taken from the BNC: 
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(24) Amid mounting criticism of the French government's failure to speak out 
against the killings, French Foreign Ministry spokesman Daniel Bernard on Jan. 
13 condemned the attacks on the opposition and said that France would only 
continue to support the government                 [IN THE MIDDLE OF]/[SURROUND] 
In (24) we can observe how the preposition amid partially sanctions the lexical concepts of 
[IN THE MIDDLE OF] and [SURROUND], just like among and between do. However, the 
conceptual import of the surrounding entity (mounting criticism) is homogeneous in that it 
is conceptualized as an inseparable entity. In (24) the nominal mounting criticism is 
apprehended as a substance-like abstract thing which establishes a correspondence link 
with the prepositional landmark of amid, making a successful and coherent semantic 
assembly. On the other hand, the TR of amid is elaborated by the relational profile of the 
composite structure evoked by French Foreign Ministry spokesman Daniel Bernard on Jan 
13 condemned attacks on the opposition, who reacts, amid mounting criticism, upon a 
delicate situation the French government was going through. 
The spatio-conceptual structure that might be recruited for metaphorical understanding 
comes from proto-scenes such as the one evoked in example (23): there is an F that is 
located in the middle of a mass. Another similar example can be an utterance such as She is 
amid the desert, in which we locate a woman with respect to a mass-like landmark, here the 
desert. Note how in these cases, there is primary activation of the Central position 
parameter since it is a conceptual feature, exhibited by the TR, that is highly prominent in 
the semantics of amid. Central position is assumed in this research as the core semantic 
value of amid. This core semantic value, in turn, shares semantic sub-structures with the [IN 
THE MIDDLE OF] lexical concept in that they highlight the mid-position adopted by the TR. 
This central position is what gets mapped onto the non-spatial domain to apprehend the 
location of concrete or abstract concepts with respect to their abstract LMs. Landmarks in 
the spatial realm are characterized by being mass-like and by surrounding the attentional 
figure, such as a desert and a large group of tall pine trees. This mass-like character and 
surrounding feature are mapped onto the non-spatial realm to apprehend abstract 
landmarks/concepts such as {CRITICISM}. These two conceptual characteristics are indeed 
captured by the parameters of Homogeneity and Surround in figure 4.20 above. Primary 
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activation in (24), then, falls on the parameters of Central position, Surround, and 
Homogeneity. 
The parameter of Surround is clearly present in the figurative realization of amid in (24). 
Moreover, and as previously mentioned, a given F that is surrounded by any type of 
element (i.e., count or mass nouns) would acquire a central position because of this specific 
figure/ground alignment. There must also be a certain proximity between F and G within a 
given spatial scenario. We can say then, for the sake of comparison, that the English 
prepositions amid, between, and among do share some conceptual ground that is reflected 
in the parameters of Surround, Proximity and Central position. These partly constitute the 
conceptual basis of each relational unit. However, each preposition exhibits subtle 
differences in terms of their conceptual structuring and linguistic realizations, particularly 
in the nature of their prepositional-landmark elements. 
As mentioned above, amid can also be integrated with coordination structures of the and-
type, just like between and among can (even though considerably less frequent in the latter). 
To show this point, let us consider the following BNC passage: 
(25) Amid the gloom and doom, the American film industry rather charitably 
nominated Hello, Dolly! for seven Oscars, including one for Best Film                     
[IN-BETWEEN] 
In (25), the composite structure amid the gloom and doom, conveys a figurative middle area 
which shares characteristics of both abstract nouns. The noun gloom (metaphorically) 
evokes feelings of great unhappiness and loss of hope whereas doom denotes 
death, destruction, or any very bad situation that cannot be avoided. It follows that the [IN-
BETWEEN] lexical concept is used here as a conceptual blend (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) 
since it exhibits characteristics that neither of the two mental spaces (space and emotion) 
has separately.   
It is important to mention that at this low-level composite structure, the prepositional 
phrase amid the doom and gloom refers to an abstract situation in which a not-yet 
mentioned TR acquires a central position in the middle of two abstract concepts. The 
semantic scope of this PP involves the rest of the sentence – that is, the American film 
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industry’ decision. The American film industry, in turn, functions as TR of amid while its 
prepositional landmark is elaborated by the gloom and doom. We can then appreciate the 
blended space – a mixture between the gloom and doom – in which the American film 
industry is located to further make the rather charitable decision of nominating Hello, Doly! 
for seven Oscars. We can observe a similar metaphorical understanding as in (24) above in 
that there is a projection of spatio-conceptual structure onto the non-spatial domain: an F is 
located in the middle of a mass-like LM that surrounds it. Just like a person who is amid the 
desert or a restaurant that is located amid tall pine trees, we can metaphorically locate the 
American film industry in the middle of two abstract concepts, such as {GLOOM} and 
{DOOM}, that are conceptualized as forming a blend – a situation or event that exhibits 
characteristics of both concepts. Primary activation is then expected to fall on the 
parameters of Central position, Surround, and Homogeneity. The latter is reflected in the 
conceptual nature of the prepositional-landmark elements even though they eventually 
create a blended space. 
Now the conceptual import of amid that lies behind the lexical integration shown in (25), is 
that the profiled things that elaborate the prepositional landmark (gloom and doom) are 
conceptualized as mass-like entities or substances:  their immediate scope is a part of its 
maximal scope. The homogeneity manifested by the gloom and doom is dependent on the 
lack of intrinsic boundary of these abstract nouns. 
Another characteristic of the prepositional landmarks of amid, is contractibility, which has 
to do with the idea that any portion of a mass of a given type is a valid instance of that type 
(Langacker 2008:141). In sum, the homogeneity denoted by the prepositional landmark of 
amid is a key factor in its linguistic realizations, as in (25).  
The four conceptual parameters proposed above as constituting the conceptual basis of the 
English preposition amid, are metaphorically extended and activated, to a greater or lesser 
extent, depending on the contribution that the rest of the lexical elements provide to each 
composite structure. In addition, amid seems to behave more figuratively than literally 
since most of its usages obtained in a simple manual search in the British National Corpus 
(BNC) evoke non-spatial domains.  
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The last piece of evidence to be exposed for understanding the semantic extension of amid 
comes from the following example taken from the BNC: 
(26) ‘Oh, Ellie!’ Terry exclaimed with a tearful smile. ‘A voice of sanity amid all 
the chaos’.                                               [SURROUND]/ [IN THE MIDDLE OF]                                                                                     
In (26) the composite structure evoked by a voice of sanity amid all the chaos conveys a 
figurative scenario of hope in which the nominal a voice of sanity elaborates the TR of 
amid, whereas all the chaos elaborates its LM. Note the similarities between this expression 
and the one in (23) (see also figure 4.21 above) in that (26) is a semantic extension of the 
spatial scenario depicted in figure 4.21. The primary conceptual prominence is attached to 
the parameter of Surround since this is the semantic function that the composite conception 
evokes in (26). Another parameter that is key for the present metaphorical understanding is 
Central position because it helps to emphasize the in-the-middle-of position of the speakers 
who are immersed in a chaotic situation. Finally, Homogeneity also receives activation due 
to the conceptual nature of the non-plural mass noun chaos. 
To sum up, we could say that amid behaves similarly to among and between in some facets; 
nevertheless, amid has its own conceptual import, which makes it unique. As mentioned 
above, amid can be integrated with simple nouns, full nominals, and coordination structures 
of the and-type (it cannot be integrated with a coordination structure of the or-type, 
however). The elements that elaborate its LM can be one or more and are generally 
conceptualized as being unitized due to their mass-like character within a given 
construction. Lastly, amid generally appears to be integrated in figurative expressions even 
though it also sanctions spatial senses, but they are less frequent than the figurative ones. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the conceptual import of between, among and amid in terms of the 
nature of their prepositional-landmark elements and the coordination structures they are 
usually integrated with.  
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 Preposition            prepositional-landmark elements              coordination structures                   
 Between                   - 2 or more elements                                or-type (as in (11)) 
                                  - Count and plural mass nouns                and-type (as in (3); (5)  
                                                                                                 (6); (7); (8); (9); (10); (13)) 
                                                                                                    none (as in (1); (2); (4);  
                                                                                                   (12); (14a)) 
 
 Among                      - At least 3 elements                                and-type 
                                   - Plural and non-plural mass nouns     none (as in (14b); (15); (16);  
                                                                                                    (17); (18); (19); (20); (21)) 
 
 Amid                          - 1 or more elements (generally               and-type (as in (22); (25)) 
                                      figurative ones)                                      none (as in (23); (24); (26)) 
                                    - Plural and non-plural mass nouns 
 
Table 4.1. Grammatical differences of the prepositional-landmark elements of between, among, and amid 
In table 4.1 above we can appreciate two important features of the prepositional-landmark 
elements that elaborate the LMs of between, among, and amid. The first one has to do with 
the number and conceptual nature (i.e. count/mass distinction) of the elements that 
constitute the prepositional landmark; whereas the second one is about whether these 
elements are integrated in a coordination structure or not. Note that among sometimes can 
be integrated with a coordination structure of the and-type as in an utterance such as There 
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are breathing problems among children and old people in which children and old people 
elaborates the landmark of among. This type of construction is less frequent, however. 
After having presented the first three English prepositions, which clearly share some 
conceptual ground among them, we are now in a position to introduce their Spanish 
equivalent entre, which has the capacity to cover all the conceptual ground that amid, 
among and between cover separately. The following section is devoted to this issue. 
4.4 Spatial lexical concepts for entre 
The Spanish prepositional vehicle entre is characterized by exhibiting no orientation, 
limited extension, boundaries, and inclusion within the limits (Trujillo 1971: 277). No 
orientation is a feature of both TR and LM. Limited extension and boundaries are features 
of the prepositional-landmark elements that co-occur with entre, and inclusion refers to the 
position adopted by the TR, which is in the middle of an area delimited by its reference 
object(s) or LM. Entre is also understood as a preposition that denotes place rather than 
path (in the sense of Jackendoff 1983) and therefore constitutes a simplex atemporal 
relation.  
According to the DLE, entre denotes a thing or things that are in the space that separates 
two or more elements. Figure 4.22 depicts this (prototypical) spatial configuration: 
 
 
 
Figure 4.22. Proto-scene for entre 
Figure 4.22 depicts a possible proto-scene for entre. As seen above, a key component of 
proto-scenes is the conceptual configurational-functional relation that holds between a 
given TR and its LM, as depicted in figure 4.22 above. At the linguistic level, the nominals 
that elaborate the TR of entre are conceptualized as being proximate to their LM(s). In 
some cases, proximity is so explicit that the TR of entre is in direct contact with its LM. 
From these types of scenes, functional aspects emerge as the result of the conceptualization 
of a TR and its LM as being within the sphere of influence or region of each other. 
  TR  
         LM          LM 
 
 
109 
 
Figure 4.22 implicitly depicts one of the core parameters of the preposition entre, which is 
the one of Surround (along with Separation). Surround refers to an attentional figure that is 
in between of two or more objects that serves as G. Because of the nature of the spatial 
array, a given F acquires an (approximately) central position as functional consequence. To 
show this point, consider the following example: 
(27) El circulo está entre los dos cuadrados                      [CENTRAL POSITION] 
                      (The circle is between the two squares)                                      
The expression in (27) clearly represents how the parameter of Surround is encoded by the 
Spanish entre since its manifestation results in a sort of boundary or extension limit in 
which the TR (the circle) can be located. It follows that the parameter that arises as a 
consequence of an attentional figure that is being surrounded is the one of Central position: 
two or more clearly separate objects that establish an extension limit to an entity that is 
located in between, make the given entity become part of the center of the spatial 
arrangement (as depicted in figure 4.22 above), rather than part of the periphery (thus, there 
is activation of Separation). The other parameter that sanctions the spatial sense of entre is 
the one of Proximity, and it has to do with the spatial extension (provided by the 
prepositional-landmark element(s)) that the TR of entre encounters. This behavior in turn, 
is akin to the one exhibited by between in that it sometimes makes use of two reference 
objects in order to locate the attentional figure. Amid also behaves in this way (as in (22) 
and (25) above), since it can be integrated with a coordination structure of the and-type, 
and it can also be integrated with just one reference object as shown in (23), (24), and (26). 
Among exhibits these grammatical behaviors as well, but it is less frequent with respect to 
the coordination structure of the and-type.  
If we look at figure 4.22, we can observe the level of proximity that is shown by the TR 
with respect to its LM. However, and as mentioned above, there are some cases in which 
TR and LM might be in contact. As an example of this scenario, consider the following 
example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
 
 
110 
 
(28) Anthony Reynolds, vocalista de Jack, se hizo esperar hasta subir al 
escenario, apareciendo de entre el público botella de vino en mano y ataviado 
con sus gafas de sol.                                [SURROUND]/ [ OUT-OF TRAJECTORY] 
The composite structure evoked in (28) is partially built by the lexical integration of the 
clause apareciendo de entre el público (coming out of the crowd), in which entre 
establishes correspondence links with the profile of the person who does the action 
(Anthony) as well as with the nominal el público (the crowd/public), which elaborates the 
prepositional landmark. In addition, this composite structure conveys a sequential scanning 
since it has to do with a change in location of the protagonist. Recall from chapter 2 that in 
these cases of complex atemporal relations of prepositions, the schematic profile that 
elaborates the TR of the preposition is relational. In (28), the profile of apareciendo 
(literally translated into English as appearing) elaborates de TR of (de) entre (equivalent in 
this case to the English out of). It is important to mention, however, that the [OUT-OF 
TRAJECTORY] and [SURROUND] lexical concepts not only are sanctioned by the clause 
apareciendo de entre el público, but they are a product of the whole composite conception 
evoked in (28) above. 
It is convenient to remark at this point that the notion of lexical integration assumed in this 
research (Langacker 1987, 2008; see also Evans 2009, 2010b) is akin to the notion of 
distributional spatial semantics (Sinha and Kuteva 1995), which posits that the spatial 
relational semantic information is not exclusively encoded by locative particles. On the one 
hand, lexical representation has to do with the mental units that populate the speaker's 
mind, that is, how words mean independently of their context. Meaning determination (i.e. 
lexical integration), on the other hand, has to do with the context-dependent realization of a 
given mental unit (i.e. a lexical concept). For instance, the Spanish preposition entre, 
according to the DLE, prototypically denotes a simplex atemporal relation between TR and 
LM in which the TR is in the middle of two or more things that constitute its LM. Another 
more figurative sense according to the DLE, is the one of inclusion, like for example in an 
utterance such as Ella está entre sus amigos (English She’s among her friends). However, 
the DLE does not mention anything about trajectory in the semantics of entre: this is 
because the encyclopedic knowledge that words provide access to can hardly be covered in 
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a dictionary. In (28) there is a shift in atemporal behavior that goes from a simplex to a 
complex relation that entre partially encodes. On the other hand, the vision provided by the 
DLE is akin to the lexical-representation level of entre in that it is mostly understood as a 
locative (simplex) relational unit. In expression (28) there are two functional consequences 
that emerge due to the situation of being in the middle of a crowd: the man (Anthony) who 
is apparently moving through the crowd, is included in it, and he can even get occluded as 
he moves through it. There might also be contact between Anthony and some people as he 
moves (i.e., proximity). It follows from this situation that the parameters of Occlusion and 
Inclusion, under certain conditions, emerge as functional consequences of the parameter of 
Surround (and Proximity). 
Consider more examples of entre taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + 
Am): 
(29) Despertarme sin horarios, pero con tiempo a disfrutar de la mañana, disfrutar 
el aire que pasa a través de la ventana antes de levantarme, revolviéndome entre 
las sabanas ...preparar el desayuno a mis acompañantes; zumo de naranja 
natural, un poco de fruta y unos huevos con beicon muy hecho...mmm...                                                         
[OCCLUSION] 
(30) Esta especie de estrecho ha recibido el nombre de Paso del Drake y, además 
de ser prueba fehaciente de la separación lenta pero continua entre las placas de 
la Antártida y de Sudamérica, es responsable de que una gran cantidad de agua 
muy fría circule alrededor del continente antártico, provocando su aislamiento 
térmico y repercutiendo en el clima global              [SEPARATION] / [LOCATION] 
In (29) we can observe how the composite structure evoked by revolviéndome entre las 
sabanas plays a prominent role at the moment of highlighting the [OCCLUSION] lexical 
concept. Once again, we can appreciate an instance of sequential scanning which is mostly 
attributed to the processual unit revolviéndome – therefore, the preposition entre, after 
becoming integrated with the verb, acquires a complex atemporal character. The relational 
profile of revolviéndome, in turn, elaborates the TR of entre, whereas the nominal 
las sábanas elaborates its LM. Importantly to mention though, is that the situated 
realization of the profiled relation evoked in revolviéndome entre las sabanas, is deeply 
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related to the semantic frame (in the sense of Fillmore 1975, 1982; see also Barsalou 1992) 
of (IDEAL) MORNING ROUTINE. 
From the phenomenological standpoint, we know that sheets are something that can easily 
cover a human body; thus, the parameter of Occlusion might be expected in example (29). 
We can say, then, supported by the linguistic evidence shown above, that Occlusion, under 
certain conditions, is indeed a phenomenological consequence of an entity that is 
surrounded to the extent it is not visually perceivable anymore. 
In the case of (30), we can observe that the parameter of Occlusion might be or might be 
not present. What we do know, however, is that the ice layers between Antarctica and 
South America are located, and therefore included, in the area that is established by these 
two territories. Note that not only is the [SEPARATION] lexical concept what gets activated, 
but so is the [LOCATION] lexical concept since example (30) also conveys the location of the 
ice layers which is in the space existing between Antarctica and South America. It follows 
from this that the [LOCATION] lexical concept might receive secondary activation. The 
composite structure la separación lenta pero continua designates a thing, which is 
[SEPARATION]. This profiled thing in turn, elaborates the TR of entre in (30). On the other 
hand, the composite structure yielded by las placas de la Antártida y de Sudamérica, 
designates two things (Antarctica and South America’s ice layers) which are coequal 
elements that are mentally juxtaposed in a single attentional frame and jointly elaborate the 
prepositional landmark of entre.  
In sum, I suggest two parameters as the core semantic value of the Spanish preposition 
entre. These are the ones of Surround, and Separation. These parameter in turn, bring 
functional consequences to the front in that functional categories such as Occlusion, 
Proximity, Inclusion, and Central position arise by virtue of phenomenological experience 
(i.e., spatial navigation and interaction). 
Figure 4.23 depicts the conceptual basis proposed for the Spanish preposition entre: 
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             Homogeneity                            Separation                       Central position  
 
      Spatial scenes involving the location of an 
Occlusion                              entity surrounded by one or more entities66                 Inclusion                                      
                                                                   
                    Surround                                                                           Proximity 
Figure 4.23. Parameters deriving from spatial scenes involving the location of an entity surrounded by one or more entities 
Figure 4.23 depicts the conceptual basis for the Spanish preposition entre, which consists, 
at the very least, of seven conceptual parameters. Note that the parameters above are the 
ones that separately compose the conceptual bases of the English equivalents between, 
among, and amid. Therefore, entre can cover practically all the semantic spectrum that is 
covered separately by its English equivalents. 
Most of the examples shown so far point to the non-processual nature of the Spanish 
preposition entre: this preposition is generally seen holistically, that is, as a simple gestalt 
wherein temporal evolution is not the focus. However, there are some cases in which this 
preposition becomes a complex (rather than simplex) atemporal relation in that it 
contributes to express a path of motion, as in (28) and (29). Importantly however, is to 
recall that complex atemporal relationships are still non-processual ones under the scope of 
Cognitive Grammar (e.g., Langacker 1987, 1991, 2008) so the evolution through time is 
always backgrounded. It can be said then, that even though in most of the cases the Spanish 
entre and its English equivalents between, among, and amid, are apprehended as purely 
locative or simplex atemporal relations, at times they can convey (in a distributed way) a 
path of motion.  
Now consider another example of the complex atemporal behavior exhibited by entre 
(taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am)): 
                                                             
66 Contrary to between, among, and amid, the prepositional-landmark elements of entre can be nouns of any 
type: count, plural mass and non-plural mass. The abstract LM of entre does not discriminate in this respect 
for its elaboration. 
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(31) "Viesca" iba pidiéndole a dios que no me muriera, estaba agotado, fatigado, 
por mi peso y por el largo camino, pero nunca se detuvo, corrió entre los 
mezquites, hasta el pueblo, busco el consultorio del médico, mientras pepillo y 
sarita corrían a sus casas, a decirles a sus mamas, la fatal noticia.                                              
[TRAJECTORY]                                                        
In (31), the primary conceptual prominence evoked by the composite structure pero nunca 
se detuvo, corrió entre los mezquites, hasta el pueblo (but he never stopped, he ran through 
the mesquites until the town), goes on the trajectory that exists between the two reference 
objects (the mesquites, which is a Mexican botanical species, and the town respectively). 
This sequential scanning in turn, is motivated by the open-class element corrió (ran), which 
profiles a processual relation between the protagonist and the action he is performing 
(going from point A to point B). This profiled relation, which anaphorically stands for the 
protagonist, elaborates the TR of entre. On the other hand, its LM is elaborated by the 
composite structure yielded by los mezquites, hasta el pueblo which evokes the sequence in 
which he runs through the mesquites (he passes point A) until he reaches the town (point 
B). 
The [TRAJECTORY] lexical concept evoked in (31) is based on sequential scanning in that 
there is a change in the location of the protagonist, which is evident. However, the 
[TRAJECTORY] lexical concept not always is conceptualized in a sequential-like fashion, but 
also summarily. To make this point clear, consider the following Spanish Web 2011 
(esTenTen11, Eu + Am) example: 
(32) Robbie McEwen (Predictor Lotto) ganó al 'sprint' la segunda etapa del Tour, 
primera en línea y disputada sobre 203 kilómetros entre Londres y Canterbury.   
[TRAJECTORY] 
In (32) the athlete Robbie McEwen was the winner of the second phase of the Tour which 
covered the 203-kilometer distance between London and Canterbury. Now the point I want 
to highlight is the composite structure yielded by 203 kilómetros entre Londres y 
Canterbury (203 kilometers between London and Canterbury) which is structured in a 
summary-like fashion in that the elements that are apprehended at each stage are summed 
or superimposed. The summary scanning of the [TRAJECTORY] lexical concept is obtained 
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from the lexical integration of the composite structure 203 kilómetros entre Londres y 
Canterbury in which the nominal 203 kilómetros elaborates the TR of entre while the 
conjoining nominal structure Londres y Canterbury establishes correspondence links with 
its prepositional landmark and therefore elaborates it. In sum, we can observe that the main 
difference in examples (31) and (32) is on the (probably metonymic) activation of the 
different facets of the [TRAJECTORY] lexical concept. In the former, the primary conceptual 
prominence is on the distance travelled whereas in the latter it is on the distance that exists 
between the two English cities. 
Now I want to finish this section by showing a corpus passage that sanctions the 
[LOCATION] lexical concept, which according to the DLE, is the most prototypical sense 
that is encoded by entre. Consider the following example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 
(esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(33) Chester (ubicado en el norte en la frontera entre Inglaterra y Gales) es la 
entrada a la región norte de Gales y se conecta con Londres, Manchester y 
Birmingham                                                                             [LOCATION]      
The maximal discourse scope in (33) profiles a thing as the main attentional focus, which is 
the English city of Chester, located in the northern border between England and Wales and 
it connects to cities such as Manchester and Birmingham, among others. Now the spatial 
location of the TR in the example above – that is, Chester, is linguistically mediated by the 
composite structure ubicado en el norte en la frontera entre Inglaterra y Gales (located in 
the north border between England and Wales). The Spanish participle ubicado (located) has 
an anaphorical function in that it refers back to Chester, which was already mentioned at 
the beginning of the passage. It follows that the Spanish past participle ubicado elaborates 
de TR of en (English in) in the composite structure ubicado en el norte (located in the 
north), whereas the nominal el norte (the north) elaborates the prepositional landmark. The 
composite structure obtained so far profiles a thing, which is Chester, so it moves forward 
to build the higher-order composite structure ubicado en el norte en la frontera entre 
Inglaterra y Gales (located in the north border between England and Wales). Note how the 
construction in (33) “zooms in” in that we now know that the TR (Chester) (at the maximal 
discourse scope) not only is in the north, but also is in the border between England and 
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Wales. It follows that the nominal profile of Inglaterra y Gales elaborates the LM of entre 
while la frontera elaborates its TR and represents the location of Chester. The parameters 
of entre that are most directly involved in its meaning determination in (33) are Separation, 
Proximity, and Central position. 
4.4.1 Figurative lexical concepts for entre 
I now turn to the non-spatial domains that the preposition entre usually conveys. To do so, 
consider the first example that deals with the [SECRET] lexical concept. The following 
passage has been taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(34) aquí entre nos, el tío que inventó el TKD se fue a vivir a Norcorea porque 
era íntimo amigo de Kim Il-Sung y simpatizaba con sus ideales socialistas 
contrarios a los del neoliberalismo de Sur Corea                                                               
[SECRET] 
In the expression (34), the introductory expression Aquí entre nos (English here between 
us), evokes a mental space in which a secret is expected. The word nos is an abbreviation of 
the pronoun nosotros. Moreover, the whole Spanish expression has unit status in that it is 
an entrenched idiomatic expression that is conventionally shared by many Spanish speakers 
from different countries including Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Ecuador, among others.  
To properly apprehend the figurative conception behind the Spanish expression Aquí entre 
nos, it is important to mention that this idiomatic expression can also be reproduced as 
entre nos. The adverb aquí may sometimes be used to emphasize the place where the secret 
is to take place. In example (34), however, this is not the case since the place where the 
speakers are is not mentioned. Instead, the deictic unit aquí (English here) may denote a 
metonymic pattern in that it stands for the specific location of the speakers: it points to the 
very fact they are face to face to tell each other the secret. The metonymic pattern might be 
present in that it signals the restricted social circle and small spatial region delimited by the 
speaker and her/his interlocutor(s). Speculatively, we may say that the metonymy 
CATEGORY (IMMEDIATE PROXIMAL DEICTIC) FOR MEMBER (the highly specific subcategory 
of immediate proximal deictic involving face-to-face interaction) is what underlies the use 
of aquí in (34). 
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Having now this in mind, the precise nature of the introductory composite structure that 
evokes a mental space wherein a secret is expected, comes from the categorizing 
relationship that each word establishes within the composite structure. Aquí entre nos yields 
a composite structure which has Aquí as a deictic unit that marks a restricted interactive and 
spatial area. At this low-level structural organization, TR and LM may coincide. Once this 
composite structure is integrated with the clause el tío que inventó el TKD se fue a vivir a 
Norcorea porque era íntimo amigo de Kim Il-Sung y simpatizaba con sus ideales 
socialistas, the secret information – that is, the reasons why the inventor of TKD 
(Taekwondo) went to North Korea, is what elaborates the TR of entre. Its prepositional 
landmark, on the other hand, is elaborated by the pronoun nos. Nos profiles an unspecified 
group of people that represents the LM where the metaphorical TR is located in the middle. 
Now the exact motivation behind the figurative use of entre in expression (34) comes from 
the parameters of Occlusion, Central position, and Separation since the secret is “placed” in 
the middle of the people who know about it. It follows that the parameter of Occlusion, 
which is a functional consequence of some TRs that are fully surrounded by their LMs to 
the extent they cannot be seen anymore, gets metaphorically extended to partially sanction 
the [SECRET] lexical concept. There is a metaphorical mapping in that there is a shift from 
the spatial to the non-spatial domain (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). In the spatial 
domain, a person (such as in (29) above) can be visually occluded by the sheets of her bed. 
However, in the abstract domain evoked in (34), the very nature of the occlusion has to do 
with confidential information – that is, an abstract thing. These metonymical and 
metaphorical patterns, along with the lexical integration of all the words that participate in 
the construction above, sanction the [SECRET] lexical concept (see example in (5) above for 
comparisons with its English equivalent between). Separation and Central position are also 
key for the image-schematic structure that is mapped from the spatial domain onto the non-
spatial spatial domain in that they help to conceptualize the role of the people and the 
secret, respectively. 
In the following lines I will present a non-exhaustive list of figurative lexical concepts for 
entre to show how this Spanish preposition can semantically cover practically all the senses 
that are sanctioned by its three English equivalents. 
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The grouping sense 
Having presented what I term the [SECRET] lexical concept, which is a figurative sense that 
is partially encoded by entre, I now proceed to explain the [GROUPING] figurative lexical 
concept which gets sanctioned under specific circumstances. The very essence of the 
grouping sense consists of saying that a certain group of things or activities, is larger than 
the things or activities mentioned or highlighted of that group. It also has to do with an 
inclusive function. According to the DLE, entre denotes a thing or things that are 
considered to be part of a group. 
Consider the following example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) 
that evokes this sense: 
(35) Entre los documentos expuestos destaca especialmente el manuscrito de 
1784 de la Memoria sobre el estado actual del Rio Guadalquivir                                
[GROUPING] 
Passage (35) starts with the expression entre los documentos expuestos (among the 
documents exposed) which profiles a thing – that is, one or more of the documents that 
were exposed. Note that this introductory expression evokes a mental space which is 
structured based on a superordinate categorization level (following Rosch 1978) in that it 
evokes the superordinate category of {DOCUMENTS}. It also tells us that more than one 
document were exposed. This composite structure is then integrated in the higher-order 
composite structure entre los documentos expuestos destaca especialmente el manuscrito 
de 1784 (among the documents exposed the manuscript of 1784 is highlighted) to narrow 
down and establish the main document that example (35) highlights. Finally, the last part of 
the passage, de la Memoria sobre el estado actual del Rio Guadalquivir, (of the memory 
about the current conditions of the Guadalquivir river), provides further details of the 1784-
manuscript, particularly on what was it about.       
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Figure 4.24. ‘entre los documentos expuestos’ 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 4.25. ‘destaca especialmente el manuscrito de 1784’ 
The figures above are intended to diagram the meaning construction process which is 
linguistically mediated by example (35). I want to emphasize that the introductory 
expression entre los documentos expuestos evokes a superordinate mental space of the 
category {DOCUMENTS} that is the primary attentional focus at that level of organization, as 
shown in figure 4.24. As we all know, there are many types of documents in the world such 
as files, articles, papers, among others. Crucially however, a type of document such as a 
manuscript is considered, in line with the Cognitive Psychology literature, a member of the 
basic level category. Note how this narrowing-down feature is provided by the composite 
structure yielded by destaca especialmente el manuscrito de 1784, which refers to the main 
document in question (the 1784-manuscript). That composite structure establishes the 
1784-manuscript (a basic level element) as profile determinant of the composite conception 
evoked in (35) and it also backgrounds the superordinate category{DOCUMENTS},67 as 
shown in figure 4.25 (compare example (35) with (19) and (20) above for conceptual 
similarities with among).  
                                                             
67 For details on categorization see Rosch (1978). 
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Finally, the parameters of the conceptual basis of entre depicted in figure 4.23 that might be 
most directly involved in (35) are Surround, Inclusion, Homogeneity, and Central position. 
Hence, they get activated and semantically extended to conceptualize the non-spatial 
scenario evoked in (35). Surround is manifested in that the TR is conceptualized as being 
surrounded by other elements of its own category. Inclusion helps us apprehend that the TR 
is included within a larger group. Homogeneity is reflected in the fact that the elements that 
constitute the LM are replicable instances of the same category. Lastly, Central position 
also gets activated and extended even though it does so after entre los documentos 
expuestos is integrated in a higher-order composite structure with destaca epecialmente el 
manuscrito de 1784. After such integration, the 1784-manuscript acquires a sort of central 
position since it is being highlighted from a group of (surrounding) documents. 
The choice sense 
At times, entre can establish a relation between the very act of deciding, and the array of 
possibilities for making it. This in turn, is akin to the behavior of two of its English 
equivalents, here among and between (as in (11), (12), (21), and (22) above). Consider the 
following example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(36) Los alumnos podrán optar entre elegir una especialidad determinada o no 
elegir ninguna                                                                            [CHOICE]                                                                                
In (36), there is a group of students who has to decide between two options: (i) to take a 
specialization module, or (ii) not to take it. It follows that the students’ decision elaborates 
the TR of entre, and the coordination structure of the or-type elaborates its prepositional 
landmark. There is a mental juxtaposition of two coequal elements (the two options 
available) within the or-type conjoining structure even though they evoke two mental 
spaces which can fill the semantic role separately: the prepositional clause entre elegir una 
especialidad determinada o no elegir ninguna, clearly shows this point. 
A coordination structure of the or-type can also be lexically integrated with entre when 
there is more than one option available, as in example (37) below: 
(37) Puedes elegir entre muchas alternativas en comida a domicilio: cajas 
Chicken Box Snack Delivery para compartir de a dos; caja Chicken Box 
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Familiar para más de tres, o también un Banquetazo Mega para toda la familia.                                         
[CHOICE] 
As shown in (37), there are some cases in which many alternatives are available, just like in 
examples (12) and (21) above. Crucially however, the coordination structures of the or- and 
and-type mostly co-occur with entre, as well as with the English preposition between, but 
not with among, at least regarding the or-type coordinate relation. For instance, people do 
not say *you have to choose among black or/and white, but between black or/and white. 
This difference in turn, might be due to the conceptual basis that each English preposition 
offers: between tends to put more emphasis on the separation of the elements that elaborate 
its prepositional landmark; this in turn, might be the reason why it is generally integrated 
with count nouns and plural mass nouns, whereas among tends to semantically co-occur 
with plural mass and non-plural mass nouns. In the case of the Spanish entre, this is not a 
conceptual issue since it is composed by all the parameters that separately build up the 
conceptual bases of its English equivalents between, among, and amid. 
Now the parameters that are mostly involved in each example vary due to the nature of the 
coordination structure in charge of the elaboration of the prepositional landmark. In (36) the 
parameters that are activated and extended are Separation and Central position. Separation 
is reflected in the coordinate structure of the -or type in that there are just two alternatives, 
whereas in (37) the parameters that might be mostly involved are Surround and Central 
position because there is a higher number of alternatives.  
The link sense 
The preposition entre can also denote connections between two or more entities just like its 
English equivalent between in (7) above. To illustrate this lexical concept, consider the 
following example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(38) Joaquín Maudos analiza la relación entre el gasto en I+D, el capital humano 
y las patentes                                                                                [LINK]                                                                                        
In (38), we can observe that Joaquín Maudos analyzes the link or relationship between the 
I+D expenditure, the human resources, and the licenses. Now if we split the passage (38) 
into two (or three) composite structures, we can note that in the first part, Joaquín Maudos 
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analiza la relación, the relational profile of analiza serves as e-site for the elaboration of its 
TR, here Joaquín Maudos, and its LM, is elaborated by the nominal profile of la relación. 
Then in the NP la relación entre el gasto en I+D, el capital humano y las patentes, relación 
functions as profile determinant since its profile corresponds to the composite structure 
profile. Within the NP, we can observe the prepositional phrase entre el gasto en I+D, el 
capital humano y las patentes, in which entre is now the profile determinant since its 
profile corresponds with the relationship profiled by the PP.  
The profiled thing (relación) of the composite structure la relación entre el gasto en I+D, 
el capital humano y las patentes, elaborates the TR of entre, whereas its prepositional 
landmark consists of the coordinate structure of the and-type provided by el gasto en I+D, 
el capital humano y las patentes. It follows that the parameter that is most directly involved 
in (38) is the one of Separation since it allows us to segregate the I+D expenditure, the 
human capital, and the licenses as the three elements that are being analyzed by the TR of 
the whole finite clause, here Joaquín Maudos. In addition, the relationship between the TR 
(relación) and LM (el gasto en I+D, el capital humano y las patentes) in the PP at this level 
of organization may be driven by Proximity, so activation of this parameter might also be 
expected. 
The competition and/or confrontation sense 
The Spanish preposition entre is used to establish a relation between the participants of a 
type of confrontation (i.e. argument) or sporting event (i.e. football match). The sense of 
entre that is exemplified in the following example is the one of sport competition. To do so, 
let us take a look at the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) corpus passage below: 
(39) Según informó la LFP, el partido entre el Almería y el Barça, 
correspondiente a la 12ª jornada del campeonato de Liga, se disputará el sábado 
20 de noviembre a las 20 horas                                               [COMPETITION]                                                                                                                 
The maximal discourse scope of passage (39) above, has to do with a decision taken by the 
LFP (Liga de Football Profesional) regarding the date and time in which a football match 
between Barcelona and Almería is to take place. Now at a low-level composite structure, 
the conceptualization of the football match is yielded by the composite structure el partido 
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entre el Almería y el Barça (the football match between Almería and Barça) in which the 
nominal el partido establishes correspondence links with the TR of entre while its 
prepositional landmark establishes correspondence links with the nominal conjoining el 
Almería y el Barça. We can observe that the two football teams are mentioned separately 
even though they are mentally juxtaposed in a single attentional frame in order to elaborate 
the prepositional landmark, so the activation and extension of the parameters of Separation 
and Central position is expected. The metaphorical extension goes on how the football 
match is conceptualized: it is the attentional focus that lies “in the middle” of the individual 
participants that make the sporting event possible, here the football teams of Almería and 
Barça (see figure 4.10 and example in (10) for similarities with the English preposition 
between). 
The in-between sense 
According to the DLE, entre denotes an intermediate state between two or more things. 
This in-between status has to do with an attentional figure which exhibits a little set of 
properties of the elements that constitute its G. To illustrate, consider the following 
example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(40) Al final, cocinar en El Bulli se convierte en algo que se mueve «entre la 
ciencia y el arte». «Tenemos un equipo de investigadores que trabajan buscando 
cosas nuevas»                                                                             [IN-BETWEEN]                                                                                                                 
El Bulli was a Spanish restaurant which was opened between the years 1962 and 2011 and 
was recognized as one the greatest restaurants in the world. It follows that the maximal 
discourse scope evoked in the example above, profiles El Bulli, while its active zone has to 
do with the very experience of what cooking in El Bulli is like. This feeling in turn, is 
encoded by the composite structure entre la ciencia y el arte (amid science and art). Note 
how the prepositional landmark of entre is elaborated by the nominal conjoining structure 
la ciencia y el arte. Also note that even though both elements are mentally juxtaposed in a 
single attentional frame, they independently project some of their attributes in a blended 
space (in the sense of Fauconnier and Turner 2002) which consists in the sensation or 
feeling of what cooking in El Bulli is like. The resulting blended space – that is, the act of 
cooking in El Bulli, is a mixture of science and art, and this concept elaborates the TR of 
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entre (compare this example with the use of amid in (25) above). We can observe, then, 
that the blended space represents a characteristic of the TR in (40) which is the feeling of 
cooking in El Bulli evoked in the clause cocinar en El Bulli se convierte en algo que se 
mueve (Cooking in El Bulli becomes something that moves). I suggest that this figurative 
conception is largely due to the activation and extension of the Central position parameter 
in that it allows us to conceptualize a TR that exhibits characteristics of both elements that 
conform its LM. The parameter of Separation also receives activation since it facilitates the 
conceptualization of the prepositional landmark as two separate and identifiable concepts, 
which nevertheless, project some of their attributes onto a single mental space that 
characterizes the TR. 
The difference sense 
The Spanish preposition entre can sanction constructions in which a comparative function 
takes place. Consider the following example extracted from the Spanish Web 2011 
(esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(41) "La diferencia entre ricos y pobres es mayor"                     [DIFFERENCE]                         
Example (41) is a quote of a person who thinks that the difference between poor and rich 
people is bigger. The composite structure la diferencia entre ricos y pobres (the difference 
between poor and rich people) evokes a relational predication that has to do with 
comparison. Ricos y pobres elaborates the prepositional landmark of entre, whereas the 
nominal la diferencia establishes a correspondence link with its TR and helps to activate 
the specific facet that entre conveys in the composite structure. We can observe how the 
prepositional-landmark elements of entre (even though they share the same attentional 
frame) evoke two clearly separate groups of people who are subject to differentiation. 
Metaphorically speaking, the gap that might result from this comparative function of entre 
is indeed where comparisons can be appreciated (see figure 4.8 and example (8) for 
similarities with between). It follows that the activation and extension of Separation and 
Central position, at the very least, is crucial for this non-spatial conception to arise. 
In addition, I would like to highlight a point about the [DIFFERENCE] lexical concept 
sanctioned by entre, in that even though it can also be sanctioned by two of its English 
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equivalents, here between and among, between is the one that is used more frequently in 
these types of constructions. This might be due to the Separation parameter that lies at the 
core of the conceptual basis of between (see figure 4.2 above), as well as to the tendency of 
between to co-occur with coordination structures of the and-type. Corpus evidence of this 
behavior comes from the BNC where a simple search in the concordance section for the 
expression difference(s) between yields 1727 Hits (15.40 per million). On the other hand, 
on a simple search for the expression difference(s) among, only 75 Hits (0.70 per million) is 
obtained.  
The collaboration sense 
Collaboration has to do with the activity of two or more things to achieve a common goal. 
According to the DLE, entre denotes cooperation between two or more people or things. 
Consider the following Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) corpus passage that 
evokes this sense: 
(42) La colaboración entre familias, profesionales y administración, clave en el 
tratamiento del autismo                                                         [COLLABORATION] 
The example above shows the cooperation of three groups of people which are families, 
professionals, and administration personnel, for autism treatment. The composite 
structure La colaboración entre familias, profesionales y administración (the collaboration 
between families, professionals, and administrative staff) profiles a thing, here 
colaboración, which is jointly elaborated by means of the prepositional-landmark elements 
familia, profesionales, and administración. Note that the open-class element colaboración 
(the TR of entre), partly helps to the activation and interpretation of specific facets of entre, 
particularly the image-schematic structure of {LINK}. This structure, in turn, may be driven 
by the parameter of Proximity. Compare this example with (41) above, where even though 
the same facets of entre get activated, the open-class item diferencia is what elaborates the 
TR of entre and hence, makes it provide a different reading to the composite conception. It 
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follows that the parameters that receive primary activation in (42) are Separation and 
Proximity. Central position might receive secondary activation.68 
The metaphorical understanding underlying the example (42) can be accounted in terms of 
the schematic conceptual content evoked in the conceptual basis of entre. Separation, 
Proximity, and Central position are indeed extended for metaphorical reasoning. 
Conceptual metaphors such as COLLABORATION IS PROXIMITY might constrain the 
apprehension of a non-spatial scenario dealing with the abstract concept of {COOPERATION} 
between three different entities to achieve a common goal. 
An important converging point between entre and, in this case the English preposition 
between (see the example (9) and figure 4.9 above), is that there is a clear separation and 
identification of the collaborative bodies that are intended to achieve a common goal, here 
the treatment of autism. This concept of separation might not be present in the same way in 
an utterance such as la colaboración entre muchas instituciones (the collaboration among 
many institutions) in which the collaborative organisms are not explicitly named since they 
are conceptualized as a homogeneous group (there is also an absence of the coordination 
structure of the and-type). Under that scenario, the English language uses the preposition 
among whereas the Spanish language keeps the same preposition, entre. 
The last thing to mention is concerned with the parameters of entre that might be most 
directly involved in (42). These are the ones of Separation and Central position. Separation 
is reflected in the distinction that exists on the cooperative bodies for autism treatment, here 
families, professionals, and the administration staff. On the other hand, Central position 
allows us to conceptualize the autism treatment as a central figure in that it is the main 
objective behind the cooperation of the organisms involved. 
The inclusion sense 
                                                             
68 Recall that secondary activation is the activation of semantic elements that are not as directly involved in a 
given construction as other semantic elements – conceptual parameters in current parlance – that so are and 
hence, receive primary activation. Secondary activation is a sort of conceptual “back up” for primary 
activation. 
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According to the DLE, entre denotes a thing or things that are considered as being a 
member of a larger group. To illustrate, consider the following example taken from the 
Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am):  
(43) Entre sus amigos se sentía admirado y querido, se sentía seguro y volcaba en 
ellos todo su amor reprimido                                                  [INCLUSION]                                                                  
To properly understand the inclusion sense of entre, let us focus on the composite structure 
entre sus amigos se sentía admirado y querido (among his friends, he would feel admired 
and beloved). At a low composite structure level, entre sus amigos evokes a mental space 
that consists of a group of people who are friends of a not-yet mentioned (or previously 
mentioned) person. The TR of entre is elaborated by the 3rd person subject (the person that 
felt admired and beloved), so it is the TR of sentía and the Spanish reflexive se. The TR of 
se sentía querido y admirado is identical to the TR of entre. The resulting higher-level 
composite structure entre sus amigos se sentía admirado y querido, evokes a relational 
predication in which entre plays the main relational role. 
Note how this figurative use type is equivalent to the one of the English among in that (i) 
the prepositional landmark is not necessarily structured as a conjoining construction of the 
and- type, and (ii) the prepositional landmark is conceptualized unitarily as a homogeneous 
thing (see example (18) above for similarities). It follows from this that there is activation 
of the Homogeneity parameter, as well as of the Inclusion for the reading provided in (43). 
The parameters of Central position and Surround might receive secondary activation. 
4.4.2 Temporal behavior of entre 
I want to finish the analysis of the Spanish entre by presenting one of the most prototypical 
temporal usages of this preposition, which is similar to the one of between (see example 
(13) and figure 4.13 above for similarities). To do so, consider the following example 
extracted from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(44) Es cierto que el arrendador también se beneficia de reducciones, 
especialmente si el arrendatario tiene entre 18 y 35 años                                                                                     
[TEMPORAL RANGE] 
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In (44) the composite structure especialmente si el arrendatario tiene entre 18 y 35 años 
(especially if the tenant is between 18 and 35 years old), profiles el arrendatario (the 
tenant), who is between 18 and 35 years old (temporal LM or RP (reference point)). As 
mentioned in example (13) above as well as in chapter 2, temporal conceptions require 
temporal thinking even though most of the time the domain of time is structured based on 
spatio-conceptual structure (Time-to-Space mapping). For instance, to understand that a 
tenant is between 18 and 35 years old, we need to apprehend the open-ended system of 
{LIFE SPAN}. Furthermore, we also need to understand the 365-day cycle, which constitutes 
a whole year. With these two temporal-thinking requisites (at the very least), the primary 
metaphor DURATION IS LENGTH can be applied to the absolute or extrinsic temporal frame of 
reference (t-FoR). 
In (44) a young tenant is the trajector of entre whereas its prepositional landmark is 
elaborated by the coordination structure 18 y 35 años. Crucially, these two juxtaposed 
coequal elements are temporal anchors in that they establish the limits of the temporal 
region in which the TR is located. Furthermore, this coordination structure makes use of an 
origo (O) that helps to anchor the relationship between the target event (TE), here the 
possible benefits of the subject in (44), and the range of age (RP) she should be to become a 
beneficiary, to the transience type of duration. The O in this case is the day of birth of the 
possible tenant, which starts the open-ended counting system based on linear time. The 
resulting temporal conception makes use of an open-ended event-reckoning system to 
locate the TE with respect to its RP. 
Note that there is a clear separation of the prepositional-landmark elements in (44). This 
allows us to temporally apprehend the range of age that a possible tenant might be; thus, 
there is activation and extension of the Separation parameter. Now the conceptual 
reification from space to time that underlies the [TEMPORAL RANGE] lexical concept might 
be reflected in the fact that the temporal range or distance existing between the ages of 18 
and 35 shares striking similarities with a space-rooted scene in which the attention falls on 
the length that there might be between two concrete things (compare for instance example 
(44) with (3) and (13), as well as with figures 4.4 and 4.13 to appreciate these similarities 
more clearly). 
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Linguistic temporal conceptions also involve temporal cognition for their proper 
realizations. As showed in chapter 2, the temporal domain has its own structure, and this is 
indeed reflected in temporal reference (Evans 2013; Morras, to appear). Example (44) 
makes use of the extrinsic t-FoR to locate the TE with respect to its RP. It follows that the 
schematic temporal structure that underlies example (44) could be glossed as [TE FIXED TO 
AN RP IN AN EVENT-RECKONING SYSTEM]. Recall that event-reckoning systems, as well as 
time-reckoning systems, can be further divided into repeatable (e.g., months), closed (e.g., 
countdowns), and open-ended (e.g., linear time). The one used in (44) is an open-ended 
event-reckoning system since we are dealing with linear time where the O is the day of 
birth of the subject in (44): the temporal unit that starts the count in the system and allows 
us to calculate the age of the subject. 
Consider now another example in which a similar metaphorical extension can be identified: 
(45) La subvención se transferirá a la cuenta bancaria que acredite la AMPA en 
un único plazo entre el primer y el segundo trimestre del curso escolar.    
                                                                                                     [TEMPORAL RANGE]    
In (45) there is a subsidy which has to be transferred to a bank account accredited by the 
AMPA (Asociaciones de Madres y Padres de Alumnos [Association of students’ parents]). 
Now the point that the analysis is concerned with, is the period of time that is given for the 
transfer of the subsidy. As in (44) above, the composite structure en un único plazo entre el 
primer y el segundo trimestre del curso escolar (in an only instance between the first and 
second trimester of the academic year), has the nominal un único plazo (only instance) as 
the TR of the relational unit entre. The TR is located within a temporal region that is 
established by the profile of the prepositional-landmark coordination structure el primer y 
el segundo trimestre del curso escolar (the first and second trimester of the academic year). 
This consists of two clearly separate periods that delimit the time in which the subsidy must 
be transferred. Hence, there is activation and extension of the Separation parameter to 
conceptualize the two trimesters. In addition, there is also activation of Central position in 
that it allows us to temporally locate the subsidy transfer with respect to the amount of time 
given. The subsidy transfer in turn, can be apprehended as the TE which is fixed to a 
repeatable event-reckoning system by virtue of its RP, here the first and second trimester. 
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The origo (O) helps to anchor the relation between TE and RP to the duration transience 
type. The O in the present case corresponds to the beginning of the academic year. 
Once again, we can appreciate the semantic extension of entre in that the parameters that 
are usually present in the spatial domain such as Separation and Central position, are 
extended in order to conceptualize temporal linguistic constructions. However, temporal 
cognition is also needed for temporal understanding, so more than one type of knowledge is 
involved in these types of conceptualizations. Spatio-conceptual structure does not fully 
motivate temporal realizations. Rather, it partially structures and supports them. This is so 
because of the inherent temporal structure that underlies temporal linguistic constructions. 
In (45) this schematic temporal structure might be glossed as [TE IS FIXED TO AN RP IN AN 
EVENT-RECKONING SYSTEM]. Note that even though the schematic temporal structure is 
identical as in example (44) above, the type of event-reckoning system is different. While 
in (44) an open-ended event reckoning-system is used, in (45) we make use of a repeatable 
event-reckoning system due to the concepts of {1ST TRIMESTER}, {2ND TRIMESTER} and 
{ACADEMIC YEAR}. These temporal concepts involve cyclical time rather than linear time.  
Lastly, recall that the temporal behavior of entre is akin to the one of between in that there 
is separation between the prepositional-landmark elements. This is so because there is 
generally a coordination structure of the and-type that allows us to place the target event in 
the middle.     
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4.5 Summary 
This chapter has dealt with the spatio-conceptual organization and semantic extension of 
the English prepositions between, among, and amid, and their Spanish equivalent entre. 
The chapter has mainly focused on how these prepositions are phenomenologically 
structured and tried to pin down the parameters that compose each conceptual basis. This in 
turn, might provide a more insightful account of spatial semantics as well as meaning 
extension to the non-spatial and temporal domains. In the case of temporal conceptions, we 
saw that time has its own structure and this is indeed reflected in language use as shown for 
the cases of between and entre. However, the role of conceptual metaphor in temporal 
understanding remains of vital importance since it fully fleshes the account. The conceptual 
differences spotted in the English prepositions (some of them were captured in table 4.1 
above) mainly come from a thorough analysis of the trajector/landmark alignment of each 
preposition under different contexts of use. This might shed light on the conceptual nature 
of the prepositional-landmark elements of between, among, and amid. It turns out that this 
conceptual nature is key to distinguishing each of them. On the contrary, the LM of entre 
does not discriminate the conceptual nature of the elements that elaborate it. That is one of 
the main reasons why the conceptual basis of entre is constituted by all the conceptual 
parameters that can be found (in some cases separately) in its English equivalents.  
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Chapter 5: English to and Spanish a. 
5.1 Spatial lexical concepts for to 
The English preposition to generally denotes a scene in which a TR is oriented with respect 
to a highlighted LM (Tyler and Evans 2003a). The fact that the prepositional landmark of to 
is profiled, makes this preposition goal-oriented: the LM is the primary goal for the TR of 
to. Consider the proto-scene for to: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Proto-scene for to (Adapted from Tyler and Evans 2003a: 148) 
In figure 5.1 above, the circle represents the TR whereas the thick line in bold stands for the 
profiled LM. Crucially, there is orientation or directionality (represented by the arrow) of 
the TR with respect to its profiled LM (primary goal). To illustrate this feature, consider the 
following example taken from the BNC: 
(1) He was pointing to a large man on the other side of the gangway who was slumped 
back in his seat clutching his chest                                            [ORIENTATION] 
According to the CED, to denotes direction. In (1), the composite structure he was pointing 
to a large man, uses the preposition to as a relational unit whose TR is elaborated by the 
clause He was pointing pointing, while the prepositional landmark (which is the primary 
goal) is elaborated by the profile of the nominal a large man. The preposition to in (1), 
conveys a summary scene in that there is no path or motion but directionality; in this case 
to functions as a simplex atemporal unit. 
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However, there are other cases in which there are path and motion – hence, the 
understanding of to involves sequential scanning, so it functions as a complex atemporal 
unit. Consider the following BNC example to see that conceptual behavior: 
(2) I got out to the shops this afternoon and have you noticed they're into Christmas 
already                                                                            [FORWARD MOTION] 
We will focus on the composite structure I got out to the shops, which conveys a sequential 
scene – this means that the speaker was somewhere and then left that place and went to 
somewhere else, here the shops. The sequential scanning in turn, is distributed by the 
semantics of to along with the satellite structure got out and the pronoun I.69 The relational 
profile of I got out elaborates the TR of to, and its prepositional landmark, which in the 
case is considered as primary goal, is elaborated by the nominal profile of the shops. The 
partial composite structure I got out to the shops then, evokes a change in location in which 
to plays an orientational or directional function which is accompanied by motion toward a 
goal (the shops). 
Both summary and sequential scanning evoked by to (as in (1) and (2) respectively), 
activate the parameter of Orientation as one of the main features at the core of the 
conceptual basis of to. The Orientation parameter is considered the core semantic value of 
to. Another important but schematic parameter of to, is what I term Vector, represented by 
the arrow in figure 5.1 above. This parameter must be understood as a schematic 
representation of orientation, motion, and length, and might constitute the core semantic 
value of to along with Orientation. For instance, when we pay attention to a cat climbing a 
tree, we have to visually track the movements of the cat – to do so, we must look at what 
the cat is doing and that implies visual directionality. The Vector parameter is also present 
                                                             
69 Following Talmy (2000), languages can be broadly divided into satellite-framed (e.g., English) and verb-
framed (e.g., Spanish). The former type relies on a particle to express information related to the path of 
motion, whereas the second type typically expresses this information in the verb root itself. In the clause I got 
out to the shops, we can appreciate how the spatial particle out evokes a relation in which a TR is outside the 
area delimited by its LM (i.e., home). There is a change in location that is mostly driven by the satellite out. 
Got is part of the satellite structure because it is a constituent of the phrasal verb get out whose holistic 
semantics expresses path. Compare this utterance to its Spanish counterpart Salí a los mercados, where the 
verb salí (got out) is the relational unit that evokes the path. 
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in constructions that involve motion as in (2); most importantly, however: this specific 
parameter plays a role in the conceptualization of the prepositional landmark as a primary 
goal since there is directionality and tendency to motion of the oriented TR toward its 
highlighted LM. Finally, the unusual degree of saliency of the prepositional landmark of to, 
leads the parameter of Primary goal to be apprehended as the functional element in the 
conceptual basis of to. 
Figure 5.2 shows the conceptual basis that the present research proposes for to: 
                                                                Orientation            
 
       Contact                       Spatial scenes involving a TR (with a tendency                       Primary goal 
                                                   to motion) toward its highlighted LM  
      Vector                                                                                                              Location 
                                                                Attachment 
Figure 5.2. Conceptual basis proposed for to 
Figure 5.2 above depicts the conceptual basis of to, which has as its core (proto-scene) all 
the spatial scenes that have to do with an oriented TR that is facing toward its highlighted 
LM and manifests a tendency to motion. The prepositional landmark in turn, is (generally) 
conceptualized as primary goal. The main parameters in the conceptual basis of to are 
Primary goal, Vector, and Orientation. Primary goal is concerned with the fact that the 
prepositional landmark of to is generally profiled and highly active – thus, it is considered 
the main goal and functional element. Vector has to do with the directional nature and 
tendency to motion of an oriented TR with respect to its LM: the vector parameter is the 
conceptual link that makes the TR “search” for its primary goal since it deals with a 
schematic representation of orientation, motion, and length. Another prominent parameter 
of to is Orientation: the highlighted status of the LM of to is readily interpretable as primary 
goal due to the orientation and tendency to motion of the TR. We can appreciate then, that 
the parameters of Vector, Primary goal, and Orientation are closely related and build up the 
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core semantic value of to.70 There are also other parameters that arise as functional 
consequences of the spatial configuration conveyed by to. For instance, Contact has to do 
with the fact that in some situations, the TR meets its LM, as in an utterance such as You 
have to apply the soap directly to the stain for better results, in which there is a clear 
sequential scanning since the TR (the soap) has to be manipulated to be in contact with the 
LM (the stain). Location is concerned with spatial relations in which the TR is located with 
respect to its LM, but the TR might not be oriented toward it; for instance, in an utterance 
such as John is standing to my right, in which there is no sense that the TR, here John, is 
oriented toward or facing the speaker’s right side from the perspective of the subject’s 
vantage point. Finally, the Attachment parameter, which is closely related to Contact, has to 
do with a TR that is attached or joined to its LM in order to form a continuum with it; for 
example, in an utterance such as They added a fence to the garden, the TR (the fence) was 
first oriented to its LM (the garden) and then it underwent contact. This in turn, implies a 
permanent situation – hence, the notion of attachment arises. We can indeed observe 
reflexes of this pattern in such words as together.  
Now consider a BNC example to see how the parameters proposed for to above get 
activated differently depending on the linguistic context this preposition is integrated with: 
(3) Couples were dancing, slowly, cheek to cheek, by the pool            [CONTACT] 
In (3), the composite structure Couples were dancing, slowly profiles the couples, who were 
dancing probably in a party or summer ball. Moreover, they were dancing in a slow manner 
and cheek to cheek. The composite structure cheek to cheek, in turn, is linked by virtue of 
the relational unit to which functions as e-site for cheek and cheek. The profile of the 
former elaborates its TR while the latter corresponds to its LM. 
Note the spatial function of to in that it profiles a spatial relation of contact between TR and 
LM. Furthermore, the trajector/landmark alignment of to in (3), is constituted by the same 
autonomous structure, here the people’s cheeks: the TR then consists of a cheek of one 
                                                             
70 Vector is distinguished from Orientation in that it is a schematic representation of direction, length, and 
motion. It also has a subjective character in that it evokes intentionality in scenes of transfers as in I sent a 
postcard to my uncle yesterday.  
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member of the couple, whereas the prepositional landmark consists of the other person’s 
cheek. 
Following Tyler and Evans (2003a), I agree that there is an experiential correlation between 
achieving a goal and contact. Every day we look for spatial goals, in the sense that we go to 
different places. For instance, having a weekend off with friends at the beach – once the 
people get to the destination, they achieve a goal by being located and hence in physical 
contact with the coastal area. From this it follows that in many situations in which there is a 
TR that is oriented toward a LM that is considered the primary goal, the TR exhibits high 
probabilities of undergoing motion, thereby reaching the LM such as in (3) above. 
However, example (3) represents cases where Primary goal is not the focus but rather 
contact. It follows that there is multiple activation of the parameters shown in figure 5.2 
above, particularly the ones of Orientation, Vector, and Contact. 
Consider another corpus example extracted from the BNC in which no contact but 
orientation is involved: 
(4) Then he turned to me. 'Miss Sandra Forsyth,' he said. 
[ORIENTATION TOWARD A LANDMARK] 
Note how in (4) above, there is no contact whatsoever between the TR, here the man, and 
the LM – that is, Miss Sandra Forsyth. The spatial relation in the composite structure Then 
he turned to me, is partly encoded by the preposition to in that it provides access for the 
activation of basic phenomenological units of experience (i.e., conceptual parameters) such 
as Orientation and Vector or agonist force in that the very action of turning our bodies to 
someone else’s implies force dynamics.71 
It is important to recall at this point that spatio-conceptual structure, that is, the type of 
conceptual structure that spatial language is principally paired to, is not solely structured by 
spatio-geometric information but also by non-spatial parameters. In the case of to, there is 
the Primary goal parameter, which in (4) offers a higher-than-usual activation of the 
prepositional landmark that is crucially conceptualized as being the main objective: the man 
who wanted to greet Miss Forsyth accomplished his goal – thus, there was an intention 
                                                             
71 See Talmy (2000) for a thorough account on force dynamics. 
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behind the man’s act. Such a non-spatial parameter amounts to evidence that prepositions 
are not only grounded in perceptual and motor states, but in introspective ones as well (see 
Barsalou 2008 for a brief review of grounded cognition). This again, is clearly 
demonstrated by the activation and prominent role of the Primary goal parameter, which is 
the main characteristic of the elements that elaborate the prepositional landmark of to. 
Moreover, this feature goes further to the extent that it becomes parameterized in the 
conceptual basis of to – this in turn, explains why the prepositional landmark of to is 
generally profiled and highly active.  In (4), to functions as e-site for the profile of he 
turned, which represents the male subject, whereas its prepositional landmark is elaborated 
by the pronoun me and is conceptualized as primary goal. 
Consider another example of to. In this case, this preposition denotes spatial distance: 
 
(5) India presently has two reprocessing plants: in Bombay, and at Tarapur, some 60 
miles to the north                                                [DIRECTION]/ [LOCATION] 
 
According to the CED, to denotes the position of something or someone in comparison 
with something or someone else. In (5), Tarapur is located with respect to Bombay based 
on an absolute spatial frame of reference since Tarapur is located around 60 miles to the 
north of Bombay.72 The composite structure some 60 miles to the north evokes a sort of 
simulation of real motion (in the sense of Bergen 2012: 30-32) in that to expresses the 
distance and direction (i.e. path) from which Tarapur is located with respect to Bombay. 
The LM of to is elaborated by the nominal the north, whereas its TR is elaborated by the 
nominal profile of some 60 miles, which expresses the distance existing between Bombay 
and Tarapur.  
Note again that the higher-than-usual status (i.e., Primary goal) of the LM of to is not 
always highlighted (as in (3)). Rather, what is highlighted by the prepositional LM in (5) is 
direction. Thus, there is activation of Orientation and Location. The parameter of 
Orientation is jointly activated by the composite expression to the north, which allows us to 
                                                             
72 For details on spatial frames of reference see Levinson (2003). 
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locate things in space in an absolute manner. Location, on the other hand, is achieved by 
the composite expression some 60 miles to the north.  
Consider now an example in which no Orientation is encoded but only location: 
(6) She also suffered injuries to the left side of her chest and a laceration over the eye           
[LOCATION]  
In (6), to profiles a relation in which the TR, here the woman’s injuries, is located with 
respect to the LM, here the woman’s chest. However, the TR is not oriented in the direction 
of its LM. An injury on someone’s chest is something that is unlikely to exhibit orientation. 
Rather, the conventional interpretation goes on the location of the injuries that are on the 
left side of the woman’s chest.  
Evidence of the existence of the Location parameter comes from the linguistic fact that the 
spatial location evoked in (6) can be paraphrased as She also suffered injuries on the left 
side of her chest and a laceration over the eye. Note that in the canonical representation of 
the relation between TR and LM, the TR is the element in focus, whereas the role of the 
LM is locating this element (hence, the LM is the second most prominent element in a 
given construction). However, in the proto-scene shown in figure 5.1, the LM is given an 
unusual degree of saliency due to the TR being oriented in direction to it. It follows from 
this, that under specific contexts, the role of the prepositional landmark of to, which is 
mostly to locate the TR, might come to predominate in the profiled relationship sanctioned 
by to. Under such contexts, the prepositional landmark acts as a salient reference point 
regarding the location of the TR. This in turn, facilitates the development of the Location 
parameter.  We can appreciate then, that the parameters of to that are most directly engaged 
in the composite conception in (6), are the ones of Location and Contact. 
The English preposition to can also convey the notion of attachment, as shown in the 
following BNC passage: 
(7) The nave arcade is high and its columns are topped by foliated capitals and, below, 
are life-size sculptured figures attached to the column                [ATTACHMENT] 
In (7), the composite structure life-size sculptured figures attached to the column, has the 
nominal life-size sculptured figures as main attentional figure. The relational profile of life-
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size sculptured figures attached elaborates the TR of to. On the other hand, the nominal the 
column functions as LM – hence, it elaborates the prepositional landmark. Under this 
context, to profiles a relation in which the TR is attached or joined to the LM so the TR 
forms part of or is contiguous with it. This sense may have aroused due to an oriented TR, 
here the life-sized sculptured figures, reaching its goal – that is, the column. This very 
notion, in turn, implies that one entity is physically fixed or joined with another in a 
permanent way. In most of the cases, the attachment sense correlates with the TR having 
first been oriented, moved to, and subsequently undergoing contact with its LM, thus, the 
[ATTACHMENT] lexical concept or sense is closely related to the [CONTACT] one. 
The parameters that are most directly involved in the composite structure life-size 
sculptured figures attached to the column in (7), are the ones of Attachment and Primary 
goal. Attachment, as mentioned above, has to do with a TR that is fixed or joined to its LM. 
In (7) we can clearly conceptualize the sculptured figures as being permanently fixed to the 
column, hence, they are in contact. The Contact parameter in turn, might receive secondary 
activation and represents the functional consequence of an entity being attached to another. 
By the same token, we might consider Attachment as a functional consequence of a TR that 
gets in (permanent) contact with its LM. The parameter of Primary goal is the other element 
that is most directly involved in the realization of to in (7) since it represents the main 
characteristic or feature of the elements that elaborate the prepositional landmark of to. It 
specifies the place where the figures must go. As mentioned earlier, the prepositional 
landmark of to generally exhibits a high level of activation – this higher-than-usual degree 
of saliency in turn, may be due to the TR being oriented to its primary goal, that is, its LM. 
Other parameters within the conceptual basis of to that might receive secondary activation 
are Location and Orientation.  
So far, we have seen the dynamic, rather than static, behavior of the English preposition to. 
Its dynamicity is reflected, among other things, in the fact that it can behave as a simplex, 
as well as a complex atemporal unit. This difference in turn, depends on the linguistic 
contexts that to is placed in. Simplex and complex atemporal relations are distinguished by 
the notion of trajectory – the former do not entail it whereas the latter do. A simplex 
atemporal relation thus, involves orientation or directionality, such as in example (1) in 
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which the man is pointing to someone else. On the other hand, there are cases in which to 
further conveys motion or trajectory, such as in (2) in which there is a change in location; 
therefore, to behaves in a complex way. It is important to bear in mind, though, the fact that 
both complex and simplex atemporal relations background the domain of time in that they 
are apprehended as non-processual units (Langacker 1987, 1991, 2008). 
The simplex/complex atemporal behavior of the preposition to, apart from being 
attributable to the very nature of language design, which is structured and dynamic, it is 
also attributable to the parameters that form its conceptual basis, particularly the one of 
Vector. The parameter of Vector, as mentioned above, is a schematic representation of 
length, motion, and orientation. It allows the preposition to to jointly or separately convey 
the notions of trajectory and directionality. Moreover, this parameter represents the 
orientation and tendency to motion that a given TR exhibits with respect to its (frequently) 
highlighted LM. This specific feature in turn, may be the key to understanding the higher-
than-usual conceptual saliency that the elements that elaborate the prepositional landmark 
of to generally acquire: they are considered the primary goal (see figure 5.1 above). Not all 
the simplex atemporal relations profiled by to are due to the Vector parameter, however. 
There are some cases in which no orientation is conveyed, such as in (6) above where the 
orientation of the TR (injuries) is not profiled, but only its location with respect to its LM. 
On the other hand, complex atemporal relations profiled by to – that is, those that profile 
trajectory, generally if not always, activate the Vector parameter for linguistic realization. 
The conceptual basis proposed above for to is of course not the only construct to account 
for lexical representation and polysemy (cf. Rice 1992). However, I have high hopes that it 
will contribute to a highly plausible conceptual account of how words are elaborated and 
extended (i.e., literal vs. figurative conceptions). In the next section, some of the (possibly) 
most frequent non-spatial usages of to are analyzed to show how the meaning extension of 
this preposition works. This extension in turn, is ultimately derived from perceptual, 
situated, and introspective experience. 
5.1.1 Non-spatial lexical concepts for to 
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The conceptual basis of to proposed above is an essential construct for understanding non-
spatial or abstract domains that are partially sanctioned by this preposition. Consider the 
first BNC example in which to is used to express political thinking: 
(8) Although only a minority of parties were favourable to the Left, it was that 
minority which was most active at Party conferences and in political propaganda in 
the country                                                                          [PREFERENCE] 
In (8), the [(POLITICAL) PREFERENCE] lexical concept is partly encoded by the composite 
expression were favourable to the Left, in which the TR of to is elaborated by the clause 
only a minority of parties were favourable, and the prepositional landmark is elaborated by 
the nominal the Left. The resulting composite conception has to do with political 
preference. To say that someone is favorable to the left or the right, is to say that this person 
matches the political thinking and values of that party. This in turn, is mostly achieve 
through introspective experience – that is, response content (in the sense of Tyler and 
Evans 2001; see also Grady 1997). A person must know herself in order to decide which 
political party vote for. It follows from this that introspection may play a crucial role in the 
development of abstract or response concepts. 73 As mentioned above, all the (conceptual) 
parameters that form the conceptual bases proposed are not only a product of sensory-
motor experience (i.e., image content), but they are also grounded in all the brain’s modal 
areas – that is, they are grounded in perception, situated action, and introspection (Barsalou 
2008; Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005).  
The role of introspection may be of great importance at the moment of understanding 
abstract domains in which the preposition to actively participates as in (8) above. I suggest 
that the parameters that most directly participate in the example above are the ones of 
Primary goal and Vector. The Primary goal parameter is reflected in the fact that the 
nominal the Left constitutes the political preference of the people who support the left wing: 
there is a tendency to orientation and motion toward the LM by part of the TR of to which 
is evident in (8). Moreover, to denotes affinity and proximity (i.e., subjective features); this 
is precisely due to the activation of those two parameters. A metaphor that could be 
involved in this non-spatial reasoning is PREFERENCE IS MOTION TOWARD A GOAL. 
                                                             
73  See Grady (1997) for full details on response concepts. 
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The parameter of Vector must be understood subjectively when it comes to the abstract 
realm and it goes hand in hand with Primary goal. As mentioned earlier, Vector has to do 
with a schematic representation of (force) direction, motion, and length. The emergence of 
this conceptual parameter not only comes from proprioception (i.e. situated action), but also 
from perception and introspection. Introspective states are key to the understanding of the 
activation of the response content that non-spatial parameters such as Primary goal and 
Vector are mainly constituted of. Now under an intersubjective perspective, the parameter 
of Vector must be understood as the affinity or appeal that makes people support a given 
political party as in (8) above. Note that there is a sort of attraction based on epistemic 
thinking, which eventually makes people decide on something – hence, being more 
proximal to the decision taken and more distal from the options rejected. Lastly, the 
parameter of Location may also get extended: the fact of favoring to the left or right party is 
to locate one self’s opinion in one of the two political wings. From this it follows that the 
metonymy LOCATION FOR POLITICAL AFFINITY might play a role in the composite 
conception evoked in favourable to the Left. 
Let us consider another figurative usage of to. In this case, to denotes a relation between a 
TR and an event which is brought about by the TR: 
(9) 'I've been sentenced to death. Apart from that, everything is fine. Everything is a                                                                                                               
winner!                                                                                                           [EVENT] 
 The composite structure I've been sentenced to death evokes an event in which a person’s 
fate is to receive the maximum punishment. That clause elaborates the TR of to whereas the 
profile of death elaborates its prepositional landmark. Note the correlation between the 
prepositional-landmark element, here death, and the event which occurs at a specific 
location. The death sentence is the “goal” that the subject in question must eventually meet. 
However, the conceptualization of such a goal triggers a spreading activation process that 
results in a new inference provided by the composite structure I've been sentenced to death. 
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The event in this case triggers the location, which is probably a prison’s area where 
executions can be carried out.74   
I think that the [EVENT] lexical concept is partly motivated by the parameters of Primary 
goal and Location. The former is mainly built up by response (i.e. abstract) content whereas 
the latter is so, but by image (i.e. perceptual) content. Put it differently, the former is based 
more on introspection whereas the latter is based more on perception. Crucially, however, 
the Location parameter offers the topological structure which is necessary for the inference 
that can be glossed as EVENT>LOCATION – after all, events are based on conceived time, 
summation, and sequential scanning (Langacker 1987, 2012b): the parameter of Location 
provides the spatio-conceptual structure for setting that event (based on temporal units) in 
space. 
Following Tyler and Evans (2003a) (see also Wierzbicka 1988), the [EVENT] lexical 
concept may serve as a conceptual source for the function that to has in complementation. 
As an example, consider the following BNC passage: 
(10) The Smoke busters of South Tees showed that you don't need to smoke to                   
have fun                                                                            [PRIMARY GOAL]/ [EVENT] 
In the composite structure you don’t need to smoke to have fun in (10) above, to behaves as 
a simplex atemporal unit that allows the structures evoked by you don’t need to smoke and 
have fun, to lexically integrate in a coherent semantic assembly. The profile of the clause 
you don’t need to smoke elaborates the TR of to. Moreover, if we consider the composite 
conception of the whole passage in (10), we can appreciate that the idea that people do not 
need to smoke to have fun was empirically proved, somehow, by the Smoke busters of 
South Tees.  
On the other hand, the prepositional landmark of to is elaborated by the relational profile of 
have fun. Now the complementation function of to is deeply connected with the experiential 
correlation of being in a place and the practical association of what it implies to be in that 
                                                             
74 Inference through spreading activation and the co-activation of implicit conceptual elements play a major 
role in language processing and understanding. Linguistic meaning is neither self-contained nor fully 
compositional (Langacker 2012b). 
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place. The act of having fun, for instance, implies this correlation: an enjoyable setting and 
the spatial affordances this implies for human interaction. 
This type of function may be a further degree of grammaticalization, via (possibly 
metonymic) pragmatic strengthening (in the sense of Traugott and Dasher 2004), that 
comes from the “purposeful” conceptual character exhibited by the (schematic) 
trajector/landmark alignment of to. To this purposeful conceptual character, we might add 
temporal structure of the sequential type. The transience type of succession (i.e., temporal 
evolution) underlies the metaphor PURPOSEFUL ACTION IS MOTION TOWARD A GOAL. This 
metaphor may allow us to see a purpose as oriented motion to a destination. 
Note how in the complementation function the LM is identified with the TR: there are 
correspondence links in that we can perfectly understand from (10) that in order to have fun 
people do not need to smoke. To have fun complements the message that people do not 
need to smoke – that is, have fun complements and is also apprehended as primary goal 
within the event of not smoking while having fun. The very fact that the preposition to 
contributes to the conceptualization of an event, makes the complementation function 
possible. This in turn, may ultimately be derived from the [EVENT] lexical concept. In Sum, 
we can observe that for the realization of to in (10) there is activation of the Primary goal 
and Vector parameters. Primary goal helps to conceptualize the act of having fun (the 
objective), while Vector schematically supports this willingness or desire to accomplish 
that goal. Location also gets activated. 
From the evidence shown above, we could say that the [EVENT] lexical concept may 
ultimately become a sense-extension unit in the conceptual basis of to. This unit would be a 
metonymic extension that comes from the Location parameter. As mentioned earlier, events 
(which are based on temporal units) need their physical setting (i.e., space) to achieve 
conceptualization – in other words, they need a location. This metonymic extension in the 
form of Event that comes from Location (see figure 5.3 below), might allow the 
complementation function that to acquires regularly. 
Another figurative use type of to that is highly frequent is the [COMPARISON] sense. To 
appreciate this function, consider the following BNC sample: 
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(11) Meyer's corporate publications had claimed that the timber industry helped to 
slow global climate change, provided economic benefits to developing countries and 
had a minor role in the destruction of tropical forests compared to those played by 
farmers and population growth.                                                        [COMPARISON] 
The passage in (11) above has a comparative function within its maximal discourse scope: 
the passage compares the timber industry on the one hand, and the farmers and population 
growth on the other hand, with respect to the roles that each group has in the destruction of 
tropical forests. Now the particular composite structure that concerns us here is the one 
yielded by compared to those played by farmers and population growth. The mental space 
of {COMPARISON}, evoked here by compared, is the timber industry’s minor role in the 
destruction of tropical forests. This elaborates the TR of to. The prepositional landmark of 
to, which in this case is the referential object of comparison, is elaborated by the profile of 
the coordinate structure those played by farmers and population growth. 
In (11) to profiles a relation between TR and LM such that a comparison is facilitated. This 
sense may derive from the experiential correlation between an act of comparison and the 
act of bringing one object to another so that they can be more easily examined and hence, 
compared. Through the process of pragmatic strengthening, this sense has become 
conventionalized. However, I suggest that this sense is also an extension of the Location 
parameter (see figure 5.3 below). As just mentioned, the act of comparison implies bringing 
two or more things together so as to examine them more easily – they have to be located 
close to each other. Such mundane act of comparison based on perception, might be key to 
understanding the motivation behind the figurative usage of the [COMPARISON] lexical 
concept that is generally and partially sanctioned by to.  
Lastly, I think that the parameters that most directly participate in the realization of this 
sense, are the ones of Primary goal and Location. Primary goal gets activated due to the 
role of the LM of to, which in (11) represents one of the objects of comparison, that is, the 
role of farmers and population growth in the destruction of the tropical forests. On the other 
hand, the parameter of Location also gets activated and figuratively extended (so metaphor 
is involved) in order to conceptualize the act of comparison between two things or group of 
 
 
146 
 
things due to the correlation existing between seeing two objects that are close to each 
other, and the cognitive operation of comparison. 
Let us now take a look at the last figurative use type of to in this non-exhaustive list of 
lexical concepts. The last non-spatial lexical concept I want to analyze using the conceptual 
basis proposed for to, is the one of [EXTREME STATE]. According to the CED, to can denote 
an extreme state. Consider the BNC sample below: 
(12) My Lady Dedlock says she has been ' bored to death '          [EXTREME STATE] 
Note how in (12) the composite structure to death functions as intensifier of bored since it 
elaborates a salient subpart of it. In (12), the main figure, here Lady Dedlock, is 
conceptualized as being in an extreme state of boredom. This reading is partly due to the 
semantics of to since it helps to conceptualize a sort of “top” or “endpoint” that is included 
in the schematic scale or process profiled by bored, whose top or “endpoint” is profiled by 
death. It follows from this idea that death is understood as the end of a schematic path that 
metaphorically encodes an extreme state. On the other hand, the image-schematic structure 
{SOURCE-PATH-GOAL}, inherent in the Orientation parameter of to, also helps in the 
metaphorical mapping concerning the level or degree of boredom, which in (12) has to do 
with the highest. Death (the terminal point of a preceding process) is metaphorically 
mapped onto extreme boredom (also the terminal point of a process of growing boredom). 
As we saw above, the parameters that constitute the conceptual basis of to might provide an 
approach to understand the motivation that lies behind (12). I think that the parameters that 
most directly participate in the figurative conception in (12) above are the ones of Contact, 
Orientation, and Vector. Contact must be understood metaphorically as the act of reaching 
a certain point, which in this case has to do with a psychological state of extreme boredom. 
Note also, as just pointed out, that the {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} image schema is inherent 
since the component states of a process (i.e. boredom increase) are construable as a scale 
(i.e. a path), leading to its completion. Orientation has to do with the “upwards” direction in 
terms of the level of boredom that the conceptualizer is going through – this figurative 
orientation is conceived at the expense of the metaphor MORE IS UP (Lakoff and Johnson 
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1980, 1999).75 Lastly, the parameter of Vector, which functions as the schematic 
representation of force, length, and orientation (and probably willingness in the 
psychological realm), allows us to profile all the component states of the process of ‘getting 
bored’ in (12). In other words, it helps to apprehend the process or sequence and then 
package it in a summary way since what really matters in (12) is the [EXTREME STATE], that 
is, the final stage of a process of getting increasingly bored. 
When we consider the composite structure bored to death in isolation, we can distinguish 
how the profile of death elaborates the LM of to, while its TR is elaborated by the relational 
profile of bored. (which anaphorically stand for Lady Dedlock). This is turn, allows us to 
comprehend the idiomaticity that lies behind such construction since we can infer, based on 
the conceptual basis of the preposition to depicted in figure 5.2 above, what factors (i.e., 
parameters) are most directly involved in the trajector/landmark alignment.  
Now the point I want to highlight here, is that when we put this idiomatic expression into 
context such as in (12) above, we have a larger construction which in this case is a 
subordinate clause. It follows that a larger construction implies a larger semantic 
integration – hence, a different trajector/landmark dynamism. Note how in the composite 
structure she has been ' bored to death ', which must be understood as a mental space that 
consists of the information reported by the speaker in (12), the preposition to acquires a 
quantifying function. Such a function in turn, implies that the TR, which is in this case is 
Lady Dedlock (at the maximal discourse scope represented by the pronoun she), establishes 
correspondence links with its LM (bored) and with a secondary landmark (Langacker 
1991) that is specified by to death. The prepositional phrase structure, then, elaborates the 
secondary LM; and the result is the extreme character of the psycho-somatic state of 
boredom evoked in (12). 
5.1.2 Complementation 
As we saw above, there are cases in which to functions as complementizer. However, and 
following Tyler and Evans (2003a), the complementation of to as an infinitival 
subordinator might be ultimately derived from the [EVENT] lexical concept (as shown in (9) 
                                                             
75 See also Barcelona (2000a) for details on the metonymic motivation of the MORE IS UP metaphor. 
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and (10) above). The experiential correlation in turn, may be attributable to the link that 
exists between the notion of futurity and the fulfillment of an expectation: source, path and 
goal can then be conceptualized through the temporal transience type of succession even 
though the infinitival to merely suspends sequential scanning since it profiles all the 
component states of the verb it combines with; therefore, it profiles the entire path 
(Langacker 1991: 446). 
Consider the following example of a complement clause: 
(13) The professor will be expected to play a major part in the organisation of 
syllabuses, teaching and lecturing in Roman Art and Archaeology                                   
[EVENT] 
Note how the subjective character of to in complementation allows the main figure, here 
the professor, to be left implicit in the complement clause in italics. In (13) The professor 
has subject status relative to its LM, here will be expected in The professor will be expected. 
Then, at a higher level of conceptual organization, the professor has topic status and the 
(secondary) LM becomes relational since it is elaborated by the clause play a major part in 
the organisation of syllabuses, teaching and lecturing in Roman Art and Archaeology. This 
relational LM, in turn, allows us to specifically know the areas in which the professor is 
expected to play a major role in. The TR of to, on the other hand, is elaborated by the 
clause The professor will be expected. 
The parameters that most directly participate in the complement clause are Location and 
Primary goal. As mentioned earlier, the [EVENT] sense derives from the Location parameter 
due to the experiential correlation existing between events and the locations in which they 
take place. This locative function, which leads to the conceptualization of an event, is 
generally characterized by the path prepositional function as in I got out to the shop in (2) 
above. The second parameter that receive primary activation in the complement clause in 
(13) is the one of Primary goal. The secondary LM, as we saw above, serves as e-site for 
the TR and determines the active zone of the primary LM specified by expected. The 
resulting conception yields the thing or things that the professor in (13) is expected to play 
a major role in. These things are apprehended as the primary goal.  
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More evidence in support for the role of to as an infinitival subordinator in 
complementation, which is derived from the [EVENT] lexical concept, comes from the 
following BNC passage that deals with a purpose clause: 
(14) 'Or have you simply come here to annoy me?'                               [PURPOSE] 
According to the CED, to denotes the purpose of doing something. In (14) we can 
appreciate a locative relation between the agents (the speaker and her interlocutor) and their 
ground (represented by the spatial deixis here). In addition, we also have to consider the 
complement clause to annoy me, which serves as secondary LM and is elaborated by the 
infinitival complement. This secondary LM mediates the interaction between the TR and its 
primary LM (have you simply (TR) come here (LM)). It follows that the secondary LM 
narrows down and hence, specify the type of event and it also stipulates the agent’s primary 
goal. In sum, the secondary LM is the event’s active zone with respect to the profiled 
relationship evoked in (14). This active zone might imply the activation of at least the 
following parameters: Orientation, Location, Vector, and Primary goal. The first three 
parameters go hand in hand with the {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} image schema that underlies 
the conceptual basis of to. As we saw above, to suspends sequential scanning since it 
denotes a complex atemporal relation which profiles all the component states of a process. 
The result is the summation (Langacker 2012b) of a sequence which highlights the end 
stage, that is, the TR goes through a change in location by being orientated and moving 
toward its LM. More importantly, however, is the activation of the Primary goal parameter, 
which crucially, contributes to our understanding of the purpose that one of the agents in 
(14) might have had in mind. 
According to Wierzbicka (1988) (see also Langacker 1991: 438-463), to-complements not 
only are characterized by evoking notions such as the personal mode and intentionality 
which is manifest by the very thought about desiring something, but they are also 
characterized by exhibiting a ‘future component of some sort’ (Wierzbicka 1988: 166). 
Moreover, to-complements present a non-committal character as in an utterance such as He 
tried to fry the bacon, in which the very act of trying is aimed at effecting – therefore, it 
precedes the subordinate event. It follows from such a non-committal character of to-
complements, that there is uncertainty as to whether any action actually took place. On the 
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other hand, if one says He tried frying the bacon, it implies that the action occurred: the act 
of trying is not aimed at effecting, but rather at ascertaining its consequence once initiated 
(Langacker 1991: 445). We can observe then, that to-complements imply a sequence of 
times even though they are atemporal relations due to the fact that they combine with 
ungrounded structures and are also ungrounded structures themselves. On the other hand, a 
gerundive complement, as in He tried frying the bacon above, implies an interpretation 
based on sameness in time: the temporal coincidence or sameness in time of -ing is 
attributable to its immediate scope which falls within the boundaries of the verb stem’s 
processual profile (Langacker 1991: 443). 
There are some verbs, however, that can be lexically integrated with either a to-infinitive or 
-ing. Examples of these are verbs like hate, prefer, like, and love (compare I love cooking 
to I love to cook). Even though there might be some degree of indeterminacy as well as 
arbitrariness, I favor the idea that a different syntactic structure implies a difference in 
meaning (Bolinger 1968). A possible explanation about the differences that may exist 
between I love cooking and I love to cook, might lie in the idea of active involvement, 
which goes hand in hand with Langacker’s notion of viewing frame. Such a notion, which 
in turn is consonant with the conceptual process of selection (see Evans 2009: Ch. 11), has 
to do with how speakers construe reality through linguistically mediated communication. In 
the former example (I love cooking), the speaker is not necessarily conceptualized as an 
active participant: it conveys the idea that the speaker likes cooking either in the sense of 
being actively involved in cooking or in the sense of just enjoying the food or watching 
food channels, and the like, whereas the latter example (I love to cook) is normally 
understood as meaning that the speaker is an active participant in the kitchen and that he or 
she could even be a chef: she is actively involved in cooking.  
5.1.3 Futurity 
I now briefly turn to the notion of futurity, which is generally associated with the 
prototypical value of to due to its goal-oriented character. According to the CED, to denotes 
a future event and is used before an infinitive. I suggest that this notion has its roots in the 
{SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} image schema that is generally conveyed by to. For instance, in the 
composite structure I got out to the shops in (2) above, we can observe how to conveys the 
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{SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} image schema in that we can conceptualize a sequence: the speaker 
is first located somewhere, and then she moves to another place which is specified by the 
prepositional landmark, here the profile of the nominal the shops. We can, then, see how 
the preposition to indicates succession and profiles the end point as primary goal. 
Moreover, the speaker in (2) might have planned in advance to go shopping before she left 
the place she was before. It follows from this idea that there is a projection (i.e., future 
plans) and then a fulfillment – this in turn, is the main experiential correlation for positing a 
motivation lying behind the notion of futurity that populates the conceptual basis of to. This 
correlation might have become parameterized as Primary goal. 
Consider now a mundane utterance such as This soccer ball is for you to have fun, uttered 
by a father to his son. Note that even though the construction specifies present tense, the 
preposition to conveys the notion of futurity in that the complement clause to have fun 
points to a future event that the speaker’ son/daughter is likely to encounter. Such a future 
event is conceptualized as a fulfillment of an expectation (i.e. goal). My point in here is to 
highlight the importance of the Primary goal parameter within the conceptual basis of to. I 
think this is the key feature that may allow us to comprehend more clearly the motivation 
existing behind the notion of futurity that is manifested in many usages in which the 
[EVENT] sense is sanctioned. Moreover, the fact that to encodes the {PATH} schema is 
further evidence for the emergence of the futurity notion. This particular schema is 
analogue to the transience type of succession whose embodied basis comes from the fact 
that the felt experience of time constitutes a sequence of events, one preceding another. 
This in turn, provides a basis for distinguishing between earlier and later events, and related 
events to their position in a sequence, giving rise to the temporal relation earlier/later. There 
is indeed a link between spatio-conceptual and temporal structure that allows summation in 
the first place and therefore, permits the understanding of conceived episodes in order to 
conceptualize the elapse of time until reaching the target event, which is the primary goal of 
the TR of to. 
I want to finish this section with a remark on futurity as a temporal conceptual feature of to. 
To do so, let us compare two sentences such as I will try to fry bacon, as opposed to *I will 
try frying bacon. The former sentence is acceptable whereas the latter sounds semantically 
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anomalous unless it is something that a person will do for the first time. The reason why the 
latter does not allow projection apart from the case just mentioned, is because of the 
conceptual nature of -ing, which can be apprehended as temporal sameness. On the 
contrary, the former sentence can be perfectly integrated with to due to its conceptual 
feature of futurity. The experiential correlation between future and the fulfillment of an 
expectation (Langacker 1991: 446), might be considered as the temporal proto-scene of to. 
5.1.4 Temporal domain of to 
In this section, I provide an analysis of the [UNTIL] temporal lexical concept of to in order 
to show how the domains of space and time interact with each other. As mentioned 
throughout the research, the conceptualization of time does have temporal structure, which 
is characterized by the three temporal frames of reference (t-FoR) – two of them (deictic 
and sequential) – have a neuro-biological basis, whereas the extrinsic or absolute temporal 
frame of reference is considered an intellectual achievement.76 On the other hand, space 
also manifests three spatial frames of reference (Levinson 2003). It follows that these 
spatio-conceptual and temporal structures jointly collaborate in the conceptualization of 
time.77 
Consider now an example in which the [UNTIL] temporal lexical concept is partially 
sanctioned by to (the example below is taken from the BNC). This sense, according to the 
CED, has to do with a particular period of time that is reached: 
(15) 'It's still two weeks to the Moulid                                                           [UNTIL] 
Example (15) above profiles the temporal distance existing between now (i.e., an ego-based 
temporal concept) and the Moulid event (TE). A Moulid is an event of a holy person which 
is celebrated by Muslims and Christians in Egypt to honor their Saints. This ceremony, in 
turn, elaborates the prepositional landmark of to and is considered the target event (TE).  
Our notion of nowness implies a constant time flow – that is, the very matrix of time that 
makes it always go forward and never backwards. This temporal feature known as 
                                                             
76 For details on temporal frames of reference and the neuro-biological basis of time see Evans (2013) and 
references therein. 
77 For an account of the space-time (dis)analogy, see Langacker (2012a). 
 
 
153 
 
transience (Evans 2013; Galton 2011) goes hand in hand with the {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} 
image schematic structure that underlies the (spatial) conceptual basis of to. Moreover, we 
need a repeatable cycle system in order to understand the temporal concept of {TWO 
WEEKS}. The profile of the nominal two weeks represents the temporal reference point (RP) 
since it helps to locate the TE, here the Moulid. The origo (O), the element that starts the 
count in this repeatable event-reckoning system, is set with respect to the solar cycle (the O 
is external to the counting system) and anchors the RP to the duration transience type. 
Thus, the type of temporal reference used in (15) is the extrinsic one. 
Note that example in (15) could also be accounted using the temporal element of 
{NOWNESS} as origo. This element characterizes the deictic t-FoR. However, it is due to the 
temporal nature of the RP in (15), which is periodicity-based, that the temporal reference 
strategy is absolute. In a case where a person said The Moulid is fast approaching, we 
could say that it is a case of deictic temporal reference, particularly because of the 
perspective point (PP) evoked in the clause is fast approaching. In that case, the MOVING 
TIME metaphor might be applied. On the other hand, the MOVING EGO metaphor, may be 
active in temporal expressions such as We are approaching the moulid, in which the clause 
We are approaching conveys this metaphorical reasoning.  
Even though the deictic t-FoR is not used in (15), there are conceptual convergences 
between the {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} schematic structure of to, and the temporal distance 
between the RP and TE in (15). Such distance might be apprehended via the primary 
metaphor DURATION IS LENGTH because of the correlation existing between spatial 
trajectory and temporal duration. It is precisely the transience type of duration, the one that 
is apprehended more easily via metaphor. 
At this point we can appreciate differences and similarities between spatio-conceptual and 
temporal structure. But most importantly, they have to be considered as dependent to each 
other, since a complete conceptualization of time requires spatio-conceptual structure (and 
probably vice versa). 
Temporal conceptualizations have their neuro-biological basis on the concepts of 
past/future and early/ later. But as mentioned throughout the research, time needs space for 
its proper conceptualization, and this is so because these two domains are so deeply related 
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to the point that they are interdependent. As Grady (1997) points out, there is an 
experiential correlation between duration, a type of transience, and length, which is a 
property of space. The result of this elemental experiential correlation gives rise to the 
primary metaphor DURATION IS LENGTH in which there is a topological reification mapped 
from the domain of space onto the domain of time. 
We can consider, then, the temporal use of to in (15) as a product of topological reification, 
but always taking into consideration the role that temporal cognition itself plays in 
temporal composite conceptions. The topological reification is motivated by the {SOURCE-
PATH-GOAL} image schema. The path is metaphorically understood as the time flow, 
whereas the goal is specified by the target event. We can note that the spatial semantics of 
to matches how the domain of time works in general in that this preposition can profile all 
the stages of conceived time (time flow) until it gets to the final event, which is generally 
considered as the primary goal. The schematic temporal structure that might be used for 
metaphorical reasoning in the first place, can be glossed as [TE FIXED TO AN RP IN A 
(REPEATABLE) EVENT-RECKONING SYSTEM]. 
The parameters that are most directly involved in (15) are Primary goal, Orientation, and 
Vector. Primary goal represents the Moulid, that is, the TE. Orientation and Vector jointly 
work in the understanding of temporal features such as the forward motion of time which is 
composed by several events that are conceptualized sequentially and summarily. There 
might also be secondary activation. For instance, the Location parameter might be 
metaphorically extended so as to apprehend temporal locations such as {NOWNESS} and 
{TWO WEEKS AHEAD}. 
Now consider an example in which the {PATH} schema is the conceptual zone that gets 
activated the most, compared to the wider and more complex {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} 
schema that is generally encoded by to: 
(16) The car wasn't there at twenty to six, but ten minutes later there it was.          
[UNTIL] 
According to the CED, to is used when saying the time, to mean before the stated hour. In 
example (16) the TE, the arrival of the car, is being fixed with respect to the 12-hour clock 
 
 
155 
 
(a.m/p.m) in a (repeatable) time-reckoning system. Moreover, the RP (the time indicated as 
twenty to six), requires an O to anchor it to the transience type of duration. The expression 
in (16) shows a 12-hour system based on the day-night cycle, where midnight is taken to 
begin the measurements of durational elapse; therefore, the O is fixed as 00:00. The 
example above differs from example (15) in the fact that while in (16) the construction is 
time-based (i.e., since we use highly precise temporal measuring systems like clocks), 
example (15) is construed as event-based (i.e., calendar units). The highly schematic 
temporal structure that is inherent in (16) may be glossed as [TE FIXED TO AN RP IN A 
(REPEATABLE) TIME-RECKONING SYSTEM]. 
We can then observe that duration manifests a deep experiential correlation with the 
{PATH} image schema (i.e., length). Even though the composite expression might profile 
the whole {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} schema, that is, from a certain point in time until 5:40, it 
is the time span between these two temporal points what contributes to the reading in (16), 
with a clear emphasis on the end part of the temporal elapse that is considered to be the 
“goal”, since it is the time that the car’s arrival is expected. 
The parameter that is most directly involved in the temporal realization of to in (16), I 
suggest, is the one of Location. Because the composite structure twenty to six is based on an 
extrinsic temporal frame of reference, which is associated with clocks and calendars, and 
relates to the duration transience type, it is that the Location parameter plays a major role in 
the localion of the TE (the arrival of the car) with respect to its RP, here 5:40.  The extrinsic 
or absolute t-FoR can then be employed to apprehend points in time. An important aspect of 
this type of temporal reference, is that even though it derives from the phenomenologically 
real experience of duration, the temporal relation that emerges from it is an intellectual 
achievement since the absolute location of time, as in twenty to six, is an ability that is not 
encountered in every culture (see Sinha et al. 2016). Note also that in this type of temporal 
systems, time reckoning harnesses the physical manifestation of natural periodicities using 
material artefacts that either embody – like an hourglass – or symbolize the periodicities, 
such as the hands of a clock face. In (16), the speaker uses the linguistically captured 
metonymic representation of a clock face to conceptualize the relation holding between the 
car arrival and its time of occurrence within the temporal matrix. 
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Another two parameters that might be involved in (16) above are Vector and Orientation 
since they help to conceptualize the passage of time. Orientation is reflected in the forward 
direction of time itself and Vector complements such directionality with its schematic 
information about motion, force, and length in the low-level composite structure yielded by 
twenty to six. If we say twenty to six, we do know that six o’ clock is an imminent point in 
time that will be met due to the very nature of time – it always goes forward rather than 
backwards, and it never stops.78 
Figure 5.3 below shows the conceptual basis of to plus its semantic extensions which might 
become pragmatically strengthened (following Traugott and Dasher 2004) to the point they 
get parameterized: 
                                                                Orientation                     Futurity 
                                                                                                                             Intentionality 
      
  Contact                          Spatial scenes involving an oriented F (with                       Primary goal 
                                        tendency to motion) towards its highlighted LM  
      Vector                                                                                                              Location 
                                                                Attachment                                              
                                                                                                          Comparison            Event 
Figure 5.3. Conceptual basis for to and its relationship with sense-extension units 
                                                             
78 This manner of understanding time as always moving forward might be considered a sub-metaphor within 
the TIME IS SPACE metaphor. However, such metaphorical thinking must be grounded in the 
phenomenologically real experience of the temporal relation known as earlier/later – that is, temporal 
evolution. As showed in chapter 2, time is phenomenologically real in that we perceive time due to our 
neuroanatomical organization. The transience types of succession and anisotropic are indeed a product of the 
phenomenologically real temporal relations of earlier/later and future/past, respectively. Duration, on the 
other hand, is more neuro-cognitively complex because it depends on physiological mechanisms (see Evans 
2013:128). 
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Figure 5.3 above shows the conceptual basis of to plus some semantic extensions that might 
become parameterized due to pragmatic strengthening. Parameterization takes place when 
semantic features start becoming prominent (via bridging contexts [Evans and Wilkins 
2000]) within the semantic pole of a word to the extent they exhibit a high frequency of 
use.79 Such high frequency leads to the entrenchment and conventionalization of some 
well-established senses of to, whereas others never get parameterized but accessed through 
parameters like the [PREFERENCE] sense evoked in (8) above. 
The semantic extensions that I think could get parameterized are Futurity, Intentionality, 
Event, and Comparison. Futurity, as shown in figure 5.3 above, comes from Orientation 
and Primary goal. This is due to the correlation between an expectation and the fulfillment 
of that expectation: the expectation is the primary goal whereas the process of achieving 
that goal is driven by Orientation (and Vector). Intentionality, on the other hand, comes 
from Primary goal (and probably Vector) because when people set themselves a list of 
goals, these goals are ultimately rooted in the volitional decision and willingness to fulfill 
and hence, reach those expectations.  
The other two sense-extension units are Event and Comparison and they come from the 
same parameter, which is Location. In the case of Event, the semantic extension may be 
due to the experiential correlation between events and locations. Locations provide the 
spatio-conceptual structure that is characterized by matter – the substrate of space, whereas 
events are constituted by temporal structure, which is characterized by the substrate of time 
– that is, action. We can observe, then, a metonymic link between locations and events in 
which one provides mental access to the other (and activates it) due to their deep 
correlation. In addition, the Event parameter might serve as conceptual source for the role 
of to as an infinitival subordinator in complementation. Finally, the parameter of 
Comparison also comes from the Location parameter and is reflected in the 
phenomenological fact that we can visually compare two things that are proximal to each 
other: the fact that they are in the visual scope facilitates the mundane (and vital) cognitive 
operation of comparison.  
                                                             
79 However, this needs to be further corroborated through a statistically corpus-driven work that measures 
frequency. 
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5.2 Spatial lexical concepts for a 
I now turn to the spatial lexical concepts or senses of the Spanish preposition a. This 
preposition is characterized by being highly polysemous:  it can sanction spatial, non-
spatial, and temporal conceptions that are generally encoded by to, along with other English 
prepositions such as at, by, on, and for. 
I will first show what I think is the most prototypical sense and the semantic core of the 
preposition a, from which a number of motivated-sense extensions take place. Such sense is 
mainly structured by the parameter of Directionality or Direction, and it is involved in the 
proto-scene of a as its main feature. According to the DLE, a denotes direction as well as 
the path that leads to an end. In the same line, Trujillo (1971) (see also Chéliz 2002), refers 
to the preposition a (and other semantically related prepositional vehicles) as a preposition 
which indicates approximation to a limit. A exhibits a telic character since it is generally 
integrated in constructions that profile a conclusive endpoint of an event.80 However, the 
endpoint of a given event is not as strict or delimitated as in other semantically related 
prepositions such as hasta (English until). For instance, I can say Voy a Italia este mes (I go 
to Italy this month) to indicate a future motion event. On the other hand, if I say Llegamos 
hasta la frontera entre Italia y Francia (We got up to the border between Italy and 
France), I am also referring to a telic event but one that is more delimitated in the sense 
that it describes an absolute endpoint (Trujillo 1971). 
Let us consider an example of a that denotes directionality. The example below is taken 
from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(17) Salimos del río dirigiéndonos a la fragata inglesa Gran Duke         [HEADING 
TO] 
The composite structure salimos del río dirigiéndonos a la fragata inglesa (We got off the 
river heading to the English frigate) evokes a sequential scanning in which there is a 
change of location and ongoing motion toward the goal, here the English frigate. The TR, 
here the group of people, is approaching the LM, the Gran Duke English frigate.  
                                                             
80 For an overview on telicity see Radden and Dirven (2007: Ch. 8). 
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At this point, I want to mention the internal structure of the Direction parameter in that it is 
constituted by the image-schematic structure of {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL}, along with concepts 
such as intentionality and futurity. In (17), we can observe how the TR (the group of 
people) is approaching its LM (the English frigate): the TR is going through a path to reach 
its goal (Direction is also present in (18) below, but stationary – the path is the visual field 
whereas the goal is the visual target). The notion of intentionality, on the other hand, is 
reflected in the willingness of the group of people to reach the place they want to go to. 
That concept becomes activated whenever the TR of a manifests a volitional character – 
that is – the TR being an animate entity. 
The last concept that lies in the internal structure of Directionality, is the one of futurity. 
Futurity is a temporal concept that is consonant with the forward motion of the transience 
types of succession and anisotropic: time never goes backwards – it is in a constant flow. 
This convergence between space (i.e., forward motion) and time (i.e., time continuity) 
provides substantial support for the correlation between futurity and the fulfillment of an 
expectation like reaching the English frigate in (17) – such an example, shows that 
intentionality and futurity go hand in hand when it comes to future plans and situated 
action. 
Now consider an example in which Directionality is related to the vantage point of a person 
from where she can appreciate things such as landscapes: 
(18) Localidad conocida por su centro de desintoxicación con vistas a la playa.            
[VIEW]/[DIRECTION] 
In (18) above, we can observe a simplex atemporal behavior of a in that it conveys a static 
scene. Note that in the summary scanning evoked by the composite structure con vistas a la 
playa (English with views to the seaside), the parameter of Directionality is the one that 
receives primary activation since the location of the building makes it face to the seaside. 
Directionality is reflected in the experiential correlation between the vantage point of a 
person (i.e. in the balcony), and the attentional focus (i.e. seaside). The plural noun vistas 
stands for the fact of being appropriately located in a certain place and/or angle, to fully 
appreciate something such as the blue sea. In (18), the profile of centro de desintoxicación 
con vistas elaborates the TR of a, whereas the profile nominal la playa elaborates its 
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prepositional landmark. Trajector/landmark alignment in this case is characterized by a TR 
that is stationary and facing toward its LM. 
The Spanish a, as mentioned above, can sanction usages in which futurity and intentionality 
are accessed through the parameter of Directionality, as shown in the corpus example 
below: 
(19) jouuuuuu mañana me voy a la playa hasta el día 30                [FUTURE EVENT] 
      (jouuuuuu tomorrow I’m going to the beach until the 30th) 
The speaker in (19) probably uttered the expression above at her place lying on bed while 
watching TV. However, Directionality receives primary activation because the construction 
in (19) points to a future event. It follows that Directionality is not just a matter of spatio-
conceptual structure, but also temporal structure. In the case of future plans, Directionality 
is concerned with upcoming events that can be apprehended via processes such as 
(embodied) mental time travel.81 On the contrary, when recalling past events, Directionality 
goes in the opposite direction (backwards) since we recapitulate events (also) through 
embodied simulations but which, nevertheless, are qualitatively different because 
recapitulation of events is mainly subject to long and short-term memory. On the other 
hand, embodied projections into possible future scenarios might be regarded more as an 
imaginative feature that is (also) based on encyclopedic knowledge: we can indeed imagine 
situations we have never gone through.  
As put above for the case of English to, there is an experiential correlation between future 
events and the fulfillments of those events. These types of correlations, in turn, might allow 
the Spanish preposition a to function as a future marker. The notions of Intentionality and 
Futurity should be considered as sense-extensional units of the parameter of Directionality 
since they do not constitute the core of the conceptual basis of a. We can observe in (18) 
that these two notions are not present: the composite conception in (18) evokes a static 
                                                             
81 It is important to highlight that the adverb mañana (tomorrow) in (19) is a space builder (Fauconnier 1994) 
in that it provides the temporal structure to set up the scene with the composite structure evoked in voy a la 
playa (I’m going to the beach). The preposition a contributes to the embodied projection into near future 
events and it does so by profiling the {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} image schema. 
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scene in which the building is apparently facing the seaside; this, in turn, makes the 
parameter of Directionality the key component to apprehend the relation that a establishes 
between the building and the seaside view. 
So far, we have seen that a behaves similarly to its English equivalent to. Both manifest the 
phenomenological characteristic that their TRs are oriented toward their LMs. Another 
parameter that they share is the one of Location, and this is evidenced in the following 
Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) passage: 
(20) Para comenzar a utilizar Screencast solo debemos dirigirnos a la página web y 
hacer click en el botón rojo, ubicado a la izquierda                                              
[LOCATION] 
According to the DLE, a denotes a situation of something or someone. In (20), the 
relational profile of ubicado (located) elaborates the TR of a, whereas the prepositional 
landmark is elaborated by la izquierda (the left). This locative function is more specific 
than say, the one below: 
(21) A la salida, en el hotel Miguel Ángel, esperaba el embajador Ulf Hjertonsson 
para la notificación oficial de Suecia                                                 [CO-LOCATION] 
We can observe from the examples (20) and (21) above, that the preposition a is 
characterized by exhibiting a considerably wide locative function. For instance, compare A 
la salida (at the exit) to A la derecha (to the right). The former locative function is more 
schematic than the latter. 
As evoked in (21), a not only can sanction the [LOCATION] sense, but also the [CO-
LOCATION] one. The composite structure a la salida (at the exit), evokes a spatial scene in 
which the TR (at a higher levels of organization), here the ambassador Ulf Hjertonsson, is 
co-located with respect to its LM, here the exit of the Miguel Ángel Hotel: the location is 
conceptually wide in the sense that it exhibits a fairly high degree of schematicity (i.e. 
coarse-grained), opposed to the higher degree of specificity evoked in (20).  
The preposition a also shares with English to the capacity to sanction the [EVENT] sense. As 
pointed out earlier, there exists a deep conceptual link between locations and events. Events 
then, must be understood as being constituted by temporal structure (i.e. conceived time) 
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which is interwoven with spatial structure in the form of things and locations. This 
conceptual link motivates the emergence of the [EVENT] sense, as in (9) above. Consider a 
Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) example of this sense: 
(22) El juez le declara culpable de asesinato y es sentenciado a muerte              
[EVENT]  
Like in (9) above, example (22) sanctions the [EVENT] sense. This sense, along with all the 
rest of the senses presented in this research, should always be understood as situated due to 
the highly important role of context and inference in the process of linguistically mediated 
meaning construction. The composite structure sentenciado a muerte (sentenced to death) 
in (22) (as in (9) above as well), might have been uttered in court by the judge. Note how 
the semantics of such a construction loses its factual meaning if it is uttered by a person’s 
friend as a joke. In other words, some usages of the [EVENT] lexical concept are deeply 
linked to the idea of social power and/or influence; for instance, the power of a judge to 
sentence a criminal to death, or the less rigid social power that parents have upon their kids, 
like when mom says “¡a comer!” (lunch time!) as a sort of command that everyone must 
come to the table and have lunch.82 
The proto-scene of a might be understood similarly to the one of English to (see figure 5.1 
above). However, the Spanish preposition a is more “flexible” since it can sanction senses 
that English to cannot, and this might be due to the locative relation of TR and LM. I 
suggest that the status of the TR and LM of a is different from the one of to. Moreover, it 
seems that the prepositional landmark of a does not have a higher-than-usual status – thus – 
its prepositional landmark is generally not over-highlighted as the LM of to.  
One example of these differences in the trajector/landmark alignment that structures the 
proto-scene of a was shown in (21), in the fact that a allows a wider location in space, 
which is compatible with English at. A second difference might be what I call the 
[INSTANTIATION] sense. When this use type is sanctioned, the prepositional landmark is 
                                                             
82 Linguistic reference must be understood as a social act within a joint attentional scene. Joint attentional 
scenes provide the intersubjective context in which symbolization takes place (see Tomasello 1999: Ch.4). 
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conceptualized as an instantiation of a type (following Langacker 1987, 1991, 2008). 
Consider the following Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) example: 
(23) busco a hombre sumiso, de buen nivel social.                             
[INSTANTIATION]                                                                                                         
(I’m looking for a mild man, with a good social level) 
The composite structure in (23) above has possibly been uttered by a person who is looking 
for a mild man (with a good social status) probably to take control over him. Note that the 
prepositional-landmark element hombre sumiso is the type of man (even though it is a 
vague instantiation of a type) that the subject in (23) is looking for – hence, her/his goal. 
This vague instantiation of the man type makes the prepositional landmark of a become a 
member of a more specific category (i.e. subordinate level). 
The preposition a can also convey modes of action such as a pie (on foot), a caballo (on 
horse), and a mano (handmade). According to the DLE, a denotes manner of action. 
Consider a corpus example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(24) Más de 700 jinetes a caballo y 72 hermandades, incluidas sus correspondientes 
carretas, participarán este próximo fin de semana en la tradicional Romería al Cerro 
de los Ángeles de Getafe.                                                           [MANNER OF 
MOTION] 
For present purposes, we will focus on the composite structure Más de 700 jinetes a 
caballo (over 700 riders on horseback), in which the profile of Más de 700 jinetes (over 
700 riders) elaborates the TR of a, whereas the noun caballo (horse) elaborates the 
prepositional landmark. Note that in this type of relation, TR and LM are in contact with 
each other: the parameter of Contact, then, becomes prominent and is essential for the 
correct understanding of the partial composite conception shown above – the riders must be 
in contact with their horses, otherwise they could not ride them. Also note that the 
composite structure a caballo (on horse) does not necessarily see the LM as primary goal, 
nevertheless, it profiles it. This might be due to the schematic trajector/landmark alignment 
of a, whose landmark sometimes is not conceptualized as a goal, opposite to the case of to 
shown above in which its prepositional landmark is generally characterized as a goal. 
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Another conceptual feature of a has to do with the notion of animacy. Animacy is generally 
present in the prepositional-landmark elements of a in many everyday usages that involve 
verbs such as the infinitives in cases like vamos a bailar/comer/comprar/ (we are going to 
dance/eat/buy). However, when animacy is not present, there are cases in which a has to be 
accompanied with the article la, if the prepositional landmark is female, like in vamos a la 
discoteca (let’s go to the disco); and with al (a+el) in the case of masculine LMs as when 
Spanish speakers say vamos al parque (let’s go to the park).  
It is important to mention at this point that the animacy showed by the prepositional-
landmark elements of a is a tendency and should not be interpreted as a rule. There are 
exceptions such as in an utterance that involves animate nominals like Luisa fue al doctor 
ayer (Luisa went to the (male) doctor yesterday), as well as in Luisa fue a la doctora (Luisa 
went to the (female) doctor yesterday). One could easily say about these utterances that the 
notion of animacy in the prepositional landmark of a is expressed by doctor. However, a 
has to be accompanied by the masculine definite article el and get contracted into al in 
these cases, due to the special type of unique reference expressed by these examples; in the 
case of a female LM, there is no contraction but addition of the female definite article la. 
We can observe then, that the use of the articles, in the case of el causing a grammatical 
contraction, makes permissible the elaboration of animate landmarks. The grammatical 
contraction, however, is not entirely due to conceptual fusion, but to phonological elision of 
e in rapid speech (a + el = al) since the elision still allowed the recognition of the two 
elements contracted; this is not possible in a la.  
A conceptual parameter that we could call Instantiation, is present in both the masculine 
and feminine definite articles. The instance is in this case is any person with this function 
(functional framed uniqueness [Radden and Dirven 2007: Ch.5]). 
As seen above, the animacy factor of a should be understood as having correspondences 
with the profile of some prepositional-landmark elements. Inanimate entities can also 
elaborate the prepositional landmark of a, as in Voy al cine (I go to the cinema). In these 
cases, there is no activation of Animacy on the LM (see figure 5.4 below). Hence, the 
preposition a exhibits semantic tendencies with both animate and inanimate things. 
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We have seen thus far that many spatial usages of a are equivalent to English to, along with 
other prepositional meanings such as the ones of for, at, by, and on. However, there is more 
to say about the Spanish prepositional vehicle a, and this is concerned with its personal use, 
which apparently has no English equivalent. To illustrate, consider the corpus example 
below: 
(25) Cada vez que veo a Juan Ferrer se produce una previa extraña simbiosis entre 
ambos.                                                                                                                [SEE] 
The composite structure Cada vez que veo a Juan Ferrer is understood in English as Every 
time I see Juan Ferrer. The relational unit a then serves as e-site in which the TR 
corresponds to the clause Cada vez que veo. On the other hand, there is a correspondence 
established between the prepositional landmark of a and the profile of the nominal Juan 
Ferrer. The resulting trajector/landmark alignment highlights some parameters such as 
Directionality, Instantiation and Animacy. There is a clear orientation or direction when we 
see people (eye tracking): our vision must focus to perceive the main figure, so we have to 
be facing the target. Instantiation, as shown in (23), is a characteristic based on a selective 
operation and is also present in (25) in the sense that there is only one Juan Ferrer, at least 
for the speaker, that makes her/him feel that there is symbiosis between them. Finally, 
Animacy is a parameter that is generally manifested by the prepositional-landmark 
elements of a (as shown above), especially in its personal use type, whose LM is 
constituted by a specific person or persons.  
The last spatial sense I want to present, in this non-exhaustive list, is the one of [DISTANCE], 
which similarly to English to, allows us to determine the final part of a temporal or spatial 
interval. According to the DLE, a indicates the end stage of a spatial or temporal interval 
existing between two things. Consider the example below (taken from the Spanish Web 
2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am)): 
(26) Estos son los pasos: 1. Doblar el papel por la mitad, de esquina a esquina, y 
otra vez también volver a doblarlo por sus esquinas. 2. Abrirlo y cortar por las líneas 
dobladas hasta la mitad de cada una. 3. Pintar los triangulitos como cada niño 
quiera.                                                                                            [DISTANCE] 
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In (26) we can observe a construction that is similar to English from…to in the composite 
structure de esquina a esquina (from corner to corner). The from…to construction, 
equivalent to the Spanish de…a, evokes a beginning and an end of a concrete or abstract 
thing or event. To conceptualize such a spatial or temporal magnitude, the preposition a 
(equivalent this time to English to) determines the end part of the {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} 
schema, which is clearly activated under this linguistic context: the TR of a in this case 
meets its prepositional landmark since the instructions in (26) say that we have to fold the 
paper from corner to corner (doblar el papel por la mitad, de esquina a esquina). It follows 
that the two parameters that receive primary activation are the ones of Directionality and 
Contact. The very act of folding the paper implies directionality; once the paper is folded, 
each paper’s corner gets into contact. 
Figure 5.4 below depicts the conceptual basis proposed in this dissertation for the Spanish 
preposition a: 
                                                                                                                 Futurity 
 
   Manner or Method                           Directionality                                        Intentionality 
 
Contact                   
                                          Spatial scenes involving a TR heading/oriented                        Location 
toward its LM to eventually be co-located with it 
 
                                                                                                             Co-location         Event 
        Instantiation                                   Animacy                                                             
Figure 5.4. Parameters of the Spanish preposition a and their relationship with sense-extension units 
Figure 5.4 above depicts the conceptual basis of a. The parameters represent what I think 
are the main semantic components of the conceptual basis. The dashed lines indicate 
semantic extension. This gives rise to new semantically related sense-extension units.  
 
 
167 
 
The parameter of Directionality could be considered the core semantic value within the 
conceptual basis of a due to its essential role in the proto-scene. From this parameter there 
are, at the very least, two semantic extensions which I gloss as Futurity, and Intentionality. 
Both sense-extension units are, including Directionality, similar to the Orientation 
parameter encoded by English to; this, in turn, explains why a is used as equivalent for 
many use types of to. However, the sense-extension units of Futurity and Intentionality 
exhibit subtle conceptual differences with respect to Futurity and Primary goal (from which 
Intentionality is a sense extension) in to (see figure 5.3 above). In addition, the Primary 
goal parameter is absent in the conceptual basis of a since its LM does not generally exhibit 
a higher-than-usual status – that is, it is highlighted less frequently compared to the LM of 
to. It follows that Intentionality is derived from Directionality rather than from Primary 
goal as in the case of English to. In sum, I propose the sense-extension units of Futurity and 
Intentionality as functional elements that emerge from the core parameter of Directionality. 
The next parameter is Location and is also prominent in the conceptual basis of a since it is 
an active conceptual structure that is present in the proto-scene of a (shown in italics in 
figure 5.4 above). As seen above, the Spanish preposition a can cover a wider spatio-
conceptual spectrum (including temporal location) compare to the English to – this wider 
locative function is in fact represented in examples (20) and (21) in which the [LOCATION] 
and [CO-LOCATION] senses are sanctioned respectively. In the English language, the 
prepositions to and at would be needed to sanction these two senses, respectively. Such 
corpus evidence, in turn, substantiates the conceptual import of a regarding its spatial 
distribution compared to the one offered by to: both can sanction the [LOCATION] sense but 
only a can sanction the [CO-LOCATION] sense. It follows that the parameter of Co-location 
emerges as a semantic extension of Location. As previously mentioned, there are solid 
reasons to posit that semantic extension is due to the prevalent role of the 
trajector/landmark locative alignment in the proto-scene of a. On the other hand, the Event 
sense-extension unit, as in the conceptual basis of to, is the other semantic extension of a 
that comes from the Location parameter. This extension, in turn, is attributed to the 
correlation existing between a place, and the event that occurs at that location.  
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Animacy and Instantiation are also parameters that highly contribute to the unique 
polysemous behavior of a. As examples (23) and (25) show above, a can be used when a 
person is looking for someone else, as in (23), and when a person is just seeing or staring at 
someone else, as in (25), among other use types of a in which the parameters of Animacy 
and/or Instantiation get activated. Note that in both examples above, the prepositional-
landmark elements of a are instances of the type human being. Such instances in turn, are 
based on both Instantiation (i.e. a person’s name) and animacy (i.e. the fact that persons are 
living things).  
The last parameter that constitute, at the very least, the conceptual basis of a and which is 
also shared with to, is the one of Contact. However, the semantic extensions that might 
emerge from Contact are not the same for each preposition. In the present case, the Contact 
parameter of a, apart from encoding the [ATTACHMENT] sense just like to as in pegaré la 
foto a la muralla (I’ll glue the picture to the wall), it can also denote manner of action or 
method. A method is understood as the way people act to get what they want, as in a golpes 
(by hitting). Manner of action is mainly related to transportation, as evidenced in example 
(24) wherein a sanctions the [MANNER OF MOTION] sense. Manner and method (along with 
attachment, even though it is not shown in the conceptual basis of a) are then considered 
semantic extensions that come from the Contact parameter. The very nature of the 
motivation behind these semantic extensions might lie in the complexities of the 
trajector/landmark alignment that is at the core of the conceptual basis of a. On 
phenomenological and/or philosophical grounds, we can say that there is an experiential 
correlation between the functional-actioning character of manner of motion such as a pie 
(on foot) or a caballo (on horseback), methods such as a golpes (by hitting), and the image-
schema of {CONTACT}. Such an experiential correlation, along with the conceptual qualities 
of the trajector/landmark alignment of a, are what allow this preposition to sanction these 
senses. 
If we take a look at all the corpus examples of a shown thus far, we can effectively interpret 
how different sense activation – a.k.a. polysemy – works. For instance, example (17) 
sanctions the [HEADING TO] lexical concept which is jointly conveyed by the composite 
structure dirigiéndonos a la fragata (heading to the frigate). According to the conceptual 
 
 
169 
 
basis for a proposed above, the parameters that are most directly involved in (17) are 
Directionality and Location (Animacy might receive secondary activation). Note the 
flexible patterns that parameters exhibit in that they conceptually adjust themselves to 
context: both examples in (17) and (18) activate the parameter of Directionality. However, 
in the former direction involves motion whereas in the latter it is understood as perspectival 
(visual) orientation (e.g. a person standing looking at the sea). We can also find in (17) the 
activation of the Intentionality sense-extension unit which has its roots in the sensory-motor 
activity of navigating through space in order to accomplish our goals. Example (18) 
sanctions the [VIEW] lexical concept since the composite structure con vistas a la playa 
(with views to the seaside) evokes a certain location from which a person can appreciate the 
sea. There is primary activation, at the very least, on the parameters of Directionality and 
Location which jointly allow us to conceptualize a vantage point, a visual target, and the 
direction in which the subject must look to see the target. 
Example (19) above sanctions the [FUTURE EVENT] sense. This sense mainly emerges due to 
the cognitive ability of mental time travel.83 The composite structure me voy a la playa (I’m 
going to the beach) evokes a speaker’s plan which points to a future event – that is, the 
construction is uttered within what James ([1890]/1950) refers to as nowness but points to 
an upcoming event. For that projection to take place, there are some parameters within the 
conceptual basis of a that get activated and therefore, collaborate to the embodied 
simulation process.84 The parameters that receive primary activation are Directionality and 
Location. Directionality in (19) encodes the {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} schema in that the 
passage of time can be understood as a line that moves forwards (i.e., the arrow of time 
[following Eddington 1928]).85 However, the part of the schematic structure that most 
directly participate in the construction – its active zone in current parlance – is the end of 
the “temporal path”. This stands for the moment the speaker in (19) will reach the seaside. 
Note how the semantic extension of Futurity is motivated (and substantiated, considering 
                                                             
83 For details on mental time travel see Corballis (2011: pp. 81-127). 
84 For full details on embodied simulations see Bergen (2012).  
85 Recall that even though time does not literally flow in any direction, the schematic temporal structure that 
emerges from the succession transience type (earlier/later temporal relation), corresponds with the conceptual 
content of the metaphor PASSAGE OF TIME IS FORWARD MOTION. 
 
 
170 
 
how space and time complement each other) by spatial scenes that involve objects 
undertaking forward motion – thus – there is an experiential correlation between forward 
motion in space, and transience (the hallmark of time). The second parameter that receives 
activation in (19) is the one of Location since the speaker can imagine herself being in other 
place in a near future. Being in other place means to encounter or see new things – hence, 
the Location parameter gets extended in order to conceptualize the event itself, which is 
going to the beach. Example (20), on the other hand, sanctions the [LOCATION] sense – 
hence, there is primary activation of the Location parameter. The composite structure 
ubicado a la izquierda (located to the left) also involves Directionality. Such an activation 
provides a more specific location of the main attentional figure, here the red button (botón 
rojo). 
Example (21) sanctions the [CO-LOCATION] lexical concept, which is a sense that is usually 
encoded by the English preposition at, but which, nevertheless, is equivalent to some 
usages of a. The locative function of the composite structure a la salida (at the exit) in (21), 
allows us to co-locate an attentional figure with respect to a reference object. Primary 
activation, then, goes on the parameter of Location, a parameter that in the case of a, and as 
opposed to English to, can cover a wider spatial organization and this is reflected in the fact 
that conceptual activation spreads onto Co-location. 
Example (22) sanctions the [EVENT] sense. The composite structure sentenciado a muerte 
(sentenced to death) indicates a future event regarding a person’s fate. The parameter that 
receives primary activation is Directionality which then spreads onto Futurity since the 
construction in (22) refers to a future event that a person must meet. I think that 
Instantiation receives activation as well since we refer to an instance of a type of sentence, 
which in the case at hand has to do with death. 
There is also primary activation of the Instantiation parameter in example (23), which is 
evoked by the composite structure busco a hombre sumiso (I look for a mild man). The 
speaker in (23) is on the lookout for a specific type of man. Animacy and Directionality 
may receive secondary activation. As pointed out above, the main conceptual import of a in 
the construction in (23) is provided by the Instantiation parameter even though in (23) the 
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instance – that is, the possible candidate who is a member of the MILD AND WEALTHY MEN 
category, profiles an undefined instance of a type. 
Examples (24) and (25) sanction the [MANNER OF MOTION] and the [SEE] lexical concepts, 
respectively. In the former, the composite structure Más de 700 jinetes a caballo (over 700 
riders on horseback) evokes a conceptual relation in which TR and LM must be in contact – 
hence, the Contact parameter receives primary activation. However, the parameter of 
Contact manifests functional consequences in that the LM provides support to the TR (e.g. 
horse riding): contact is a requisite to undergo motion on horseback. In the latter example in 
(25), we can observe the personal use type of a which has no English equivalent and is 
used when the direct object is one or more people. In (25) above, we can observe the 
activation of three parameters which might shed light on the things Spanish speakers pay 
attention to at the moment of using the personal use type of a. In the composite structure 
cada vez que veo a Juan Ferrer (every time I see Juan Ferrer), the parameters that 
participate most directly in the composite conception are Directionality, Animacy, and 
Instantiation. As mentioned earlier, Directionality has to do with the visual trajectory. I 
suggest that Animacy and Instantiation are the key parameters in order to properly 
understand the personal use type of the Spanish a. Instantiation allows us to specify the 
people we are referring to, whereas animacy is considered an essential feature of human 
beings. Note however, that people who are dead can also be referred using the personal 
preposition a, like if someone said ayer fui al cementerio a ver a Juan (yesterday I went to 
the cemetery to see Juan). It follows that the parameter of Instantiation (along with 
Directionality) might be more relevant than Animacy for the correct understanding of the 
personal use type of a. 
Finally, example (26) sanctions the [DISTANCE] sense in which the composite structure 
doblar el papel por la mitad (fold the paper in the middle) profiles the folded paper. 
However, this partial composite conception is then integrated with de esquina a esquina 
(from corner to corner) which provides an adverbial function since it denotes the “how to 
perform an action”. The Spanish preposition de in the de…a Spanish construction (English 
from… to), evokes the beginning of a spatial distance: it begins a path. On the other hand, a 
denotes the end of that path. Note how in (26) there is motion of the TR (the paper) toward 
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its LM (the paper’s corner) to the point they meet – hence, there is activation of the 
Directionality and Contact parameters. 
In this section we have approached the spatial organization exhibited by the Spanish 
prepositional vehicle a. This organization is motivated by its proto-scene which provides 
the conceptual content for parameterization to take place. The proto-scene of a is 
characterized by a TR that is oriented toward and/or approaching its LM to eventually 
become co-located with it. This sort of trajector/landmark alignment in turn, might shed 
light on the highly polysemous character of a. The conceptual basis for a proposed above, 
is an attempt to understand in a better and easier way how spatio-conceptual structure 
becomes parameterized for linguistic communication. Parameters are then in a continuum 
with their proto-scenes in that abstractions of specific spatial arrangements give rise to 
idealized spatio-functional configurations, like the ones exhibited by a and other 
prepositions analysed in this research. Hence, parameters are essential for their proto-
scenes to be structured, but at the same time they must become linguistically packaged. 
The conceptual basis for a depicted above, shows how conceptual parameters are the result 
of abstractions of spatial arrangements that we encounter since the early stages in life. 
Children first acquire the conceptual basis in its most prototypical stage, that is, non-
linguistically through joint attentional scenes (Tomasello 1999, 2003) and then they acquire 
the linguistic symbol (e.g., prepositions) which embodies (through the process of 
parameterization) the conceptual character of a given spatial arrangement. With time and 
practice, children eventually fully master all the senses or lexical concepts that a given 
preposition can offer. 
The conceptual phenomenon of polysemy might also be understood using the notion of 
conceptual basis, along with processes such as highlighting and profile/active-zone 
discrepancy. The conceptual bases proposed so far, allow us to see how parameters get 
activated differently depending on the linguistic context prepositions are placed in, and the 
activation route that there might be in cases of semantic extension.86 This understanding, in 
turn, might shed light on how English and Spanish speakers apprehend spatial 
                                                             
86 As shown above, spatial lexical concepts also activate sense-extension units for their proper realizations. 
This in turn, blurs the traditional and rigid distinction between literal and figurative conceptions. 
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arrangements, and it may also offer a new and dynamic view to English and Spanish 
teachers and students on how spatial language works. 
5.2.1 Non-spatial domains of a 
Non-spatial conceptions, as seen throughout this research, are ultimately motivated by the 
parameters that constitute the conceptual basis of a given preposition. The same parameters 
can acquire a spatial or a non-spatial realization of its semantics. To see this point, consider 
a Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) corpus example that shows how the 
Directionality parameter is used figuratively: 
(27) Estamos dirigiéndonos a los agentes económicos y sociales más representativos 
de la Región                                                                                   [COMUNICATION] 
In (27) the composite structure Estamos dirigiéndonos a los agentes (literally we are 
heading to the agents), profiles a TR that is heading toward its LM. However, 
dirigiéndonos a, rather than being taken literally as heading to, should be paraphrased as 
establishing communicative relations with – hence, the composite structure Estamos 
dirigiéndonos a los agentes must be interpreted in English as We are sending a 
message/addressing to the agents. It follows that there is a metaphorical thinking behind 
such a Spanish idiomatic expression as dirigirse a alguien, which roughly means to 
communicate something to someone. This Spanish expression has unit status (in the sense 
of Langacker 1987) and is motivated by the fact that when a TR is heading to its LM, there 
is one moment in which they meet. This scene is analogous to a person who wants to 
approach another to tell her/him something. To perform such an action, the person must 
head to the right direction. Going on the right direction allows the speaker to meet the 
person she wants, and it also allows the speaker to achieve her goal, which is to convey the 
information she wanted to. In sum, in example (27) the parameter that receives primary 
activation and gets figuratively extended is the one of Directionality since it contributes to 
the semantics that a message is being transferred from the group of people to the economic 
and social agents. 
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Let us now consider another figurative use type of a. This time, the figurative extension 
comes from the parameter of Instantiation, as shown below. The following example was 
taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) corpus: 
(28) ahora hay nuevos mapas multi jugador recoloreados, sólo a 10 dólares el pack 
de 5                                                                                        [PRICE DESIGNATION] 
According to the DLE, a precedes price designation. In (28) the composite conception 
evokes the price of the new multi-player maps, which is 10 dollars. Note how the price 
designation is conveyed by the composite structure sólo a 10 dólares (only for 10 dollars). 
The profiled nominal 10 dólares elaborates the prepositional landmark of a, whereas its TR 
is elaborated by the nominal el pack de 5. The adverb sólo (only) functions as quantifier for 
the prepositional landmark. This adverb evokes a mental space (within the adequate script) 
that has to do with an exact size or amount of something (money in this case). In this 
example, the relation between TR and LM is driven by Instantiation, one of the parameters 
that constitutes the conceptual basis of a and which I think receives primary activation in 
(28). As we saw above, particularly in (23) and (25), the Spanish preposition a can specify 
or instantiate its LM: it can profile an instance of a type. The type in (28) might be PRICE 
and instances of it can be 1, 2, 3, or more dollars. 
The metaphorical understanding of the [PRICE DESIGNATION] sense comes from more 
mundane usages of a in which Instantiation is prominent and therefore achieves primary 
activation such as in (25) above. If one says ayer vi a Pedro (“yesterday I saw Pedro”) o 
busco a alguien que me quiera (“I’m looking for someone who loves me”), one specifies an 
instance of a type even though in the former utterance the level of specificity is higher than 
in the latter. Both are good candidates for instantiation; constructions such as the two 
above, serve as conceptual sources for figurative extensions like the one used for 
designating a price for things.  
Now consider an example in which Instantiation is activated, along with more parameters 
such as Location. The sample below is taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu 
+ Am): 
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(29) Todos sabemos que la ciencia avanza, paso a paso consigue grandes 
innovaciones que nos alargan la vida.                                                   [PROGRESS] 
According to the DLE, a indicates distribution or proportional counting. In the example 
above, we can observe how a jointly encodes this, along with the rest of the symbolic units 
in the Spanish idiomatic expression paso a paso (step by step). The idiomatic expression 
paso a paso, behaves similarly to the English expression step by step: they are used to refer 
to the fact that some progress on something is going on – one stage at a time until the whole 
task is complete. Note that the paso a paso idiomatic expression consists of a sequence 
(path) that leads to an end (goal). In (29), the scientific progress indicates the maximal 
discourse scope in which the idea that big innovations are acquired step by step is profiled. 
The scientific progress stands for the path whereas the innovations stand for the goal.  
The figurative composite conception in (29) might be attributable to spatial scenes that 
involve, at the very least, directionality, location and instantiation. Directionality is 
understood temporally due to our very temporal concept of {EVOLUTION}.87 There are also 
other structures such as the image schema of {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL}. Progress, as is widely 
and generally apprehended, implies moving forward rather than backwards or going up 
instead of down. The metaphor that might be involved in (29) is PROGRESS IS FORWARD 
MOTION. 
The parameter of Location is also involved in the figurative conception in (29), in that it 
provides spatio-conceptual structure for the reification of spatial structure onto a non-
spatial location. The composite expression paso a paso implies succession – hence, the 
location of a thing with respect to another in a path or sequence.  Finally, we can observe 
that the last parameter that is apparently active in (29) is the one of Instantiation, and is 
reflected in the fact that each “step” of the step by step (Spanish paso a paso) idiomatic 
expression, is a unique step, period of time, or stage of a given procedure, that is different 
from the previous or the upcoming one.  
Let us consider another figurative corpus example of a to see how the activation of 
parameters varies depending on the linguistic context: 
                                                             
87 This temporal concept is primarily structured by the transience type of succession.  
 
 
176 
 
(30) Todo un lujo tener un profesional como él a mi lado                               
[SUPPORT]  
The composite conception in (30) evokes the [SUPPORT] sense that the preposition a partly 
conveys along with the rest of the symbolic units. The composite structure Todo un lujo 
tener un profesional como él a mi lado is interpreted in English as It’s such a luxury to 
have a professional like him next to me (or on my side). Of particular interest for the present 
analysis is the composite structure a mi lado (next to me/ on my side). Such construction 
profiles a relation between TR and LM that has to do with an over-than-average 
professional (TR) that is closely located to the speaker’ side (LM). However, the seemingly 
locative function of a mi lado, is far from encoding physical proximity. Rather, it has to do 
with mental and professional support. 
The experiential and motivational structure for this expression might lie behind humanly 
relevant scenes that involve closeness between two things that are located next to each 
other – a mundane spatial organization – serves as metonymic conceptual source (and this 
metonymy generalizes into metaphor) for non-spatial conceptions. It follows that the 
Location parameter is the one that receives primary activation and is figuratively 
interpreted in that it does not point to the fact of physical location but to psychological and 
interpersonal closeness. Moreover, we can observe a degree of schematicity in that a mi 
lado does not profile a specific direction (left or right for instance), rather, it profiles 
closeness between the TR (the professional) and the LM (the speaker in (30)) – they are 
within their influence zone. In sum, the parameter of Location gets figuratively extended by 
virtue of the experiential correlation between two objects in space that are closely located to 
each other, and two people that establish psychological an interpersonal closeness since 
they support each other and work together.  
We can appreciate, then, that location of objects in space plays a central role as spatio-
conceptual structure for the apprehension of non-spatial domains such as personal and/or 
psychological closeness between people. In addition, the parameter of Instantiation (along 
with Animacy, which is reflected in the LM) also receives activation since mi lado (my 
side) is an instance of the type lado. Now the metaphor that could be at play in (30) is 
SUPPORT IS THINGS ON ONE’S SIDE.  
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As shown in the examples of figuration above, the Spanish preposition a has a highly 
polysemous character. This is reflected in the many use types it can sanction. This highly 
polysemous character of a overrides the semantics of to in that a is equivalent to many of 
its senses, but a goes beyond because it can also sanction some instances that are evoked by 
other English prepositions such as by, on, for and at. Furthermore, the Spanish preposition 
a is also characterized by exhibiting the personal use type as in (23) and (25), which has no 
English equivalent.   
As previously mentioned, the two sections above, which were concerned with spatial and 
non-spatial conception, are not intended to provide an exhaustive list of all the possible 
senses of a, nor do strictly posit a rigid difference between literal and figurative 
conceptions. The former point, from which I agree on with Taylor (2006), has to with an 
encyclopedic view of word meaning rather than a dictionary-like view (see Langacker 
1987: 154-166). To try to pin down all the possible meanings that any lexeme may have is 
an ill-conceived quest for lexical semantics. Under my perspective as a cognitive linguist, 
this would downplay our human capacity to create meaning based on symbolic 
representations. The conceptual bases proposed in this research – contrary to the dictionary-
like view – are intended to comprehend better and more clearly how conceptual processes 
that are triggered by linguistically mediated communication such as elaboration and 
extension, can take place. Regarding the literal/figurative language continuum, there are 
(many) cases that hinge in the middle, as for example the [FUTURE EVENT] lexical concept. 
The next two sections of this analysis of a are concerned with its role as an infinitival 
complement, followed by its temporal behavior.  
5.2.2 Complementation      
I now briefly turn to show the conceptual character of a as an infinitival subordinator in 
complementation. Following Tyler and Evans (2003a) in their suggestions on the 
motivation of to in complementation, we may posit the idea of the role of a as an infinitival 
complementizer. This function may also be ultimately derived from the [EVENT] lexical 
concept. Such a hypothesis in turn, might be supported by the conceptual basis proposed 
for a in figure 5.4 above, which may shed light on the motivation underlying linguistic 
usage events that involve this preposition. It follows that complementation functions could 
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be understood as sense extensions from a more prototypical space-rooted meaning and be 
apprehended as a single category due to the broad range of phenomena it covers (Achard 
2007). 
To illustrate, let us consider a corpus example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen 
11, Eu + Am): 
(31) el horno del obrador comienza a calentarse mientras las hermanas Clarisas 
amasan harina, azúcar y huevo                                                                      [START] 
(the worker’s oven starts to heat up/ heating up while the Poor Clares mix flour, sugar and egg). 
In (31), we can observe how a jointly contributes to the sanctioning of the [START] sense. It 
is partly conveyed due to the nature of spatial semantics, which, in line with Sinha and 
Kuteva (1995), assumes a view of meaning construction as being distributed along all the 
symbolic units that make up a linguistic construction. In complementation particularly 
(following Givón 1980, 1990), the distribution of a complement form with the main verb it 
occurs with is understood as the motivational factor that links the semantics of that verb 
with the complement distribution.  
As seen in figure 5.4 above, the conceptual basis of a has to do with spatial scenes that 
involve a TR that is oriented and/or undergoing motion toward its LM with the purpose of 
being co-located with it. In (31), we can observe that some characteristics of this proto-
scene are present, particularly the sense-extension unit of Futurity (derived from 
Directionality) which in the case of a and English to, is a prominent feature. The sense-
extension unit of Futurity (see figure 5.4 above) is the main semantic value in the clause 
empezar a calentar (starts to heat up/ hitting up) since a calentar elaborates a subpart of 
the verb empezar: it particularly specifies the “what” of the process. The verb empezar (to 
start), then, evokes a mental space of {BEGINNING} which is partially structured by the 
{PATH} image schema due to temporal evolution: if a person starts an action, this action has 
a beginning and an end stage. The {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} schema in turn, conceptually 
underlies the parameter of Directionality. Once the mental space of {BEGINNING} is evoked, 
the relational profile of a calentar specifies a subpart of the process. Futurity is involved 
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because it evokes the process in which the oven’s temperature reaches its adequate level to 
bake. 
There are also two more sense-extension units that might receive (secondary) activation in 
(31) and these are the ones of Intentionality and Event. The former has to do with the 
volitional act of turning on the oven for a purpose such as bakery, whereas the latter gets 
activated due to the animacy that is required to turn on the oven and begin the heating up 
process (i.e., temporal evolution) in order to bake or do any other related activity within 
that particular scenario or script (in the sense of Schank and Abelson 1977) which might be 
glossed as WORKING IN THE BAKERY INDUSTRY.88 
I want to highlight that a apparently exhibits a sort of “one-viewing frame” – the locus of 
viewing attention (Langacker 1991). A can be construed as a complementizer just in one 
way as shown in (31), compared to the English infinitival and gerundive complementizers. 
The composite structure el horno del obrador comienza a calentarse, as pointed out above, 
can be interpreted in English as either with an infinitival complement as in the worker’s 
oven starts to heat up or with a gerund as in the worker’s oven starts heating up. This 
difference in construal represents a conceptual feature of the complementation category of 
the English language system that is not found in Spanish. For instance, while the English 
verb start can be lexically integrated with either complementizer as in the BNC corpus 
samples (32a) and (32b) below, the Spanish language uses only a as a complementizer. 
(32) a. Tuckett gets badly scared and starts running for where he thinks his old 
friend Lucy Scarrott lives.                                                                         [START] 
       b. I start to run across the grass, as fast as I can. They are chasing me         
[START] 
Note how in (32a) and (32b) the verb start is integrated with a gerund and an infinitive 
complement, respectively. Even though both complements have an atemporalizing 
character since they combine with ungrounded structures and are not grounding 
                                                             
88 It is important to mention that events do not require intentional participants, but only a subtype of events. 
Actions, as in (31) above, do require an agent, which is prototypically human and intentional. In these cases, 
we might expect activation of the Event sense-extension unit. 
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predications themselves (Langacker 1991:440), they are considered to exhibit sameness in 
time (Wierzbicka 1988) (also known as temporal coincidence ([Langacker 1991]) in the 
case of the gerundive complements, as in (32a), or future orientation (Wierzbicka 1988) in 
cases like the infinitive in (32b). Both complementizers are based on summation (following 
Langacker 2012b); however, summation in the -ing complementizer results in summary 
scanning whereas in the -to + infinitive construction, summation is related to a suspension 
of a sequential scanning: a profiled process at one level of organization is superseded by 
another at a higher level. This causes the former profiled process to be pushed to the 
background – hence, there is a cancellation of sequential scanning. 
On the other hand, the preposition a does not seem to exhibit this fine-grained temporal 
feature. Consider the following corpus sample taken from the Spanish Web 2011 
(esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(33) Empezaron a correr como locas. ¡¡¡¡Que felicidad!!!!                          [START] 
In (33) the composite structure Empezaron a correr como locas has two English 
alternatives, (i) they started to run like crazy or (ii) they started running like crazy. This in 
turn, shows that a is the only option to linguistically encode these types of conceptual 
subordinations in Spanish. Furthermore, this amounts to evidence of relativistic effects in 
language and cognition in that Spanish speakers might conceptualize the complementation 
function of a as something that always points to the future: the future orientation 
predominates in a as a complementizer.89 It follows that this only option for 
complementation does not allow Spanish speakers to linguistically encode the fine-grained 
distinction between temporal coincidence – the “happening-now” feature of -ing – and the 
“this-will-happen” feature or temporal-evolution character of -to. 
5.2.3 Temporal domain of a 
                                                             
89 Recall that the complementation function of a might be ultimately derived from the Event sense-extension 
unit. Futurity contributes with the temporal structure of a future event (i.e., mental projection). Note how 
Futurity can temporally range from an event that is about to happen as in Estoy a punto de comer (I’m about 
to eat), to an event that is located farther in time as in Voy a Alemania el próximo mes (I’m going to Germany 
next month).  
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Temporal conceptualizations of time, as shown so far, not only are apprehended using 
spatio-conceptual structure, but also schematic temporal structure. Space and time 
complement each other but they also differ since they are qualitatively different. For 
instance, when it comes to dimensionality (as seen in chapter 2), space is concerned with 
length whereas time has to do with duration. In other words, time is unique because its 
hallmark – transience – is something that space lacks: time always moves forward (unless 
people create a time machine to go back) whereas spatial navigation can take place in any 
direction (e.g., backwards, sideways, forward).90 In sum, there is indeed space-time 
analogies and disanalogies that can be spotted at the conceptual and linguistic level 
(Langacker 2012a).  
Let us consider an example of the temporal behavior of a to see how spatio-conceptual 
structure contributes to the conceptualization of time, which in turn, needs temporal 
structure for a complete apprehension of this domain: 
(34) Opencor es una cadena de tiendas de conveniencia con 156 tiendas distribuidas 
por toda España, que tiene como principal característica su amplío horario de 
apertura de 8 a 2 de la madrugada.    [TERMINAL POINT WITHIN AN EXPLICITLY 
DEMARCATED PERIOD]   
In (34), we can appreciate how a denotes the end of a demarcated period in the composite 
structure de 8 a 2 de la madrugada (from 8 till/to 2 in the morning). The demarcated 
period, in turn, is partly structured by the {PATH} image schema: the Spanish preposition de 
(English from) is the one which initially triggers such a schema, whereas a is the relational 
unit that marks its end. This structuring might be driven by the primary metaphor 
DURATION IS LENGTH (Grady 1997). However, for the metaphorical mapping to take place, 
we also make use of additional temporal and spatio-conceptual structure.  
                                                             
90 Recall that when we refer to this aspect of time – moving in a forward manner – we indeed use metaphor. 
However, the temporal evolution that broadly characterizes the three types of transience is based on 
phenomenologically real temporal experiences (as well as internal temporal mechanisms). Hence, transience 
is non-metaphorical. Temporal evolution is not necessarily seen as moving forward, nor past and future 
necessarily are seen as being behind and ahead, respectively. This latter case has been showed by Núñez and 
Sweetser (2006) in the Aymaran culture. To sum up, transience is the hallmark of the temporal domain, it is 
phenomenologically real and is absent in space.  
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For instance, we make use of our human ability to understand repeatable systems such as 
the 24-hour cycle, which constitutes our notion of what a day is. This specific type of 
temporal cycle ({DAY/NIGHT} cycle based on a 24-hour or 12-hour system) locates the 
target event (TE) and anchors it (with the help of an origo (O)) to a time-reckoning system 
in which time is metonymically represented by a clock face: the motion of the hands around 
a clock face is a metonymic representation of the elapse of time. 
Furthermore, to understand this mensural cycle, we also make use of the extrinsic or 
absolute temporal frame of reference (t-FoR) (Evans 2013: Ch.6), which derives from the 
phenomenologically real experience of duration. The schematic temporal structure evoked 
by this t-FoR in (34) can be glossed as [TE FIXED TO AN RP WITHIN THE 12-HOUR SYSTEM]. 
The TE is the opening hours of the store, the reference point (RP) is 8 a.m. - 2 a.m., and the 
O (origo) is fixed as 00:00 since it is from where the count of this repeatable time-
reckoning system begins. 
If we take a look at figure 5.4 above, we can observe how some parameters get activated 
for temporal conceptualization. The first parameter is Directionality and is reflected in the 
temporal elapse – from 8 a.m. to 2 a.m. Direction in this sense is analogous to the 
transience type of duration: a temporal vector that always goes forward and never stops, 
but which nevertheless, can be demarcated by the from…to construction (the de…a 
construction in Spanish) where a denotes the end point within the temporal elapse existing 
between 8 a.m. and 2 a.m.  
The second parameter that is most directly involved in (34) is the one of Co-location since 
we temporally co-locate the opening hours (TE) with respect to the temporal matrix (i.e., 
the 12- or 24-hour system), specifically within the demarcated period (RP) evoked in (34). 
This semantic extension in turn, might be underdetermined by the LOCATION IN TIME IS 
LOCATION IN SPACE metaphor. In addition, the preposition a also activates the Instantiation 
parameter since 8 and 2 de la madrugada (2 in the morning) represent instances of a type, 
which is “time period”. 
Finally, I want to remark the strikingly high level of similarity between examples (34) and 
(26) above since the same de…a Spanish construction is used for talking about space and 
time, respectively. This corpus evidence along with the present linguistic analysis intends to 
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put forward the idea that temporal conceptualizations are only partly supported and 
structured by spatial experience and representation because space and time are distinct at 
the experiential level.  
Now consider another temporal lexical concept of a. This one has to do with less fine-
grained periods within the {NIGHT/DAY} cycle. The example below was taken from the 
Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(35) una fruta a la mañana con el desayuno, otra a media mañana o en la merienda                                     
[MOMENT]  
              (one piece of fruit in the morning, then another before midday or after lunch) 
The corpus sample in (35) shows how the preposition a can denote temporal location in that 
it refers to particular periods of the {DAY/NIGHT} unit. Once again, we can observe how this 
cyclical temporal unit is key for the understanding of the temporal semantics in (35) along 
with the transience type of succession due to its temporal structuring in the chain of events 
that characterizes temporal concept such as {DAY/NIGHT}. 
There are two composite structures that provide a with the [MOMENT] sense. The first one is 
una fruta a la mañana and the second is otra a media mañana. In both composite structures 
the TR is the same (the piece of fruit) whereas the prepositional landmark is elaborated by 
“early morning” and “mid-morning” respectively.91 
The semantic import of a in (35) can then be approached by applying the conceptual basis 
proposed in figure 5.4 above. I suggest that primary activation is attributable to the 
parameter of Location which then conceptually spreads onto Co-location and Event. There 
is a conceptual link between Location and the event-reckoning system that allows us to 
distinguish between the different episodes that constitute the {DAY/NIGHT} unit. That is, 
temporal concepts such as {MORNING}, {MIDDAY}, and {EVENING}, among others.  
The first composite structure una fruta a la mañana has as its TE the very act of eating a 
piece of fruit. On the other hand, the prepositional phrase a la mañana (in the morning) 
                                                             
91 The Spanish adverbial expression a media mañana is roughly translated into English as before midday (and 
literally into “to mid-morning”). 
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serves as RP to locate the TE. In addition, the (temporal) RP requires an origo to anchor the 
TE to the transience type of duration within a repeatable event-reckoning system (a sort of 
calendar-like thinking). In this case, the origo corresponds to {MIDNIGHT}. 
In the second composite structure otra a media mañana (another (piece of fruit) at “mid-
morning”), the TE is the same while the temporal location changes due to a new 
prepositional element filling the RP slot. The temporal location evoked in a media manana, 
is partly supported and structured by spatio-conceptual structure that comes from the 
location parameter (and the Co-location sense-extension unit). This is so because there is an 
inherent temporal structure that is evoked in linguistic constructions whenever temporal 
reference is established. In the present case, the schematic inherent temporal structure that 
is part and parcel of our human conceptual system might be glossed as [TE FIXED TO AN RP 
IN A REPEATABLE EVENT-RECKONING SYSTEM]. 
The last temporal sense of a that the present author wants to show, is concerned with the 
[AGE] lexical concept, and is structured by the extrinsic t-FoR since it is periodicity-based. 
To exemplify this sense, consider a corpus example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 
(esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(36) Su vida cambió a los 10 años. Abandonó el colegio de su pueblo, Puebla del 
Prior, en Badajoz, para pasar al Colegio San José, en Villafranca de los Barros.                    
[AGE] 
              (Her life changed at the of 10. She abandoned the school of her town…) 
The temporal lexical concept of a evoked in (36), can be distinguished from the [TERMINAL 
POINT WITHIN AN EXPLICITLY DEMARCATED PERIOD] and [MOMENT] senses even though they 
all emerge from the duration transience type – the extrinsic matrix that is employed to fix 
events in time independently of the subjective experience. In this case, the example in (36) 
is characterized by an open-ended event-reckoning system, which, following Evans (2013: 
133), can be informally referred to as linear time. In (36), the TE, here the subject’s life 
change due to unknown reasons, establishes a temporal relation (by virtue of the 
preposition a) with the temporal RP which functions as LM, here 10 años. The origo – that 
is, the initial point for setting the system in operation – starts at day 1 considering this is the 
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beginning of the subject’s life (i.e., her day of birth): the point from which the count begins. 
The schematic temporal structure that underlies example (36) can be glossed as [TE FIXED 
TO AN RP IN AN OPEN-ENDED EVENT-RECKONING SYSTEM]. 
I think that the supplemental spatio-conceptual structure that contributes to a fully 
apprehension of the temporal conception in (36) above comes from the activation of the 
Location parameter, which subsequently spreads onto Co-location, as in the cases shown 
above. The parameter of Location shares conceptual features with some purely temporal 
structure in the conceptual system. These links in turn, may be guided by the metaphor 
LOCATION IN TIME IS LOCATION IN SPACE. The combination of these types of knowledge 
results in the domain of time being conceptualized as either event-like or time-based 
depending on the temporal tool that is used: calendars or clocks (i.e., cyclical and mensural 
temporal understandings that lie at the heart of the extrinsic t-FoR). 
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5.3 Summary 
This chapter has focused on the English preposition to and Spanish preposition a. This set 
of prepositions, contrary to the previous case of entre as equivalent to the English 
prepositions between, among, and amid, exhibits less semantic overlap in terms of the 
semantic parameters that constitute each conceptual basis. This, in turn, might be due to the 
conceptual structuring of the trajector/landmark alignment in each preposition. A key 
conceptual feature of to seems to be the higher-than-usual status that is generally exhibited 
by its prepositional landmark. The LM of to is generally conceptualized as a primary goal. 
On the other hand, the prepositional-landmark elements of a need not necessarily be 
considered as primary goal. This difference in the proto-scene of each preposition, is 
reflected in parameterization – the process of the constitution of the conceptual parameters 
within a conceptual basis. As a result, the Spanish preposition a can sanction lexical 
concepts that are also partly triggered by English at, for, on, and by. Hence, a exhibits a 
highly polysemous character. Complementation was also briefly addressed and the main 
idea that can be extracted has to do with the role of the Event sense-extension unit as main 
motivational factor. Futurity turns out to be a key temporal unit to differentiating the 
infinitive from the gerund complement in the case of English to. On the other hand, a does 
not exhibit such a fine-grained temporal distinction between temporal sameness and 
succession or temporal evolution. Finally, the chapter finishes with some remarks on the 
temporal behavior of to and a by showing how spatio-conceptual and purely temporal 
structure interact in linguistic temporal conceptualizations. The conceptual metaphor 
LOCATION IN TIME IS LOCATION IN SPACE may underdetermine these correspondences. 
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Chapter 6: English for and Spanish para. 
6.1 Spatial lexical concepts for for 
I now turn to the English preposition for, which contrary to the preposition to, its 
prepositional-landmark elements do not generally achieve a higher-than-usual activation 
level. To illustrate this point, consider the corpus example below: 
(1) Once all nine barrels have been discharged the weapon is of no further use, although 
hopefully it will have done its job by this time, and your enemies will be running 
for the hills                                                                                [HEADING TOWARD] 
Note how in (1), the English preposition for acquires a similar reading as it does so the 
preposition to under some specific linguistic contexts such as the one evoked above. Such 
linguistic behavior, in turn, suggests that both prepositions designate a TR that is oriented 
and sometimes undergoing motion toward its LM. However, the trajector/landmark 
alignment in the proto-scene of for is driven by the notion of oblique goal, that is, the TR of 
for appears to be related to an ulterior purpose and is contingent upon reaching its LM 
(Tyler and Evans 2003a: 146). Due to the oblique character of the prepositional landmark 
of for, the landmark is not conceptualized as primary focus (as in the case of to). This 
primariness versus obliqueness in turn, allows us to distinguish conceptual differences, for 
instance in utterances like running to the hills compared to running for the hills: in the 
former the hills are apprehended as primary goal whereas in the latter they are seen as a 
means to an end rather than the end itself. 
According to Tyler and Evans (2003a), the interpretation of the prepositional landmark of 
for as an oblique goal serves as previous step to achieve the ultimate purpose. There is a 
salient element of intentionality on part of the TR. For instance, in example (1) above, to 
run for the hills in order to escape shows a level of calculation and purposeful planning that 
goes beyond simply designating the hills as the end point. Intentionality seems to constitute 
a conceptual feature that is highly relevant and hence characterizes the trajector/landmark 
alignment of for. 
The highly prevalent role of purposefulness of the TR of for is evidenced in sentences such 
as * the ball rolled for the wall, compared to the ball rolled to the wall. We understand a 
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ball as an inanimate entity whose movements are controlled by physical forces such as 
gravity. Its rolling cannot be construed as self-initiated in order to achieve a particular 
purpose. It is in this sense that for requires an intentional or purposeful TR – hence, it 
involves intentionality. 
Consider below the proto-scene for for: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Proto-scene for for (Adapted from Tyler and Evans 2003a: 148) 
As mentioned above, both prepositions to and for designate TRs that are oriented with 
respect to their LMs. However, the trajector/landmark alignment status associated with 
each preposition is different and the consequence of this is reflected in the functional 
elements associated with to and for. Whereas to denotes a spatial relation in which an 
oriented TR is directed toward its highlighted LM (the functional element, as seen in the 
previous chapter, is the landmark as goal), for denotes a similar spatial scene, particularly 
on the notion of orientation, but the functional component of for has to do with the oblique 
or secondary nature of the LM. This secondary nature is reflected in the fact that reaching 
or attaining a LM facilitates the primary purpose. 
Figure 6.1 above represents the proto-scene that is associated with for. The circle stands for 
the TR of for, whereas the arrow represents the orientation (just as the proto-scene 
associated with to). The vertical line indicates the prepositional landmark. Note that it is a 
dashed line in that it reflects the fact that the LM of for is not highlighted. This in turn, is 
due to the very oblique nature of it. The oblique or secondary nature of the LM represents 
the notion that reaching or attaining the LM facilitates the primary purpose. The LM is not 
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highlighted because it does not achieve enough conceptual prominence due to its role as 
facilitator of the ulterior purpose of the TR. Hence, it remains in the base while other 
substructures are selected as the profile. 
Now consider another BNC example of for to see its prepositional-landmark oblique 
character: 
(2) He was driving a car chased for twenty miles by police                  [DISTANCE] 
According to the CED, for is used to show an amount of time or distance. In (2) above, for 
conveys a complex atemporal relation (since it involves trajectory) in which the relational 
profile of He was driving a car chased elaborates the TR of for and its prepositional 
landmark is elaborated by twenty miles. Note how orientation, a conceptual feature of the 
TR, is inherently understood within the trajectory that the vehicles undergo, which 
presumably is in a forward-like manner.  
We could also observe the oblique nature in the trajector/landmark alignment of for in that 
the prepositional landmark in (2), which is elaborated by the nominal profile of twenty 
miles, is conceptualized as the way or opportunity that the police have to hopefully reach 
the car. That is, the twenty-mile length is seen as a means to an end, which is to capture the 
driver. 
Let us now consider the [INTENDED RECIPIENT] sense of for, which may shed light on the 
impersonal character of this preposition as well as on the intentional character of the 
functional element associated with its proto-scene: 
(3) 'Excuse me, Doctor. There's a package for you                 [INTENDED RECIPIENT] 
According to the CED, for denotes a thing that is intended to be given. In (3) the pronoun 
you stands for the antecedent Doctor, which elaborates the prepositional landmark of for, 
and is conceptualized as the receiver of the package, which is the TR of for. The doctor is 
the intended recipient of a situated (and purposeful) action. It follows that the intended 
recipient motivates such an action, which in (3) has to do with the delivery of the package. 
According to the CDE, for also denotes the purpose of doing something. In the same line, 
there might be a correlation (following Tyler and Evans 2003a) between a recipient and the 
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purpose of the action. If we consider the action of buying something with an intended 
recipient in mind and then post it, that is a purposeful/volitional action. In (3), the purpose 
of sending the package to the doctor is for him to receive what is inside. Crucially, the very 
scene in which the doctor opens the delivered package is when the ulterior purpose is met. 
This ulterior purpose in turn, is achieved through an oblique feature that apparently (partly) 
structures the “other-orientedness” character (in the sense of Wierzbicka 1988) of the 
English for. The fact of interpreting the LM of for as an oblique goal that serves some 
ultimate purpose, points to a salient element of intentionality manifested by the TR, which 
in (3) is the willingness and desire of the sender to get her/his package received by her/his 
intended addressee.  
Consider another example of for taken from the BNC: 
(4) He says they are now going for pubs                                       [PURPOSE]           
The composite structure going for pubs in (4), not only points to the fact that the people 
have to physically move themselves to arrive at the place they want to go, but it also 
represents the way or method they have to accomplish their goal, which presumably has to 
do with having fun from bar to bar. The prepositional phrase for pubs, then, serves as 
oblique goal – a conduit to the ultimate objective. Note how the action of the TR, here the 
group of people, is associated with a particular purpose. In (4) above, the TR performs a 
particular activity in order to achieve something: the act of going for pubs is motivated by 
the willingness and desire of having fun. 
Following Tyler and Evans (2003a), I agree with the hypothesis that the [PURPOSE] sense 
might have been partly originated by virtue of a TR undergoing motion and reaching a 
particular location which concomitantly served an ultimate purpose. For instance, in (4) 
they are now going for pubs, the act of heading to the pubs serves to achieve a particular 
purpose, namely having fun and recreate. As such, the act of going to the pubs correlates 
with the ulterior purpose. From this example we can shed light on the idea that once the 
implicature of purpose associated with motion becomes strengthened, this meaning can be 
generalized to activities that have an ultimate purpose, irrespective of whether they involve 
motion as in (4) above. We will see those non-spatial usages in the following section. 
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The English preposition for can also sanction what is knowns as the [BENEFICIARY] sense in 
that it denotes a relation between an action and a beneficiary. To illustrate, consider the 
following BNC sample: 
(5) Guinness also encourages others to use its sponsorship programmes to raise money 
for charity                                                                          [BENEFICIARY] 
In (5) the prepositional landmark of for is elaborated by charity. This means that the 
sponsorship programs to raise money, which function as TR, would go directly to the 
beneficiary. This sense seems to be closely related to the [INTENDED RECIPIENT] sense 
evoked in (3) above. The difference between these senses may lie in the entailment of the 
receipt (Tyler and Evans 2003a: 154). While in (3) it is still felicitous to infer that the 
doctor received the package, in (5) the receiver, here a supposedly charity organization, 
does receive the intended benefit, here the money that would be collected. Because the 
intended recipient is a beneficiary (i.e., a charity organization), then a possible motivation 
for this use type may be due to the correlation between the purpose of performing a certain 
action like raising money, and the benefits for the people or entity that receive the result of 
such an action. In other words, this specific sense of for may be due to the relationship 
existing between benefactor or giver and beneficiary. Nevertheless, the suggestions offered 
by Tyler and Evans seem not to be satisfactory at all because it is still unclear. To say that 
under the [INTENDED RECIPIENT] sense the actual delivery to the recipient does not 
necessarily take place or is not entailed, whereas it necessarily takes place (i.e. it is 
entailed) under the  [BENEFICIARY] sense, is to discard situations where, due to a number of 
causes the money  never reaches the beneficiary (the sponsor deceives the donors, the 
beneficiary refuses it, the money gets lost in the process, and so forth). In these cases, we 
cannot be totally sure about this entailment that according to Tyler and Evans is supposedly 
conveyed by [BENEFICIARY] but not by [INTENDED RECIPIENT]. 
The lexical concept of [BENEFICIARY] is then understood in this research as a recipient that 
receives something which is positive, as opposed to negative. 
According to what we have seen so far about the spatio-conceptual behavior of for, I now 
propose the following conceptual basis for this preposition: 
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                                                             Orientation 
Purpose                                                                                                                   Beneficiary 
 
Spatial scenes involving a TR that is 
 Intentionality                         oriented and/or heading toward its LM                                 Recipient 
 
                                                         
                                                           Oblique goal 
Figure 6.2. Conceptual basis proposed for the English preposition for 
The conceptual basis for for in figure 6.2 above, depicts a similar organization as the 
English preposition to: both have to do with spatial scenes that involve a TR that is oriented 
and/or undergoing motion toward its LM. However, even though the construal of these 
seemingly similar prepositions involves oriented TRs, the conceptual activation is different. 
The prepositional-landmark elements of for do not have a higher-than-usual status as the 
ones of to. This difference in LM status carries significant functional consequences. It 
follows that the functional element of to, as seen in chapter 5, comes from conceptualizing 
the prepositional landmark as primary goal. On the other hand, the functional element 
associated with for, comes from its LM status being apprehended as an oblique goal – that 
is – the prepositional landmark of for is considered a means to a result. 
If we look at the composite structure in (1) running for the hills and compare it with a 
similar expression such as running to the hills, we can say that both for and to appear to 
prompt for an oriented TR which is undergoing motion toward its LM (orientation). We can 
also observe motion due to the trajectory encoded by the verb. However, subtle but 
important differences in interpretation exist between these two prepositional use types. As 
noted earlier, by using the preposition to as in running to the hills, the act of reaching the 
hills is emphasized – the hills are conceptualized as primary physical goal or objective. On 
the contrary, by using the preposition for as in running for the hills, this implies that 
reaching the hills is a means to an end, rather than the end or goal itself. Example (1) might 
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be put in a context of warfare in which reaching the hills would serve the purpose of 
providing safety. In sum, we can appreciate how the preposition for appears to relate its TR 
to an ulterior purpose that is contingent upon reaching a LM. Because the LM of for is not 
the primary focus, I assume its function, in line with Tyler and Evans (2003a), as an 
oblique goal. 
From the proto-scene depicted at the center of the conceptual basis, we can appreciate that 
some parameters emerge consequently (i.e. abstractions) from our humanly relevant 
interaction in space and time. The fact that the TR of for is oriented (and probably 
manifests a tendency to motion) toward its LM, makes the parameter of Orientation 
emerge. As seen in figure 6.1 above, the arrow represents the TR’s orientation with respect 
to its LM (which is represented by a dashed line since it is not the primary focus). 
Orientation could be considered the semantic core value of for, along with Intentionality. 
The second parameter that constitutes, at the very least, the conceptual basis of for is 
Recipient and it has to do with the prepositional-landmark elements of for being 
conceptualized as intended recipients of a particular action as in (3) and (5) above. This 
parameter is driven by the correlation between a purposeful activity and the intended 
recipient to whom such an action is aimed at. For instance, one can say I bought this scarf 
for Tom – the very action of buying a scarf is done with a recipient in mind, here Tom. 
Now note the sense-extension unit of Beneficiary that comes from the Recipient parameter 
(see figure 6.2 above). A recipient and a beneficiary are two closely related concepts; 
however, the difference may hinge on the factual benefit of the intended recipient who is 
receiving the action. As mentioned above, if one says the money was raised for charity, we 
may understand that the receiver of the money, here a charity organization, is directly 
beneficed. The transfer may be entailed. On the other hand, if I say I bought a scarf for 
Tom, we understand that Tom has not received the intended transfer yet. However, this idea 
of Tyler and Evans (2003a) seems to be proposed based on speculations since such a 
hypothesis needs to be further corroborated and developed in more detail. 
The reason why the parameter of Beneficiary is an extension of Recipient is because 
Recipient is conceptually more primitive and schematic: it offers the enough conceptual 
ground to understand more complex concepts such as Beneficiary. The nature of the entity 
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that is transferred is also important to understand this concept, in that it can carry good or 
bad consequences for the recipient. As previously mentioned, the lexical concept of 
[BENEFICIARY] gets activated whenever the recipient of an action receives something that is 
positive. 
The next parameter, which is assumed to be of vital importance within the conceptual basis 
of for, is the one of Oblique goal. This is indeed a characteristic of the elements that 
elaborate the prepositional landmark of for. Recall that the LM of for is conceptualized as 
an oblique goal due to its function in facilitating the ulterior purpose of the TR once the LM 
is attained. Crucially, the impersonal and committal character of the prepositional landmark 
is understood as the functional element that is associated with the proto-scene of for. It 
follows from such an assumption that the concept of Intentionality is a clear indicator and 
hence, salient element that characterizes the conceptual behavior of for’s TR. This element 
apparently is entrenched enough, through processes such as pragmatic strengthening and 
bridging contexts, to the extent it becomes parameterized in the conceptual basis of for. 
Intentionality is thus the last parameter (at the very least) that should constitute for’s 
conceptual basis. In line with Tyler and Evans (2003a), I thus assume Intentionality as an 
important aspect of the functional element (Oblique goal) associated with for. Hence, this 
parameter is part of the core semantic value of for. 
Before carrying on with more details about the conceptual basis of for, I want to clearly 
state the differences between the notion of intentionality in both prepositions to and for. In 
the case of to, Intentionality is a sense-extension unit that jointly comes from Futurity and 
Primary goal, whereas in the conceptual basis of for Intentionality is a constituent 
parameter that is part of the core semantic value of for, rather than an extension. This 
difference in conceptual status might be due to the functional element of each preposition: 
while the functional element of to has to do with the parameter of Primary goal, the one of 
for is concerned with the committal Oblique goal. Hence, the oblique goal is conceptually 
more complex since it involves recursion in that it serves an ultimate purpose: oblique and 
primary goals are linked recursively so that the former (the oblique goal) is completely 
necessary for the realization of the latter (the ultimate purpose).  
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Regarding Purpose in figure 6.2 above, this sense-extension unit might have emerged due 
to Intentionality having a highly active and structural role in the obliqueness that underlies 
the LM of for. As we have seen, the preposition for is not generally integrated with non-
purposeful TRs for it would sound semantically anomalous. For instance, if we compare 
expressions such as * the ball rolled for the end of the road vs. the ball rolled to the end of 
the road, we can appreciate a lack of intention of the TR in the former expression, whereas 
in the latter it sounds acceptable. This difference in readings is due to the semantics of each 
preposition, particularly to the existence of the Oblique goal parameter, a parameter which 
serves as functional element in the conceptual basis of for, but which is absent in the one of 
to. 
Following the conceptual basis proposed in figure 6.2 above, we can see how parameters 
get activated differently depending on the linguistic contexts that the preposition for is put 
in. In other words, by applying the conceptual basis, we can obverse for’s conceptual 
import in a situated linguistic construction. For example, in (1), the composite expression 
running for the hills involves, at the very least, the activation of a number of parameters 
that constitute the semantics of the relational unit for. The first one is Orientation, which in 
(1) is also accompanied by Forward Motion. This activation has to do with an oriented TR, 
here the group of people, which is moving toward a LM, here the hills. The second 
parameter that receives activation is the one of Intentionality, and it is reflected by the 
volitional action generated by the TR in (1) which is running for the hills, probably to reach 
safety. Safety in this case might be the ulterior purpose – hence, there might be activation 
of the sense-extension unit Purpose. The last parameter that becomes activated in (1) is 
Oblique goal. As mentioned above, reaching the hills represents a means to the ultimate 
purpose, rather than the ultimate purpose itself. 
In (2), the parameter that appears to be most directly involved in the sanctioning of the 
[DISTANCE] lexical concept is Orientation. The composite structure He was driving a car 
chased for twenty miles by police, involves a sequential scanning of two cars that are 
presumably undergoing forward motion. Because of the complex atemporal behavior of for, 
the parameter of Orientation plays a role in that it serves as conceptual bedrock to 
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understand things such as motion as well as the spatial length where the car chase took 
place.  
The Oblique goal parameter might also get activated in (2) (probably secondarily). This 
parameter may evoke more emotional aspects that underlie linguistic structure, particularly 
in that there was an opportunity that the police had to catch the driver:  twenty miles builds 
up the spatial scenario in which this situation occurred. The twenty-mile distance was a 
way and/or opportunity (i.e., spatial setting) to achieve the ultimate purpose.  
Note also that there is a certain degree of intentionality on part of the TR when it comes to 
the [SPATIAL DISTANCE] lexical concept. In (2) There was a clear intention of the driver to 
get rid of the police, and a clear intention by the police to catch the driver, but these factors 
appear not to be as conceptually relevant as Orientation for the present example. 
There are other cases in which we can appreciate a higher activation of Intentionality as in 
(3) above, in which the composite conception evoked in There's a package for you conveys 
a scene in which a delivered package was sent to an intended recipient. Under this context, 
the preposition for establishes a conceptual relation between the intentional object transfer 
(i.e., sending) and the intended recipient. As mentioned above, there is indeed a correlation 
between the “intentional spark” that results in a purposeful situated action which is done by 
the person who wanted the doctor to receive the package, and a recipient, here the doctor in 
(3). However, the fact that the delivered package arrived at the doctor’s hands could be 
interpreted as the oblique goal since the ulterior purpose is to open the package, see what is 
inside, and use it for a given purpose. In sum, the parameters that are most directly involved 
in (3) are Oblique goal and Recipient.  Oblique goal is manifest by the successful delivery 
of the package to the doctor’s hands, whereas Recipient is reflected in the successful 
transfer from the sender to the doctor.  
It is good to mention at this point that Intentionality might also receive activation in (3) 
since it represents the sender’s willingness to send the package to the doctor for any reason 
she might have had. On the other hand, the activation of the Recipient parameter is due to 
the doctor receiving the package. Note that the sense-extension unit of Beneficiary does not 
get activated since we do not actually know whether the package represents positive or 
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negative things for the doctor.92 Lastly, Orientation may receive secondary activation 
considering the trajector/landmark alignment evoked in (3). After all, the delivered package 
had to travel to reach its intended recipient – that is to say, the TR approached its LM by 
undertaking an oriented path/trajectory. 
Let us now look again at example (4) in which the parameter that is most directly involved 
is Purpose (this semantic unit, in turn, is accessed through Intentionality). The composite 
structure He says they are now going for pubs, particularly the going for pubs construction, 
conveys a sequential scene in which a group of people has made the decision of going and 
hanging out in some pubs. The crucial point is that the group of people agreed on a 
purposeful action: go to pubs in order to, or with the intention of having fun. It follows that 
such a volitional decision carries some phenomenological consequences in that the group of 
people must move to reach the pubs – hence, activation of the Orientation parameter is to 
be expected. There is also activation of the Oblique goal parameter, since reaching the pubs 
(i.e. obliqueness) facilitates the ultimate purpose, here to have fun (i.e. primariness). 
Example (5), on the other hand, highlights more the Beneficiary sense-extension unit 
(accessed through Recipient) than all the rest. The composite expression raise money for 
charity not only conveys an intended recipient, here any organization that helps the needy, 
but also makes clear (supposedly) that the intended recipient will benefit from the reception 
of the intended transfer. Intentionality may also receive activation considering what it takes 
to collect money. Finally, Oblique goal is also activated, and this is reflected in the fact that 
the money collected would eventually help people who live under difficult economic 
conditions. 
In the next section I will proceed to show how the conceptual basis proposed for the 
English preposition for may shed some light on how non-spatial lexical concepts are 
motivated and ultimately grounded in spatio-physical experience. 
6.1.1 Non-spatial lexical concepts of for 
                                                             
92 Recall that this is why the present account distinguishes between the more semantically primitive notion of 
{RECIPIENT}, and the more specific one of {BENEFICIARY}. In this dissertation, the sense-extension unit of 
Beneficiary is understood as a person or thing that receives something positive. 
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The preposition for seems to be deeply related to emotions, this in turn might be due to a 
higher concentration of introspective structure in its conceptual basis. Such a pattern might 
be reflected in the Oblique goal parameter. Most of the usages related with for are primarily 
concerned with motives, intentions, and purposes. This points to the more intentional 
character of the functional element associated with the proto-scene of for. 
Consider the BNC example below: 
(6) Desperately she reminded herself that she was Eddie's sister and prayed for courage   
[PURPOSE]      
In (6), we can see how the semantic import of for consists in a conceptual relation that is 
held between the act of praying and the thing prayed for. The composite structure prayed 
for courage clearly points to this import. Now note how the image schematic structure of 
for (in the sense of Lakoff 1990) is projected onto the non-spatial domain in that praying 
for courage is to ask God to give us something which cannot be seen but felt, here courage. 
This invariance in image schematic structure comes from the spatio-physical experience 
which is embodied in linguistic structure as in (3) above, where the intended recipient gets 
the package. This package, in turn, is a concrete thing, considering it is an object. On the 
other hand, in (6) above the subject prays for getting (i.e., receiving) courage: an abstract 
concept that is subjectively built mostly by introspective structure.93 
It follows from this situated use type of for that the parameters that might be mostly 
involved in (6) – its active zones – are Purpose and Oblique goal. Remember that the notion 
of active zone is treated somehow differently in this research. In this nuanced perspective, it 
also deals with the different activations of the parameters of a word’s conceptual basis 
depending on the linguistic context that prepositions are placed in. Indeed, the conceptual 
bases proposed so far allow us to pin down the semantic areas (i.e. conceptual parameters) 
of a closed-class item that are most directly involved in a given construction. 
                                                             
93 Recall that the types of conceptual structures that underlie all concepts are perceptual, situated-like, and 
introspective (and temporal). Concrete and abstract things distinguish themselves by their situational focus. 
Different amounts of these types of knowledge constitute a given concept. 
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Purpose, as mentioned earlier, has to do with the purposeful act of praying for something 
(this in turn is accessed through Intentionality), in this case courage. Oblique goal, on the 
other hand, is concerned with the hypothetical scenario in which courage arrives at the 
speaker’s persona. Such a situation would then facilitate the speaker in (6) to do the thing 
she needed courage to proceed and act upon. Recipient and Beneficiary would also get 
activated in this situation since the speaker would be the recipient of the thing she needed.  
Consider another example in which for highlights its purposeful character: 
(7) 'I've invited Felipe up to my villa for dinner'.                                   [PURPOSE] 
Note how the preposition for sanctions the [PURPOSE] sense similarly to (6). However, even 
though both examples sanction the same lexical concept as well as profile the same 
relation, there still exist subtle differences which might be the result of a situated 
trajector/landmark alignment. Such a situated alignment implies assuming an encyclopedic 
view of lexical semantics. One consequence of this is that a lexical item takes a subtly 
different value every time it is used. That value depends on the array of associated 
conceptions it happens to evoke on a given occasion, and the specific level of activation 
that a word s’ parameters achieve (following Langacker 2000). For instance, we can 
observe that Felipe in (7) is not seen as a recipient of the event, here dinner, On the other 
hand, speaker in (6) may be conceptualized as a recipient of an abstract thing (courage). We 
can observe from such a subtle difference, that secondary activation is also important for 
linguistic realization due to its contribution to a complete informational characterization of 
a situated construction. Recall that Secondary activation is the activation of semantic 
elements that are less involved in a given construction. However, this is a sort of conceptual 
“back up” for primary activation. 
In (7) the LM of for, which is elaborated by dinner and is closely related to the subject’s 
purpose since the subject in (7) wants Felipe to be there and share with the other guests, 
represents the physical place for a purpose, which may ideally be to enjoy, share, and have 
fun among relatives and/or friends. Dinner in turn reflects obliqueness in this respect so we 
can expect activation of the Oblique goal parameter. There is also activation of 
Intentionality as trigger factor for the subject in (7) to invite Felipe, this activation is then 
spread onto the sense-extension unit Purpose. In addition, there might be secondary 
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activation of the Recipient parameter if we think of Felipe as metaphorically receiving 
something, like an invitation. 
Let us consider another BNC example in which for deals with abstract things: 
(8) 'I hope to have some good news for you soon.'                 [INTENDED RECIPIENT] 
Example (8) evokes a person’s wish to have good news for other people. The speaker in (8) 
has turned her attention to another person’s interests. This attention, in turn, is driven by the 
intentionality that ends up becoming a purposeful wish, which is to bring some good news 
to a target. The intended recipient motivates the particular action designated, which in (8) is 
reflected in the speaker’s willingness and desire to have some good news for her/him/them. 
Once again, we can observe invariance in terms of image-schematic structure of the 
conceptual basis of for that is mapped onto non-spatial realms. Good news is something 
which is generally abstract in that it makes people enter into psychosomatic states such as 
happiness, sadness or excitement, among others. The intended recipient of the good news in 
(8) might additionally receive a positive hit of adrenaline and happiness when hearing the 
good news. Such a figurative receipt is partly the result of the invariance in the image-
schematic structure of for, which is ultimately grounded in spatio-physical experience. Now 
the parameters of for that are mostly involved in the figurative conception in (8) are 
Recipient and Purpose. Recipient is manifested in the intended recipient to whom the 
speaker in (8) wishes to have good news for. In the hypothetical case that the intended 
recipient had the good news, she would then become a beneficiary considering that good 
news evokes something positive rather than negative. Purpose, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the purposeful decision of trying to communicate good news to the 
intended recipient. That purposeful activity is undertaken expressly with a recipient in 
mind. Finally, Oblique goal might receive secondary activation since in the hypothetical 
scenario in which the intended recipient received the good news, she might be able to do 
something regarding this new situation. In other words, receiving good news may facilitate 
the undertaking of some other things. 
The {SOURCE-PATH-GOAL} image-schema is indeed used for metaphorical reasoning in that 
it provides source domain inferences due to cognitive topology – that is, image schematic 
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structure (Lakoff 1990: 54). Example (8) above may also be schematically interpreted as 
{X HOPES Y TO RECEIVE Z} in which X stands for the person who wishes, Y stands for the 
wish itself, and Z for the intended recipient. We also have to consider the temporal factor 
that is characterized by the {PATH} schema and it means that the person in (8) must start 
doing something (i.e. a process) in order to achieve her goal, which is to communicate good 
news to a specific person. 
Now consider an example in which the Beneficiary sense-extension unit gets more directly 
involved in the meaning of for below: 
(9) Well, doesn't seem as if anyone else has put up the score but it was Tottenham 1 - 
Leeds 1. Deane scored for Leeds                                                  [BENEFICIARY]  
In (9) we can note how in the composite structure Deane scored for Leeds, the 
prepositional landmark, here Leeds, is conceptualized not only as a recipient, but also as a 
beneficiary. The football team of Leeds does receive a benefit, here a goal. That is what 
makes the Leeds football team to be considered – loosely speaking – as a sort of recipient. 
Note that the receipt might presumably be entailed, as pointed out by Tyler and Evans 
(2003a), when the Beneficiary sense-extension unit becomes activated. It follows that under 
this context there is activation of the parameter of Recipient and then this activation spreads 
onto Beneficiary.  
Every goal that is scored contributes to the likelihood of the team to win the match. When 
Deane scored, the team immediately became a beneficiary. They were probably 1-0 with 
that goal (or 1-1 in the other possible situation). In the case of the positive scenario (1-0 for 
Leeds), this would lead to an eventual win, which is supposedly to be the ulterior purpose 
of each football team. It follows that activation of the Oblique goal parameter may also be 
expected because scoring goals in any sport approaches the team or player to the victory. 
Now consider some examples in which the semantics of for is less clear-cut when it comes 
to providing an explanatory motivation behind non-spatial usages. However, the conceptual 
basis proposed for for might prove itself useful to pin down a motivation. To see this point, 
consider the following BNC example: 
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(10) The Duchamp exhibition curated by Pontus Hulten opens at the Palazzo 
Grassi (21 March-4 July) and coincides intentionally with a show of drawings by 
Victor Hugo, better known for his novels such as Les Miserables and The 
Hunchback of Notre Dame                                                        [BECAUSE OF] 
The composite structure Victor Hugo, better known for his novels in (10) above, evokes the 
main attentional figure, here Victor Hugo, who is better known for his written work (LM). 
Note how Victor Hugo is integrated in a higher-order structural level in which the relational 
profile of better known elaborates the TR of for whereas its prepositional landmark is 
elaborated by his novels such as Les Miserables and The Hunchback of Notre Dame. The 
result of such a higher-order composite structure highlights Victor Hugo against a 
background which consists of his literary work that makes him easier to be recognized. 
This particular trajector/landmark alignment shows how the TR becomes easier to identify 
once we take a look at the relations it has with respect to its LM: the landmark in (10) 
facilitates the recognition of the TR by evoking background information about it.  
The parameter that receives primary activation in order to sanction the [BECAUSE OF] sense 
of for is Oblique goal. Identifying the TR by the background information provided by its 
LM is key to the understanding of this lexical concept – the author in (10) can be identified 
much faster once a couple of his novels are mentioned (Les Miserables and The Hunchback 
of Notre Dame in (10)). Hence, mentioning the novels would further facilitate his 
recognition. To put it differently, the novels represent the obliqueness element of for while 
the mental access to the complex {VICTOR HUGO} concept, i.e. its recognition/identification, 
is the primary goal. 
There is another sense that is generally related to the semantics of for and is the [OCCASION] 
sense. Consider the following BNC example:   
     (11) 'They are not going home for Christmas?'                                         [OCCASION]  
As shown so far in the non-spatial conceptions of for, there is a clear preponderance of 
senses associated to this preposition that are primarily concerned with motives, intentions, 
and purposes. This in turn, reflects the intentional character of the functional element of the 
proto-scene of for.  
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It is important to recall at this point that spatial language is constituted by spatial and non-
spatial parameters. Crucially, concrete and abstract parameters emerge from the very same 
situational content (Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005),94 that is, through embodied 
experience. Concrete and abstract concepts differ in situational focus – while concrete 
concepts are concerned with objects and their possible affordances in space, abstract 
concepts are focused on events and introspections. This is not to say, however, that 
concrete concepts are not developed by conceptual structure that comes from events and 
introspection; rather, it means that the amount of event-like and introspective conceptual 
structure in concrete concepts is apparently less concentrated due to the immediacy of 
visual perception.  Lastly, a parameter such as Oblique goal might be considered an abstract 
concept since its focus is on multiple components that are not localized but widely 
distributed. An oblique goal includes, at the very least, a trajector/landmark alignment in 
which the TR is oriented or heading toward its LM, and an ulterior purpose which is 
generally manifest as a feature of the TR: reaching or attaining the LM facilitates the 
ultimate goal. It follows that the non-spatial or abstract content of the Oblique goal lies in-
between these events.  
Returning to example (11), we can now see how the Oblique goal is the parameter that is 
most directly involved. The composite structure for Christmas, evokes an occasion of the 
year in which people have different plans for gathering and enjoy together. Now the 
particular semantic import of for concerns the fact that Christmas is conceptualized as an 
event in which more subordinate events will occur. In current parlance, Christmas in (11) 
serves as oblique goal for an ulterior purpose. If I say they are not going home for 
Christmas? I point to the fact that staying at home for Christmas might be a good occasion 
to enjoy with the family and have a memorable moment or any other subordinate event 
people may encounter when celebrating Christmas with family at home. 
Consider now the [COMPARING] sense of for, which according to the CED, is used for 
comparing one thing with others of the same type: 
                                                             
94 See Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) for a preliminary account of abstract concepts. 
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(12) She's forty-one now, but she's young. She looks young for her age and she     
acts young. People think of her as younger.                                      [COMPARING] 
The composite structure She looks young for her age refers to the fact that considering that 
the woman who is being referred to in (12) is forty-one, she looks younger than an average 
forty-one-year-old woman. The woman referred to, is an instance which is being compared 
with respect to its type. To achieve such a communicative purpose, the composite structure 
She looks young for her age jointly contributes (along with the whole discourse context) to 
the composite conception evoked in (12) with a conceptual relation that is driven by the 
preposition for in which She looks young profiles the forty-one woman who looks younger 
than the average. The clause She looks young is what elaborates the TR of for.  
On the other hand, the nominal her age elaborates the prepositional landmark. Considering 
the status of this trajector/landmark alignment, we can observe that the LM opens a 
comparative mental space since it evokes the group of 41-year-old women to which the 
woman referred to in (12) is compared in terms of how young women are supposed to look 
at that age (the LM presupposes a norm with the average degree of youthful appearance for 
this age group, the type). The TR provides the instance of the type against which it is being 
compared. 
The whole composite conception evoked in She's forty-one now, but she's young. She looks 
young for her age and she acts young. People think of her as younger, jointly contributes to 
the scope of the comparative event. I think that the semantic import of for hinges on the 
trajector/landmark alignment. In (12) the TR in She looks young for her age is identified by 
its type but is also compared to it. The type in this case serves as evidence that the woman 
referred to does actually look younger than an overall woman of the same age. It follows 
that the type, which consists in the prepositional landmark, serves a double function: (i) it 
identifies the woman referred to with respect to its type, and (ii) it activates the mental 
space of {COMPARISON} in the for her age prepositional phrase by providing the schematic 
information to do so.  
Note that in (12) the woman is first recognized with respect to others of her type and then 
once this recognition has been computed, contingencies such as the fact that she indeed 
looks younger than the rest of the people of her age can come up. Such a contingency might 
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be motivated by an elaboration of the Oblique goal parameter that gets activated in order to 
conceive the [COMPARING] sense: we do make use of one thing to think about another. 
Hence, the use of for in (12) exhibits obliqueness in that the TR is first recognized with 
respect to its LM (i.e., obliqueness) to eventually extract some conclusions from that 
recognition (i.e., primariness). 
I now show what is understood as the [RESPONSIBILITY] sense of for. According to the 
CED, for is used to say whose responsibility something is. Consider the BNC example 
below: 
(13) Japan alone is responsible for about 100,000 dolphin deaths a year. 
[RESPONSIBILITY] 
In the composite structure Japan alone is responsible for, the relational profile of Japan 
alone is responsible elaborates the TR of for. The main attentional figure, here Japan, is 
conceptualized as the doer of what its LM, here about 100,000 dolphin deaths a year, 
specifies. The first mental space evokes Japan as responsible for something which is 
specified in the second mental space. Now there are features in the conceptual basis of for 
proposed above that may shed some light on this specific figurative usage. Note that the 
first mental space evoked by Japan alone is responsible for, can be metaphorically 
understood as if Japan was a recipient of a responsibility. Then, this composite conception 
is integrated and specified by the second mental space which functions as prepositional 
landmark. This second mental space, then, complements the figurative understanding in 
that it contributes with an “object” that goes into the recipient, which in the current case is 
an abstract thing – about 100,000 dolphin deaths yearly. We might think of the 
RESPONSIBILITY IS AN OBJECT IN A RECIPIENT metaphor as partly structuring this figurative 
usage. This is driven by the Recipient parameter. Thus, there are correspondence links 
between these bodies of knowledge. 
In addition, we might also say that there is (secondary) activation of the Purpose sense-
extension unit (accessed through Intentionality) considering that the country of Japan 
deliberately takes the decision of killing 100,000 dolphins yearly. 
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The English preposition for can also sanction the [SUPPORT] lexical concept. According to 
the CED, for is used to show support for or agreement with something. Consider the 
following BNC sample: 
(14) Of those who voted, virtually all voted for either the Conservative or Labour 
parties                                                                                                   [SUPPORT] 
To explain the semantic import of for in (14), particularly on the virtually all voted for 
either the Conservative or Labour parties composite structure, we can once again use the 
conceptual basis of for in figure 6.2 above. I think there is a figurative extension that is 
partly facilitated by the Oblique goal parameter in that obliqueness is manifested more 
schematically in the act of voting. It follows that a political thinking of a person becomes 
embodied during election days in the votes themselves. To say that I voted for a certain 
party, then, implies that my thinking became embodied in a piece of paper – that is, there is 
obliqueness – and once this first event is met, then the ulterior goal comes, which is to 
contribute to the possible victory of the party that one supports. 
There is also activation of Beneficiary (along with Recipient). The party in (14) that is 
voted is conceptualized as a “figurative recipient” of the intended vote. It follows that being 
a recipient of a vote means that the recipient is receiving something which is beneficial – 
therefore, Beneficiary gets activated and contributes to the realization of the [SUPPORT] 
lexical concept. The last parameter that should be considered in the realization of this sense 
is Intentionality (and Purpose), considering the intentions that lie behind the act of voting.  
Consider another example in which for evokes a semantically related but distinct relation: 
(15) It would be bad for me.                                                 [IN RELATION TO] 
According to the CED, for denotes someone or something that is in some relationship with 
someone or something. We can appreciate from the composite conception evoked in (15) 
that the speaker got to the conclusion that a certain situation or thing would not be suitable 
for her, probably on the basis of her reflection upon it. Note also that for in (15) shows a 
self-oriented character rather than other-oriented as it is usually the case with for.95 
                                                             
95 We can also use the other-oriented feature of for and say It would be bad for you/her/him/it/them/us. 
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To conceptualize the hypothetical scenario due to the modal would, which serves as space 
builder in (15) above, the speaker simulates (i.e., conceptualizes) herself as a recipient of an 
event that carries bad consequences. The conceptualizer might be considered as a 
“recipient” because it is anaphorically used to refer back to an object that can be transferred 
spatially or metaphorically (e.g., She proposed an idea, but that would be bad for me). 
In (15), the Recipient parameter gets activated and probably extended by providing the 
invariant image-schematic structure that drives this figurative thinking. This image-
schematic structure, as mentioned earlier, is highly flexible. For instance, imagine that 
example (15) had the adjective good rather than bad as in It would be good for me, then the 
trajector/landmark alignment would present other type of configuration, particularly in that 
the LM (me in (15)) might be willing to be the beneficiary of a TR that carries good news. 
However, because the TR in (15) is linked to a bad situation, the speaker (represented by 
the prepositional landmark and conceptualized as the metaphorical recipient) might not 
want to be the recipient of bad consequences. In the hypothetical case the speaker did 
receive the bad consequences, she would not become a beneficiary.       
Finally, it is important to mention that a second parameter that may receive activation is 
Oblique goal. If someone says that something is good or bad for someone else, she refers to 
the fact that the outcomes of an event may affect or benefit a person in different ways. The 
preposition for in this case is highly linked to the results behind receiving good or bad 
news. For instance, I can say a part-time job would be good for me because I had more 
time. Note the obliqueness of for in that it provides the conceptual ground to introduce the 
primariness which is reflected in the reasons and/or results of a thing or event, which in the 
utterance just given is related to having more time. In sum, I suggest that the [IN RELATION 
TO] lexical concept that is generally sanctioned by the preposition for is due to the 
activation and extension of the Recipient, and Oblique goal parameters.                                        
I now present the last figurative use of for in this non-exhaustive list of figurative 
conceptions. The sense I want to analyze can be glossed as [PAYMENT]. According to the 
CED, for is used to refer to the act of getting things in exchange. To illustrate, consider the 
following BNC sample: 
(16) I've paid for your education, fed and clothed you.                 [PAYMENT] 
 
 
208 
 
Let us focus on the composite structure evoked in I've paid for your education in (16) 
above. The relational profile of I’ve paid elaborates the TR of for whereas its prepositional 
landmark is elaborated by the nominal your education. It follows that in order to understand 
the contribution of for in (16), we need to again consider the trajector/landmark alignment 
that underlies the linguistic construction. The TR in this case is a relation – the very act of 
paying education fees– which represents a purposeful event. Hence, activation of the 
Purpose sense-extension unit is to be expected, along with Intentionality. On the other 
hand, we have the prepositional landmark which is elaborated by the nominal your 
education. Note that your education refers to the education of a specific person. That 
person is the recipient of the action of paying education fees and hence, she or he becomes 
a beneficiary. Thus, the parameter of Recipient also gets highlighted and then this 
activation spreads onto Beneficiary. 
Lastly, the very fact that the TR in (16) meets its LM – that is, the act of paying the 
education fees was followed by the beneficiary going to school/college, concomitantly 
serves an ulterior purpose, which is possibly related to the knowledge that the person will 
acquire, along with the academic degree and array of job opportunities that an educated 
person can apply for. Note that there is also activation of the Oblique goal parameter since 
it evokes the notions of obliqueness (and primariness). These are reflected in the fact that 
reaching or attaining the LM facilitates the primary purpose, here to be able to find better 
opportunities in life through education. In sum, the parameters that get activated in order to 
apprehend the [PAYMENT] lexical concept in (16) are Recipient, Beneficiary, Purpose 
(accessed through Intentionality), and Oblique goal. 
6.1.2 Temporal domain of for 
I now turn to the temporal domain of for. To do so, I will show two temporal lexical 
concepts: [DURATION] and [EVENT]. Both lexical concepts are grounded in what is known 
as the extrinsic temporal frame of reference (or t-FoR for short). 
Before proceeding to analyze the first sense, which is [DURATION], it is important to recall 
that space and time have fundamental roles in grammar. Objects and events are the 
prototypes of nouns and verbs respectively and hence, are conceptualized as spatial and 
temporal entities. That parallelism might evoke the illusion that these two foundations of 
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human cognition should be treated as unified. However, time seems to manifest a special 
status (following Evans 2004, 2013; Galton 2011; Langacker 2012b; Pöppel 2004, 2009; 
see also Sinha et al. 2016) because it is always the medium for conceptualization itself (i.e., 
processing time), and many times also serves as an object of conception. It follows that the 
dynamic conception of space, through time, makes possible the “metaphorical” conception 
of time itself in terms of space. That is one of the reasons why the present research assumes 
the weak version of Conceptual Metaphor Theory,96 particularly in the TIME IS SPACE 
metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). The apprehension of the temporal domain involves 
both purely temporal and spatial knowledge.  
Consider the BNC example below: 
(17) Stanley Peters has been with the company for five years        [DURATION] 
Example (17) evokes the [DURATION] sense. Here the main attentional figure, Stanley 
Peters, had a relationship with the company that lasted for five years (this latter relational 
profile elaborates de TR of for). It may be suitable in this example to apply Grady’s (1997) 
DURATION IS LENGTH primary metaphor to shed light on the partial structuring and 
supportive role of spatio-conceptual structure in temporal understanding. This metaphor 
may well provide the conceptual ground in order to understand the primary concept of 
length – a spatial feature per excellence – with respect to duration, which is a type of 
transience and the feature that makes time having its own structure. Recall that while the 
substrate of space is matter, the one of time is action. The former domain is isotropic while 
the latter is anisotropic.97 
The spatio-conceptual motivation for the partial structuring of temporal scenes may come 
from spatial situations as evoked in example (2) above. In the clause He was driving a car 
chased for twenty miles by police, in which the preposition for (together with the LM 
twenty miles) clearly denotes spatial magnitude, there is image-schematic structure that is 
preserved and thus, serves as conceptual source for apprehending the temporal magnitude – 
that is, the primary target, as evidenced in (17) above. In addition, such space-time mapping 
                                                             
96 For an account and neuropsychological evidence that space and time might be represented and processed 
independently of each other in the brains of modern adults, see Kemmerer (2005). 
97 For a review of time vs. space, see Evans (2013: 142-166). 
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might also be motivated by what is known as conceptual alternativity (Talmy 2000). This 
conceptual phenomenon, as previously mentioned in chapter 2, has to do with our cognitive 
ability to conceptualize time in terms of space and vice versa. I can say that Málaga is 200 
kilometers from Córdoba, this way I use space to indicate the distance existing between 
those two Spanish cities; but if I say Málaga is 2 hours by car from Córdoba, I use 
temporal structure instead.  
Going back to example (17) and considering the notions of primary metaphor and 
conceptual alternativity, we can now observe how the composite structure for five years 
evokes a mental space about the duration of the relationship that is held between Stanley 
Peters and the company he works for. I suggest that the semantic contribution of for in (17) 
might be partly attributed to the parameter of Orientation. As the proto-scene of for shows 
above (see figures 6.1 and 6.2), the TR of for is generally oriented or heading toward its 
LM. In addition, motion is understood as going forward rather than backwards. This 
behavior parallels the temporal nature of the succession transience type. The orientation 
feature (plus forward motion) of for may be considered as the only topological (i.e. spatial) 
image-schematic structure that is preserved for the temporal understanding in (17). 
We can (again) appreciate how purely temporal cognition is at work in that we have a TE 
(target event) which is located by an RP (reference point), here 5 years, and further 
anchored by an O (origo) (represented by day 1: the day Stanley started working in the 
company) to the transience type of duration. The highly schematic temporal knowledge that 
emerges from this extrinsic t-FoR can be glossed as [TE IS FIXED TO AN RP IN THE 
GREGORIAN CALENDAR].  
Temporal reference is indeed one of the types of knowledge involved in temporal 
conceptions. The parameter of Orientation contributes (as another type of knowledge) to 
fully fledge our understanding of temporal evolution via metaphorical extension. Metaphor 
is also a type of knowledge that is involved. It has a relevant role in partially structuring 
and supporting temporal conceptions. 
I now want to briefly highlight the importance of the extrinsic t-FoR in our ability to 
conceptualize time in (17). Recall that the extrinsic t-FoR is perhaps the most complex of 
the three t-FoRs. This t-FoR is known for its “absolute” character since it fixes events in 
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time regardless of individual human experience.98 It follows that the extrinsic t-FoR is 
periodicity-based, compared to the egocentric and event-based reference strategies that 
characterize the deictic and sequential t-FoRs, respectively. 
As pointed out earlier, there is a bifurcation within the extrinsic t-FoR which comes from 
the use of calendars and clocks – two temporal artefacts that embody this t-FoR. It follows 
from this that we must distinguish between event-reckoning systems, embodied in 
calendars, and time-reckoning systems, which are embodied in clocks. Both types of 
systems serve to count periodicities. The distinction goes on their relative complexities: 
time-reckoning systems (i.e. clocks) are considered to be more complex because they can 
fix events with finer precision against the temporal matrix. In example (17) above, the 
(temporal) semantics of for is partly motivated by the temporal structure which is derived 
from event-reckoning systems since the prepositional phrase for five years makes use of 
cyclical (and mensural) time for conceptualization. However, we also make use of features 
of time-reckoning systems to fully understand the [DURATION] temporal lexical concept. 
Time-reckoning (and event-reckoning) systems, in turn, are divided into three categories: 
the repeatable type, like the 24-hour system and the {YEAR} temporal unit, the closed type, 
as in the case of countdowns, and the open-ended type, such as a long count that might 
never end. The system that serves to apprehend example (17) is the repeatable one since it 
involves the temporal unit {YEAR}, which is cyclical (and mensural in that a year consists 
of 365 days which can be further calculated into hours). We could say, then, that the 
periodicity-based temporal strategy used in (17) is mainly characterized by a repeatable 
system that allows us to temporally measure the elapse of 5 years. 
To merely understand the prepositional landmark of for which is elaborated by the nominal 
profile of five years in (17), we need to understand cyclical units such as {DAY/NIGHT}, 
{WEEK}, {MONTH}, the 24-hour cycle, among others. Indeed, we do need temporal 
cognition to understand temporal concepts such as {YEAR}or {HOUR}. This in turn is 
developmentally complex in that human beings seem to start acquiring temporal concepts 
gradually: from simple to more complex ones – that is, 
{DAY}<{WEEK}<{MONTH}<{YEAR}. 
                                                             
98 Note the parallelism in this regard to the absolute spatial frame of reference (see Levinson 2003). 
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In sum, we have seen how time contributes with its own structure to the realization of the 
[DURATION] temporal lexical concept of for. As suggested above, the temporal structure 
that is reflected in the periodicity-based temporal strategy is a much-needed 
complementation for conceptual and primary metaphors as well as for the situated 
semantics of for in (17). It seems that all these types of knowledge (i.e. metaphor, spatio-
conceptual structure, temporal structure, and semantic tendencies) establish 
correspondences to jointly conceive temporal scenarios. 
I now present the second and last temporal sense of for, as mentioned at the outset of this 
section. Consider the following BNC example: 
(18) She saw him pick up the sweater her parents had bought her for her birthday 
[EVENT] 
Example (18) is similar to (11) because both are structured by temporal knowledge that 
comes from a repeatable event-reckoning system. In (18) the TE consists in the 
manipulation of a woman’s sweater by an unspecified man. This sweater in turn, is a 
birthday gift that was given by her parents. The information that the sweater is a birthday 
present is provided by the prepositional landmark, or RP in this temporal location strategy, 
her birthday. 
A key characteristic of a repeatable event (and time)-reckoning system is that it requires an 
origo – the point that initiates the cycle – to properly function. In the case of (18), and 
similarly in (17) above, the cyclical unit {YEAR} is of vital importance since it allows us to 
set the origo (prototypically) as January the 1st. This allows us to start the count and anchor 
the TE to the duration transience type. 
I think that the fine-grained contribution of for in (18), is similar to (11) above (so it could 
be partially structured by spatio-physical experience) since activation might fall on the 
parameter of Oblique goal. The script or cognitive model of {BIRTHDAY} exhibits as one of 
its attributes the concept of {GIFT}. Hence, the prepositional phrase for her birthday 
represents an occasion in which many subordinate events can take place. There might also 
be activation of Recipient (which may spread onto Beneficiary), and Purpose (which is 
accessed through Intentionality). Recipient has to do with the person who celebrated her 
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birthday and thus received a gift. This in turn, may be interpreted as a beneficiary. The 
Purpose parameter may also get activated (secondarily) considering the purposeful activity 
of buying a present with an intended recipient in mind.  
Note that the parameter of Orientation might not get activated in (18) (contrary to in (17)). 
This may be due to duration not being conceptually prominent for the composite 
conception in (18). Rather than duration, what is profiled is the event as a whole. 
6.1.3 For…to construction 
I now want to briefly offer some remarks on the for…to complement type that is usually 
found in the English language. In line with Michel Achard (2007), I agree that the 
distribution of a complement type is mainly a matter of semantic compatibility between 
meaningful elements. For these semantically compatible elements to be integrated in a 
complement clause as in She wishes for Tom to be famous, they have to undergo conceptual 
subordination (Langacker 1991: 440). Conceptual subordination may be the key to 
understanding the four complement types commonly found in English, namely -to, -ing, -
that, and -for…to. In the utterance just given above, the act of wishing something is 
superimposed by the clause Tom… be famous. This process is construed holistically and 
hence, manipulated unitarily. This means that the for…to complement type, as well as the 
rest of the complement types, encourage summary scanning. 
One of the possibly main differences between the -to and the for…to complement clause 
types may lie in the notion of “self’”, compared to “other” (in the sense of Wierzbicka 
1988). This is linked to the other-oriented character of for as pointed out earlier. While -to 
complements tend to be more focused on the ego’s experience, for…to complements 
usually express the experience of others. Such conceptual behavior can be explained by 
virtue of the parameters of Primary goal and Oblique goal that characterize and are 
considered functional elements of the conceptual bases of to and for, respectively. In 
addition, these two parameters may shed light on the specific contribution that each 
preposition offers in the for…to construction. I think that there is indeed obliqueness 
encoded in for and primariness in to. To illustrate this point, consider a BNC example of the 
for…to complement type: 
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(19) Stopping at one of the doors, he waited for her to catch up 
We will focus on the composite structure he waited for her to catch up, in which the clause 
he waited profiles the man and elaborates the TR of for whereas her elaborates its LM in 
He waited for her. Due to conceptual subordination, this composite structure is then 
superimposed in a summary-like manner by the infinitival subordinate clause to catch up, 
which elaborates a secondary LM and specifies the reasons behind the subject’s act of 
waiting for the woman in (19). 
Note how obliqueness and primariness are present but construed holistically due to the 
atemporalizing character of complement types (Langacker 1991). In (19), the composite 
structure he waited for her clearly shows obliqueness in that the trajector/landmark 
alignment of for is characterized by a purposeful TR that is oriented with respect to its LM. 
The LM, in turn, is crucially conceptualized as an oblique goal: attaining the LM facilitates 
an ulterior purpose, which in (19) is evoked by the infinitival subordinate clause to catch 
up. Note the semantic import of to in that it evokes the primary goal of the purposeful TR, 
which is to catch up. It follows from this that there is activation, at the very least, of 
Oblique goal and Purpose on part of for, and activation of Primary goal on part of to. 
Furthermore, the conceptual activations of each preposition jointly work via 
correspondence links between their substructures, as well as between the lexico-
grammatical elements within the for…to construction. 
This preliminary analysis of the conceptual activation that may occur in for and to, might 
contribute to a more complete understanding of the for…to complement. It contributes in 
that it provides some ideas on what is the specific semantic import that each preposition 
offers in the construction. Hence, it helps to pin down the very nature behind linguistic 
structure. 
Thus far we have seen how the English preposition for is conceptualized spatially, non-
spatially, and temporally. We have also seen the for…to construction, how is motivated and 
the principal differences it exhibits with respect to the -to complement type. Such insights 
can indeed be applied to English and Spanish language teaching in a quest for a better 
explanation and comprehension by both teachers and students regarding spatial, non-
spatial, and temporal prepositional usages. This is indeed one of the issues we will develop 
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in the next chapter. For now, we continue with the analysis of the Spanish preposition para, 
which in some respects, is equivalent to the semantics of for. 
6.2 Spatial lexical concepts for para 
The Spanish preposition para is usually considered to evoke an event’s ulterior purpose 
(Trujillo 1971: 273) and is also used to introduce a participant that receives the end of a 
process (Chéliz 2002). In this first brief glance at its predominant semantic description in 
the literature, we can already appreciate that para is deeply related to intentions, motives 
and purposes, in a similar way as English for.  
The Spanish preposition para is used to introduce the recipient of a process. Hence, it 
expresses the final purpose which lies behind movement itself. This is actually what the 
DLE shows as the prototypical meaning of para, a meaning that denotes the end of an 
undertaken action. Such a prototypical meaning, I might add, is motivated by more spatially 
grounded scenarios that exhibit a sense of movement. Indeed, this sense is the second entry 
that the DLE offers. Consider now a corpus example (taken from the Spanish Web 2011 
(esTenTen11, Eu + Am)) of this sense: 
(20) A las cinco y media saldrá el ministro para Madrid          [DEPARTURE] 
                 [At half past five, the minister will go to Madrid] 
In (20) above, the composite structure A las cinco y media saldrá el ministro, evokes a 
relation, which is driven by the verb saldrá (this in English literally means will go out) and 
the preposition a, between the time (expressed using a repeatable time-reckoning system) 
and the TE (target event), here the minister’s trip. Then this expression is integrated in the 
higher-order composite structure A las cinco y media saldrá el ministro para Madrid, in 
which the TR of para is elaborated by the clause saldrá el ministro, whereas the 
prepositional landmark is elaborated by the profile of Madrid. 
There is indeed a sense of movement that is jointly accomplished by the verb and the 
prepositional vehicle para (as well as by the whole construction in general). Hence, we can 
appreciate that direction is a prominent feature in the spatial usages of para. Note that 
direction can be conceptualized as static or dynamic. To put it differently, para can behave 
as a simplex or complex atemporal relational unit. In (20), the scene evoked might be 
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thought of as simplex since it refers to a future event: the event is not currently happening, 
but it will. On the contrary, I can say Vamos yendo para Madrid (we are (now) going to 
Madrid), in this way, sequential scanning is more immediate since it is not being mentally 
simulated through mental time travel but currently experienced.  
As put above, para evokes an event’s ulterior purpose. In (20) above (as well as in the 
invented utterance Vamos yendo para Madrid) this is reflected in the fact that reaching the 
LM might facilitate an ulterior goal. This conceptual import is in fact what para has in 
common with for – that is, obliqueness. This in turn, reflects the atelic character of para 
and for in that they participate in constructions that evoke events which lack a conclusive 
endpoint. 
In the same line, para also evokes a recipient of an action, just like for does. Consider a 
Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) example of this usage: 
(21) Si formas parte de la gran cantidad de deportistas que participan cada fin de 
semana en alguna de las numerosas pruebas deportivas que se celebran en nuestra 
Comunitat, esta tarjeta es para ti                                                 [RECIPIENT] 
[If you are part of the sporty people who participate each weekend on the sport 
events of our community, this card is for you.] 
In (21) the composite structure esta tarjeta es para ti (this card is for you), encodes the 
[RECIPIENT] sense similarly to for in (3) above. The nominal esta tarjeta profiles the card 
(la tarjeta), which elaborates the TR of para while its prepositional landmark is elaborated 
by ti (you). Note how, as pointed out by Chéliz (2002), para denotes a participant that 
receives the end of a process. In the current case, a person can get a sports card if and only 
if she participates each weekend in the sporting events of the community. In other words, 
after the process of constantly participating in sport activities each weekend, that person 
becomes a recipient of the sports card. Crucially, and consonant with English for, a 
recipient who receives something that is supposedly categorized as “good” or “positive” 
becomes a beneficiary. On the contrary, and as mentioned earlier, if I say Tengo malas 
noticias para ti (I have bad news for you), the interlocutor is considered as a simple 
recipient rather than a beneficiary. From this it follows that Beneficiary might well be 
considered a sense-extension unit of Recipient just like in the conceptual basis of for. 
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There is another factor in (21) which has to do with obliqueness since the very fact of 
receiving a sports card facilitates access to certain things such as sport facilities, discounts, 
and the like. 
Examples (20) and (21) exhibit an atelic character in that the events evoked by para lack a 
definite endpoint. However, the highly polysemous behavior of para allows this preposition 
to sanction telic events as well – that is, events that evoke a conclusive endpoint. To 
illustrate, consider a corpus example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + 
Am): 
(22) Me realizaron una radiografía para ver que tenía                       [PURPOSE] 
           (I had a radiograph made          to    see what I had) 
In (22) the clause me realizaron una radiografía (I had a radiograph made) profiles the 
subject’s radiograph which then is integrated with para ver que tenía in order to achieve the 
higher-order composite structure me realizaron una radiografía para ver que tenía. The 
profile of the clause Me realizaron una radiografía elaborates the TR of para and its 
prepositional landmark is elaborated by ver que tenía. From this example we can observe 
that there is no obliqueness whatsoever. Rather, the primary goal is immediately accessed 
due to the role that the prepositional-landmark element of para has in the construction in 
(22). 
If we compare example (22) to example (4) above, we can appreciate that even though both 
prepositions para and for can sanction the [PURPOSE] sense, the activation route (in the 
sense of Evans 2009) is different. It follows from this idea that the functional element of 
para might be considered as a sort of hybrid that is highly context-dependent: the LM of 
para can function as either oblique goal or primary goal as in (22) above. That shift in LM 
status posits a challenge when it comes to the understanding of the polysemous behavior of 
para. However, the conceptual basis that is about to be proposed for para, may provide 
some insights to approach such a polysemous character. 
Note that the activation route that leads to the highlighting of the [PURPOSE] sense in (4) 
above, particularly reflected in the composite structure going for pubs, is achieved by virtue 
of the semantic import of for that serves as a conduit to the ultimate goal (e.g., to have fun) 
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– that is, there is a TR, here the group of people who is going for pubs, which undergoes 
motion and then reaches its LM that concomitantly serves an ulterior goal. If we take a look 
at figure 6.2 above, we can observe that the Purpose parameter is a sense-extension unit of 
Intentionality, which is reflected in the purposeful character embedded in the TR of for; 
hence, the Intentionality parameter is activated and then this activation spreads onto  
Purpose (there is also activation of the parameters of Orientation and Oblique goal for a 
complete apprehension of the composite conception evoked in (4) above). On the other 
hand, the activation route of the [PURPOSE] sense of para is more direct since the primary 
goal is evoked in the prepositional landmark para ver que tenía (to see what I had), rather 
than by a purposeful TR as in the case of for in example (4). 
In sum, I think that the Spanish preposition para behaves in a hybrid-like manner since it 
exhibits semantic features (i.e., conceptual parameters) that are found separately in the 
English prepositions to and for, namely obliqueness and primariness. This latter conceptual 
parameter is apprehended as Purpose in the conceptual basis of para. 
Figure 6.3 below depicts the conceptual basis proposed for para that intends to shed some 
light on its hybrid character: 
Obliqueness 
 
Direction                              Spatial scene involving a TR that is heading                         Purpose 
                                               toward its (sometimes highlighted) LM 
 
                                                                  Recipient                                 Beneficiary 
Figure 6.3. Conceptual basis proposed for the Spanish preposition para 
Figure 6.3 above depicts the conceptual basis of para. As mentioned earlier, the hybrid 
character of this preposition is mainly due to the parameters of Obliqueness and Purpose, 
these are referred to in the conceptual bases of for and to as Oblique goal and Primary goal, 
respectively. These parameters in turn, might be understood as emerging from the proto-
scene(s) of para in which the TR is not simply oriented but undergoing actual motion 
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toward its LM. These two conceptual parameters can be considered the functional elements 
of para. 
Indeed, the hybrid-like character of para is related to the conceptual nature of its 
prepositional landmark since it can be conceptualized as either primary or oblique goal. 
Note that all the parameters of para that are proposed in figure 6.3, except Direction, are 
generally related to features that are exhibited by the elements that elaborate the 
prepositional landmark. 
Obliqueness, as previously mentioned, has to do with a TR attaining its LM in order to 
reach an ulterior purpose and this is deeply related to the intentions or purposes behind a 
certain action. The parameter of Purpose, then, complements somehow the semantics of 
Obliqueness and is an important aspect of the hybrid-like functional element associated 
with the proto-scene of para. Such a hybrid functional element, in turn, is motivated by the 
fact that the prepositional landmark of para is highlighted at times – hence, it is sometimes 
conceptualized as goal, whereas in some other occasions it is apprehended as the facilitator 
of an ulterior purpose. 
The parameter of Purpose in the conceptual basis of para manifests a double function since 
it can get activated as a semantic feature of the LM or TR depending on the construction 
that para is put in (i.e., meaning determination). If the LM of para is conceptualized as an 
oblique goal, the parameter of Purpose is generally understood as a semantic feature of the 
TR like in an utterance such as Este juguete es para ti (This toy is for you), uttered by a 
father to his daughter or son. Under that context, the Purpose parameter might be embedded 
in the toy since it is the intention of the father to give a toy to his daughter/son for her/him 
to play with. On the other hand, obliqueness is embedded in the prepositional phrase para ti 
(for you) since by accepting the toy, the kid will be able to play with it – this in turn, 
represents the ultimate purpose that lies behind giving a toy as a present. Now there are 
some situations in which the Purpose parameter falls on the prepositional landmark. For 
instance, in an utterance such as Estas gafas son para ver mejor (These lenses are to see 
more clearly), where the prepositional landmark ver mejor (see more clearly) is the primary 
goal since that is exactly what lenses are made for. 
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Recipient, as put above, is related to one of the most prototypical senses that is generally 
associated with the semantics of para since this preposition is used to introduce the 
participant(s) that receive the end of a process or action. Hence, this parameter is related to 
conceptual transfer in that it serves as motivational source, through reification, to express 
non-spatial transfers such as the one in an utterance like Mis mejores deseos para ti (My 
best wishes for you), where the transfer is clearly not about a concrete thing but rather 
about feelings and emotions. Now from the Recipient parameter we can expect the related 
concept of beneficiary, which in the present account is treated as a sense-extension unit due 
to some recipients becoming actual beneficiaries in some situations involving transfer. Such 
a status depends on whether the transferred object carries good or bad consequences for the 
receiver – the prepositional-landmark element(s) of para. 
The last parameter that makes up (at the very least) the conceptual basis of para is 
Direction. This semantic feature is generally associated to the presence of a TR undergoing 
motion toward its LM. An important aspect of the conceptual behavior of this parameter is 
that it differs from Directionality or Orientation, which are exhibited by English to, for, and 
Spanish a, in that those prepositions exhibit TRs which can be either oriented or 
undergoing motion toward their LMs. In the case of para, I would say that motion (rather 
than mere orientation) is what is more prominent and hence, drives its proto-scene. 
If we use the conceptual basis proposed for para in figure 6.3 above, we can observe and 
therefore understand how conceptual activation works. It also sheds some light on the 
conceptual phenomenon known as polysemy. For instance, in example (20) particularly in 
the composite structure saldrá el ministro para Madrid (the minister will go out to Madrid), 
the parameters that are mostly involved and hence contribute to the semantics of para in 
that situated realization are Direction, Obliqueness and possibly Purpose. Direction is 
reflected in the fact that the minister will have to take a specific direction through a path in 
order to reach Madrid (LM). As mentioned above, example (20) evokes a future event due 
to the Spanish future marker -drá in saldrá, which is equivalent to the English modal will. 
That is, the action of going to Madrid is not happening right now but it will – thus, the 
notions of direction and movement (i.e., sequential scanning) is achieved through mental 
time travel. In the case of Obliqueness, its contribution in (20) has to do with facilitating an 
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ulterior purpose, which might be related to the activity that the minister must do in Madrid. 
For instance, imagine that example (20) were more specific and said saldrá el ministro 
para Madrid a una reunión (the minister will go to Madrid for a meeting). Under this 
context, then, we could appreciate more easily the obliqueness character in the realization 
of para since reaching the LM is a requisite in order to attend the meeting. Lastly, the 
parameter of Purpose may also get activated, perhaps secondarily, since attaining the LM is 
in turn a condition for the fulfillment of the goal. There is also a clear disposition of the TR 
to reach its LM. 
In example (21), specifically in the composite structure evoked in esta tarjeta es para ti 
(this card is for you), there is activation of different parameters in the conceptual basis of 
para. The composite structure profiles a transfer in that someone is receiving something, 
here a sports card. Hence, the activation of Recipient is to be expected. In addition, and as 
previously mentioned, a transfer can carry good or bad consequences for the recipient. In 
the present case it seems to carry good ones – benefits – considering our notion of what 
sports cards are used for. We can then, also expect activation of Beneficiary, which 
emerges as a sense-extension unit of Recipient. Finally, the last parameter that I think is 
involved in (21), yet not as strongly as Recipient and Beneficiary, is Obliqueness, since it 
helps the addressee to apprehend the fact that once a person receives the sports card, she 
will be able to opt for benefits such as discounts and sport facilities. In other words, she 
will be able to make the most of her sports card. 
Example (22) on the other hand, sanctions the [PURPOSE] sense. This sense is not achieved 
concomitantly but directly. In the composite structure evoked in me realizaron una 
radiografía para ver qué tenía (I had a radiograph made to see what I had), the patient’s 
radiograph elaborates the TR of para and is conceptualized as the means that the doctors 
used to see what the patient’s problem was. It follows that knowing about the patient’s 
problem constitutes the main goal behind taking the radiograph and that is exactly what is 
evoked in the prepositional phrase para ver que tenía. It also follows from this idea that in 
(22) the parameter that is most directly involved in the realization of para is Purpose.  
In the final analysis, the conceptual basis of para seems to prove useful to apprehend the 
motivation that underlies prepositional usages. Indeed, we can see how parameters are 
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activated differently depending on the linguistic contexts that para is used in. It also sheds 
light on the dynamic and flexible (rather than static) patterns of linguistic structure and 
human cognition. The conceptual basis can also be used as a pedagogical tool for L2 
learners, as we shall see in the next chapter. For now, I will proceed to show a non-
exhaustive list of non-spatial usages of para. These seem to be more frequent than spatial 
usages, since the very nature of this preposition is related to motives, intentions, and 
purposes – that is, it exhibits a considerable level of introspective knowledge in its 
conceptual structuring. This is reflected in the parameters of Obliqueness and Purpose. 
6.2.1 Non-spatial domains of para 
As just announced, I now turn to analyze some of the prototypical non-spatial lexical 
concepts that are related to the semantics of the Spanish preposition para. The first sense I 
consider, is the [USE] lexical concept.  
According to the DLE, para is used to determine the use of something. To illustrate this 
point, consider the following example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu 
+ Am): 
(23) Antiséptico, para la limpieza de las heridas                                   [USE] 
           (Antiseptic, for    the cleaning of the wounds)   
In (23) Antiséptico elaborates the TR of para whereas its prepositional landmark is 
elaborated by la limpieza de las heridas. Trajector/landmark alignment in this case 
manifests a similar organization as its English equivalent expression Antiseptic, for the 
cleaning of the wounds, since both convey an impersonal perspective, that is, both 
expressions suggest that the antiseptic is there just in case, not because a particular person 
needs it right now. 
Note that English speakers generally use the preposition for, alongside with to to convey 
this sense. However, there are some cases in which for is the only option to express such 
meaning as in What are antiseptics for? (Spanish ¿Para qué son los antisépticos?), as 
compared to *What are antiseptics to? On the other hand, the Spanish language only has 
para at its disposal to convey that meaning. 
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Regarding conceptual activation, I think that the parameter that is most directly involved in 
(23) is Purpose and is evoked by the prepositional phrase para la limpieza (for the 
cleaning). This structure is then integrated in the higher-order composite structure para la 
limpieza de las heridas in which the profile of de las heridas (of the wounds) elaborates the 
secondary landmark that specifies the thing to which the antiseptic is aimed at. Note that 
Purpose is accessed directly (rather than via conceptual spreading) due to the very nature of 
the proto-scene of para, particularly because its LM can function as either primary or 
oblique goal. 
On the other hand, English speakers may access the [USE] sense in alternative ways 
depending on the perspective (personal or impersonal) that the [USE] sense is meant to take. 
For instance, the English equivalent of (23) Antiseptic, for the cleaning of the wounds, 
makes use of for rather than to as relational unit. It follows that the parameters that are 
activated are Oblique goal and Purpose (the latter is a sense-extension of Intentionality and 
it might receive secondary activation). Obliqueness is represented by the cleaning of the 
wounds – if they get cleaned, then they can recover faster, hence, the primary purpose of 
healing would be met. On the other hand, I think that the Purpose parameter is reflected on 
the conceptual nature of the TR, here antiseptic. An antiseptic is a chemical used for 
preventing infection in an injury, especially by killing bacteria – that is, it is made with a 
specific purpose in mind. Once the antiseptic is applied, wounds get cleaned and then start 
to heal. 
As pointed out by Wierzbicka (1988), there is an impersonal nature behind the use of the 
English preposition for. For instance, the composite structure for the cleaning of the 
wounds refers to a general action and/or purpose rather than to a more specific – personal 
one. On the contrary, imagine now we say This antiseptic is to clean the wound, which in 
Spanish is equivalent to say Este Antiséptico es para limpiar la herida. Under this context, 
this antiseptic represents an instance of a type. The definite article the, along with the 
determiner this, are conceptually anchored to the current discourse space and mental 
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contact that exist between hearer and speaker (Langacker 1991: 96-103).99 This in turn, is 
the reason why it sounds more personal: there is a higher level of definiteness.  
As the examples just given above show, the Spanish preposition para is the only option to 
construe each event. On the other hand, English speakers have to distinguish every time 
they want to convey personal or impersonal expressions involving to and for. If we take a 
look at the conceptual basis of to in figure 5.3 in chapter 5, we could observe that in an 
expression such as This antiseptic is to clean the wound (Spanish Este Antiséptico es para 
limpiar la herida), primary activation falls on the parameter of Primary goal (Purpose in 
para), which is accessed directly rather than concomitantly or through extension, and, as 
opposed to for, Primary goal is a parameter exhibited by the prepositional landmark of to, 
here limpiar la herida (clean the wound), rather than by a purposeful TR. 
In sum, the linguistic distinction in the English language is due to a different conceptual 
distribution of the semantics of to and for that is reflected in their trajector/landmark 
alignment. Such conceptual behavior, in turn, amounts to evidence to posit a hybrid status 
of the Spanish relational unit para which hinges between some characteristics of to and for, 
particularly primary goal or purpose, and obliqueness, respectively. This hybrid status is 
also reflected in the personal and impersonal perspectives that the English language can 
express. We can observe that both English prepositions to and for manifest implicatures. 
Now the crucial difference is in the scope of such implicatures, which in line with 
Wierzbicka (1988), I think it lies in the personal and impersonal characters of to and for, 
respectively, as in (23) and in the invented personal-oriented construction that follows that 
example (This antiseptic is to clean the wound). The Spanish preposition para, on the other 
hand, exhibits a hybrid character since it can cover both personal and impersonal 
implicatures. 
Consider another non-spatial usage of para. According to the DLE, para denotes aptitude, 
willingness or capacity: 
                                                             
99 For a definition of current discourse space, mental contact, and a characterization of the definite article the, 
see (Langacker 1991: 96-103). 
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(24) La desactivación o desinstalación de programas es una medida eficaz para 
acelerar el PC.                                                                 [FUNCTION]/[CAPACITY] 
                   (The deactivation of programs is an effective way to accelerate the PC) 
Example (24) is similar to (23) in that both are driven by the Purpose parameter which is 
exhibited as a feature of the prepositional landmark of para. In the clause La desactivación 
o desinstalación de programas es una medida eficaz para acelerar el PC, the profile of una 
medida eficaz (an effective way) elaborates the TR of para whereas its prepositional 
landmark is elaborated by the relational profile of acelerar el PC. The relation that para 
holds in this TR/LM alignment is driven by the activation of Purpose. Recipient receives 
secondary activation considering that the PC is the recipient of such an action. 
Besides, we should not discard secondary activation of Obliqueness in the semantic import 
of para in (24). The composite structure evoked in para acelerar el PC (to accelerate the 
PC), may point to this idea in that once some programs get uninstalled or disactivated, the 
computer will operate faster. 
Another sense I want to present, which I gloss [ABSTRACT TRANSFER], is motivated by 
spatially grounded scenarios where actual transfer takes place. To illustrate, consider the 
following Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) corpus example: 
(25) Te mando todos mis mejores deseos para ti, y espero que de verdad te 
recuperes.                                                                        [ABSTRACT TRANSFER] 
(Best wishes for you and I really hope that you get well soon) 
Examples such as the one in (25) above, are motivated by spatially grounded events in 
which movement toward a LM is involved. If we go back to example (3) above, we can 
appreciate an actual transfer in which a sender posted something, in this case a package, to 
an intended recipient. That very schematic notion of transfer is indeed what provides the 
image-schematic structure to understand a transfer of an abstract thing such as wishes and 
feelings (e.g., positive vibes).  
In the composite structure te mando todos mis mejores deseos para ti, which literally means 
I send all my bests wishes to you, the person who sends the whishes occupies the role of the 
sender, the wishes are conceptualized as the entity sent, and the receiver is apprehended as 
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the intended recipient: these are the elements that constitute our notion of conceptual 
transfer and hence are essential structures within the image schematic structure that is 
mapped from the spatial domain onto the non-spatial. Now the specific import of para in 
(25) has to do with the metaphorical interpretation of the parameters of Recipient and 
Direction. 
Direction is metaphorically extended in order to understand the transfer itself. The 
transferred object must move from point A, here the sender, to point B, here the intended 
recipient. Just like objects in space can undergo movement for a transfer to take place, 
feelings, thoughts, and emotions are apprehended similarly in that they can also be sent. If I 
say My best wishes for you, I am clearly sending good vibes to my intended recipient and 
she can actually feel it through intersubjectivity, which is the ever-present and necessary 
context of a joint attentional scene (see Tomasello 1999, 2003). In other words, abstract 
things such as feelings can travel intersubjectively from the self to the intended recipient 
just like a concrete object in the spatial realm can move, or be moved, from point A to point 
B.  
The second parameter that receives activation is Recipient. This parameter is 
metaphorically interpreted since the receiver in this case is not receiving something which 
is concrete, but rather abstract. The recipient cannot literally receive anything but feel the 
positive vibes that are sent. In addition, the receiver might feel herself a beneficiary of such 
good vibes depending on how close her relationship with the sender is, so secondary 
activation of the Beneficiary sense-extension unit might be expected. 
Note also the impersonal character of para in (25) in that is other-oriented. This might 
indicate a degree of obliqueness considering that once an intended recipient receives the 
abstract transfer, it concomitantly serves the ulterior purpose which could be to make the 
intended recipient feel good, supported, or happy, and boost up her confidence. Thus, 
Obliqueness and Purpose might receive secondary activation. 
The next and last non-spatial lexical concept of para in this non-exhaustive list that the 
present author wants to analyze, can be glossed as [IN RELATION TO]. Consider the 
following example extracted from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
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(26) ¿Qué es para ti la solidaridad?                                [IN RELATION TO] 
            What is for you    solidarity? 
In this sense, as in (15) above with for, I think that the parameter that is most directly 
involved in the figurative conception is Recipient. This comes from the phenomenological 
experience of being given an object (i.e. transfer) and the manipulation of that object. Such 
a spatially grounded scenario offers the image-schematic structure to metaphorically extend 
the Recipient parameter and apprehend the figurative conception in (26). The Recipient 
parameter in this sense triggers a subjective personal vantage point from which one gives 
an opinion of an abstract concept in our mind. In the composite structure ¿Qué es para ti la 
solidaridad? (What is solidarity for you?) a person asks her interlocutor about her opinion 
of a concept inside her mental repository – that is, the human conceptual system.  
The act of being given an object is followed by the ability we have to scrutinize the object 
given: we can check its details, interact with it, and the like, since we have control upon it. 
This last stage of the TRANSFER event, that is, the one in which we have the object in our 
hands, so we can scrutinize it, might be the image schematic structure that is projected onto 
the non-spatial realm. However, note that neither the sender nor the transferred object is 
projected onto the [IN RELATION TO] sense, but only the recipient who has the “object” 
under control. By the same token, if I asked someone what solidarity is for her/him, I am 
assuming that my interlocutor has indeed such an abstract concept stored in her mind and 
now I want to know what she thinks about it: the person is actually a recipient of that 
concept since she has already acquired it. 
Note that para in this sense, along with English for, can be used either personally or 
impersonally. Example (26) evokes a scene that is other-oriented; but imagine that we say 
La solidaridad para mi es amor (For me, solidarity is love); in this way, the expression 
exhibits a self-oriented character due to the first-person vantage point. However, the 
conceptual motivation in both examples is the same: people might use the Recipient 
parameter to characterize the ego in the sense of a “knowledge container”. Note that in the 
case that we asked someone what is 2 plus 2 for you? (¿Cuánto es 2 más 2 para ti?), this 
would sound inappropriate due to the fact that the answer itself cannot be subjective.  
Everybody would agree that 2 plus 2 equals 4 – that is, an ever-present mathematical truth. 
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On the other hand, subjectivity comes into play when non-rigid truth is in focus. By “non-
rigid” we mean, a flexible truth: something that can be true for a person might not be so for 
another. If I ask someone what solidarity is for her, she might differ from my own view of 
solidarity even though we might agree on some points. The same goes for many abstract 
concepts such as {LOVE}, {HATE}, {ANGER}, {HAPPINESS}, {SADNESS}, among others. It 
follows from this idea that the parameter of Recipient in the [IN RELATION TO] lexical 
concept is metaphorically extended and helps us to conceptualize the ego who has gone 
through certain humanly relevant experiences that have made her develop an abstract 
concept such as [SOLIDARITY]. In other words, she has been the recipient of certain 
(subjective) experiences that made her develop that concept. By using the preposition para 
in a construction such as ¿Qué es para ti la solidaridad? people want to know about their 
interlocutor’s personal experiences. 
6.2.2 Temporal behavior of para 
I now turn to the temporal behavior of para. This Spanish preposition, compared to its 
English equivalent for, cannot sanction the [DURATION] sense as in (17), but only the 
[EVENT] sense, as in (18) above. This behavior parallels its spatial behavior because para 
cannot sanction the [SPATIAL DISTANCE] sense either, like English for in (2) above. If we go 
back to example (2), we can observe that the contribution of for in the composite structure 
evoked in He was driving a car chased for twenty miles by police, designates the amount of 
distance travelled by the cars. The conceptualization of spatial distance is mainly driven by 
the parameter of Orientation (see figure 6.2 above). On the other hand, if we try to translate 
the expression for twenty miles into Spanish, we must say por veinte millas, -a lo largo de 
veinte millas, or even durante veinte millas, rather than *para veinte millas. 
Note that even though the preposition para has in its conceptual basis the parameter of 
Direction, which is similar to Orientation in for, it cannot sanction the [SPATIAL DISTANCE] 
nor the [DURATION] sense.100 This might be due to lexical concepts, along with parameters 
– I might add – being considered to be language as well as vehicle-specific (in the sense of 
Evans 2009). The naïve view of linguistic structure that holds that a language represents an 
                                                             
100 Both senses can be sanctioned by the Spanish preposition por as in por veinte millas (for twenty miles) and 
por 5 años (for 5 years). 
 
 
229 
 
inventory of language-specific vehicles encoding cross-linguistically identical semantic 
units is rejected by the approach to lexical semantics adopted in this dissertation. To 
illustrate this point, consider the way Spanish and English speakers encode what is 
ostensibly the same spatial relationship. In order to prompt for the spatial scenes evoked by 
the utterances in (27), the Spanish lexical concept that I gloss as [PLACEMENT OF ONE 
ENTITY BETWEEN ONE OR MORE ENTITIES] associated with the Spanish prepositional vehicle 
entre (seen in chapter 4), has to be triggered. 
(27) a. Ella se aparcó entre el coche azul y el negro. 
             (She    parked between the blue    and the black car) 
            b. Ella se aparcó entre muchos coches    
               (She    parked among many       cars) 
As examples in (27) show, Spanish speakers use the preposition entre as the one and only 
option to linguistically encode these qualitatively different spatial scenes. However, the 
situation in the English language is different. The Spanish examples in (27) are categorized 
into lexical concepts of two different kinds in English. This is achieved by using the two 
distinct symbolic units, here between and among. 
In addition to the language-specific character of lexical concepts, we should also take into 
consideration the parameters that contribute to the realization of a lexical concept. They are 
also language-specific, and this is evidenced by the parameters of Orientation and Direction 
in the conceptual bases of for and para, respectively. Even though these prepositions share 
parameters that at first glance can be used interchangeably, the elaboration and extension of 
those parameters do not work in the same way. It follows from this that parameters must be 
vehicle-specific (not the other way around). In sum, conceptual parameters that seem to be 
shared cross-linguistically do not necessarily sanction identical senses. 
Now consider an example in which para can equate the semantics of the English lexical 
concept [EVENT], which is achieved (in a distributive way) by for in an utterance such as 
the one below: 
(28) Hoy queda un mes para navidad                             [UPCOMING EVENT] 
           (We are (just) one month away for Christmas) 
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In (28) the preposition para helps the speaker to jointly convey, along with the rest of the 
elements in the construction, the [UPCOMING EVENT] lexical concept. Under this context, 
para establishes a relation between Navidad (Christmas), here the target event (TE), and 
the time remaining for this event to happen, here un mes (the temporal reference point or 
RP).  
The first thing we need to account for in order to apprehend this temporal conception is 
temporal cognition. We make use of the temporal unit {YEAR}, whose origo (O) is fixed as 
January the 1st, to temporally anchor the relation between the TE (Christmas) and its RP 
(one month) to the transience type of duration. Hence, we make use of the extrinsic 
temporal frame of reference (t- FoR) since we are dealing with periodicities. In addition, I 
think that we also make use of the deictic t-FoR (see Evans 2013: Ch. 4), whose O is 
constituted by what James ([1890]/1950) refers to as nowness and is reflected in the 
egocentric experience of now (here the term deictic). It follows that the O of this t-FoR is 
related to the phenomenologically real experience of anisotropicity: the inherent asymmetry 
of the passage of time. This is reflected in the felt distinction between future (present) and 
past. The O in this temporal reference is set one month before Christmas since it is where 
the subject in (28) is spatio-temporally located. 
In the composite structure Hoy queda un mes (just one month away) in (28), we co-locate 
the ego with respect to an upcoming event – that is, an event which is relatively close. The 
upcoming event is then specified by the prepositional phrase para Navidad (for Christmas), 
where the event is conceptualized as being one month ahead from the current temporal 
location of the ego. This, in turn, allows us to arrive at the conclusion that the speaker is 
temporally co-located with respect to the month of November, probably on the 24th. It 
follows that Hoy queda un mes is apprehended as the reference point (RP) from which the 
target event (TE), here Christmas, is located using an ego-based temporal strategy. 
Alternatively, and as put above, we could also attribute this temporal location to an 
extrinsic strategy where we use a repeatable event-reckoning system to locate the TE with 
respect to its RP and further anchor it to the duration transience type. This alternative in 
terms of temporal location, works irrespective of the subjective experience of {NOW} since 
its O is external to the system, rather than internal. 
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Regarding the specific contribution of para in (28) we could say that there is activation of 
the parameters of Direction, Purpose, and Obliqueness. Direction gets extended since it 
allows us to conceptualize the passage of time as well as to locate the ego which can be 
either approaching the TE or static waiting for the event to come: the MOVING EGO and 
MOVING TIME metaphors both involve direction (and movement) of one of their constituents 
within an egocentric temporal strategy. 
The activation of Purpose and Obliqueness, I think, may vary depending on what is the real 
focus of the speaker in (28). If the speaker conceptualizes the prepositional landmark 
Christmas as primary goal, then Purpose would achieve primary activation whereas 
Obliqueness receives secondary activation. Obliqueness in this sense points to the sub-
events within the {CHRISTMAS} cognitive model/script such as {GIFT TIME}. On the other 
hand, if the speaker in (28) conceptualizes Christmas as an oblique goal, primary activation 
falls on the parameter of Obliqueness while Purpose receives secondary activation. Under 
that perspective, Christmas is apprehended as something which facilitates an ulterior 
purpose, such as sharing a lovely moment with the family and enjoy dinner together. Such a 
difference in conceptualization may amount to evidence for the hybrid-like character of the 
Spanish preposition para. 
Consider now another example taken from the Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am): 
(29) Top 10 juegos iPad para Navidad                                 [EVENT] 
           (Top 10 iPad games for Christmas)  
To understand the temporal conception in (29) it is first necessary to use the notion of 
extrinsic temporal reference. The TE in (29) corresponds to the top 10 games that are 
available for iPad. These are conceptualized as possible things that people want as a 
Christmas gift. Christmas, on the other hand, is the RP that locates the TE (which is of 
course a time before Christmas). We also make use of an O which is fixed as January, the 
1st. This (temporal) element anchors the relation between TE and RP to the transience type 
of duration and begins the count in an event-reckoning system. The temporal structure that 
constitutes the “temporal semantic scaffolding” in (29) can be glossed as [TE FIXED TO AN 
RP IN A REPEATABLE EVENT-RECKONING SYSTEM]. 
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Now the parameters of para that could be mostly involved in the temporal conception in 
(29) are Obliqueness, Purpose, and Direction. Obliqueness is reflected in the fact that one 
event might facilitate another. Christmas in (29) is conceptualized as a great occasion for 
iPad gamers to acquire one (or more) of the top 10 games for that device. On the other 
hand, the activation of Purpose is reflected in the gamer’s primary goal to get one of the top 
10 games for Christmas. Finally, Direction is activated due to the temporal projection 
existing behind thinking of a product that can be given for Christmas – that is, a future 
event. For instance, if say Quiero un portatil para navidad (I want a laptop for Christmas), 
I clearly point to an upcoming event which may offer me the opportunity to acquire what I 
want.  
I now finish this analysis by showing the [POINT IN TIME] sense of para, which similarly to 
English to, is used to express fine-grained temporal reference. To illustrate, consider the 
following Spanish Web 2011 (esTenTen11, Eu + Am) corpus example: 
(30) Faltaban pocos minutos para las ocho de la tarde y los dos equipos ya  
estaban en el terreno de juego                                            [POINT IN TIME] 
(It was few minutes to/till 8 p.m. and the two teams were already in the pitch) 
As mentioned earlier, events that involve fine-grained temporal units such as seconds and 
minutes, are fixed with respect to the 12- or 24-hour cycle in a repeatable time-reckoning 
system. In (30), the RP is evoked in the clause pocos minutos para las ocho de la tarde 
(few minutes to 8 p.m.). Its O is fixed as 00:00 and anchors the TE (i.e. the sporting event) 
to the transience type of duration.  
Now if we focus on the composite structure pocos minutos para las ocho de la tarde (few 
minutes to 8 p.m.), we can appreciate how the TR of para is elaborated by the profile of 
Faltaban pocos minutos (few minutes) while its LM is filled by las ocho de la tarde.  
The activation of para in (30) falls on the Direction parameter and then gets extended to 
facilitate the conceptualization of the passage of time in a sort of linear manner that moves 
forward (i.e., temporal evolution). The nominal pocos minutos stands for the elapse of time 
that exists until it is 8 p.m., which according to the maximal discourse scope evoked in 
(30), is the time at which the match begins. From this idea, we could say that Obliqueness 
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may receive secondary activation since the football match, which is conceptualized as the 
TE and hence the thing that acquires primary focus, is dependent on the time at which it is 
supposed to start. Once the time is met (obliqueness) the main event can take place 
(primariness). Lastly, the schematic temporal structure that might underlie example (30) 
could be glossed as [TE FIXED TO AN RP IN A REPEATABLE TIME-RECKONING SYSTEM]. 
The present section aimed to shed some light on the conceptually complex behavior of para 
regarding its temporal domain. The conceptual basis proposed above for para seems to be 
suitable for a clear understanding of its semantic spectrum. It also helps us to spot 
differences and similarities with respect to its English equivalent for (and to). Lastly, the 
conceptual basis also provides a psychologically and cognitively plausible account of 
language use and amounts to evidence for the hybrid character of this Spanish preposition.     
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6.3 Summary 
This chapter has presented a contrastive analysis of the English preposition for and the 
Spanish preposition para. We saw that for is mainly integrated with lexical concepts that 
are related to reasons, purposes, and intentions. This is in turn, might be due to the 
prepositional landmark of for being conceptualized as an oblique goal. Obliqueness seems 
to be key in the conceptual basis of for and is apprehended as a functional element. This 
parameter represents one of the main distinctions between the prepositions to and for: 
primariness vs. obliqueness. We also saw the temporal behavior of for and could appreciate 
the amount of purely temporal cognition that is needed for temporal conceptualization, 
along with other types of knowledge such as spatio-conceptual structure and conceptual 
metaphor (and metonymy). These types of knowledge may help us to approach a more 
complete account of temporal semantics. As shown in this chapter, the parameter that might 
be mostly involved in the space-time mapping of for is Orientation, considering it 
resembles one of the transience types of time, which is succession (anisotropic may also 
share substructures with this parameter). The for…to construction was also briefly analyzed 
and the main idea that can be taken from this is that the parameters of Oblique goal and 
Primary goal play a substantial role in the conceptual subordination that is involved in these 
types of constructions. On the other hand, the chapter also presented the analysis of the 
Spanish preposition para, which seems to be constituted in a hybrid-like manner in that it 
exhibits characteristics that can be found separately in the English to and for. This could be 
due to the proto-scene of para where its LM might or might not get highlighted. That 
behavior, in turn, makes the conceptual basis of para be structured by conceptual 
parameters such as Purpose and Obliqueness. This explains why para can, at times, be the 
equivalent to some English expressions that involve the prepositions to and for. The 
peculiar conceptual structuring of para not only is reflected in spatial and non-spatial 
instances of language use, but also in temporal ones: para is used similarly to to and for in 
that it partially sanctions temporal lexical concepts such as [UPCOMING EVENT] and [POINT 
IN TIME].  
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
The analysis presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6 is an attempt to understand more clearly how 
spatial language works and how spatial configurations, that is, the internal structures that 
are abstracted away from humanly relevant interactions in space called proto-scenes, are 
the bedrock and conceptual source for processes such as elaboration and extension – which 
broadly speaking – deal with literal and figurative conceptions, respectively. The analysis 
also helps us to appreciate how distinct but semantically related parameters get activated 
differently depending on the linguistic context that prepositions are integrated in.  
Proto-scenes not only are fundamental to spatial language, but to word meaning in general. 
In addition, constructs such as situatedness, scope, prominence, specificity, perspective, 
figure/ground alignment and force dynamics are supposed to represent cognitive abilities 
that allow us to achieve those abstractions and functional components that a given proto-
scene may offer to the human conceptual system. This takes us to a view of language that is 
based on conceptualization and enactment, rather than purely on perception. This is the 
reason why the present research assumes an enactive approach to mind and language 
(followingThompson 2007, 2005; Di Paolo and Thompson 2014; see also Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch 1991), in which cognitive processes and structures emerge from 
recurrent sensorimotor patterns of perception and action.  Moreover, our nervous system 
should not be apprehended as an information processor (in the computationalist sense), but 
rather as a meaning maker (Thompson 2007). This view of phenomenology (following 
Husserl (1980) and Merleau-Ponty (1962)) as the philosophy of the lived body, deserves 
great attention if we want to fully account for the structuring of the mind, spatial language, 
and word meaning in general. Lastly, and linked to the importance of situated action and 
introspection, is the claim that feelings are not self-enclosed but present in an “affective 
atmosphere” which deeply influences how we perceive and respond to experience. In other 
words, within phenomenology, we must also consider such things as feelings and emotions 
(see Damasio 1999 for such a view), which constitute the aesthetics of phenomenological 
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human experience (in the sense of Johnson 2007, 2005). Moreover, feelings and emotions 
have their roots in autopoietic and metabolic processes (see Maiese 2014).101 
The analysis of English and Spanish prepositions presented in this dissertation, posits a 
challenge to the static view of grammar in that parameters are flexible bundles of schematic 
information which constitute the semantic pole of a symbolic unit, including more complex 
assemblies such as sentences. Language is then not seen as a language acquisition device in 
the brain (Chomsky 1995) but rather as a manifestation of how human cognition works. 
Human cognition, in turn, exhibits a high level of flexibility, including the dark matter 
(Everett 2016),102 which allows us to go through processes that involve “cognitive 
plasticity” such as enculturization (Thompson 2007: Ch.13). Such a cognitive diversity (see 
for instance Levinson 2003) might in turn explain how humans can arrive at semantically 
similar concepts through conventionalized and entrenched space-rooted symbolic units, 
which are then extended onto the non-spatial and temporal domains.  
Space provides human beings with a rich conceptual stock that the various cultures around 
the world use differently. This is due to the communicative needs and cultural scripts they 
have (Everett 2009, 2012; see also Kövecses 2005). This is the reason why I think, 
following Evans (2009), that not only lexical concepts are language/culture-specific, but so 
are parameters since they get activated and extended differently depending on the language 
one speaks. For instance, two parameters that partly constitute the conceptual basis of to are 
Orientation and Location. They partly allow us to interpret temporal conceptions evoked 
for example in utterances such as See you at a quarter to 1 in that Orientation is implied in 
the forward motion of time which is approaching 1 o’ clock, whereas Location helps 
English speakers to support that temporal conception by temporally co-locate the event (i.e. 
meeting) with respect to the temporal matrix, here the 12-hour clock. Recall that this lexical 
concept is glossed as [POINT IN TIME]. 
                                                             
101 Autopoietic processes have to do with the creation or reproduction of an autonomous system. And 
metabolic processes have to do with how an autonomous system obtain energy from organic molecules (See 
Thompson 2007: Ch. 5 for details on autopoiesis.) 
102 The term dark matter is a complex notion developed in Everett (2016) which deals with, at the very least, 
“personal interpretations of experiences, acquired concepts, and their cultural-internal interpretations” (ibid. 
18). 
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On the other hand, the Spanish preposition para, which is equivalent to English to in some 
respects, is also used to convey the [POINT IN TIME] temporal lexical concept, but it does so 
through an alternative activation route, as when Spanish speakers say queda un cuarto de 
hora para la 1 (a quarter to 1). Now if we take a look at the conceptual basis of para in 
figure 6.3 (chapter 6), we can see that Location is not present, hence, it cannot be 
considered for this temporal realization. Nevertheless, para conveys the [POINT IN TIME] 
lexical concept due to the activation of the Direction parameter as seen in example (30) in 
chapter 6 (Obliqueness may receive secondary activation). In this sense, the partial 
supportive and structural role of spatio-conceptual structure in temporal conceptions of this 
type is analogue to succession and anisotropic. Recall that this latter transience type 
consists of the felt experience that time evolves from future to present to past. This “arrow 
of time” (in the sense of Eddington 1928), exhibits correspondences with substructures of 
the semantics of para. 
Note that different languages can convey semantically similar lexical concepts; 
nevertheless, the way in which they arrive at the intended meaning and the conceptual 
nature of the parameters involved in a given construction are culturally driven. We can say, 
then, that knowing a language is to know the culture in which it is embedded (Everett 2009, 
2012). Take for instance Chilean and Colombian Spanish. In Chilean Spanish and some 
other types of Spanish as well, people say Estoy en el cine (I am at the cinema), whereas in 
some parts of Colombia people say Estoy en cine (I am at cinema) – they omit the Spanish 
definite article el (the). This in turn, is due to the tight link that exists between mind, 
culture, and language (i.e. cultural conventionalization). What sounds completely normal 
for some Colombian Spanish speakers, sounds incomplete for a Chilean Spanish speaker 
like me. The same goes for temporal expressions. Peninsular Spanish speakers, for instance, 
say La 1 menos cuarto (literally translated into English as “a quarter less to 1”), whereas 
most countries in Latin America say Un cuarto para la 1 (a quarter to 1). In addition to 
cultural aspects, entrenchment is also key since we deal with different expressions of fairly 
similar temporal lexical concepts in which the MOVING TIME metaphor is likely to be 
involved, along with temporal structure in the form of an extrinsic temporal reference that 
can be glossed as [TE FIXED TO AN RP IN THE 12-HOUR CLOCK SYSTEM]. 
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Now the general picture of spatial language and its non-spatial usages comes from the fact 
that once we thoroughly analyze the spatial roots, we are able to understand figuration. If I 
say for example I am in love, the preposition in clearly does not convey a spatial scenario 
but a psychosomatic state whose motivation comes from the very interaction we have with 
containers in general, and this might not be due to the Enclosure parameter (see figure 2.1 
in chapter 2), but because containers offer certain conditions that affect the entity contained. 
If I put a cheese sandwich in my backpack to store it on a hot day, it will be rotten the next 
day, whereas if I put the cheese sandwich in the fridge, it can last longer. Containers do 
provide affecting conditions to the entity contained, and this in turn allows us to talk about 
things that affect us by using the prepositions in (and en in Spanish) metaphorically, as in 
Estoy en problemas (I’m in trouble) and Estoy en shock (I’m in shock). From this it follows 
that figuration is ultimately a result of humanly relevant interaction with the world in the 
sense of proto-scenes. These interactions provide us with the image-schematic structure to 
talk about, and hence conceptualize, abstract domains. 
As mentioned earlier, in addition to the embodied character of word meaning and its 
manifestation in the process of parameterization, we must also add, following Barsalou 
(1999, 2003, 2008) that this process, along with our notion of proto-scenes, is not only the 
result of perception alone but also of situated action and introspection. Therefore, we can 
encounter parameters such as Primary goal and Obliqueness in English to and for 
respectively (and both in the case of Spanish para),103 which are abstract concepts that have 
to do with intentions, motives and purposes. It follows that the development of all concepts 
– concrete and abstract – needs perception, situated action, and introspection for their 
proper acquisition. In other words, they all need situational content, but their situational 
focus is different. As previously mentioned, abstract concepts are indeed more focused on 
situated action and introspection since the immediacy of perception is absent. This in turn, 
is evidenced in the fact that if we think of an abstract concept such as {HAPPINESS}, we are 
likely to recollect a certain positive state of mind rather than visualizing just one thing, like 
imagining a guitar. When imagining a guitar, we also make use of event-like and 
introspective structure (in the case we have emotions attached to a specific guitar), but we 
                                                             
103 Primariness is captured by the parameter of Purpose in the conceptual basis of para. 
 
 
239 
 
still can imagine it just like it is, because is a concrete object that offers specific affordances 
to interact with.  
We can now get a picture of human cognition and language as totally interwoven, flexible 
and dynamic, and based on perception, situated action and introspection. Grammar is the 
conceptualization (Langacker 2000), through enactment, of interaction in space. Humanly 
relevant interactions start from the very beginning in the form of {CONTAINMENT}, 
considering we as fetuses are in the womb. These pre-conceptual stages end up structuring 
human cognition and language in the form of image-schemas way before the first words are 
taken up.  
Space and interactions are then the bedrock from which abstractions in the form of 
conceptual parameters emerge and are responsible for the human capacity of moving from 
the spatial to the non-spatial. If I say the cat is climbing up the tree, it is because I can see 
the cat doing the action right now (in the case that I am not imagining it) – the sentence is 
based on spatial factuality, but if I say She is climbing up the social ladder, the meaning of 
the particle up is clearly not literal but metaphorical. Nevertheless, the non-spatial utterance 
is ultimately motivated by spatial usages of up. Interestingly, a child may take considerably 
longer to say that someone is climbing up the social ladder than saying that a cat is 
climbing up a tree. This in turn, might amount to evidence that figurative language use 
comes after spatial affairs are fairly entrenched in the infant’s mind. 
We can observe that non-spatial domains are notably motivated by proto-scenes, even in 
prepositions that seem to have a high frequency in non-spatial constructions such as the 
English for and Spanish para. In addition, proto-scenes also help to structure the temporal 
domain. However, temporal cognition is required (following Evans 2004, 2013; Galton 
2011; Pöppel 2004, 2009) to a large extent to apprehend temporal linguistic realizations. 
This special status of Time comes from the very nature of it in structuring human cognition 
since it serves as a pre-semantic operation in terms of temporal integration systems at the 
neuronal level. We do need time for conceptualization. After all, spatial relations could not 
be conceived without the temporal structure to do so. In this regard, I assume that time is 
more basic than space even though both are the foundations of human cognition. 
Conceptualization and enactment occur through conceived and processing time (Langacker 
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1987) within the three-fold structure of time-consciousness (Husserl 1991) which has to do 
with primal impression – akin to the notion of {NOWNESS}, retention, which deals with the 
just-past event structure, and protention, which has to do with the immediate future – what 
is about to happen. This in turn, goes hand in hand with Pöppel’s idea (2004, 2009) of the 
3-second window. 
Interestingly, despite the assumption about the more basic or essential import of time 
compared to space, temporal concepts may arrive later than spatial ones due to the 
immediacy of perception. Recall that space is isotropic whereas time is not. This difference 
is partly what makes us conceptualize time in terms of space, and temporal duration in 
terms of spatial distance. Such a mapping is reflected in the prepositional usages shown in 
the analysis in that there is an invariance in image-schematic structure that is mapped from 
the spatial organization of a given conceptual basis onto its temporal domain, as in when 
we say The toy is between the teddy bear and the candy box to refer to the mid-position in 
which the toy is placed, and That event happened between the years 1999 and 2000, in 
which we temporally co-locate an event, which lasted for one year, with respect to its 
temporal landmark, here 1999 and 2000. Note the invariance in that we preserve cognitive 
topological structures (Lakoff 1990) to locate an attentional figure in the middle of two 
reference points. Now my point about the special status of Time with respect to other non-
temporal domains (i.e., abstract domains) is that we do need temporal cognition and this is 
reflected, for instance, in concepts such as {YEAR}, {WEEK}, {MONTH}, {HOUR}, 
{MINUTE}, among many others. This in turn, may help us to approach a more complete 
account of the temporal semantics of prepositional usages. In addition, we must also 
consider the schematic temporal structure that is exhibited by the three temporal reference 
strategies (i.e., ego-based, event-based, periodicity-based). Nevertheless, there is a strong 
tendency to conceptualize time in terms of space and this is likely to be due to temporal 
experience being fundamental to the construction of events. Temporal representation has to 
be supported by correlated spatial experience and ensuing spatial representation (Evans 
2013). 
7.1. Word meaning and spatio-conceptual structure 
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The perspective of language taken in this research is clearly opposite to what is known as 
literalism, which according to Recanati (2004), is the dominant position in modern 
linguistics with respect to word meaning, sentence meaning, and speaker meaning.104 
Literalism takes the traditional distinction between semantics – the context-independent 
aspects of meaning – and pragmatics – the context-dependent aspect. Under this view, word 
meanings are assumed to be fixed and stable. However, that vision carries some problems 
because of the following reasons. The first issue has to do with the truth evaluable aspect of 
sentence meaning. To see this point, consider the example below: 
(1) Málaga is 200 kilometers from Córdoba 
The utterance above can be evaluated according to whether it is true or false with respect to 
the world’ state of affairs. In this case, the proposition expressed in (1) is true. However, 
that proposition is independent of any given context of use. To show this fact, now consider 
the hypothetical scenario in which two interlocutors in (2), who are driving to Málaga from 
Córdoba, wonder whether they have enough gas to make it. 
(2) A: Do you think we can make it to Córdoba without filling up? 
B: Málaga is 200 kilometers from Córdoba 
According to literalism, the sentence expressed by B means what it does – that Málaga is 
200 kilometers from Córdoba. However, it means more than the literal meaning. This is due 
to the implicatures that the sentential context and pragmatic principles or maxims and 
metonymy (Barcelona 2003, 2007, n.d.) bring to the front. The implicatures behind B’s 
expression is that they might not reach Córdoba unless they first get more gas. The speaker 
meaning is then a consequence of interpreting the communicative intention of the speaker’s 
utterance in a given context. 
We can see, then, that under the view of literalism, words have context-independent 
meanings, which in turn would fall under the purview of semantics rather than pragmatics. 
Such separation between semantics and pragmatics might indeed be illusory (Clark 1996; 
                                                             
104 The distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning was introduced by the British philosopher 
Paul Grice (1989). 
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Coulson 2000; Croft 2000; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987). Take for example the word 
close in (3) below: 
(3) a. Lucy closed the book. 
b. Lucy closed her mouth. 
c. Lucy closed the door. 
d. Lucy closed the curtains. 
e. The surgeon closed the wound. 
As noted by Searle (1983), in examples like these, the meaning of close is a function of 
what he refers to as background – a construct akin to Langacker’s (1987) encyclopedic 
knowledge. The different ways in which we can close things is a function of our 
encyclopedic knowledge of the world: we know about experiences that involve different 
sorts of operations. Therefore, words provide access to encyclopedic knowledge which is 
non-linguistic (i.e., conceptual) in nature and this access is a function of the context in 
which the word is embedded. The linguistic context serves to narrow down the sort of 
encyclopedic knowledge to which close relates in each example. The protean nature of 
words is then context-dependent since words offer a vast semantic potential that the present 
research captures by using the notion of conceptual basis. Such a conceptual basis does 
need sentential context in order to highlight one or more attributes in a situated linguistic 
event. 
A possible solution to the many entries or senses (variations of word meaning which are 
stored in long-term semantic memory) that a given word such as close can have, is to adopt 
the Sense Enumerative Lexicon approach, developed in the pioneering work on lexical 
semantics by James Pustejovsky (1995). However, and as observed by Pustejovsky, even 
such an account cannot predict the creative use of words in novel contexts. It follows that 
each unique instance has a distinct utterance context that highlights specific attributes 
within the semantic potential of words (i.e., a word’s conceptual basis). To take a Sense 
Enumerative approach would be a mistaken approach since it implies sanctioning an 
infinite proliferation of word senses which would be stored in long-term semantic memory. 
Such a position is not psychologically plausible; that is why the prepositional analysis 
presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6, emphasizes the importance of elaboration and extension, 
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as well as sentential context at the moment of highlighting the parameters that are most 
directly involved in a given construction. Language is structured but also highly flexible 
and dynamic, just like the autonomous system-environment coupling is when it comes to 
phenomenology. There must be dynamicity and “ecological structures”. 
An even further challenge for literalism has to do with figuration, which has been referred 
to as the “defective” use of literal language (Searle [1979] (1993)). This view sees 
figuration as a function of language use, and thus, falls under the view of pragmatics rather 
than semantics. We must first understand what the sentence means and then interpret the 
speaker’s intended meaning in a non-literal way. However, and as shown by Gibbs (1994), 
language users appear to be equally as efficient in apprehending literal and figurative 
conceptions. The challenge of literalism is then to work out the difference, if any, between 
the role and function of literal conceptions and figuration. To illustrate, consider the 
following utterance: 
(4) Gary’s mother is a witch 
The utterance above clearly does not mean that Gary’s mother is a witch, in the sense of a 
green-skinned woman who can put spells on people and curse them. Rather, the meanings 
associated with the profiles of Gary’s mother and witch are integrated with the predicative 
nominative construction, which might be glossed as “[SUBJECT is an NP]” and it 
informally means that “The subject is a type of the entity specified”. To make this point 
more clearly, consider the following utterance below: 
(5) Gary’s mother is a teacher 
From the utterance in (5), we as language users can derive that Gary’s mother is included in 
the category of those whose professional career is teaching, and that this situation persists 
through time.105 Note that the same construction cannot convey a class-inclusion semantics 
for the example in (4). We can observe, then, that the ultimate challenge for literalism is to 
account for the variation in word meaning in that there must be an explanation about why 
                                                             
105 According to Langacker (1991) the copular verb be encodes the “continuation through time of a stable 
situation characterized only as a stative relation” (ibid.65). 
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(4) means something other than what it literally says, while (5) means what it does literally 
appear to say. 
As we saw above, the protean nature of words neither can be properly described by 
literalism nor by the Enumerative Sense approach since words exhibit (significant) 
variation across utterances. As Jean Aitchison puts it: “Word meanings cannot be pinned 
down, as if they were dead insects. Instead, they flutter around elusively like live 
butterflies” (1996: 39-40). Work from cognitive psychology (e.g., Barsalou 1999, 2003, 
2008; see also Zwaan 2004) points out that words provide access to simulators (i.e., 
conceptual structure which is non-linguistic in nature). These are large-scale coherent 
bodies of body-based knowledge. Crucially, this knowledge is of different types due to 
variation in situational focus (in the sense of Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005). 
Nevertheless, it comes from the same situational content that is based on perception, 
situated action, and introspection. This allows human beings to create embodied 
simulations (Bergen 2012; see also Bergen and Chang 2005). The semantic potential or 
conceptual basis of a word, then, is primarily non-linguistic in nature. Words under this 
view are points of access (Langacker 1987; see also Evans 2009) to a conceptual structure 
whose active zone is context dependent. The semantic contribution of words is context-
induced since the parameters that constitute the conceptual basis of a given word (and 
cognitive models and frames in the case of open-class items) get activated differently 
depending on the sentential and situational contexts.106 This brings the consequence that a 
conceptual basis of a word is never realized completely (i.e., full sanctioning) but its 
realization involves only the contextually relevant aspects that are most prominent in a 
situated usage event. 
So far, we can appreciate the existence of two important systems – the conceptual and the 
linguistic. In line with Barsalou (2003, 2008), the reenactment of perceptual, motor, and 
introspective states to achieve embodied simulations consists of knowledge of different 
types that populate the conceptual system. From this idea it follows that words provide 
access to different types of conceptual contents that might be broadly divided into rich vs. 
                                                             
106 See Clark (1996) for details on joint action along with other background factors in linguistically mediated 
communication. 
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schematic. Open-class words, particularly nouns, verbs, and adjectives, are considered as 
providing rich conceptual content, whereas closed-class items offer a narrower access, and 
hence, provide schematic content (Talmy 2000, 2007). Note, however, that even among 
these rich word classes, the content is different since the situational focus varies. Nouns are 
based more on perception and situated action than on introspection (if it is a concrete 
entity). Verbs are mainly focused on motor states (situated action), and adjectives – 
depending on whether they are concrete or abstract – are more based on perceptual and 
introspective states. 
When it comes to closed-class words such as prepositions, conjunctions, pronouns, among 
others, there is a more schematic rather than rich conceptual structure. Informally speaking, 
we can note that such a distinction is reflected in the psychological fact that if someone 
asks us to imagine a big green lizard that spits fire, we can certainly get to the mental 
picture of it due to the adjectives big and green, the nouns lizard and fire, and the verb spit, 
these provide rich conceptual structure to achieve this simulation. On the contrary, if 
someone tells us to imagine the pronoun she or the preposition between in isolation, we 
might get to a more schematic embodied simulation of a non-specified female entity for 
she, and a spatial relation between (at least) three things – one entity located in the middle 
of the other two – for between. Now note that just as open-class words manifest different 
situational focus and thus type of knowledge, so do closed-class items. This clearly points 
to the fact that encyclopedic knowledge consists of a large-scale body of coherent 
representations of the world’s affairs (i.e., understanding) that emerge from different types 
of conceptual knowledge. 
In the case of prepositions (and particles such as up), I think that they are mainly structured 
by what I call spatio-conceptual structure, considering that space (following Talmy 2000) 
provides a unique sort of conceptual structure. It follows that the relational character of 
phenomenology in the sense of the connections existing between objects in space and 
human interaction, constitutes the bedrock of spatial language in the format of proto-scenes, 
which as mentioned throughout this research, are the humanly relevant interactions in space 
where abstractions as well as functional elements are derived. However, even though 
prepositions and particles are mainly configured via perceptual and motor states, 
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introspective structure is also present in some parameters and sense-extension units shown 
in the analysis such as Intentionality, Primary goal, Obliqueness, Purpose, Vector, and 
Futurity. Thus, parameters that are non-spatial in nature also contribute to the conceptual 
bases of space-rooted English and Spanish prepositions like to, for, a, and para.  
Even though prepositions and closed-class elements in general give access to a schematic 
conceptual structure that is primarily based on spatio-conceptual information, we should 
not regard them as static and fixed due to the fact that they constitute the “semantic 
scaffolding” – so to speak – of a cognitive representation (Talmy 2000) (i.e., conception). 
Take for instance the utterance given above, a big green lizard that spits fire, in which the 
closed-class elements are the indefinite article a, the third-person inflection -s, and the 
demonstrative that. Now imagine we change the open-class words and say a small gray 
mouse that eats cheese. The conception of such an utterance results in a different embodied 
simulation namely because of the open-class words (small, gray, mouse, eat, and cheese), 
whereas the semantic scaffolding remains the same in that we are still talking about an 
unspecific instance of a type that exhibits a specific quality and/or behavior. This in turn, is 
the main reason to keep the traditional distinction of open and closed-class vehicles with 
the extra component which is that these groups of words provide access to rich and 
schematic conceptual structure, respectively. This might be due to the difference between 
broad and narrow access to conceptual structure (See Morras [in press] for such a view). 
The idea suggested above goes contrary to some cognitive linguistic scholars such as Evans 
(e.g., 2009, 2010b, 2013), who claims that closed-class vehicles do not provide access to 
conceptual content but encode purely linguistic content.107 I think that closed-class items do 
offer access to conceptual structure, but this conceptual structure is of a different kind, and 
is reflected in the way prepositions are distributed across a given composite conception. To 
illustrate this point, consider the following example: 
           (6)  a. She is going to the beach right now                                [FORWARD MOTION] 
                     ((Ella) va a/para la playa ahora) 
                                                             
107 According to Evans (2009), conceptual content is “the nature of the knowledge encoded by a cognitive 
model” (ibid.107). 
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                  b. She is studying to get her degree                                            [PURPOSE] 
                      ((Ella) está estudiando para obtener su grado) 
                  c. She is to the right of her teacher                                             [LOCATION] 
                     ((Ella) está a la derecha de su profesor) 
                  d. She feels quite attached to me                             [EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT] 
                     ((Ella) se siente muy apegada a mi) 
Prepositional vehicles do provide access to encyclopedic knowledge, but this is of a more 
schematic type than for example, the semantics evoked by a simple noun such as car, 
which is imaginably easier due to its highly rich and detailed conceptual content. 
On the other hand, prepositional vehicles also manifest a semantic potential from which 
literal and figurative conceptions are achieved through elaboration and extension, 
respectively. In (6a) the parameters that are mostly involved and distributed along the 
sentence are Orientation and Vector, considering that the TR is approaching (this involves 
orientation and forward motion) its LM. In (6b), the preposition to acquires a complemental 
function and activates the Primary goal parameter as the main semantic contributor to 
understand the purpose that leads the TR to attain its LM. In (6c), to highlights the Location 
parameter in order to understand the location of the TR with respect to its LM. Finally, in 
(6d) to is integrated in a figurative conception which activates, and extends, the Attachment 
parameter to apprehend the fact that the TR exhibits psychosomatic states such as affection 
toward its LM. 
Following Barsalou (1999), all concepts are simulators. Simulators are schematic memories 
of perceived events that allow us to produce simulations that are always partial and sketchy, 
never complete. Linguistic symbols develop together with their associated perceptual 
symbol. For Barsalou, linguistic symbols resemble perceptual symbols in that they also are 
schematic memories of perceived events. They develop in similar fashion. Hence, there are 
simulators for words that become linked to simulators for entire entities or events. Yet there 
are also linguistic simulators that become associated with other aspects of simulations (ibid. 
592); these include properties (e.g., red), manners (e.g., clumsily), relations (e.g., to), and so 
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forth. This evidence from cognitive psychology supports the idea that all lexical concepts 
offer access to conceptual structure that varies in richness. 
Without access to encyclopedic knowledge of the schematic type, particularly spatio-
conceptual structure, a preposition such as to could not be properly realized and hence 
would not acquire any situated semantics. Words of any type, then, are contextual 
expressions: they are never completely meaningful independent of the utterance in which 
they are embedded. Such dependency is deeply related to the encyclopedic knowledge to 
which words provide access to, as well as to the para-linguistic contexts, such as prosody. 
All these factors together drive what is known as interpretation (See Evans 2009: Ch.13 for 
details on this conceptual process.) 
In the final analysis, we can indeed observe that prepositions provide access to spatio-
conceptual structure, which is a type of knowledge that comes from the phenomenology of 
the lived body and is manifested in parameters such as Attachment, Separation, Inclusion, 
Occlusion, Orientation, Location, among others. After all, space provides human beings 
with a considerable number of image schemas, which might be considered as the bedrock 
of spatio-conceptual structure. Spatial relations become parameterized in the semantic 
potential of spatial language. This is not to say, however, that other grammatical categories 
lack spatial grams (in the sense of Svorou 1994). For instance, a noun such as table has the 
parameter of Flat Surface (i.e., horizontality) as a functional category that must be included 
in its semantic description, if we really want to understand how people properly interact 
with tables. On the other hand, a verb such as jump does evoke in its semantics image 
schemas such as {UP} and {DOWN}, implicit in the very action of jumping. The idea I want 
to emphasize is that the amount of spatio-conceptual structure is higher in prepositions than 
in other grammatical categories and this is due to the fact that they mostly have to do with 
spatial relations, rather than with pure objects, feelings, or actions.  
Once the spatio-conceptual structure is parameterized and entrenched, the conceptual basis 
that emerges is a mental representation of a lexical item – that is, speakers store information 
of a given word in long-term semantic memory. Speakers do have a notion of what a word 
such as between means in isolation – they have a lexical representation of it. With the 
passage of time and practice, young speakers start developing this conceptual basis further 
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as they encounter different usage contexts for a preposition like between, among or amid 
(and entre in the case of Spanish speakers). This mental representation is then the main 
motivational factor for apprehending figurative and temporal usages. This in turn, may 
explain why there is invariance in terms of image-schematic structure that is preserved 
when we move from the spatial to the non-spatial or the temporal domain. 
7.1.1 The functional nature behind spatial semantics 
I now want to briefly remark some key ideas on how space provides spatio-conceptual 
structure, which can be understood as spatio-topological relations of some sort, as 
illustrated for the English and Spanish prepositions analyzed in this research. As noted 
earlier, in order to fully understand and employ spatial lexical concepts of a given 
prepositional vehicle, language users must also allow for non-spatial parameters that form 
part of the conceptual basis of prepositions. The functional nature, then, comes from the 
fact that such non-spatial parameters are functional consequences of humanly relevant 
interactions with spatio-topological properties. However, space-rooted parameters like 
Central position, which partly structures the conceptual bases of between, among, and amid, 
can also be considered a functional consequence of an entity that is placed in between two 
or more things. In addition, such a configuration not only would involve human interaction 
but object-like, as in My car is parked between the red truck and the blue Volkswagen. 
Hence, functional elements, even though they are likely to be non-spatial, also imply 
situated spatial relations that emerge as consequences of an already established spatial 
organization. Functional understanding is required if spatial lexical concepts are to be 
correctly interpreted in context. 
As put in the work of Herskovits (e.g., 1986, 1988), the traditional view posits that the 
“basic” function of the senses or lexical concepts associated with prepositional vehicles is 
to encode purely spatial relations. Recall that such a vision, Herskovits refers to as the 
simple relation model,108 and states that the semantic contribution of any prepositional 
vehicle relates to spatio-geometric properties which generally involve notions such as 
dimensions, axes or proximity (see Bennett 1975 for representative examples). However, 
and as noted by Herskovits (1988), the simple relation model is unable to account for the 
                                                             
108 For a survey of the descriptive inadequacies of that model see Herskovits (1988). 
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range of spatial representations that prepositions can designate. By the same token, 
Vandeloise (1991, 1994) argues that any account of lexical semantics that leaves aside the 
importance of the functional nature of spatial language fails to properly account for how 
they are actually employed.    
In sum, the functional consequences existing between objects in a given spatial 
organization as well as the humanly relevant interaction with such an organization is a 
critical fact to understand in a better and more clearly way how spatial language works. It 
also fully fledges the idea that image-schematic structure is invariantly mapped when it 
comes to the non-spatial and the temporal domain. 
7.1.2 Polysemy and conceptual activation (active zone) 
I now briefly turn to polysemy and active zones to see how the conceptual bases proposed 
in this research might shed light on these conceptual phenomena. 
Traditionally, polysemy has been related to a relatively abstract underlying mental 
representation that acquires its meaning under specific contexts. Lexical entries seem to 
lack details, and hence are filled in by context (see Ruhl 1989 for such a view). According 
to this view, polysemy is epiphenomenal due to its emergence from monosemy. 
On the other hand, the pioneering work of Lakoff (1987) and Brugman and Lakoff (1988) 
started to change this vision by redefining polysemy as an underlying phenomenon (i.e., 
conceptual). Rather than words exhibiting polysemy due to a single mental representation, 
polysemy occurs because of its very conceptual nature: there must be more conceptual 
content stored in long-term semantic memory, rather than a single abstract monosemous 
sense. 
While the highly influential work of Brugman and Lakoff provided insight and a new 
perspective on this phenomenon, it leads us to a vision of polysemy that is akin to the Sense 
Enumerative Lexicon mentioned above. Word senses for Brugman and Lakoff are derived 
from semantic networks. This, in turn, assumes that such senses or lexical concepts are 
relatively stable knowledge structures. The difficulty behind such an assumption, comes 
from the fact that meaning is protean in nature – that is – it always shifts in context. It 
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follows that when analyzing a preposition such as over, to, or for, we might end up with a 
longer list of senses for each preposition than the ones shown in the analysis. 
Some cognitive linguistic approaches (e.g., Allwood 2003; Croft and Cruse 2004; Zlatev 
2003) argue that the semantic contribution of words emerges from context. Under this 
view, words do not have pre-specified senses but meaning potential (Allwood 2003), 
purport (Croft and Cruse 2004) or use potential (Zlatev 2003).109 These different terms 
point to the same conceptual notion: the potential knowledge that words provide access to, 
which in the present research is referred to as conceptual basis. 
Thus far, we can observe that word senses are not pre-specified and stable and that 
approaches to cognitive lexical semantics are usage-based in character. The contribution of 
a word is always a function of a situated interpretation in specific contexts of use. However, 
the difficulty that arises from this view, as spotted by Peter Harder (2009) is that meaning 
construction depends on language output – that is – comprehension. This underplays the 
role of production (input). It follows that this perspective is close to the notion of usage 
fundamentalism (Harder 2009), which can be understood as “the risk of eliminating the role 
of words as prompts for meaning construction” (Evans 2009: 153) or as Harder himself 
puts: “The assumption that only actualized utterances really exist” (ibid. 16). We could say, 
then, that language users must have some sort of mental representation in order to use 
words in the way they do. The construct of the conceptual basis is an attempt to get around 
such usage fundamentalism since it deals with both comprehension and production. It also 
shows how words are represented at the level of the lexical representation (i.e., in 
isolation), as well as at the level of contextual realization (meaning determination). 
Another relevant construct that might be key to properly understand how polysemy works 
is active zone, which has been thoroughly developed by Ronald Langacker (e.g., 1987, 
2000, 2008, 2009). Recall that the present research takes a nuanced approach to this notion 
and assumes that active zones are akin to what Evans (2009) terms highlighting, which has 
to do with the facets or attributes of an entity that most directly participate in a 
construction. It follows from this idea that metonymic processes might play a crucial role 
(following Langacker 2009; see also Barcelona 2011; Herskovits 1985) in constructional 
                                                             
109 See also meaning spectrum (Evans 2015a). 
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meaning, due to the fact that the very nature of our reference point ability is metonymic 
(Langacker 1993).110 Reference points often have to do with the profile/active-zone 
discrepancy: TRs and LMs profile relationships that make accessible an array of associated 
areas that form the reference point's dominion (Langacker 2009: 52-53). Within this 
dominion, metonymic selection often takes place to highlight the attributes of the 
construction that most directly participate in the profiled relationship.  
If we go back to example (28) in chapter 4 (here repeated for convenience and numbered as 
(7)): 
(7) Anthony Reynolds, vocalista de Jack, se hizo esperar hasta subir al escenario, 
apareciendo de entre el público botella de vino en mano y ataviado con sus gafas de 
sol.                                                              [SURROUND]/ [ OUT-OF TRAJECTORY] 
and if we focus our attention on the composite structure evoked by the non-finite clause 
apareciendo entre el público, we can observe that there is a spatial relation between the 
prepositional TR and the prepositional LM which is characterized by the presence of the 
parameters of Surround and Proximity; these parameters in turn, give rise to a 
center/periphery configuration between TR and LM that generates a shared region. 
However, the functional consequence of the Central position parameter exhibits a degree of 
schematicity regarding the exact location of the TR within the spatial arrangement that is 
partially encoded by entre.  
If we go back to figure 4.1 in chapter 4, we can see how the triangle (TR) adopts a central 
position by being in the middle of the three squares (LM). On the other hand, in expression 
(7), we cannot say that the man (Anthony) is exactly in the middle of the crowd but he is 
included in a spatial region conceptualized as a mass (the crowd): he could be at any point 
within the limits established by the crowd.111  
                                                             
110 However, a caveat is in order. Not all reference point phenomena involve a metonymic operation, although 
most of them do. For example, topicalization is not necessarily metonymic: As for that problem, I think we 
should just wait and see. 
111 This is so until the man comes out of the crowd. This is specified by the Spanish verb apareciendo 
(literally translated into English as appearing). 
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Another important point to mention is the fact that composite conceptions – that is, the very 
meaning of constructions – usually involve the activation of more than one parameter. For 
example, in expression (7), the most prominent parameter is the one of Surround, even 
though Central position, Inclusion, Occlusion, and Proximity also get (metonymically) 
activated. On the other hand, the attribute of entre which is highlighted in example (32) 
(chapter 4) in the composite structure 203 kilómetros entre Londres y Canterbury (203 
kilometres between London and Canterbury) is the one of spatial distance due to the 
activation of the Separation parameter. Central position might also receive activation. 
Figure 7.1 and 7.2 below depict the possible spatial conceptions that could be derived from 
expression (7) above and example (32) in chapter 4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Array of possible spatial locations in (7) 
 
                                                            203 kilometres  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Distance between London and Canterbury in example (32) (chapter 4) 
London Canterbury 
 
 
254 
 
Metonymic patterns in conceptual activation or highlighting could be more mundane than 
usually thought (Langacker 2009): they drive the correct activation of specific attributes 
and values that are available in a profiled relation. Figure 7.1 depicts a more schematic 
relation between TR and LM due to the difficulty to exactly locate the man with respect to 
the crowd in (7). Figure 7.2, on the other hand, depicts a different active zone of entre, 
namely the distance (i.e., separation) that there is between the two English cities. 
The Spanish preposition entre profiles a highly schematic relation between a TR and its 
LM, this in turn, is related to the polysemous behaviour of this prepositional vehicle. Note 
how the English language shows a difference in that it uses the prepositions between, 
among, and amid. These English prepositions might be better differentiated by careful 
examination of the conceptual nature of their prepositional-landmark elements. On the 
other hand, the Spanish language only uses the preposition entre no matter what the nature 
of the nominals that constitute its prepositional landmark is. This in turn, reflects both (i) 
the highly polysemous behaviour of entre, and (ii) the need of this preposition to be 
integrated with a count, plural mass or non-plural mass noun that elaborates its LM to 
eventually narrow down its scope and evoke a specific spatial arrangement (See Morras 
2018; Morras and Barcelona 2019 for an overview of entre and its English equivalents.) 
From this idea we can spot an important difference at the level of the lexical representation 
between the Spanish preposition entre and its English equivalents, and this is that the 
spatio-conceptual structure availability manifested by the Spanish preposition is more 
schematic (as in the case of the Spanish preposition en compared to its English equivalents 
in, on, and at) because of its dependency on its lexical integration with a nominal as its LM, 
to acquire a specific spatial use type. This situation is different with the English preposition 
between, since at the lexical representation level, it can somehow evoke or make people 
mentally simulate a spatial scene in which a non-specified attentional figure is in the middle 
of two or more surrounding entities that are clearly separate and hence identifiable. In this 
sense, spatio-conceptual structure availability should be understood as the amount of 
spatio-conceptual information existing at the level of the lexical representation of some 
closed-class items such as prepositions. 
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Distributed semantics in the sense of Sinha and Kuteva (1995) is another key notion to 
approach the protean nature of prepositions, as well as the closely related notion of 
profile/active-zone discrepancy. Take for example expressions (32) and (33) in chapter 4, 
which profile the same spatial arrangement involving an attentional figure that is in the 
middle of two things. Both examples are reproduced as (8) and (9) below for convenience: 
(8) Robbie McEwen (Predictor Lotto) ganó al 'sprint' la segunda etapa del Tour, primera 
en línea y disputada sobre 203 kilómetros entre Londres y Canterbury.   [TRAJECTORY] 
(9) Chester (ubicado en el norte en la frontera entre Inglaterra y Gales) es la entrada a la 
región norte de Gales y se conecta con Londres, Manchester y Birmingham    
[LOCATION]     
However, there is a discrepancy in the active zones that each construction highlights. In (8), 
the function of entre that partly contributes to select the correct “reading” is the distance or 
trajectory existing between point A (London) and point B (Canterbury). On the other hand, 
example (9) sanctions the [LOCATION] lexical concept because of the contribution that each 
word makes in the construction. What gets activated in example (9) is the location of 
Chester that is in the northern border between England and Wales, rather than its distance 
from a particular LM as in (8). 
In a nutshell, profile/active-zone discrepancy is a conceptual phenomenon that should be 
understood in a distributive-like way: the correct activation of a semantic element of a 
preposition such as entre (or of any other symbolic unit or construction) is jointly achieved 
by all the elements that partially compose the given construction (in the sense of Goldberg 
1995). As mentioned earlier, the conceptual bases proposed in this dissertation are an 
attempt to comprehend in a simpler and more clearly way the semantic foundations for 
elaboration and extension that these prepositions offer. 
I finish this section with some remarks about the plausibility of metonymic constraints on 
polysemy. I think (following Langacker 2009; Barcelona, p.c.) that metonymy might be the 
answer for understanding the conceptual nature of profile/active-zone discrepancy. The 
reasons behind such a plausibility come from the idea of metonymy as access and 
activation. Metonymy occurs as frequently as metaphor or even more. This ubiquitous 
 
 
256 
 
cognitive operation can be further observed in non-linguistic communication – particularly 
at the level of what is known as index and icon (Burks, 1949). These notions were 
originally introduced by the philosopher Charles Peirce (1932). For instance, a walking 
sign is an icon since it shows a person who is walking. The image provides mental access 
to the cognitive model or script (Schank and Abelson 1977) of {PEDESTRIAN AREA}. On the 
other hand, the semantic quality of an index also manifests metonymic patterns of mental 
access and activation. For instance, when we see through our window a big black cloud that 
is coming toward our city or town, we might expect rain, a storm, lighting and thunders. 
That is an indexical contingency that is metonymically based. 
These semantic levels are also present in the animal realm: if a squirrel hears the roar of a 
jaguar (or any other type of predator), it immediately reacts and goes away. In other words, 
just by hearing the jaguar’s roar the squirrel can expect a possible predator: a part in this 
case (the roar of the jaguar) provides mental access to the whole thing, here the feline 
predator. Such an animal behavior supports the idea that metonymy is more “cognitively 
fundamental” than metaphor. Thus, metonymy seems to be entrenched in more complex 
conceptual phenomena such as polysemy. This is not to say, however, that metaphor is not 
involved; it simply points to a more elemental or basic role of metonymy in language and 
cognition. 
7.2 Contribution of the research 
The contribution that the present research attempts to make is mainly focused on a 
psychologically real description of the spatial organization of the English and Spanish 
prepositional vehicles analyzed. Such a description allows linguists as well as Spanish and 
English learners (and teachers) to properly understand the “literal” roots of prepositions in 
terms of the spatio-topological relations they hold, as well as the functional elements that 
emerge from those relations. This understanding of their spatial organization may be 
approached by using constructs such as proto-scenes and conceptual parameters (in 
addition to others such as trajector and landmark). In this way, it provides an explanation 
and hence, motivation, of the non-spatial and temporal usages that prepositions often 
exhibit. The present account also provides a systematic set of criteria (the “parameters”) to 
tease apart the subtle semantic differences distinguishing neighboring English prepositions 
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like between, amid, among or to and for, and those distinguishing these English 
prepositions from semantically similar prepositions like entre, a, and para. 
The research also shows how English and Spanish speakers conceptualize space differently, 
and this is reflected in the way the conceptual bases are structured. The Spanish language 
appears to have a more polysemous prepositional set than English since it often needs fewer 
prepositions to convey what the English language generally expresses by using more than 
one, as in the case of entre, a, and para shown in the analysis. Such a difference in spatio-
conceptual structure is key to properly understanding how English and Spanish prepositions 
can be elaborated and extended. The analysis above might be the basis to carry out 
psycholinguistic experimentation in order to validate the psychological reality of the 
conceptual bases proposed. This is an issue that will be taken up in section 7.4 below. 
The conceptual phenomenon of polysemy, even though is not the main purpose of this 
research, can be accounted for as the different semantically related activations (often 
metonymically) that a prepositional vehicle can receive under specific contexts. As seen 
above, words are contextual expressions so the semantics they acquire is tightly linked to 
the linguistic and non-linguistic context where they are embedded. Such a situated 
interpretation makes conceptual activation or highlighting never behave in the very same 
way. 
Lastly, the conceptual bases proposed above not only deal with comprehension, but also 
production. Hence, they attempt to solve Harder’s (2009) usage fundamentalism in that a 
conceptual basis is a mental representation of the meaning spectrum of a word that is stored 
in long-term semantic memory. This lexical representation is intended to deal with both 
input and output. It follows that this might help Spanish and English learners to acquire 
spatial language in a more cognition-friendly way (in the sense of Holme 2009) rather than 
by heart, as it has traditionally been the case. Sections 7.3, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, and 7.3.3 below are 
precisely devoted to this issue. 
7.2.1 Limitations 
One of the major limitations of the present research is the lack of solid psychological 
evidence of the parameters proposed. The parameters proposed here are based on 
 
 
258 
 
introspection and corpus analysis: language-in-use database and dictionaries were used to 
see how prepositions behave in context, as well as to pin down the parameters that might 
constitute each conceptual basis. To formally determine the existence of the parameters 
proposed, we might need corpus work that measures frequency in order to have empirical 
data about their usage, and statistical information about the elements that some prepositions 
generally co-occur with. 
A further limitation is the notion of sense-extension units, that is, semantic extensions that 
seem to be more entrenched than others to the point they might get parameterized via 
bridging contexts and pragmatic strengthening. Corpus research on frequency could also 
help to clarify this point since that would allow us to appreciate a sort of level of conceptual 
prominence that a given parameter has with respect to the rest in their conceptual basis. 
Even though the psychological validation of the parameters proposed lies beyond the scope 
of the present dissertation, it nevertheless suggests how to implement experimental 
methods to investigate the psychological reality of the conceptual bases proposed here. A 
sample for entre and its English equivalents is presented in section 7.4 below. 
Lastly, the data collected for linguistic analysis is written corpus; this means we cannot 
have access to paralinguistic cues such as intonation, pitch, and gesture. Further research 
using audio-visual methods would be more appropriate for a thorough analysis of 
prepositional usages in (almost full) context to take into account as many factors as possible 
(i.e., joint attentional scenes [Tomasello 1999, 2003; see also Clark 1996]) within a situated 
linguistic event. 
7.3 Pedagogical implications 
The conceptual bases proposed for the English and Spanish prepositions analyzed in this 
study can have pedagogical implications and applications. The “conceptual basis” notion 
can be introduced to students when studying word meaning. A word’s conceptual basis 
then, helps us to understand how prepositions – in the present case – are semantically 
constituted and how they acquire their situated semantics. It also provides students with 
enough ground to practice and put the prepositions in novel contexts of use. However, 
before proceeding to introduce and explain how to teach the conceptual bases of 
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prepositions to English and Spanish students, the English and/or Spanish teacher must give 
them a hint of some essential notions in cognitive linguistics. I propose below some key 
concepts that language teachers should take into account to provide their students with a 
basic cognitive linguistic background. The reason is that, along with a growing group of 
applied cognitive linguists (e.g., Boers and Demecheleer 1998; Holme 2009; Littlemore 
2009; Pütz 2007; Tyler 2012), I claim that a cognitive-linguistic perspective carries 
significant implications for language pedagogy. 
Some of the benefits of establishing a comprehensive introduction to cognitive-linguistic 
concepts before studying prepositions will be briefly introduced below, followed in the next 
section by their applications to the teaching of prepositions, to student assessment, and to 
practical activities in the classroom.  
Language awareness 
The idea of language awareness is particularly important for the aims pursued by Applied 
Cognitive Linguistics. It has to do with the awareness not only of the target language 
structure, but also of the equivalent structures of the first language. As shown in the 
analysis, either L1 Spanish or English speakers can indeed appreciate the differences in 
terms of parameters and proto-scenes that each preposition exhibits. Language awareness, 
thus, allows learners to see the conceptual differences that exist between their mother 
tongue and the target language since they can compare the semantics of symbolic units 
(Pütz 2007). Such a principle has been specially emphasized in studies on figurative 
expressions and language teaching. 
As pointed out by Taylor (1993), the Contrastive Analysis view (see Eckman 1977 for such 
a perspective) is compatible with cognitive linguistics as long as it is focused on 
conceptualization and semantic import rather than on formal entities. We must provide 
students with a simple explanation of how conceptual categories vary from language to 
language. For instance, English learners whose native tongue is Spanish, may find it 
difficult to understand the differences between the prepositions between, among, and amid 
(just like an English speaker might with respect to entre) since in Spanish all the parameters 
that separately constitute the three English prepositions make up the conceptual basis of 
their Spanish equivalent entre: the conceptual categories that are encountered all together in 
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entre such as Separation, Occlusion and Inclusion, among others, are found separately in its 
English equivalents. We can observe then, following Martin Pütz (2007), that there can be 
relatively high or relatively low degrees of cognitive naturalness (low degree in this case), 
which is dependent on the differences and similarities existing between the conceptual 
categories of the first and target language.112 
Regarding non-spatial conceptions in the first and target language awareness, work on 
prepositional semantics by Boers and Demecheleer (1998), which provided a contrastive 
analysis between English and French, points to the importance of drawing the learner’s 
attention to the links or experiential correlations that there are between a preposition’s 
spatial sense and its figurative extensions. This amounts to evidence that exploring the 
literal roots of prepositions is key for teaching their extensions. 
Figure/ground alignment  
Figure/ground alignment is central to human cognition since it is the way we focus on 
things (i.e., foregrounding) that are perceived against their background. The foregrounded 
thing is, hence, the focus of attention (Talmy 1978). 
Language teachers should briefly explain to their students what figure/ground alignment is, 
and how this not only is essential to perception, but also to audition and other senses. To do 
so, we can make students focus on a visual stimulus such as a drawing on the whiteboard 
and make them realize how the drawing is the attentional focus which is foregrounded 
against the board. Then, make them shift their attention and focus it on the board while 
backgrounding the drawing.113 In this way, we can introduce to them the notion of 
figure/ground reversal (Langacker 1987: 125).  
By the same token, we can make students listen to their partners for one minute and ask 
them to focus on her partner’s voice while noticing how the environmental acoustics 
                                                             
112 Cognitive naturalness in this sense has to do with how close two or more languages (the mother tongue and 
the target language) are in terms of conceptual categories. The higher the cognitive naturalness is between the 
two languages, the easier the acquisition of the target language is. 
113 This implies more concentration because a drawing on the board tends to be more prominent for visual 
perception. 
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become the background. After that, make them shift their attention and focus on what other 
classmates are talking so their partner’s voice becomes backgrounded. 
After students have the notion of figure/ground alignment, teachers may quickly introduce 
the closely related notions of trajector and landmark (Langacker 1987) to make them 
appreciate the similarities between figure/ground and TR/LM. It could also be appropriate 
to mention to students that the alignment that there is between TR and LM is the linguistic 
manifestation of the more primitive cognitive ability, here figure and ground, an idea that 
dates back to Gestalt psychology. By doing so, we can briefly show to students the 
continuum between embodied experience, mind patterns, and language use. 
Force Dynamics and Image Schemas 
Vital to any movement we make in space, force dynamic is at the heart of the autonomous 
system-environment coupling. Notions such as agonist and antagonist (Talmy 2000) might 
be introduced to students in order to show the tendency toward motion and rest that the 
agonist and antagonist exhibit, and how this relationship is manifested in language. For 
instance, we can show students a sentence such as The ball kept rolling, in which the 
agonist, here the ball, shows a tendency to motion which does not cease to occur since there 
is no antagonist to stop such a force. On the contrary, if we show students a sentence such 
as The ball kept rolling until a car ran it over, we can show students that the tendency to 
motion exhibited by the agonist is abruptly stopped by the antagonist force (exerted by the 
car). 
Within force dynamics, teachers can introduce the construct of image schemas (Johnson 
1987, 2005, 2007; Hampe 2005). These can be explained to students as spatial 
representations that emerge from different types of interactions in space. Some of them are 
{CONTACT}, {CONTAINMENT}, {CENTER/PERIPHERY}, {PRESSURE}, {SEPARATION}, among 
others, and they structure word meaning, especially prepositions (and particles) which 
represent the linguistic way that human beings have to refer to spatial relations. In this 
sense, we can appreciate the tight relation between image schemas and conceptual 
parameters (Morras in press). They could even be apprehended interchangeably in some 
cases. 
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Construals 
The notion of construal is essential for students to understand how reality can be expressed 
in alternative ways. Following Langacker (2008), four classes of construal phenomena can 
be applied to any domain of experience. These are specificity, focusing, prominence, and 
perspective. Specificity relates to the degree of granularity or resolution that a construction 
can exhibit. For instance, when teaching the differences between the English prepositions 
between and among, we can show students how between manifests a higher degree of 
specificity since it generally encodes the Separation parameter as in a sentence such as The 
flowerpot is between you and me. In this sentence the flowerpot is the TR whereas the 
coordinate structure between you and me serves as LM. All the elements can be clearly 
distinguished in the visual field, so the precise location of the attentional figure is easily 
recognized. On the other hand, if we introduce students a sentence such as She is among the 
crowd, the degree of specificity decreases in that we do not precisely know the position of 
the attentional figure, here She, due to the activation of the Inclusion, and possibly 
Occlusion, parameters. 
Focusing relates to the perceptual opposition between figure and ground and its special 
manifestation in language known as the trajector and landmark opposition. More generally, 
this feature of human cognition can be categorized as foreground and background as they 
all involve a departure from a base-line which is motivated by previous experience. We can 
speak, then, about foreground and background whenever one conception precedes and, in 
some way, facilitates the emergence of another.  
The concept of prominence, though deeply related to focusing since it also involves 
conceptual selection relative to what is backgrounded, must be treated independently since 
it mainly has to do with two types of prominence: profiling and trajector/landmark 
alignment.114 Profiling relates to what an expression designates against its base – the 
selection of a certain body of conceptual content. We also have to point out to students that 
                                                             
114 TR and LM is an instance of both focusing and prominence. Focusing because it is relative to levels of 
organization; this also fits with prominence since “anything selected is rendered prominent relative to what is 
unselected, and a foreground is salient relative to its background” (Langacker 2008: 66). TR and LM involves 
the focusing of attention, so they are considered as a “strong kind of foregrounding” (ibid.66). 
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words profile either a thing, in the case of conceptually autonomous elements (simple 
nouns and nominals) or a relation, in the case of conceptually dependent elements such as 
prepositions and verbs, and all the rest of the grammatical categories.  
The last class of construal phenomenon that might facilitate the students’ apprehension of 
language use is perspective and it deals with what Langacker (2008: 72) calls “viewing 
arrangement”. Perspective provides us with a vantage point which – broadly speaking – 
refers to the location of the speaker. We can actually construe the same scene from the 
perspective of different participants as in I saw John walking in quickly with a smile on his 
face (where the speaker is located in the room where John walked in), compared to I saw 
John walking in quickly (in this case the speaker is located outside the room where John 
walked in and probably could not see his smiley face). 
Metaphor 
Language teachers should foster figurative language acquisition. After all, the human 
conceptual system is structured metaphorically (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999), so having 
a basic knowledge of how metaphor (along with metonymy) work in the first and target 
language would facilitate language acquisition as well as the understanding of the 
motivation behind non-spatial and temporal usages of prepositional vehicles. Metaphorical 
understanding allows students to conceive the mapping of the invariant image-schematic 
structure that is preserved from the source to the target domain.115 It is for that reason that 
teachers should provide a brief explanation about how metaphor works. 
Metonymy 
Metonymy is a vital cognitive process that might be even more ubiquitous than metaphor to 
the extent it sometimes (if not always) motivates metaphorical conceptions (see Barcelona 
2000a for such an account). As seen in section 7.1.2, metonymy may drive lower-semantic 
levels such as index and icon, so it is crucial to our perception and apprehension of the 
world. It allows us to manipulate larger entities, interpreting a product by its process as in 
the book is going on swimmingly, where the book refers to the process of writing or 
                                                             
115 Language teachers should also briefly explain to students the notion of domain of experience (Langacker 
1987). 
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publishing, or a product by a producer as in She drinks Heineken. The construal phenomena 
of focusing and prominence might be driven by metonymic patterns since metonymy 
allows us to select the most important aspects of a given construction. For instance, we can 
refer to a motorbike as a nice “pair of wheels”. By doing so, we single out that a pair of 
wheels is the most salient aspect of the motorbike since it is mainly the wheels that make 
motorbikes become a vehicle for transportation. Through cultural convention, we can treat 
one aspect of an entity as more important than another. Hence, metonymy might be 
responsible for the conceptual operation of selection, which is a process that enters into the 
grammar (See Langacker 2009 for an account on metonymic grammar.) 
My own experience as an English teacher has proven metaphor and metonymy teaching 
fruitful. For instance, my students, native Spanish speakers learning English as a foreign 
language, found it difficult to understand the idiomatic expression grab a bite to eat, 
particularly because of the metonymy in bite, which rather than the action, refers to a thing 
(food). After explaining the metonymic relation existing between the act of biting and food 
consumption in the idiom, students understood its meaning, and most importantly, they 
understood the motivation lying behind that idiom. One of the reasons why this specific 
idiom was complicated for them is because (Chilean) Spanish does not have that idiomatic 
expression in its repertoire. 
Geometry 
The form of the objects that populate space is another relevant factor when it comes to 
teaching spatial language. The form of objects can change perception; hence, how objects 
and spatial relations are construed in linguistically mediated communication. For instance, 
to know whether an entity exhibits or requires the parameter of Containment, it is important 
to consider the object’s shape as in the water is in the cup. The noun cup is clearly a 
container object that can store water inside its concave shape. Water, on the other hand, is a 
substance that can be contained. Now if we say *there is dust in the cup, it would sound 
semantically anomalous considering the geometric characteristics of dust. On the contrary, 
we should say there is dust on the cup since we want to highlight the surface of the cup 
rather than its capacity of containing things in its inside. 
Embodiment and Encyclopedic knowledge 
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As stated at the outset of this chapter, embodiment and enactment are key to understanding 
how mind and language are structured.116 The enactive and embodied approach to language 
and cognition offers a view of how concepts are acquired, presented,117 and re-presented 
(when imagining), as well as provides the reasons why human beings have the concepts in 
the way they do. There are basic concepts such as {UP}, {DOWN}, {LEFT}, {RIGHT}, 
{GRAVITY}, that have universal status considering we are all members of the same species 
and move and interact in space similarly. It follows that a brief introduction to 
phenomenology in the classroom might be beneficial to help students not only understand 
spatial language more clearly, but word meaning in general.  
Movement in space, along with the aesthetics of human experience (i.e. feelings and 
emotions) and social relationships are what mainly constitute the encyclopedic knowledge: 
coherent bodies of non-linguistic structure that emerge as consequence of human 
interactions in a social setting. These non-linguistic bodies are not fixed but constantly 
being complemented or even changed according to the experiences we encounter. The 
experience of the lived body is crucial to understand the affordances (i.e. possibilities for 
interaction) that space provides to us, as well as to understand the development of concrete 
and abstract concepts based on perceptive, event-like, and introspective structure. 
At this point, however, a caveat is in order when it comes to teaching the notion of 
encyclopedic knowledge, and it has to do with the culturally driven nature of conceptual 
development and metaphor (Kövecses 2005). Concepts that are more “complex” than for 
example {GRAVITY}, have a considerable amount of cultural influence. For instance, the 
concept of {COW} that I and the rest of the Chilean population have (along with other 
Western civilizations) is that of farm animals from which milk can be extracted, and which 
are also used for meat production. In addition, some people practice rodeo with them. But 
in places like India, the concept of {COW} is something completely different since rather 
                                                             
116 I use the word structured in a looser way considering the flexible patterns that mind and language exhibit. 
117 The term presentation is drawing from phenomenological research (e.g., Searle 1983; Thompson 2007) 
and it deals with the presentational nature of human experience. The objects we experience when dynamize in 
space are present in their very being. On the other hand, re-presentation has to do with imagination and 
memory since objects are not present in their very being; rather, they are phenomenologically absent. They 
are mentally evoked or called forth. 
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than being categorized as a rodeo animal or food, they are categorized as sacred entities, 
something that for a Chilean person is difficult to understand since they do not share the 
same cultural scripts.118 Hence, when teaching embodiment and encyclopedic knowledge, 
teachers have to point out the cultural aspects that lie behind these two concepts. Any 
linguistic theory that does not take into consideration the social and cultural aspects of mind 
and language, would miss the mark. 
The constructs and ideas briefly discussed above are not the only ones that language 
teachers should take into consideration for their application in the classroom. They of 
course can select more from a wide array of concepts that cognitive linguistics and 
cognitive psychology offer that seem to be suitable for teaching purposes. Language 
teachers must adapt this knowledge to the students’ needs. Concepts must be explained in a 
straightforward manner by considering the most important facts of a given construct or 
idea. The constructs selected, I think, are among the most relevant ones for students since 
they allow them to acquire a linguistics foundation not only in the target language but also 
in their mother tongue. Hence, they could constitute the basis for a pedagogical grammar. 
Cognitive Linguistics has proven useful when it comes to applicability (e.g., Boers and 
Demecheleer 1998; Holme 2009; Lindstromberg 1996; Littlemore 2009; Tyler 2012). 
However, the traditional view of a static grammar is still the mainstream view in the 
classroom where prepositions are analyzed as fixed meaning-bearing units and learned by 
rote due to the many senses they can acquire depending on context. In addition, we still 
have to find a solution to Harder’s (2009) usage fundamentalism since production is not 
given the same attention as comprehension. For that to happen, we need a more cognition-
friendly approach in which students can reach conclusions on their own and figure out new 
meanings from unknown constructions. An important step within a most-desirable 
cognitive linguistics syllabus (see Holme 2009: Ch.9) would involve fostering usage 
through communicative goal-oriented classroom activities, as well as to engage students in 
the explicit analysis of form and meaning. Languages should be taught “inside-outwards” 
rather than the other way around. 
7.3.1 Pedagogical Applications 
                                                             
118 However, the Indian and Chilean cultures do share the category of FARM ANIMAL and MILK PRODUCER. 
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The analysis presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6, not only is intended to show the differences 
in terms of spatio-conceptual structure that the Spanish prepositions entre, a, and para, and 
their English equivalents exhibit, but also to demonstrate the utility that a cognitive 
linguistic approach to prepositions has in the area of Language Teaching. The conceptual 
bases proposed in this research are an attempt to show L2 English and Spanish students the 
motivation behind language use. Of significance is the phenomenological structure that 
composes the semantic spectrum or conceptual basis – in current parlance – of prepositions, 
and how this space-motivated semantics partly allows us to conceive non-spatial and 
temporal conceptions. Moreover, the conceptual bases proposed are suitable for students to 
reason about the possible elaborations and figurative extensions that a given preposition 
may have, rather than establishing, in a dictionary-like fashion, all the possible senses (i.e., 
entries) that a preposition might sanction. This latter situation, as previously pointed out, 
would be an ill-conceived quest on word meaning if we take seriously the protean nature of 
words (Taylor 2006), as well as the significance of encyclopedic knowledge in language 
use. For instance, there are cases in which between establishes a complex atemporal 
relation rather than simplex. The difference goes on the notion of trajectory. Even though 
both types of relations are atemporal since the temporal factor (i.e., conceived time) is 
backgrounded, entre can at times convey trajectory as in an utterance such as El corrió por 
entre los cerros hasta alcanzar el pueblo (He run through the hills until he reached the 
town). It follows that this sequential scanning is not considered in the typical dictionary-
view of word meaning since entre is primarily considered a preposition that denotes place 
rather than path (in the sense of Jackendoff 1983).  
The conceptual bases proposed in this study for between, among, amid, to, for, entre, a, and 
para, clearly point to an encyclopedic rather than dictionary-like view of word meaning so 
students can work out the meaning of prepositions under different linguistic contexts and 
they can also produce language in novel contexts of use. 
I think (following O’ Dowd 1998) that grammar textbooks have never successfully 
provided an explanation of language that is usage-based and this is because grammar 
textbooks are based on a static view of grammar where prepositions are treated under the 
scope of the simple relations model, which as pointed out, states that prepositions encode 
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purely spatio-geometric relations.119 However, this view is descriptively inadequate since it 
provides no accurate explanation for how the prototypical or ideal sense-units associated 
with prepositions are actually used. To account for a functional-cognitive perspective, we 
need to take into consideration the parameters that are non-spatial as well. This idea is akin 
to what Johnson (2005) refers to as the felt qualities of image schematic structure in our 
experience, understanding, and thought.  
The conceptual bases proposed for the English and Spanish prepositions are intended to be 
an alternative to the simple relations model in that they provide English and Spanish 
students with a psychologically and phenomenologically real account of the spatio-
conceptual configuration of prepositions, as well as with an explanation of the motivation 
that underlies non-spatial and temporal usages. In the following sections (7.3.2, and 7.3.3), 
I present some suggestions on how to present this content and how to assess students to see 
whether this cognitive linguistic method works, followed by suggestions for activities in the 
L2 classroom. 
7.3.2 Classroom content presentation and assessment 
The constructs presented in section 7.3 can be introduced to students previously starting the 
English or Spanish (spatial language) lesson in order to provide them with the linguistic 
knowledge necessary to raise students’ awareness of their mother tongue and target 
language. One or two lessons might be needed before the language content is presented. 
This will partly depend on the teacher’s background regarding the constructs and ideas of 
cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, as well as on the students’ needs. 
Before start introducing the cognitive linguistic concepts proposed in section 7.3, teachers 
can set a placement test (see Appendixes A, B, and C for a sample). This will let teachers 
know about the students’ current knowledge on prepositional usages of the target language. 
By doing so, teachers can have a record about how well they perform in the first assessment 
and whether it will be improved in the next assessment after students are introduced the 
constructs shown above followed by the conceptual bases and classroom activities to 
actively participate and use prepositions in the most natural way possible. 
                                                             
119 However, see Radden and Dirven (2007) for a cognitive linguistic approach to English grammar. 
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After the placement test, teachers can start to introduce the constructs given above, and they 
can also introduce more if necessary. After having presented the constructs and hence, 
provided students with a (cognitive) linguistics foundation, teachers can project on the 
board the conceptual bases (one by one) proposed for the English and Spanish prepositions. 
In this way, English and Spanish students can compare how spatio-conceptual structure is 
“packaged” differently in each language. Teachers might first start with the students’ 
mother tongue and then show the differences that exist in the target language. 
When presenting the conceptual bases to the class, the first emphasis teachers should give 
is on the proto-scene from which abstractions and functionality emerge. In addition, 
explaining the relationship between TR and LM within the proto-scene might enormously 
help students to appreciate the conceptual nature of the relationship and know the reasons 
why parameters constitute the conceptual basis of each preposition in the way they do.  
After having introduced the proto-scenes, teachers should analyze the parameters one by 
one with the class, always making clear to students the fundamental characters of 
perception, situated action, and introspection that lie at the heart of human experience. 
When explaining a conceptual parameter, it is suitable to provide a linguistic example in 
which that parameter plays a prominent role and then elicit more examples from students. 
This latter strategy may allow teachers to see whether students have a good first grasp of 
the content they are just being introduced, as well as to solve any doubt that may arise. 
When all the parameters of a given conceptual basis are analyzed and discussed in the 
classroom, teachers can briefly explain to students how conceptual activation (i.e. 
highlighting) works, by giving emphasis on the situated character of word meaning. This 
can allow students to understand that prepositions are not stable and fixed, but prone to 
change their semantics according to context. In addition, it is important to remark that 
prepositions do consist of mental representations, characterized in the form of their 
conceptual bases, that are stored in long-term semantic memory. In other words, teachers 
should make clear to students that the conceptual basis is a mental lexical representation 
that allows speakers to comprehend and produce language, and when this lexical 
representation is put in context, a sort of conceptual narrowing occurs in the sense that just 
some parameters receive primary activation, some others receive secondary activation, 
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which reinforces the primary one, while others do not receive activation whatsoever. As 
seen throughout the analysis, words generally receive partial rather than full sanctioning. 
After having presented and analyzed in detail the conceptual bases of the prepositional 
vehicles proposed for each language, teachers could either go for some classroom activities 
in which spatial lexical concepts are the communicative purpose, or, depending on the 
students’ proficiency of the target language, can immediately explain to the class the 
motivation underlying non-spatial and temporal prepositional usages,120 which crucially, 
are partly structured by the conceptual bases analyzed. Teachers must give emphasis on the 
invariant image-schematic structure that is mapped from the spatial to the non-spatial and 
temporal domains, pointing out the similarities between them. For instance, in an 
expression such as She is next to my heart, the speaker is clearly not positioning the woman 
“literally” next to his/her heart but conveys emotional closeness. Such an utterance, in turn, 
shares the image-schematic structure with more space-rooted conceptions as in My bike is 
next to the apple tree. Teachers can ask students for novel instances of non-spatial usages in 
order to collectively discuss them in the classroom and try to pin down the parameter(s) 
that get activated and extended in order to achieve that specific conception. 
Now when it comes to Time, in addition to show the invariant mapping from the spatial 
onto the temporal domain, teachers should provide students with a brief introduction to 
temporal cognition and temporal concepts since time seems to be more basic than space.121 
Despite the image-schematic structure that is provided by space, we do need temporal 
concepts such as {WEEK}, {HOUR}, {YEAR}, among many others. Temporal reference is 
also crucial to fully apprehend temporal conceptions such as a quarter to midnight in which 
a quarter and midnight are temporal concepts that are in a conceptual relation by virtue of 
                                                             
120 It is important to mention in the classroom that the preposition among does not exhibit temporal behavior. 
And in the case of amid, its temporal behavior points to a vague temporal period such as in amid the 
centuries, in which there is a high degree of schematicity. In addition, teachers should mention that the 
temporal usages of amid are not frequent at all, just like this preposition is in general. Teachers could use 
corpus-driven data to show this point to the class. 
121 This issue is indeed another possible topic that can be introduced before starting the spatial language 
lesson. 
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the preposition to. This relation in turn, corresponds to the temporal matrix for locating 
events in time in an absolute manner (extrinsic temporal frame of reference). 
In the final assessment, which comes after having done all the procedures stated above 
(including classroom activities that are proposed in the next section), students can be 
additionally asked to give the reasons about their answers (i.e. justify). The final assessment 
might come in the same format as Appendixes A, B, and C, plus the justification for each 
answer. By doing so, teachers can see whether students really understood why prepositions 
are used in the way they are, as well as observe if there is improvement on the students’ 
prepositional knowledge by comparing these latter results with the ones obtained in the 
placement test. The number of lessons to do all the procedures just shown (including the 
classroom activities proposed in the next section) may vary between 3 and 6, plus the 
individual work students should do at home. 
7.3.3 Classroom activities 
I now turn to propose some activities that can be carried out in the classroom in order to 
facilitate – through application – students’ acquisition and/or improvement of the 
prepositional vehicles analyzed in this research. All the activities proposed below, however, 
are intended to practice the most prototypical usages of the prepositions analyzed since 
fully detailed classroom activities that involve more senses are out of the scope of the 
present research. Nevertheless, they intend to provide insight on how a cognitive linguistic 
theory can be applied to the classroom. 
Between 
In groups of three to four, students can be asked to locate things in the classroom that are in 
between two or more things. Teachers should advice students to focus on the parameter of 
Separation – a prominent parameter that partly compose the conceptual basis of between. 
Students can even locate each person in the group, depending on the geometric shape in 
which the groups are established (e.g., in line, circle). This activity helps to reinforce the 
idea that the parameter of Separation is key to understanding the semantics of between.  
After carrying out this type of activity, which is focused on space, teachers could ask 
students to think of a temporal range of an activity they usually do. For example, how much 
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time it takes to read an eighty-page book, or do a workout in the gym, so the answer would 
be likely to be, for instance, between 5 and 7 days or between 1 and 2 hours.122 
If teachers want to elicit from the class expressions that involve between in abstract 
domains rather than temporal scenes, they could make students ask their partners about the 
last decision they had to make, particularly about the options that there were available for 
it. This group activity may trigger answers such as I had to choose between X or Y last 
week. 
After the activities are done, teachers can reinforce the already seen theory behind spatial, 
non-spatial, and temporal usages of the preposition between. This way may facilitate the 
internalization of students’ knowledge. 
Among 
For this preposition, teachers could bring a “toolkit” to the classroom and show some 
displays of different spatial organizations, particularly the ones that are sanctioned by 
between and among in order to make students differentiate. For instance, teachers can show 
students a blue marble that is in the middle of two or three red ones, and another blue 
marble that is surrounded by a big group of red ones. The question(s) teachers should ask to 
students is where the blue marble is or whether the blue marble is between or among the 
red ones in each spatial organization. After students provide a response, teachers can ask 
for the reasons why they think the blue marble is between or among the red ones. By doing 
so, teachers can make sure that students understand the motivation and therefore, the 
reasons, that underlie spatial constructions that involve the prepositions among and 
between. 
For the non-spatial usages of among, teachers can project on the board an image of a person 
that is deciding. The person in the picture can be surrounded by interrogation signs, so 
teachers can draw the class’s attention to that fact and say, “Look! the person has to make a 
decision among several options available”. After teachers show and work out the picture, 
                                                             
122 Teacher can also reinforce students the idea that between is often integrated with coordination structures of 
the and- and or- type. 
 
 
273 
 
they can make students work in pair and ask their partners whether they have ever had to 
decide among several options. 
When the activity is over, teachers can remark the motivation underlying this non-spatial 
usage by pointing to the invariant image-schematic structure that is mapped from the spatial 
realm onto the non-spatial. 
Amid 
Considering that amid is integrated with prepositional-landmark elements that are 
conceptualized as a unitary mass, and that in the Spanish language its semantics is also 
equivalent to “en medio de” (in the middle of), is that teachers could project on the board a 
person who is lost in the desert, for instance, and say to the class “Look! that poor guy is 
amid the desert”. After drawing the class’s attention to the amid the desert construction, 
teachers can ask students about what they would do if they were lost amid the desert like 
the person in the picture. Teachers can make students work in pairs or trios and ask them to 
share their comments with the class after discussing what they would do in that 
hypothetical scenario. 
A non-spatial sense of amid that could be fostered through practice in the classroom is the 
[IN-BETWEEN] lexical concept, considering that it is generally sanctioned by this 
preposition, as in amid the gloom and doom in (25) in chapter 4. To do so, teachers could 
start talking about feelings and emotions such as happiness and sadness and then ask the 
class (one by one if it is a small group) whether they have ever been amid happiness and 
sadness or other types of emotions, and under which situations. 
Entre 
In the case of the Spanish preposition entre, teachers can do all the activities that were 
proposed separately for its English equivalents, always pointing out the polysemous 
behavior of this preposition in that it acquires its semantics depending on the conceptual 
nature of the elements that elaborate its LM.  
To 
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In groups of three to five, students can be given a map with some highlighted places such as 
a museum, school, pharmacy, supermarket, and the like. After having jointly analyzed the 
map, teachers can make students ask their partners about their plans for the evening. The 
question what are you going to do this evening? might be suitable to start a dialogue in 
which they can decide where to go using the map. Students should be encouraged to 
formulate that question in order to use the preposition to (even within the future modal 
construction be going to), so they can appreciate the directionality and future orientation 
that this preposition conveys. Another question that students can ask to their partners in the 
group is where is located the place you are going to? A possible answer, depending on how 
the map is structured, might be the place I’m going to is next to the library. This way, 
students can also practice the simplex atemporal behavior of to and convey location. 
To practice some of the non-spatial usages of to, student can work in pairs and ask each 
other what friend is the closest one to them and the reasons why, so students can provide 
each other with a deeper answer and get more oral practice. Another question they can ask 
to each other is whether they have feelings attached to inanimate things such as a guitar or 
dance shoes, and the reasons why they have those feeling attached to a material thing. With 
these two sample questions, students could practice and internalize some figurative usages 
of to, particularly the [EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT] lexical concept. 
For the temporal domain, teachers could project an image on the board of a pretend 
upcoming event (i.e. flyer) such as a fair and tell students that it is just two weeks for that 
event to occur. In addition, teachers might say that the event will start at a quarter to 4. By 
doing so, we can reinforce the temporal behavior of to. Teachers can then make students 
ask their partners if they would like to go to the fair, and what they would do at that event. 
Afterwards, teachers can ask students the time at which the event will be held and how 
much time left there is for the event to happen. 
A 
To practice the semantics of the Spanish preposition a, teachers can do the activity of the 
map proposed for to above. Another activity might be to project on the board a picture of a 
person that is heading to a certain place and ask the class where the person is heading to. 
Possible answers to this question can be “Ella va a(l)(la) 
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supermercado/farmacia/museo/etc.” (She’s going to the 
supermarket/pharmacy/museum/etc.). 
For more advanced Spanish students, an activity to understand the personal use of a can be 
to project an image of, for example, an animal, and say to the class “Les presento a mi 
mascota” (“This is my pet”) and then talk about it for a bit. Students can then be asked to 
bring an image of a person or animal they would like to introduce to the class and talk 
about it. In this way, Spanish learners could appreciate that the personal use of a is a 
function that has no equivalency in the English language (compare for instance yesterday I 
saw John with the Spanish equivalent Ayer ví a Juan).    
An activity to practice one of the non-spatial usages of a is to work in pairs and make 
students ask each other about a person who has been always by their side (this activity is 
similar to the one proposed for to above). The Spanish instruction can be “Cuéntame 
acerca de una persona que siempre ha estado a tu lado” (tell me about a person who has 
always been by your side). Note that in this activity, students can get vividly involved – 
through subjective experience – in a linguistic event that involves the preposition a as main 
non-spatial relational unit.  Students should be encouraged to use full answers, so they can 
start with “La persona que siempre ha estado a mi lado es…” (the person who’s always 
been by my side is…), and then they can tell their partner the reasons why. 
Finally, an activity that focuses on the temporal aspect of a might be to talk about relevant 
activities that are done within a temporal range or period. Students can work in pairs an ask 
each other things like “¿Qué haces usualmente el fin de semana al medio día?” (What do 
you usually do on weekends at midday?), and the reasons why.  
Another activity could be to project an image on the board of a person who regularly 
studies from 5 to 7 p.m. Teachers can then say to the class “Ana estudia todos los días de 5 
a 7” (Ann studies every day from 5 to 7). Then teachers can make students work in pairs or 
trios and ask their partners about what they do during that time in weekdays and weekends. 
Teachers monitor the activity (and foster students’ participation) in the meantime. 
For 
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To practice the preposition for, teachers can project on the board images of a person that is 
going to different places such as a pharmacy. Then students can be asked about what they 
think the person is going to the pharmacy for. This activity intends to reinforce the notion 
of obliqueness in the semantics of for. A possible answer to this question might be “She’s 
going there for some medicine” (to eventually consume it and get well). 
A more figurative usage of for that can be practiced in pairs, is to make students ask their 
partner about what is one of the most important things in the world for her/him and the 
reasons why, so students can get involved in a longer conversation while the teacher 
monitors the interactions and participates in the exchange if needed. This activity is 
intended to practice the [IN RELATION TO] lexical concept that is generally sanctioned by 
for. 
To practice the temporal domain of for, students can get into groups of three to four and ask 
their partners for how long they have been doing an activity that they like. They can also 
make further questions about that activity to extend the conversation. 
Para 
For this preposition, teachers could project some images of people going to different places 
such as to the beach or to a city for holidays. Then, they can say to the class (while pointing 
to one of the images) “Ellos van para Madrid de vacaciones” (They go to Madrid for 
holidays) or “Ellos van para la playa a pasarlo bien” (They go to the beach to have fun). 
After that, teachers can make students work in groups of three and ask each other what they 
will do for their holidays (Spanish ¿Qué harás para estas vacaciones?) 
Another activity, which deals with the [FUNCTIONALITY] lexical concept of para, is to 
project images of some artefacts such as a screwdriver (Spanish atornillador) and ask the 
class “¿Para qué sirve ese objecto?” (What is that object for?). The answer that teachers 
should look for is “Ese objeto sirve para…” (That object is (used) for…). In addition, 
before teachers ask the class for the function of the object(s) shown, they can ask students 
for the name of the object(s). This helps students to develop vocabulary.  
Finally, to practice the temporal domain of para, teachers can get students work in pairs 
and make them talk about their upcoming birthday party. To do so, students can ask their 
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partner “¿Cuánto queda para tu cumpleaños?” (How much time is there left for your 
birthday?), followed by the question “¿Qué harás?” (What will you do?). Students must be 
encouraged to provide full answers such as “Quedan X días para mi cumpleaños” (It’s X 
days left for my birthday) and “Para mi cumpleaños me gustaría…” (For my birthday I’d 
like…). Teachers walk around the class monitoring and providing some help to the students 
when needed. 
The classroom activities proposed above represent an attempt to show how to practice 
spatial, non-spatial, and temporal usages of the prepositions analyzed. They are intended to 
be carried out after a detailed analysis of each preposition in the L2 classroom (and the 
placement test taken at the beginning of the first session). The activities above are probably 
suitable for (upper) intermediate English/Spanish learners, but of course they can be 
adjusted to the students’ proficiency of the target language. In sum, we can indeed 
appreciate the benefits of a cognitive linguistic perspective on language teaching since it 
provides us not only with a psychologically plausible linguistic theory, but also with a 
much more grounded notion of how language is acquired through embodied experience. 
The next and last section is intended to show a proposal about how to validate the 
psychological reality of some parameters that constitute the conceptual bases of between, 
among, amid, and their Spanish equivalent entre. 
7.4 Psycholinguistic validation proposal for the English prepositions between, among, 
amid, and their Spanish equivalent entre. 
I want to finish this chapter by suggesting how the conceptual bases of between, among, 
amid, and entre might be psychologically validated. The experiments proposed in this 
section are concerned with their spatial understanding.123 I outline below some of the 
possible behavioral experiments that could be carried out to test the psychological reality of 
some of the conceptual parameters put forward above. This proposal intends to provide a 
hint of how to experimentally study language and space, as well as to provide experts in 
areas such as experimental cognitive psychology with a falsifiable hypothesis in order to 
                                                             
123 If the spatio-conceptual structures proposed for these prepositions turn out to be correct, this would allow 
the design of further experiments aiming to investigate metaphorical extensions.   
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consider alternative explanations if the original hypothesis turns out to be incorrect. It is 
obviously scholars in those disciplines that are best equipped to test the hypotheses that 
emerge from the cognitive linguistic analysis presented in this research since this is 
something that lies beyond my ability as a cognitive linguist (see Gibbs 2007). 
Let us start with the three English prepositions first. Recall that between, among and amid, 
can be distinguished by their trajector/landmark alignment. This, in turn, is (partly) 
reflected in the parameters of Separation, Inclusion, and Central position of between, 
among, and amid, respectively. The parameter of Separation seems to be critical for English 
speakers at the moment of sanctioning spatial scenes that involve the preposition between. 
On the other hand, Inclusion is pivotal to understanding spatial usages of among, as she’s 
among the crowd compared to *She’s between the crowd. Finally, I suggest that Central 
position is key in the spatial semantics of amid as in amid the desert, compared to *among 
the desert or to *between the desert. In this case, amid the desert can be paraphrased as in 
the middle of the desert. Psychological validation, I suggest, should be focused on the 
parameters of Separation for between, Inclusion for among, and Central position for amid. 
This is the issue we now turn to. 
7.4.1 Separation  
To test the psychological reality of the parameter of Separation in between, an acceptability 
rating method could be used. In this method, real objects or pictures are shown to 
participants. These objects or pictures must display a particular spatial configuration that is 
accompanied by a sentence about that display. Then the participants have to rate the 
acceptability of the sentence in relation to the picture using a Likert-type scale (e.g., from 1 
(bad) to 10 (good)). An example of a stimulus for an acceptability rating experiment could 
be the figure depicted in 7.3 below: 
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Rate: X is between Y and Z 
           Y   
     
           X   
     
           Z   
 
Figure 7.3. 5x5 rectangular grid illustrating the location of X with respect to its reference objects 
One of the advantages of using the acceptability rating method is that it offers a fine-
grained measure that provides more information than a simple “yes or no” decision task 
like in Verification tasks (See Carlson and Hill 2007 on experimental methods for studying 
language and space.) However, several weaknesses of this method can be spotted, among 
them the artificial measure applied in that it does not transparently map onto language use, 
as well as the lack of other entities that could be shown in the display apart from the target 
and the reference object(s). After all, we rarely find objects in the real world that are 
isolated from other objects. 
Another method for testing the psychological reality of Separation in between could be 
Placements tasks. In these types of tasks participants are given real objects or pictures of 
objects and then they are asked to place the object in a specific relation with (an)other 
object(s). For instance, an instruction that participants could follow is “Put the green 
marble between the blue and the red ones”. Participants might arrange the objects given so 
that the utterance is true. The resulting arrangement might be of great interest to conclude 
for the pivotal and differentiating role of Separation in the conceptual basis of between – a 
conceptual feature that may distinguish it from the semantically related relational profiles 
evoked by among and amid. 
The placement task has a considerable number of benefits, among them its more naturalistic 
approach and use of language to accomplish the task (compared to Acceptability Ratings, 
which involve matching). Placement tasks also offer valuable information about how 
participants map language onto space. However, some drawbacks have also been spotted 
when using this method. For instance, while the placement of an object can be achieved 
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through language instruction, the reverse is not necessarily true – that is, in the case that the 
participants are given a placement of the objects, other spatial terms may be used to 
describe that relation. 
7.4.2 Inclusion  
To test the inclusion parameter of among, one of the previous methods could be applied and 
is Placement tasks. Participants might be asked to follow an instruction such as “Put the 
green marble among the red ones”. This instruction, however, would yield a spatial 
organization that deals with more than the inclusive feature of among, since it may also 
involve proximity and central position. To focus more on Inclusion, a further experiment 
may have to be carried out. This could be done by a feature-listing task, in which 
participants are asked to write down, or choose from a list, properties that best capture the 
meaning of a given expression. In a sentence such as the handkerchief is among the socks, 
participants can be asked which properties are implied in it. A list of properties – mainly all 
the parameters that constitute the conceptual bases of between, among, and amid, can be 
listed for participants to select. The list of properties ultimately intends to find whether the 
parameter of Inclusion is picked up, while keeping in mind that more than one parameter 
can be selected for the sample utterance just given above. Some of them can be Proximity, 
Occlusion, and Surround. 
In the final analysis, the rationale behind the feature-listing tasks is that if people can 
apprehend the meaning of a given sentence, then they can also explain what that expression 
means and what features are associated with that meaning. These types of experiments are 
easy to conduct, and they generally yield intriguing data to work with. However, one of the 
main weaknesses that can be spotted, points to the fact that these studies are based on the 
conscious impression that people have upon the meaning of an expression, which might not 
accurately reflect mental representation. 
7.4.3 Central position 
We now turn to Central position, a parameter that, I suggest, is key to differentiating amid 
from between and among. A method that might be suitable for validating its psychological 
reality, considering the large semantic overlap that amid has with respect to among, is the 
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listing-feature task considered for Inclusion above. By using this method, participants could 
be given a sentence such as She’s amid the desert. The sentence in turn, could be 
accompanied by a picture of a man or woman who is alone in the middle of a desert. 
Participants are then asked for the properties that are most directly involved in the sentence 
and image shown. These properties can be either open-ended, or more controlled if 
participants select the parameters from a list (I am personally inclined to the latter option).  
Even though the parameter of Central position is also shared by between and among, its 
conceptual nature seems to be different in each conceptual basis. In the case of amid, 
Central position is akin to [IN THE MIDDLE OF] lexical concept in that it is less flexible 
regarding the peripheral location of an attentional figure within the region established by its 
ground. If participants are shown a picture of a man/woman who is lost in the desert 
accompanied by a sentence such as She’s amid the desert, the participants are likely to 
choose Central position as something synonymous to the locative concept evoked by in the 
middle of. Central position in this sense encodes a high degree of centrality in terms of the 
location of the attentional figure, to the extent that in some figurative conceptions as in 
amid the gloom and doom shown in (25) in chapter 4, it allows us to sanction the [IN-
BETWEEN] lexical concept. 
7.4.4 Spanish entre 
We now turn to the Spanish preposition entre. As shown in the analysis, entre exhibits the 
semantic capacity of covering almost all the conceptual content of its English equivalents. 
This characteristic makes entre a highly polysemous preposition. This polysemous behavior 
in turn, might be psycholinguistically validated by focusing on different parameters that get 
activated under certain contexts. The parameters that should be studied (at the very least) 
are Separation, Inclusion and Central position. These parameters play a prominent role in 
expressions such as El columpio está entre los dos árboles (the swing is between the two 
trees), Ella está entre la multitud (She’s among the crowd), and Esa escena fue entre pena y 
gloria (that scene was amid sadness and glory), respectively. 
All the methods mentioned so far (Acceptability Ratings, Placement tasks, and listing-
feature tasks) could in principle be applied to test the psychological reality of the 
conceptual basis of entre. By testing the three parameters of entre mentioned above, we 
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could support, with empirical evidence, at least two things: (i) the highly polysemous 
behavior of entre, and (ii) the idea that entre can cover the sematic region that between, 
among and amid do separately. 
The methods suggested for analyzing the interface between language and space, and the 
mental representation of language in the case of listing-feature tasks, were briefly described 
to illustrate how possible psychological validations might be carried out. Each method is a 
valuable tool for addressing the language, cognition, and space interface. Due to the 
weaknesses and strengths that all methods present, it seems that significant benefits may be 
obtained by combining these methods (and others) in a programmatic line of research. This 
of course, is something that I leave for experts in experimental research. 
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7.5 Summary 
This chapter has focused on putting to the front the main ideas that the cognitive linguistic 
analysis presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6 implies for language and cognition. We saw that 
proto-scenes are essential for encyclopedic knowledge and word meaning since they allow 
us to compress the complexity of phenomenology into lexical items. From this it follows 
that spatio-conceptual structure not only deals with pure spatial parameters but also with 
functionality. We also saw that words are contextual expressions in that their situated 
semantics arise from context, that is, lexical integration. This process allows us to 
determine the active zones of a word’s conceptual basis. On the other hand, words in 
isolation are conceived as mental lexical representations that are stored in long-term 
semantic memory. The distinction between lexical representation and meaning 
determination is essential to apprehend this insight. By the same token, the distinction 
between open and closed-class items must be apprehended as a continuum where the 
degree of richness varies: while both classes offer access to conceptual structure, closed-
class elements constitute the semantic scaffolding for richer conceptual content (i.e. they 
offer a narrower access to conceptual structure). Both types play a role in embodied 
simulation processes. The way in which the schematic content evoked by prepositions has 
been approached can be applied to the classroom for teaching not only English and Spanish 
as a foreign or second language, but also for undergraduate and postgraduate students 
undertaking linguistics and language teaching courses. Such a cognitive-functional view 
implies a new way to present the English/Spanish/linguistics lecture/lesson. Some 
constructs and ideas from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, as well as 
classroom activities were also suggested. Finally, suggestions for validating the 
psychological reality of the conceptual bases for between, among, amid, and entre, were 
also provided, with an emphasis on the parameters of Separation, Inclusion, and Central 
position. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
This last chapter is focused on key ideas that have been promoted throughout this 
dissertation. Among these we can find (i) the importance of a thorough understanding of 
spatio-conceptual structure to account for non-spatial and temporal prepositional usages; 
(ii) the assumption that time exhibits its own structure, which is qualitatively different from 
spatial structure, (iii) the pedagogical implications and applications that the present account 
offers, and (iv) the psychological experimentation that might be carried out using this 
approach. The research also provides a systematic set of criteria (the “conceptual 
parameters”) to tease apart the subtle semantic differences distinguishing neighboring 
English prepositions like between, amid, among or to and for, and those distinguishing 
these English prepositions from semantically similar prepositions such as entre, a, and 
para. 
We will go through the four points above one by one.  
8.1 Spatio-conceptual structure as schematic non-linguistic knowledge 
One of the main ideas that drives this research is that closed-class items such as 
prepositions offer a narrow access to conceptual structure. This, in turn, is the reason why 
the closed-class set is apprehended as being schematic. However, and as previously 
mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, some cognitive linguistic scholars (e.g., Evans 2009, 2013) 
claim that closed-class items do not offer access sites to conceptual structure. Rather, they 
are assumed to encode purely linguistic content. But how is it so? As seen in the analysis in 
chapters 4, 5, and 6, prepositions do exhibit a conceptual basis that contributes to embodied 
simulations with specific features such as relations (in the sense of Barsalou 1999). This 
conceptual basis is not static but highly flexible even though it is constituted by conceptual 
parameters, which are schematic bundles of information that are phenomenologically 
based. Conceptual parameters capture the schematic conceptual content that is precisely 
facilitated by closed-class items. Under this view, conceptual parameters are akin to image 
schemas in that both are schematic representations of spatial organizations. The difference 
between them is that conceptual parameters are also related to functionality and non-spatial 
aspects such as Primary goal in to and Oblique goal in for. 
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The notion of conceptual parameters (see Morras [in press] for an overview) allows us to 
appreciate the schematic conceptual import that closed-class items have within a cognitive 
representation. It also offers a point of comparison with respect to cognitive models and 
frames, which are rich bodies of non-linguistic knowledge that are interconnected in a sort 
of semantic network. According to Evans, cognitive models (and frames) are the only type 
of conceptual structure that is accessed by the linguistic system. Moreover, this structure is 
facilitated exclusively by open-class elements, mainly nouns, verbs, and adjectives. But 
why posit a sort of unique type of conceptual structure?  
The present research takes a nuanced perspective on this issue by assuming that there is 
more than one type of conceptual structure. Among them spatio-conceptual (which possibly 
involves perceptual, event-like, and introspective structures), and temporal structures. 
Recall that according to Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005), all concepts are based on 
perception, situated action, and introspection. However, they vary in their focus: abstract 
concepts tend to be mainly organized by introspective and event-like structures, whereas 
concrete concepts are mainly constituted by perceptual and event-like structures. Then why 
is that a concept such as {FOR} may be exclusively encoded as linguistic content whereas a 
concept such as {TABLE} may be not? Why not assume a continuum between conceptual 
schematicity and conceptual richness? To assume such a continuum, however, we do not 
have to lose the notion of linguistic structure, which can be understood as the linguistic 
knowledge that is encoded in and externalized only via language. This point is important, 
because as it has been shown in the cognitive sciences (e.g., Alwood 2003; Clark 2003; 
Munnich and Landau 2003; Rice 1992; Slobin 2003), there is a tight link between the 
linguistic and the conceptual systems. This tight relationship makes the distinction between 
these two systems fuzzy. 
To shed some light on the difference between the linguistic and conceptual systems, we can 
use the notion of linguistic parameter (Morras, in press). This can be understood as a 
highly schematic unit of linguistic knowledge that is conveyed in linguistic structure. 
Linguistic parameters emerge as a result of recurrent linguistic patterns and structures of 
usage events. Following Langacker (1987, 2008), words profile either a thing or a relation. 
Things are profiled by simple nouns and nominals, while relations are profiled by all the 
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rest of the grammatical categories. It follows that [THING] and [RELATION] are two 
“linguistic” parameters that are encoded at the most schematic level of linguistic 
organization. This sort of parametric knowledge might be unique to the linguistic system in 
the sense they are acquired through usage. 
In the final analysis, we have a general picture of words as offering access to conceptual 
structure of different types. Lexical concepts, that is, units of mental grammar that 
constitute the semantic pole of a symbolic unit and sanction instances of language use, 
exhibit bipartite organization. On the one hand they encode purely linguistic content that 
can be apprehended as linguistic parameters. And on the other hand, they facilitate access 
to conceptual structure, which crucially (and opposite to Evans’s claims), varies in 
richness. The rich conceptual material is captured by cognitive models and frames. These 
non-linguistic bodies of knowledge constitute the conceptual basis of an open-class item. 
On the other hand, the schematic conceptual material can be understood in terms of 
conceptual parameters. These phenomenology-based semantic units, I suggest, structure the 
conceptual basis of a closed-class item. 
Spatio-conceptual structure turns out to be a type of conceptual knowledge that is motivated 
by the spatial domain. This type of knowledge is further constituted by at least three 
situational contents: perceptual, event-like, and introspective. A further aspect to consider is 
the graded scale in terms of the schematicity and richness that is reflected in concepts, 
particularly on the “amount” or “focus” of each situational content with respect to each 
concept. For instance, the abstract concept of {CONFUSION} is likely to be more structured 
by introspective and event-like structures, than by perceptual structure. On the other hand, a 
concrete concept such as {TREE}, is likely to be more structured by perceptual and event-
like structures, than by introspection. In sum, spatio-conceptual structure should be 
understood as consisting of more than one type of knowledge, and it underlies the 
semantics of open and closed-class items. In the present research, however, spatio-
conceptual structure has been used to (i) understand the schematic import of conceptual 
structure, and (ii) to posit semantic units – that is, conceptual parameters – as notions that 
help us apprehend the form that this schematic conceptual knowledge takes for 
linguistically mediated communication. 
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Indeed, the conceptual bases proposed in this investigation seem to be useful to account for 
a motivation on figurative language that is psychologically plausible. Conceptual 
parameters emerge from phenomenological experience and structure the conceptual basis of 
closed-class items. It follows from this that they allow us to identify the part or portion of a 
word’s conceptual basis that is recruited for metaphorical reasoning (in the sense of Lakoff 
1990). As shown in the preceding analysis, spatio-conceptual structure is recruited for non-
spatial and temporal conceptions. Interactions in space and the shape of our bodies turn out 
to be essential for such a figurative understanding. Spatio-conceptual structure fully fleshes 
abstract and temporal concepts since they exhibit correspondences between their sub-
structures. These correspondences might be established by virtue of metaphor. For instance, 
in a sentence such as This secret is between you and me, the topological schematic structure 
of between (see figure 4.2 in chapter 4) that, at the very least, should be recruited for 
metaphorical reasoning concerns the parameters of Separation and Central position. These 
two parameters facilitate the understanding of an abstract thing, here a secret, which is 
“located” in the middle of two (or more) people. The secret acquires a central position 
while the people are identifiable things that probably surround the abstract thing. Hence, 
separation is a prominent feature. Now the conceptual metaphor that may be at work in the 
example just given is SECRET INFORMATION IS A THING LOCATED BETWEEN TWO OR MORE 
ENTITIES. In this metaphor, we can appreciate how the parameter of Central position 
establishes correspondences with the secret information that is located between two or more 
LMs. On the other hand, the Separation parameter establishes correspondences with the 
entities that help to locate the TR in the middle.  
We can then identify the topological structure that is preserved for metaphorical reasoning 
by using the conceptual bases proposed in this research. They can show us which aspects of 
a word’s conceptual basis establish correspondences with substructures of conceptual 
metaphors. Under this view, spatio-conceptual structure and metaphor are seen as two types 
of knowledge that are needed, at the very least, for non-spatial conceptions. However, there 
might be more types of knowledge involved in non-spatial conceptions, among them non-
metaphorical representations for abstract concepts. 
8.1.1 Non-metaphorical representations for non-spatial conceptualizations 
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Following Barsalou et al. (1993) as well as Murphy (1996), I assume that non-metaphorical 
(i.e. direct) representations are essential for non-spatial understanding, and hence, represent 
another type of knowledge that is involved in this type of constructions. If we consider 
again the example given in the previous section, This secret is between you and me, we can 
observe that we do make use of an abstract, non-metaphorical concept of {SECRET}, which 
in turn, may primarily be structured by introspective (and event-like) content. Without the 
non-metaphorical representation of what a secret is, here the target domain of the 
metaphorical understanding, the projection from the source domain, here the location of an 
F between two or more things, would be impossible: there cannot be a metaphorical 
projection onto a contentless target.  
A further point relates to the semantic tendencies that words exhibit. In This secret is 
between you and me, we can appreciate that between exhibits semantic tendencies toward 
prepositional-landmark elements that are conceptualized as identifiable things. This is what 
allows lexical integration in the first place. Semantic tendencies, then, can be understood as 
representing another type of knowledge that is involved in figuration. 
From the ideas above it follows that the role of conceptual metaphor is crucial since it 
facilitates a coherent semantic assembly between spatio-conceptual structure and “abstract” 
structure (i.e. direct non-metaphorical representations). We can find a similar situation with 
respect to the temporal domain: there is also more knowledge involved than just metaphor 
in temporal conceptualizations. This is an issue we now turn. 
8.2 Temporal structure as schematic scaffolding for temporal usages 
The notion of conceptual basis introduced in this research can also be used to pin down the 
motivation that underlies temporal conceptions. For instance, in a temporal linguistic 
construction such as It took me between five and six hours, we can appreciate the semantic 
import of the preposition between by observing its conceptual basis proposed in figure 4.2 
in chapter 4. There is activation of the Central position and Separation parameters. These 
parameters are further extended, via metaphors such as TIME IS SPACE and DURATION IS 
LENGTH, to conceive such a temporal scene. In sum, we can see the amount of spatio-
conceptual structure that is preserved for temporal conceptualizations. 
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Despite the great utility that this notion might offer, we still need to account for purely 
temporal concepts. Like abstract concepts, temporal concepts have a direct non-
metaphorical basis which is purely temporal at their most schematic level. We do need to 
apprehend basic temporal relations such as earlier/later and future/past, as well as to 
develop rudimentary systems to understand temporal cyclicity. That core rudimentary 
system is understood as cyclical time and constitutes one of the foundations of the extrinsic 
temporal frame of reference (or t-FoR for short). These temporal concepts, among others 
that were shown in the analysis as well as in chapter 2, can be apprehended as temporal 
scaffoldings for temporal linguistic constructions. These temporal scaffoldings, in turn, are 
manifestations of our temporal cognition.  
Crucial for those scaffoldings is temporal reference. As seen throughout the analysis, there 
is indeed a schematic temporal structure that underlies temporal prepositional usages. The 
form that this temporal structure takes, mainly depends on the temporal frame of reference 
that is employed. Recall that there are three t-FoRs: deictic (ego-based), sequential (event-
based), and extrinsic (periodicity-based). These temporal references represent schematic 
temporal scaffoldings that are purely temporal. Let us briefly show the import of these 
temporal strategies in linguistic constructions. 
The deictic t-FoR is characterized as being ego-based and emerge from the 
phenomenologically real temporal relation of future/past. Expressions that use this type of 
temporal reference can be Christmas is approaching. Note that in this utterance, the 
perspective point (PP) comes from the target event (TE), here Christmas. The reference 
point (RP) takes its reference from the egocentric experience of now and helps to locate the 
TE. Now the origo (O) corresponds to the experience of now from the perspective of the 
TE. (Note also that the conceptual metaphor that is at work here is the MOVING TIME 
metaphor.) This type of perspective point (Evans 2013:85-87) is also understood as target-
event perspective point. In sum, the schematic temporal structure that may work as 
temporal scaffolding could be glossed as [TE FIXED TO EGOCENTRIC EXPERIENCE OF NOW, 
FROM PERSPECTIVE OF THE EVENT]. 
On the other hand, we can also say We are approaching Christmas. In this way, we make 
use of a reference-point perspective point. Note that in this type of perspective point, the 
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RP (rather than the TE) receives focal prominence so it appears in subject position. The 
conceptual metaphor that is at work, which should be considered as one type of knowledge 
that is involved in this type of temporal conceptualization, is the MOVING EGO metaphor. 
There is a TE, here Christmas, which is located with respect to its RP, encoded by We. The 
O corresponds to the egocentric experience of now and determines the location of the 
speaker. In the final analysis, the purely temporal schematic structure that functions as 
temporal scaffolding in the utterance We are approaching Christmas, can be glossed as [TE 
FIXED TO EGOCENTRIC EXPERIENCE OF NOW, FROM PERSPECTIVE OF THE EGO]. 
The second type of temporal reference that provides temporal scaffoldings is termed 
sequential and emerges from the temporal relation of earlier/later. We can locate events as 
following or preceding another event. This is achieved through our understanding of the 
temporal relation earlier/later which comes from the phenomenologically real experience of 
succession – a type of transience. 
As with the deictic t-FoR, the sequential t-FoR can be broadly divided into two because this 
t-FoR also offers two perspective points (PP). The first is known as prospective perspective 
point (Evans 2013: 118-121) and evokes a relation such that the TE is sequenced earlier 
than the RP. Importantly for this type of perspective point, is that the earlier relation is 
viewed from the perspective point of the earlier event. Instances of this temporal reference 
can be Breakfast comes before dinner, where the TE, here breakfast is located as preceding 
the second event that functions as an RP, here dinner. The schematic temporal structure that 
may function as temporal scaffolding for this type of temporal linguistic construction may 
be glossed as [EVENT X IS SEQUENCED EARLIER THAN EVENT Y USING THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
EVENT X]. 
On the other hand, we can evoke a lexical concept of [LATER IN SEQUENCE], rather than 
[EARLIER IN SEQUENCE], as in Dinner comes after breakfast. In this way, we make use of a 
retrospective perspective point (Evans 2013: 121-122) that encodes a temporal relation 
such that the TE (breakfast) is sequenced later than the RP (dinner), and that relation is 
viewed from the perspective of the later event. In sum, the purely temporal structure that 
should function as temporal scaffolding in the example just given could be glossed as 
[EVENT Y IS SEQUENCED LATER THAN EVENT X USING THE PERSPECTIVE OF EVENT Y]. This 
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temporal scaffolding is a manifestation of one of the (several) aspects of our temporal 
cognition. 
The conceptual metaphor TIME IS OBJECTS IN A SEQUENCE (Moore 2006, 2014) is also 
involved in this type of temporal reference as another type of knowledge that is required. 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 below summarize the two perspectival points of the sequential t-FoR. 
                                                 PP                                      
 
 
 
                         Time 
                                                 TE                                       RP              
Fig. 8.1. Prospective perspective point (Adapted from Evans 2013: 117). “Breakfast comes before dinner” 
                                                  
                                                                                             PP                                        
 
 
 
                             Time  
                                                 TE                                       RP 
Fig. 8.2. Retrospective perspective point (Adapted from Evans 2013: 118). “Dinner comes after breakfast” 
The last t-FoR is termed extrinsic and is the temporal reference that is generally used by the 
prepositions analyzed in this research, as shown in chapters 4, 5, and 6. This type of t-FoR 
does not make use of a perspective point since it provides a means for fixing events in time 
in an absolute manner – that is, without reference to an observer. As seen throughout this 
investigation, the extrinsic t-FoR can be broadly divided into event-reckoning and time-
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reckoning systems. These systems are related to the use of calendars and clocks, 
respectively. And they are also further divided into repeatable, open-ended (e.g., a long 
count), and closed systems (e.g., countdowns). 
From the idea above we can apprehend the extrinsic temporal reference as encoding at least 
two temporal structures. The first one is related to the use of calendars, and it can be 
understood as [TE FIXED TO AN RP IN AN EVENT-RECKONING SYSTEM]. The second 
schematic temporal structure has to do with clocks, and it can be conceived as [TE FIXED TO 
AN RP IN A TIME-RECKONING SYSTEM]. 
The three t-FoRs (see Evans 2013 for full details) present compelling evidence of the 
existence of a unique type of conceptual structure that is purely temporal. Despite time 
being embodied in the temporal relations of future/past, earlier/later, as well as in the 
metonymic use of clocks and calendar, the temporal domain exhibits its own conceptual 
structure that is qualitatively different from spatio-conceptual structure. Crucially for this 
distinction to be recognized, is the assumption of transience as the hallmark of time. 
Indeed, transience is the purely temporal experience that lies at the neurobiological and 
subjective levels. This temporal element is absent in the spatial domain. 
The assumption of transience as the hallmark of the temporal domain leads us to think 
about time ‘as such’ (using the term of Sinha et al. 2016). Time is not an “abstract” domain, 
but a purely temporal one. Even though its different ways to be conceptualized are mainly 
facilitated via conceptual metaphor, this should not lead us to think of time as being an 
abstract domain that must be understood only through metaphor. It follows that whenever 
we deal with temporal reference, there is conceptual structure that is purely temporal. This 
temporal structure is reflected in the “temporal scaffoldings” that were briefly shown in this 
section. 
We can now see differences between non-spatial and temporal instances. Consider the 
examples below: 
(1) a. The event was held between September and November 
b. There is a secret between John and Lucy 
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The most important aspect to consider in order to differentiate non-spatial from temporal 
scenes is temporal reference. Note that temporal reference is reflected in (1a) in the 
temporal lexical concepts of [SEPTEMBER], [NOVEMBER], and [EVENT], as well as in the 
relational profile evoked in was held. These elements establish correspondence links with 
the temporal schematic structure [TE FIXED TO AN RP IN A (REPEATABLE) EVENT-
RECKONING SYSTEM]. The resulting assembly yields a TE, here the event in (1a) that is 
fixed to an RP, encoded by the prepositional phrase between September and November. In 
addition, we also need an origo (O) to anchor the relationship between TE and RP to the 
transience type of duration and start the count in a repeatable event-reckoning system. The 
O in this case is fixed as January, the 1st since it is when our cyclical temporal concept of 
{YEAR} begins. 
Now the conceptual import that we can extract using the conceptual basis of between in 
figure 4.2 (chapter 4), concerns the parameters of Separation and Central position. These 
parameters share substructures with the schematic temporal profile of the extrinsic t-FoR. 
Separation is manifested in the conceptual nature of the RP, whereas Central position is a 
feature that characterizes the TE. 
On the other hand, there is no temporal reference in (1b). However, the same parameters of 
between, here Separation and Central position, are metaphorically interpreted to conceive a 
secret that is located between two people. As mentioned throughout this research, metaphor 
is one type of knowledge that must be involved in non-spatial and temporal 
conceptualizations, among others such as non-metaphorical representations, temporal 
reference, spatio-conceptual structure, and semantic tendencies. It follows from this that the 
fact that the same parameters of between in (1) are extended for non-spatial and temporal 
understandings, does not amount to evidence that time is an abstract domain. This in turn, 
is due to temporal reference. 
As seen above, time is a complex and essential domain for the human mind. Whenever 
there is temporal reference, we deal with purely temporal structure. The conceptual bases 
proposed in this investigation seem to be useful to account for the schematic topological 
structure that is preserved for temporal reasoning. However, temporal conceptualizations 
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are far more complex since there are different types of knowledge involved in these types 
of linguistic constructions. 
8.3 Insights, implications and applications of the conceptual bases 
The view of language and human cognition adopted in this research, leads us to a linguistic 
theory that is psychologically plausible. Indeed, the conceptual parameters seen are 
phenomenology-based abstractions of humanly relevant scenes that eventually constitute 
the conceptual basis of closed-class items such as prepositions. These parameters, I suggest, 
have a psychological reality that can be tested via experimental methods such as the ones 
suggested in chapter 7 (section 7.4). 
The conceptual bases proposed allow us to appreciate the lexical representation level of 
words: the meaning spectrum that must be stored in long-term semantic memory as mental 
units. They also shed light on the meaning determination of words – that is, their contextual 
realization that makes some attributes (i.e., conceptual parameters and cognitive models) to 
get highlighted while others remain in the background. Conceptual parameters, on the other 
hand, provide a systematic set of criteria to tease apart the subtle semantic differences that 
there might be between prepositional sets. 
We saw in chapter 7 the further implications that this view carries for language teaching, 
among them the meaningful character of syntax, the functionality existing behind spatial 
organizations, the notion of embodiment, and the rejection of a dictionary-like view of 
word meaning. Such implications might bring benefits to both teachers and students in 
terms of a linguistic theory that is based on the general and cognitive commitments (Lakoff 
1990) since it sees language as being motivated and connected to general cognitive abilities 
such as figure and ground. Teachers and students may well be more “prepared to learn” 
once they grasp these fundamental tenets from cognitive linguistics and cognitive 
psychology. 
The conceptual bases shown in this research can be used as a pedagogical tool to teach 
spatial, non-spatial, and temporal usages of prepositions. As seen in the previous chapter, 
the conceptual bases are organized in such a way that they facilitate students and teachers’ 
understanding of the semantics of words at the lexical representation level (i.e. in isolation). 
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They also allow students to work out the different senses that a preposition, in this case, 
may sanction under different contexts. Students can work on production and 
comprehension once they internalize the parameters that constitute a given conceptual 
basis. In this regard, a conceptual basis is a cognition-friendly notion since it allows a deep 
understanding of the target structure and also makes students reflect upon their own mother 
tongue by spotting differences with respect to the target language. 
The conceptual bases not only offer teachers and students a view of the motivation that 
underlies spatial language, but also non-spatial and temporal language. The conceptual 
bases can be used to appreciate the part or portion of spatio-conceptual structure that is 
recruited for non-spatial and temporal conceptions. 
The conceptual bases can be further tested for psychological reality. As shown in the 
previous chapter. Space-rooted conceptual parameters could be tested by experimenting on 
their spatial semantics to see whether speakers actually use these semantic features to 
understand space. If the semantic parameters of a word such as between (as shown in 
section 7.4 in chapter 7) turned out to be correct, this would allow us first to corroborate the 
psychological reality of the conceptual parameters proposed, and second, to design further 
experiments to study the metaphorical extensions of the space-rooted parameters with 
respect to non-spatial and temporal conceptualizations. 
8.4 Suggestions for further research 
Further research is desirable in terms of a more complete semantic study of more English 
and Spanish prepositions in order to cover both prepositional sets. This analysis is intended 
as a contribution to a cognitive linguistic syllabus of English and Spanish as a 
second/foreign language. 
Another aspect for further research concerns the pedagogical applications that this view 
offers. This issue will be definitely explored in depth in future investigations. All the 
recommendations given in section 7.3 in chapter 7 will be applied at that later stage. 
Finally, the last issue that the present research sheds light on, but which unfortunately I 
could not develop further, has to do with the phycological validations of the conceptual 
bases proposed. As seen in the previous chapter in section 7.4, an illustrative set of possible 
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experiments was introduced, suggesting to apply some experimental methods to validate 
the psychological reality of some of the conceptual parameters of the prepositions between, 
among, amid, and entre. At a later stage, I plan to carry out that set of experiments with the 
help of an expert in experimental methods, as well as to work out how to validate the rest of 
the conceptual bases proposed.  
In the final analysis, the conceptual bases presented in this research intend to shed light on 
the spatio-conceptual structuring of prepositions and their role in non-spatial and temporal 
scenes. The conceptual bases analyzed are based on a linguistic theory that is 
psychologically plausible. This might bring benefits for teachers, students, and scholars in 
related areas that look for motivation, rather than mere arbitrariness, behind linguistic 
structure. 
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8.5 Summary  
This last chapter has briefly presented the main concluding remarks that can be extracted 
from this research. We argued for the importance of a thorough understanding of spatio-
conceptual structure. Such an in-depth apprehension would allow us to approach a more 
solid theory of spatial semantics where functionality and non-spatial conceptual parameters 
are as important as spatio-geometric information. This in turn, sheds light on the spatial 
structure that is recruited for non-spatial and temporal conceptions. The second issue 
concerned the role of temporal structure as temporal scaffolding for temporal linguistic 
constructions. Even though the conceptual bases proposed allow us to see the part or 
portion of spatio-conceptual structure that is mapped, we still need to account for purely 
temporal structure since temporal (and non-spatial) conceptualizations involve more 
knowledge than just metaphor. Finally, the chapter finishes with some comments on the 
benefits in terms of pedagogical applications and study material that the present account 
offers. It also carries implications for the classroom that need the cooperation of both 
teachers and students upon a new perspective on how language may work. The chapter 
concludes with recommendations for further research. These recommendations are indeed 
future steps of the present dissertation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
298 
 
Appendix A 
 
Instructions: Fill in the blanks with between, among, or amid. 
 
1. She’s ________________ the desert. She might need some help. 
 
2. You are sitting _______________ Mr and Mrs Johnson 
 
 
3. There is a gap __________________ the blue and red car where we can park. 
 
4. The keys were hidden __________________ the weeds for two weeks. 
 
 
5. __________________ other things, she knows how to play the harp. 
 
6. ________________ you and me, I think that Joey likes Chloe. 
 
 
7. ________________ sadness and furiousness. She had to make a decision. 
 
8. There is a link __________________ good nutrition and people’s wellbeing. 
 
 
9. The bill will be paid ________________ us. 
 
10. That University is __________________ the top 100 in Medicine. 
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Appendix B 
 
Instructions: Fill in the gaps with to or for. 
 
1. They went _______ the pub _______ some good fun yesterday. 
 
2. This present is ______ you. Hope you like it. 
 
 
3. She’s been practicing karate ______ more than 6 years. 
 
4. The reunion was held at a quarter ______ 2 p.m. 
 
 
5. _____ me, happiness is about good moments. 
 
6. I’ll start ______ design new types of chairs from now on. 
 
7. In the picture, my sister is next _____ mi dad. 
 
8. I might go _____ the party tonight and relax. I’ve been too busy lately. 
 
 
9. He prefers wine ____ beer. 
 
10. The garage was built _______ the car’s safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
300 
 
Appendix C 
 
Instrucciones: Complete con entre, a, o para. 
 
1. ___________ tu y yo, parece que ___________ Francisco tú le gustas. 
 
 
2. ___________ la izquierda de la fotografía estoy yo ______ los diez años.  
 
 
3. Vi _______ Jaime ayer, se veía muy saludable ________ su avanzada edad. 
 
 
4. Este alicate es ______ cortar el cable. 
 
 
5. Corrió por __________ los matorrales hasta encontrar _______ su mascota. 
 
 
6. Busco ________ una persona que sepa de administración. 
 
 
7. Este dinero es ________ ti ________ que te vaya de vacaciones. 
 
 
8. El móvil quedó oculto ________ las sabanas toda la mañana y yo sin poder hallarlo. 
 
 
9. ¿ _________ qué sirve esto? 
 
 
10. _______ llantos y alegría, Violeta vio _______su hijo marcharse a los E.E.U.U. 
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